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Abstract
“The Adjudicatory State” traces the collision between the federal legal vision for
the early American West and the preexisting laws and customs that governed the region.
To administer the vast region it obtained in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, the United States
created the territorial system, under which federal officials would temporarily govern
western “territories” until they achieved statehood. The federal government would also
survey and sell the public domain to private purchasers. But these grand plans ran afoul
of territorial realities. Both the Northwest Territory, encompassing much of the present-day
Midwest, and the Southwest Territory, encompassing present-day Tennessee, were
borderlands, places where Native peoples, French settlers, Anglo-American intruders,
and land companies contended for sovereignty and property. Instead of crafting a new
legal order, federal officials found themselves barraged with preexisting claims.
The polyphony of claims played out especially clearly in the contests over land
and so-called “Indian affairs.” In the territories, title derived from a complicated blend of
Native, French, British, and state law. It fell to federal officials to understand and
translate these plural rights of ownership into the single federal title that would undergird
the federal land system. In Indian affairs, federal officials embraced a vision of federal
sovereignty in which federal law would serve as the impartial arbiter in conflicts between
Native nations and U.S. citizens. Yet early American law encompassed too much
ambiguity and localism for centralized authority to succeed. Instead of relying on law,
federal officials ultimately attempted to secure both peace and allegiance through liberal
payments of federal funds to both Natives and U.S. citizens.
The federal government’s role in the territories as an adjudicatory state adhered
neither to an account that emphasizes federal power’s inexorable westward march nor to
a straightforward narrative of federal failure against local customary practice. Through
resolving claims, federal government slowly accreted authority, but in ways that defied
classification as strong or weak. The process traced here also blurred the sharp

dichotomy between informal and formal law, and suggests how the rise of federalism
helped channel the plural claims of the borderlands into a framework of dual sovereignty.
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ABSTRACT
THE ADJUDICATORY STATE:
SOVEREIGNTY, PROPERTY, AND LAW IN THE U.S. TERRITORIES, 1783-1802
Gregory Ablavsky
Daniel K. Richter
“The Adjudicatory State” traces the collision between the federal legal vision for
the early American West and the preexisting laws and customs that governed the region.
To administer the vast region it obtained in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, the United States
created the territorial system, under which federal officials would temporarily govern
western “territories” until they achieved statehood. The federal government would also
survey and sell the public domain to private purchasers. But these grand plans ran afoul
of territorial realities. Both the Northwest Territory, encompassing much of the presentday Midwest, and the Southwest Territory, encompassing present-day Tennessee, were
borderlands, places where Native peoples, French settlers, Anglo-American intruders,
and land companies contended for sovereignty and property. Instead of crafting a new
legal order, federal officials found themselves barraged with preexisting claims.
The polyphony of claims played out especially clearly in the contests over land
and so-called “Indian affairs.” In the territories, title derived from a complicated blend of
Native, French, British, and state law. It fell to federal officials to understand and
translate these plural rights of ownership into the single federal title that would undergird
the federal land system. In Indian affairs, federal officials embraced a vision of federal
sovereignty in which federal law would serve as the impartial arbiter in conflicts between
Native nations and U.S. citizens. Yet early American law encompassed too much
ambiguity and localism for centralized authority to succeed. Instead of relying on law,
federal officials ultimately attempted to secure both peace and allegiance through liberal
payments of federal funds to both Natives and U.S. citizens.
The federal government’s role in the territories as an adjudicatory state adhered
neither to an account that emphasizes federal power’s inexorable westward march nor to
a straightforward narrative of federal failure against local customary practice. Through
resolving claims, federal government slowly accreted authority, but in ways that defied
classification as strong or weak. The process traced here also blurred the sharp
dichotomy between informal and formal law, and suggests how the rise of federalism
helped channel the plural claims of the borderlands into a framework of dual sovereignty.
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Introduction
In 1783, two Anglo-American settlers, William McCormick and Edward Lucas,
recorded legal land claims known as preemption rights before the local court.
McCormick and Lucas lived in a tiny settlement along the Cumberland River formerly
known as French Lick, recently renamed Nashville, described by one visitor as a
“recently founded place” with only two real houses. The court was labeled the District
Court, North Carolina Cumberland District, since Nashville was nominally part of North
Carolina, though in fact the court existed without any formal state authorization. Later
that year, the court’s presiding officer and the town’s founder, James Robertson, entered
a contract with the North Carolina politician William Blount. Blount was to obtain as
many military land rights as he could, probably fifty or one hundred thousand acres, for
Robertson to locate around Nashville.1
Two hundred miles north, residents of the town of Vincennes along the Wabash
River—a nearly century-old French settlement that had recently become part of the
expansive territory of Virginia—were also engaged in routine legal transactions.
Dominque Burguant, Josete Poirer, and Vital Bouche had entered a land contract,
recorded in French and sworn before a local notary, that sold a lot “of the depth of one
street to the next” for 2,000 livres in pelts. A couple of years earlier, Thomas Jefferson,
Virginia’s governor, had sent a letter to Vincennes. It was for Jean Baptiste Ducoigne, a
leader of the local Piankeshaw nation. Jefferson assured the Piankeshaws that the “great
1

“Cumberland District Ct. Records,” 3R, January 20, 1783, Reel 224, Tennessee State Library and Archives; ibid., May 6, 1783;
“Col. James Roberson to William Blount, Articles of Agreement” October 30, 1783, Folder 1, MSS49353, William Blount Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress [hereinafter WBP:LC]. On early Nashville, see Kristofer Ray, Middle Tennessee, 17751825 : Progress and Popular Democracy on the Southwestern Frontier (Knoxville, Tenn. : University of Tennessee Press, 2007); an
older and somewhat romantic account can be found in Harriette Simpson Arnow, Seedtime on the Cumberland, (East Lansing, MI,
USA: Michigan State University Press, 2013).
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council in Philadelphia” would see “justice done you.” Responding to Piankashaw
complaints about “the want of goods,” Jefferson informed Ducoigne that he would try to
send them ammunition and other items, but that after the war’s end the Piankashaws
would “be well supplied through the rest of your lives.” This diplomacy reflected the
long-standing regional custom of using gifts to cement relationships between Natives and
non-Natives.2
While the residents of Nashville and Vincennes practiced everyday law, they
likely had only a vague sense that, much further east, across the Atlantic, representatives
of the United States were concluding a treaty that purported to determine the question of
sovereignty over both settlements, along with much of the rest of North America.
Ultimately, the agreement they reached, the 1783 Treaty of Paris, ended the
Revolutionary War between Britain and the United States and ceded the United States all
British territory east of the Mississippi River, north of Spanish Florida and south of
British Canada.3
To the leaders of the United States, the Treaty represented a watershed, a
validation of their long struggle for independence, nationhood, and territory. For the next
twenty years, the United States would struggle to determine what, exactly, sovereignty
and ownership over such an enormous swath of the continent meant. There were

2

“Land Sale Contract Between Dominque Burguant and Josete Poirier and Vital Bouche” (typescript translation), December 24, 1782,
I.164, Lasselle Family Papers, L127, Indiana State Library, Manuscripts & Rare Books Division, Indianapolis, Ind.; “Advertisement
from Johnas Scoggan,” April 26, 1783, Laselle Family Papers, L127, Indiana State Library, Manuscripts & Rare Books Division;
“Draft of a Petition of Officers in the Continental Line of the Army to the President and Delegates of the United States in Congress
Assembled,” May 7, 1783, Box 4, Folder 2, Series I: Business Records, Manuscripts and Documents of the Ohio Company of
Associates, Special Collections, Marietta College Library, Marietta, Ohio; Speech to Jean Baptiste Ducoigne, June 1781, in Papers of
Thomas Jefferson: Main Series, 6:60-64[hereinafter PTJ:MS]. On the history of Vincennes, see Andrew R. L. Cayton, Frontier
Indiana (Bloomington, Ind.” Indiana University Press, 1998); Denise Marie Wilson, “Vincennes: From French Colonial Village to
American Frontier Town, 1730-1820” (Ph.D. Dissertation, West Virginia University, 1997); Carl J. Ekberg, French Roots in the
Illinois Country: The Mississippi Frontier in Colonial Times (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998).
3
Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Great Britain, September 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 84.
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extensive debates over how the United States should govern such vast and distant
expanses. Gazing west from Philadelphia and New York, politicians and statesmen
crafted visions for national expansion that they codified in the Northwest Ordinance and
U.S. Constitution. These foundational charters created the territorial system. After states
ceded their claims of both property and jurisdiction over western lands to the national
government, that government would divide these lands into “territories,” appointing
governors, judges, and federal officials to oversee them until they were ready for
statehood on equal terms with the existing states. The federal government would also
carve up the territorial lands into neatly gridded parcels, which it would then sell to
private purchasers. The Northwest Territory was the first of these federally administered
governments, created in 1787 from the vast lands north of the Ohio River ceded by
Virginia. The Southwest Territory soon followed in 1790 when North Carolina ceded the
federal government its claim to jurisdiction and ownership of lands in present-day
Tennessee.4
But while Congress built schemes and systems, the residents of the newly
proclaimed “territories”—in towns like Vincennes; Nashville; Chota, the Cherokee
“beloved town”; and the “Glaize,” the polyglot Native village of the upper Miami

4

For considerations of visions of the West during this period, focusing particularly on the state territorial cessions, see Peter S. Onuf,
The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Peter S. Onuf, “Liberty, Development, and Union: Visions of the West in the 1780s,” The William and
Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 43, no. 2 (April 1, 1986): 179–213. Explorations focused specifically on the territories include John
Porter Bloom, ed., The American Territorial System (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1973); Jack Ericson Eblen, The First and Second
United States Empires; Governors and Territorial Government, 1784-1912. ([Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968);
Stefan Heumann, “The Tutelary Empire: State- and Nation-Building in the 19th Century United States” (Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, 2009). For the implications of the constitution for territorial governance, see Gary Lawson and Guy
Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American Legal History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
Studies of the Northwest Ordinance are especially numerous, clustered around its bicentennial. See Peter S Onuf, Statehood and
Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). R. Douglas Hurt, “Historians and the
Northwest Ordinance,” The Western Historical Quarterly 20, no. 3 (1989): 261–80; Frederick D. Williams, ed. The Northwest
Ordinance: Essays on Its Formulation, Provisions, and Legacy, (East Lansing, Mich: Michigan State University Press, 1989); Denis
P. Duffey, “The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document,” Columbia Law Review 95, no. 4 (1995): 929–68.
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country—continued living under their own ideas of law and governance. For them, the
visions dreamed up by distant officials were largely an irrelevancy. They had seen such
self-proclaimed sovereigns come and go with grand plans unrealized: their homes were
both the crossroads and the graveyard of empires, and the territory the federal
government now claimed had been fought over for centuries among the French, Spanish,
and British, as well as Virginia, North Carolina, Connecticut, and Georgia. Out of the
thin soil of the few official papers left behind by these mostly absent governments—laws,
deeds, and treaties—a hothouse growth of local customary law and practice had
flourished. Despite, and in part because of, forty years of war, the regions’ dominant
sovereigns remained Native nations, who still owned and controlled nearly all the lands
within the territories. The few long-standing Euro-American settlements like Vincennes
remained remote outposts in this Native land; they had survived largely due to the norms
and close relationships they had established with surrounding Native nations. More
recent arrivals like the Nashville residents, who settled on dubiously obtained land in
1779, might have more jaundiced views of their Native neighbors and wished to exert
power over them, but they, too, found themselves thrust into adapting to prevailing
norms. This did not mean peace; violence often accompanied coexistence. But Natives
and non-Natives employed a shared vocabulary and diplomatic framework to interpret
and resolve such conflicts. For all the residents of the territories, these quotidian issues—
who owns this parcel of land? how could an unsanctioned killing be remedied? —loomed
larger than the questions of constitutions and governments that dominated in
Philadelphia.5
5

For a fuller discussion of the prior histories of the regions that became the territories, see the Prologue.
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This dissertation recounts what happened when these worlds of high federal law
and policy and territorial reality collided. Over the course of the late 1780s and 1790s,
officials dispatched by the federal government arrived in the territories, satchels full of
laws, ordinances, and instructions on how to govern. What they encountered confused
and frustrated them, as they found themselves attempting to reshape along federal lines a
world that they only dimly understood. Often, they felt powerless in the face of a
cacophony of claims and demands, produced by autonomous peoples who seemed to
have little respect for the federal government or its representatives.
Nonetheless, federal officials were reshaping the territories, albeit not in ways that
they necessarily intended or even realized. Those in the territories may have given little
thought to matters of state, but they cared a great deal about having their claims—to land,
to justice, to protection—honored and acknowledged by some sort of authority. Here,
formal law and custom fused: the federal government’s claim to sovereignty often made
it the only definitive pronouncement available. Even sovereign Native nations looked to
the federal government to affirm their rights, particularly against other Native nations. In
this sense, the federal government in the territories functioned as what might be termed
an “adjudicatory state”—one in which the government sifted through and resolved
contending claims. The result was the accretion of federal authority almost by default.
As Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, stated, dimly acknowledging
this role, “[T]here is perhaps nothing that contributes more to induce an affectionate

5

Submission to any power, than the habit of looking up to that power as the depositary and
dispenser of Justice in the last resort.”6
This process played out in two intertwined areas that dominated territorial
governance. The first was land. Beginning with the Land Ordinance of 1785, Congress
established a template for subdividing and then selling the public domain. But territorial
land was not vacant. Claims to title covered enormous swaths of land that federal
officials had believed empty, derived from a profusion of sources—Native title,
purchases from Natives, state land schemes, preexisting Euroamerican laws,
improvement rights, federal military bounty rights. The federal government’s initial
effort to sweep aside this thorny tangle and create a new land system of governmentsanctioned land companies ended up heightening, rather than resolving, the profusion of
land rights.

As a result of all this confusion, federal officials spent most of the next

decade and a half sifting through these claims, often with great reluctance, rather than
selling the public domain. But all this effort worked to translate this crazy-quilt of
sources of ownership into title that rested on federal authority, which increasingly
became the basis for all land rights in the former territories.7

6

Gov. Arthur St. Clair to Secretary of State, December 15, 1794, in The Territorial Papers of the United States, Vol. II, The Territory
Northwest of the River Ohio, 1787-1803, ed. Clarence Edward Carter (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934), 499-500
[hereinafter TP: Vol. II]. Gordon Wood briefly uses the phrase “adjudicatory state” to describe James Madison’s vision for the new
federal government, contrasting it with Hamilton’s more aggressive interpretation of federal authority. Gordon S Wood, Empire of
Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 91, 103, 148. As the history presented
here suggests, however, adjudication did not necessarily imply a limited or passive role for government; in the territories, adjudication
involved a considerable and at times aggressive expansion of national state authority.
7
Paul Frymer offers the most current account of the role of the public land system in the exercise of federal state authority, in which
he stresses the ways in which the federal government could use the availability and access to land as a method to govern and control
westward expansion without expending financial or military resources. Paul Frymer, “‘A Rush and a Push and the Land Is Ours’:
Territorial Expansion, Land Policy, and U.S. State Formation,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 01 (March 2014): 119–44. Though
Frymer’s convincing account of land as a instrument of governance coincides with some of the contentions made here, he arguably
overstates the extent to which the federal government was successful in its effort to police access to title, at least during the early
period. As Frymer’s account implicitly notes, the federal government was just as frequently constrained to honor the title of
preexisting settlers as it was able to govern by distributing public lands. This dynamic has largely been absent from histories of the
public domain, and ignores the complicated interplay between constraint and authority suggested by the federal government’s role as
adjudicator of preexisting private land claims.
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The second area was what federal officials called “Indian affairs.” This was a
broad category, encompassing all the issues that implicated the relationship between the
United States and Native nations: treaties, trade, warfare, and cross-cultural crime. Here,
too, the federal government embarked on a bold effort to recast long-standing practices.
Through federal Indian treaties, the Trade and Intercourse Acts, and the Constitution, the
national government sought to end seemingly interminable cross-cultural violence by
inserting the federal government as an arbiter between Natives and non-Natives in the
territories, promising impartial justice. But conflict continued, in large part because
federal officials’ insistence on the clarity and supremacy of federal law was ill-matched
to the ambiguities both of early American law and of the territories. When justice failed,
federal officials turned in desperation to a readier source of authority than law—money.
Throughout the 1790s, federal funds flowed into the territories, both as compensation for
unpunished crimes and as an attempt to purchase the tenuous loyalties of both Native and
non-Native territorial residents through presents and protection, respectively. Though a
crude, expensive, and often ineffective tool, federal money reoriented the territories
around federal policy, as both Natives and non-Natives came to look to the federal
government, and its treasury, for redress of wrongs committed by the other.
By the time the Southwest Territory became the state of Tennessee in 1796 and a
portion of the Northwest Territory became Ohio in 1802, much of law and governance
now flowed from the federal government. This is not to suggest that the federal
government could rule by dictate: adjudication often produced conflict, not submission or
affection, and citizens of the new states proved remarkably adept at using federal power
7

to secure goals at odds with federal policy. Statehood and its aftermath also provoked
some of the fiercest contentions over national authority, as the federal government and
newly minted states struggled bitterly to control both lands and Indian affairs. These
controversies underscore how much territorial governance and the process of state
admission had channeled polyvocal struggles over local custom and law into a frame of
dual state and federal sovereignty. The showy efforts to resist federal control also
suggest just how much the federal government had insinuated itself into the lives of
territorial citizens, who simultaneously disliked federal involvement and yet craved
federal sanction and support. Whether welcomed or despised, federal law and authority
had become inescapable.
***
How historians have interpreted the territories and the early American West more
generally in the first few decades of the early republic has depended on where they
grounded their perspective and centered their narratives. Some have followed the gaze of
Anglo-American politicians westward from Philadelphia, while others have rooted
themselves in the particularities of the multiethnic communities of the Ohio and
Tennessee countries. The result has been diverging narratives, especially about the
“state”—a somewhat abstract term rarely used in early America that has nonetheless
become the subject of considerable historiographical discussion.
Views on the early American state have shifted. A traditional narrative depicted
the early American national state as small, weak, and insignificant—a “midget institution
in a giant land,” in John Murrin’s memorable phrase. In this earlier account, the great
8

transformations wrought between the American Revolution and the Civil War, especially
the rapid expansion of the United States across North America into lands owned by
Native peoples and foreign empires, reflected an inexorable demographic force that swept
across the landscape, dragging a reluctant federal government in its wake. But
increasingly, historians and political scientists have rejected this vision of early American
statelessness as a “myth,” propagated in part by early Americans themselves, that ignored
the substantial role of the federal government throughout American society. Drawing
from the literature on early modern state-building in Europe, they have found striking
parallels between the United States and the centralizing European nations of the same
era.8
Though these scholars point to evidence of federal strength throughout the United
States, the region early Americans labeled the “West,” the lands between the
Appalachians and the Mississippi River, looms especially large in their argument. No
other region, these scholars convincingly claim, was as reliant on the federal government,
which governed Indian affairs, territorial administration, the public domain, the national
8
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military, and foreign relations, all of which had an outsized impact in the early American
West. Taken altogether, these scholars conclude, “The territories, not the capital, were
the repository of national authority.”9
Yet standing apart from these debates over the comparative strength of the early
American state is a third narrative strand, in which the state is conspicuous by its
absence. These historians focus on the early American West not as a colony of the
federal government but as a borderland—a place where multiple peoples and sovereigns
collided in an often-violent struggle for coexistence and power. These histories, too, put
the United States in an internationalist frame, in this case in a comparative context
against global experiences of encounter and empire. In these narratives, the United States
and its federal government are rarely central protagonists. Rather, other peoples held the
power to dictate events, particularly the Native peoples who dominated the continent well
into the nineteenth century, a time long after earlier histories had described Native
autonomy as already in eclipse. In the borderlands, the plans and visions concocted in
distant imperial capitals melted away, and governments frequently appeared the hapless
pawns of complicated local dynamics of power and interrelationship that they little
understood and could not control. As two recent commentators summarized the field,
“Borderlands history is everything that state-centered histories are not.”10
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There is, however, an unspoken narrative about the state embedded in much of
borderlands history. These works extend to the frontier the story famously related by
Hendrick Hartog of free-range pigs roaming the streets of New York in defiance of
municipal ordinances and judicial decrees outlawing the practice: custom prevails over
the state’s formal edicts, thanks to what Hartog terms the “implicit pluralism” of
American law. This narrative of the failure of the centralized state to overcome the local
and the particular has considerable currency, even outside historical circles. Two of the
foremost proponents of this account in different fields—James Scott, describing abortive
efforts to recast traditional land structures along rational lines, and Hernando de Soto,
depicting how customary practices overcame formal titling schemes—both rely on the
history of land in the early American West to illuminate this overarching point about state
failure.11
These portrayals of the early American West as a region simultaneously
dominated by the state and yet outside state control seem paradoxical and contradictory,
but the scholars of the state and of the borderlands are mostly talking past each other.
This problem has several layers. One is that, when closely examined, the early American
“state” slips like sand through fingers, devolving into its diverse constituent parts, many
of which looked almost nothing like the archetypal images of hierarchical bureaucracies.
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Much of the early American state seems indistinguishable to modern eyes from “the
people,” as then defined: white propertied men serving on juries or in the militia,
selecting members of local elites as magistrates and officers. Other, seemingly familiar
parts of the state—legislatures and the executive, for instance—played unfamiliar roles as
quasi-judicial bodies, expending inordinate amounts of time resolving individual claims
when not engaged in what present-day standards would deem breathtaking acts of
venality and self-dealing. And the closest analogs of present-day bureaucracies, places
like the War Department or the Land Office that dealt with matters of enormous concern,
often consisted of a handful of clerks in makeshift rooms. This unfamiliarity of the
origins and nature of state authority in early America can often blind us to when and how
it was exercised.12
This challenge carries over into sources. Because of the federal government’s
often slapdash early recordkeeping, the history of the early American state in the
territories cannot be written solely from Washington; retelling this past requires delving
into the records that survive scattered in regional archives throughout the former
territories. By the same token, because so much of federal authority was exercised
through local institutions, understanding federal power involves juxtaposing the
documents of high policy with the correspondence, deeds, warrants, lawsuits, and
petitions that together comprised the stuff of governance in the territories. This
perspective also shifts understandings of which historical actors mattered: even histories
12
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that emphasize the importance of Natives, intruders, and others in the construction of the
federal state often present them as subjects of federal policy, transforming a dialogue into
a univocal process of subjugation. For their part, borderlands historians have been adept
at delving deep into the records produced in the peripheries, reading them against the
grain to illuminate the experiences of Native peoples and other marginalized groups who
produced few records of their own. But in the process, they have sometimes then missed
the insights to be gained by interpreting these documents with the grain: that is, to read
them as the administrative documents that they were, illustrating how early American
institutions functioned when pressed with claims by Natives and others.
Another, and related, problem is the challenge of figuring out how to assess state
authority and power in practice. Historians and political scientists have increasingly
eschewed earlier labels of states as “strong” or “weak” to focus on finer distinctions.
Some scholars have stressed the contrast between “despotic power,” the state’s ability to
impose its agenda unfettered, and “infrastructural power,” the state’s authority to
“implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm”; others have similarly
emphasized how the early American state operated “out of sight,” or was “light and
inconspicuous.” Yet even these careful typologies fail to capture fully the often
counterintuitive and paradoxical ways that the early American national state exerted
power and influence. Federal authority was ubiquitous in the territories, literally written
into every land grant, passport into Indian country, or territorial court case. Moreover, in
dealing with land, the territories, and Indian affairs, the federal government was operating
where it enjoyed extensive and often exclusive constitutional responsibility. But, to an
13

extent scholars have not appreciated, this pervasiveness often failed to provide the power
to impose policies, either through coercion or the subtler power of infrastructure. Federal
officials often felt put-upon and helpless, unable to shape events or resist the demands
made of them. Yet ironically, territorial citizens and Natives also spoke of their
powerlessness, bemoaning their dependence on a federal government that they
nonetheless were remarkably able to twist to their own ends.13
This seeming contradiction reflected the fact that federal authority in the
territories only rarely dictated outcomes and controlled policy; it consisted, rather, of
defining the rules and norms that governed territorial conflicts. Territorial inhabitants
were right to complain that they could not escape federal authority: even as they resisted
federal law, the inhabitants enhanced its legitimacy and scope by implicitly accepting the
federal government’s legislative and adjudicatory power. But federal officials were right,
too, that in practice their interpretations of federal law rarely prevailed over the dissenting
views of territorial residents. In this sense, the federal government in the territories was
not simply weak in some ways but strong in others. Rather, the cause of federal
powerlessness in the territories—its seeming inability to control how territorial
inhabitants exploited federal authority and resources—was also simultaneously the
source of federal government’s primary power: territorial inhabitants’ craving for, and
dependence on, the legitimating role of federal law.

13

The contrast between despotic and infrastructural power appears in Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its
Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” European Journal of Sociology 25, no. 2 (1984): 185–213; that the federal government operated
“out of sight” and lightly and inconspicuously are the claims of Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight, and Max Edling, A
Revolution in Favor of Government. Efforts to capture how the federal government was both strong and weak appear in Gerstle,
Liberty and Coercion; James T. Sparrow, William J. Novak, and Stephen W. Sawyer, eds.,“Introduction,” in Boundaries of the State
in US History, 1–19.

14

Grounding “the state” more firmly in these historical particulars, this dissertation
suggests, offers an interpretation of governance and borderlands not as antithetical and
antagonistic, but as mutually constitutive. It was the proliferation of polities and
jurisdictions deemed legitimate that created the borderlands as places marked by multiple
centers of power, authority, and sources of rights. Yet at the same time, the constant
conflict and violence among multiple claimants led many in the borderlands to seek an
arbiter with some claim to legitimacy and sovereignty. The early national state in the
U.S. territories, in short, was as much a product of the borderlands as it was of the capital.
If its authority came to suffuse much of everyday law and practice in the territories, it
was often because so many borderlands residents—Native, French, and AngloAmerican—wished it to, if only to defend what they believed to be their own rights and
entitlements.
***
To capture these complicated dynamics of early American governance, this
dissertation employs a different focus from the existing literature on the territories and
state-building, which has seen substantial growth in recent years. One difference is the
attention given the Southwest Territory. Nearly all the current work fixates on the
Northwest Territory and the Ohio River Valley. The Southwest Territory appears, to the
limited extent that it does, as a negative counterpoint, a largely stateless realm that
reflects the failure of federal state-building. In fact, sustained comparison suggests that
the broad structural forces at work in the two territories were strikingly similar, and that
the federal state was present along the southwestern borderlands to a degree current
15

scholarship downplays. That the Southwest Territory was deemed a failure while the
Northwest Territory was lauded as a success is itself a historical artifact that reflects the
contentions of the territorial period and requires exploration.14
This dissertation also differs from prior work by adopting as its interpretive frame
the allied concepts of law and administration. For early Americans, law constituted the
state in ways difficult to capture now, when law has been mythologized as a specialized
and technical discipline dominated by experts. For late eighteenth-century AngloAmericans, law was not an arcane abstraction, but a language and habit of thought that
suffused their everyday lives: most white men routinely went to court to sue or be sued,
court day was the center of community social and economic life, and criminal law was
regarded as a reflection of community will. Legality was fundamental to how territorial
residents understood authority and government. Law’s centrality encompassed Natives as
well: Native perceptions of Anglo-American law, and Anglo-Americans’ perceptions of
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Native law, helped structure the relationship between Native nations and the United
States.15
Understanding law in the territories requires taking institutions seriously,
particularly early American administration. As a new generation of legal historians has
emphasized, administration—in this instance, officers of the executive branch appointed
by the federal government—was often where questions of law were worked out. This
was particularly true in the territories, where federally appointed officials like territorial
governors, Indian agents, and army paymasters had to resolve a remarkable array of
important legal questions both in dialogue with and outside of courts. In the context of
both land rights and Indian affairs, this was often because the federal government was
creating legal rights, or at least formalizing inchoate rights, a task for which courts were
often ill-equipped. In thinking through late eighteenth-century administration, we should
not read the large literature on the twentieth-century “administrative state” backward in
time. As it then existed, federal administration was barely organized, and often consisted
of loose and fluid networks of personal relationships. But what is striking, and
surprising, about early American administration, especially when set against later
developments, is how this small handful of officials often managed to exercise
disproportionate influence.16
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Law in the territories was also “legally pluralist”—a term of art that refers to the
coexistence of multiple legitimate sources of law within a single jurisdiction. As a large
literature on law and empire underscores, legal pluralism was particularly rife in imperial
borderlands, where the law promulgated by imperial powers had to accommodate the
diverse legal practices of other peoples and sovereigns, whether through formal structures
or implicit acknowledgment. As an analytic, legal pluralism offers a helpful tool with
which to think through the processes that unfolded in the U.S. territories, and it also
points to similarities between the United States and other global empires. The process of
centralization traced here follows in some respects the legal history of empire offered by
Lauren A. Benton, in which the proliferation of claims produced by pluralism tended to
strengthen, rather than undermine, the central state.17
But, while useful, legal pluralism should also not be employed uncritically or as a
default explanatory model. The risks are twofold. First, many scholars, particularly in
U.S. context, have followed Hartog’s use of legal pluralism as a synonym for the wellworn dichotomy between customary and formal law. This version casts legal pluralism
as antithetical to state-ordered legal systems. In fact, as the comparative literature on law
and empire demonstrates, so-called “strong” legal pluralism exists when plural law
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becomes formal law—when, as in colonial India, multiple legal orders are granted formal
recognition and institutionalized within state law and courts. Exploring pluralism in the
territories, in other words, does not require concluding that customary practice thwarted
state orderings.18
Related to this risk of conflating pluralism and weak state authority is the
assumption that borderlands and legal pluralism are inevitably twinned concepts. In fact,
the U.S. Constitution made the American borderlands formally less legally plural than the
rest of the nation. Federalism created overlapping jurisdictions with multiple legitimate
sources of law throughout the United States—except in the territories, where the federal
government was the sole sovereign, at least outside of Indian country. And, for most
practical purposes, Indian country—legally, the land that remained under Native control
and jurisdiction—was foreign territory under federal law, mapmakers’ pretensions
notwithstanding.19
In this sense, the legal complexities of the territories stemmed more from
neighboring as overlapping jurisdictions—from, in other words, the challenge of
borders. In both the Northwest and Southwest Territories, the United States abutted
foreign jurisdictions that it could not control, including Native nations as well as the
British and Spanish empires. Accordingly, issues of diplomacy infused territorial law.
But even with respect to the proliferation of neighboring foreign jurisdictions, the
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territories were distinctive but not unique: the nation’s long northern, southern, and
maritime borders often posed similar challenges. 20
The legal history of the territories, in short, is not a simple account of how
diversity and customary practices thwarted arbitrarily drawn national boundaries. On the
contrary, the role of federal government as an adjudicatory state emphasizes how formal
jurisdictional borders, however abstract and artificial, became meaningful and real to
ordinary citizens, who relied on official exercises of federal jurisdiction to resolve and
confirm their plural rights.

This dissertation also differs from other works in what it omits. Unlike prior
studies, it does not rely on political partisanship as a fundamental explanatory paradigm.
To be sure, there were deep ideological differences among early Americans about how
the United States should govern the territories, distribute lands, and negotiate with Native
peoples, and, by the late 1790s, these positions were associated with contending political
parties labeled as Federalists and Democratic-Republicans. But this paradigm obscures
as well as illuminates, especially when pushed backward in time to the much more fluid
and uncertain period of the late 1780s and early 1790s. Fixating on high politics ignores
what we might call the politics of the everyday—the quotidian clashes over self-interest,
individual personalities, and shifting allegiances that were often far more consequential
than ideological divides. This was especially true in the territories, where partisan labels
20
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were often applied post hoc to factions grounded in intensely personal disagreements.
Moreover, interpreting territorial government through partisanship ignores the role of
empire and of administration. The most meaningful divides were often those between
periphery and center: the fractious Washington Cabinet pursued a strikingly unified
approach to territorial governance, even as many territorial citizens embraced a clear, and
often very different, set of expectations for federal rule. Territorial officials fell in
between. As a result, their politics were often more administrative than ideological,
reflecting their acute role-consciousness of negotiating between the instructions of distant
superiors and the demands of those they governed.21
This dissertation also considers only briefly the issue of slavery. This may seem
counterintuitive, since the presence or absence of slavery was perhaps the most glaring
difference between the two territories: Congress extended the Northwest Ordinance to the
Southwest Territory verbatim except for the Ordinance’s ban on slavery, an action
required by North Carolina’s cession. But this contrast should not be overdrawn. As
much excellent work traces, slavery existed north as well south of the Ohio, where it was
the subject of intense legal and political struggles. Meanwhile, the Southwest Territory
was far from the plantation society that central Tennessee in particular would later
become: most of the population was then clustered in present-day eastern Tennessee, a
region where slavery remained relatively marginal through the Civil War. This is not to
downplay the extent to which slavery was central to the early history of both territories,
21
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where enslaved Africans and Natives were both ubiquitous and entangled in relationships
between Natives and the United States. But there is also a danger of reading the
territories’ early history in light of mid-nineteenth-century preoccupations over the
ostensibly sharp boundaries between slave and free territory and the scope of federal
power over slavery. This approach risks obscuring the work of empire that the federal
government engaged in in both the Southwest and Northwest Territories—the process of
dispossessing Native peoples and making land alienable. In this sense, the
accomplishments of federal power in the late eighteenth century were the necessary
precondition to the rapid spread of imported labor, both enslaved and free, that followed
over the next half-century.22
***
For all the work on the early American West in the last several decades, the
process of its transformation from borderland to “bordered land,” in the memorable
phrase of Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, still remains somewhat mysterious. The
broad causes of this shift in power are apparent: the rising demographic, military, and
financial might of the United States, coupled with the waning of alternate sources of
power and patronage in the borderlands. Yet, notwithstanding these factors, there were
good reasons to doubt that a federal government hobbled by internal divisions, weak
allegiances, and a miniscule cadre of officials could overcome its rivals to secure its
22
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tenuous hold on the trans-Appalachian West—an outcome that Francois Furstenberg
justifiably dubbed the “most unlikely scenario of all.”23
The history explored here suggests one way the federal government managed to
gain the borderlands: with the help of its residents themselves. This is at odds with
standard accounts of the relationship between the peoples of the borderlands, especially
Native peoples, and the United States, which is usually portrayed as one of resistance. As
the history that follows shows, there was plenty of struggle against the federal
government and its policies in the territories. But these clashes should not blind us to the
reality that many of the same people who fought the federal government also at times
welcomed and relied on it, reinforcing its authority and legitimacy in the process. In
hindsight, perhaps, this gamble on federal power seems a mistake on the inhabitants’ part,
as federal authority rarely proved a boon for most borderlands residents, whether Native,
French, or impoverished white settlers. But this judgment imposes an unrealistic
expectation of foresight on people in difficult and constrained circumstances; it also
obscures the federal government’s contradictory dual role as both agent of and occasional
check on expansionist impulses. At the time, federal officials held out both the promise
of resolving lengthy and tedious conflicts and the possibility that federal law would
protect some modicum of residents’ deeply felt rights. For many, this offer was too
tempting to resist.
23

Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North
American History,” The American Historical Review 104, no. 3 (1999): 814–4; .Francois Furstenberg, “The Significance of the TransAppalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (2008): 647–77. One response has been to
deny the “narrative closure” of this arc—to emphasis the persistence of autonomy and agency for many supposedly colonized peoples
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See Hämäläinen and Truett, “On Borderlands,” 338–61. But while this critique has
much to recommend it, it is also somewhat disingenuous. No doubt, many peoples confronted by the growing power of the United
States nonetheless maintained independence and control. But this was likely cold comfort to once-powerful peoples and nations
uprooted from their homelands by the whim of distant federal officials. Understandably, they themselves understood this history in
terms of loss and tragedy.

23

This page intentionally blank

24

A Note on Terminology
Part of the challenge of the territories is the difficulty of applying terms that
suggest rigid boundaries onto more fluid situations and identities. In general, I favor the
term Native to describe the descendants of the indigenous peoples of North America, and
I capitalize it to signify its status as a marker of national status—as a member of a Native
nation—as well as of ethnicity. At times I use the term “Indian,” the more common
parlance of the time, particularly when I speak of the views of federal officials and
others. Consistent with the usage of the time, especially in formal diplomacy, I refer to
Native “nations,” though I occasionally also employ “tribe” or “tribal.” I use Natives’
national affiliations when speaking of a single nation or its members. Following the
practice of many federal officials, particularly on formal occasions, I often refer to “U.S.
citizens” more broadly and “territorial citizens” more specifically, in contradistinction to
Native peoples, though the meaning and scope of U.S. citizenship was still hazy at this
time. I generally use “Anglo-American” to describe the U.S. citizens who arrived and
settled in the territories, who mostly, although not solely, traced their ancestry to the
British Isles; this ancestry distinguished them from the territories’ pre-existing French
residents, who were also legally U.S. citizens. I also at times describe U.S. citizens of
European descent as “white,” a racial category well known and understood at the time to
distinguish Euro-Americans from Native peoples.
There are also the challenges of labeling historical institutions and concepts. To
ease comprehension, I refer to the federal government or national government. Both
terms were used at the time, though not as often as the now less familiar “general
25

government.” Finally, many in the late eighteenth century employed the term
“sovereignty,” though many now criticize the term for being overly abstract or even
quasi-metaphysical. For early Americans, sovereignty conveyed both jurisdiction—the
power to set and determine the laws for a given territory or people—and autonomy. But
sovereignty’s abstract aspect also appealed to many at the time: like “independence,”
“sovereignty” was at once protean while also conveying a powerful sense of national
dignity and status.
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Prologue
The regions that the United States classified as the territories had older names, as
Anglo-Americans bastardized indigenous terms into English forms well known to early
Americans. In what became the Northwest Territory, the hilly, forested Ohio Country
stretched from Lake Erie down to the Ohio River, the region’s main waterway; the river
and the region’s name derived from the Seneca word “ohiiyo’,” used as the name for
what is now the Allegheny River in western Pennsylvania. Further west were the
Wabash and Illinois Countries— versions of the Miami river name “waapaahšiiki” and
the Miami tribal name “lenweewa,”—where flatter lands hinted at the prairies further
west. Much of the future Southwest Territory went under the name of the Tennessee
Country, named after its principal waterway, the Tennessee River, itself a version of the
Cherokee town name “Tanasi.” The Tennessee flowed from the stony foothills of Smoky
Mountains along North Carolina down to the Ohio and ultimately the Mississippi.1
All these regions were, first and foremost, Native spaces. “Indians is all we see,
know or hear of," one army officer reported; “they are thick as Bees in this part of the
World,” another officer stated. North of the Ohio, this Native world was marked by
mobility and the legacy of eastern colonization. Alongside long-standing residents such
as the Miamis and the Wabash Confederacy lived more recent arrivals like the
Delawares, whose ancestral homelands lay in eastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey; the
Shawnees, who had lived further south; and the Wyandots, who moved south from the
western Great Lakes. Many of these newcomers now lived in multi-ethnic, polyglot
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towns alongside other Native nations. Ties of trade and diplomacy linked the Ohio and
Illinois countries in all directions—east to the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois), west and north
to the Anishinaabe (known to early Americans as the Ottawas, Chippewas, and
Potawatomies), and also to the south, to the nations of the Tennessee Country.2
The Tennessee Country lay within what historians and anthropologists have
labeled the Mississippi Shatter Zone. From the collapse of the hierarchical Mississippian
societies that had long occupied the Native Southeast, new Native groups began to
emerge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the Choctaws in present-day
Mississippi, the Chickasaws in present-day western Tennessee, the Creeks in present-day
Alabama and Georgia, and the Cherokees in present-day eastern Tennessee and northern
Georgia. More populous and centralized than the nations north of the Ohio, these Native
polities were nonetheless often subdivided based on geography into “upper” and “lower”
towns that seemed to American observers only loosely affiliated. The Southwest
Territory itself lay within the “Tennessee Corridor,” a long-standing trade, hunting, and
diplomatic route shared among the four nations that connected the Native southeast with
the Ohio country.3
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Euro-American settlements within these Native homelands were few and
scattered. In the mid-eighteenth century, the French had established the remote military
and trading outposts of Vincennes, Kaskaskia, and Cahokia along the Mississippi and
Wabash Rivers; these small villages survived transfer to the British after the Seven
Years’ War, and were again seized during the American Revolution, this time by
Virginians. A few white settlers had begun to venture down the Ohio River from western
Pennsylvania into the Ohio Country, joined by settlers who had crossed the river from
“Ken-tuck-ee,” rapidly populating with Virginians. In the Tennessee Country, which lay
south of Kentucky, Euro-American settlements were divided. To the east, in Cherokee
territory along the headwaters of the Tennessee River, North Carolinians began to arrive
from across the mountains in the early 1770s, in a region later designated the Washington
and Hamilton Districts. Several hundred miles to the west, separated from Washington
and Hamilton by the Cherokee homelands, lay the nascent settlement of Nashville on the
Cumberland River, established in 1779 by a few hundred North Carolinians travelling
south from Kentucky, and known as the Cumberland or Mero District.4
In 1783, the British transferred sovereignty over this region—the entire transAppalachian West east of the Mississippi, south of the Great Lakes, and north of
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Florida—to the United States. Competing European empires, though, still surrounded
these newly American regions. Directly across the Mississippi from the Illinois Country
lay Spanish Louisiana, populated by fledging settlements such as St. Louis as well as,
downriver, the commercial hub of New Orleans. The Spanish also controlled the Gulf
Coast. Somewhere south of the Tennessee Country, in lands owned by the Creek,
Chickasaw, and Choctaw nations, lay the uncertain and disputed boundary between
American and Spanish territory. North of the Ohio and Illinois Countries lay British
Canada, still closely linked to the Illinois and Wabash countries by commercial ties. The
commercial, diplomatic, and regional hubs of Detroit and Michilimackinac further north
formally belonged to the United States under the Treaty of Paris, but the British, alleging
American violations of the treaty, had not ceded control.5
Sovereignty over the lands within the borders of the United States was claimed by
the states. By dint of its purported conquest as well as its charter rights, Virginia asserted
sovereignty over all the lands north of the Ohio River to the Canadian border, a claim
disputed by Connecticut and Massachusetts. Virginia also claimed Kentucky, south of
the Ohio River; beyond that, North Carolina held formal jurisdiction over the Tennessee
Country, even though the region’s residents were constantly plotting to secede from what
they regarded as a highly neglectful North Carolinian government. The lands south of
the Tennessee Country ostensibly fell within Georgia’s jurisdiction.6
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Over the course of the 1780s, states ceded many of their land claims to the United
States, motivated by a desire to be freed from the burdens of administration as well as by
considerable pressure by Congress and the states without western lands. Virginia was
among the first: in 1784, it ceded “all right title and claim as well of soil as jurisdiction
which this Commonwealth hath to the Territory or Tract of Country” north of the Ohio
River to the federal government (the state retained control, however, over Kentucky).
After offering and then retracting a cession in 1784, North Carolina finally ceded “all
right, title and claim which this State has to the Sovereignty and territory of the Lands” in
the Tennessee Country in 1789.7
These state acts of cessions were less unilateral gifts than complicated and
carefully negotiated contracts with the federal government. They contained elaborate and
detailed provisions that required that the federal government honor prior and even future
state land grants, guarantee the persistence of certain state laws, and protect territorial
residents. They also stipulated that the ceded lands ultimately be admitted as separate
states with the same rights of “Sovereignty, Freedom and Independence as the other
States.”8
The federal government slowly established its authority in the ceded regions. In
the 1780s, a small federal military force created several forts along the Ohio River, and
federal negotiators met the Ohio Country tribes to negotiate treaties. Congress did not
create a government for Virginia’s ceded lands until 1787, when it enacted the Northwest
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Ordinance. Styled a compact between the territorial residents and the United States, the
Ordinance established a government with a federally appointed governor, secretary
(effectively lieutenant governor), and three territorial judges; together, the governor and
judges would initially constitute the territorial legislature. It also stipulated that, once the
territory had reached 60,000 inhabitants, it, or some portion of it, would be entitled to
admission to statehood, and guaranteed territorial residents certain fundamental rights. In
1790, when Congress accepted North Carolina’s cession, it largely extended the
Northwest Ordinance over the newly created Southwest Territory.9
In 1788, Congress selected as governor of the Northwest Territory Arthur St.
Clair, a Scottish-born Pennsylvanian, Revolutionary War general, and former President
of Congress. One territorial citizen recollected St. Clair as a man of “grate humanity &
Sencibility,” but also a man who “could not beare dictation by inferiors or those of Under
rank to him.” As territorial secretary, Congress appointed Winthrop Sargent, a surveyor
from Massachusetts. In the Southwest Territory, the federal government relied on
prominent locals. The President selected William Blount, a politically influential North
Carolinian who had served in the Constitutional Convention and the Continental
Congress, as governor. North Carolina’s congressional delegation all concurred that
Blount was the “properest man,” though Blount’s extensive land speculations had led the
Creeks to dub him “Fushe Micco”—the “Dirt King.” Daniel Smith, a Nashville surveyor
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and the “ablest and best character there,” in one congressman’s estimation, secured
appointment as territorial secretary.10
This handful of federal officials confronted the world that the United States had
inherited: regions of jurisdictional uncertainty, with unclear and contested boundaries,
where formal sovereignty had passed and repassed between competing would-be imperial
powers, and where effective sovereignty remained in Native hands. The clearest
consequence of the century of imperial struggle and contest for control over eastern
North America that preceded the creation of the federal territories was a jumble of claims
to property, sovereignty, and jurisdiction—a tangle that it now fell to these often
beleaguered officials to resolve.
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PART I: LAND
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Chapter 1: Sources of Title in the Territories
In 1785, Thomas Jefferson helped create the first law governing federal lands.
The Land Ordinance of 1785 laid out a plan for the expansive territory that the federal
government came to own as states ceded their land claims. Long hailed by historians as
the origin point for the federal land system, the law envisioned transforming vacant
public domain into rigidly rectangular parcels, divided by federal surveyors into lines that
hewed to the four points of the compass, which would then be sold at public auction. 1
In practice, as Thomas Jefferson soon discovered, the federal government had
obtained more a property morass than a public domain. Six years after the Ordinance,
Jefferson, now serving as Secretary of State in a new federal government, sent a detailed
document to President George Washington: “a report on the lands of the U.S. within the
North Western and South Western territories, unclaimed either by Indians, or by citizens
of these states.” Ostensibly intended to chart “the residuary unclaimed mass” of land that
could be sold by the federal government, the report actually recorded the tangled state of
ownership in the territories.2
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As measured by Jefferson’s report, the Land Ordinance of 1785 was a failure.
Harassed by Natives who rejected Anglo-American assertions of ownership, federal
surveyors had only slowly surveyed a small corner of the Northwest Territory known as
the “Seven Ranges.” And only a portion of those lands—just over 150,000 acres—had
actually been purchased.3
While federal policy floundered, the territories did not lie vacant and
“unclaimed.” On the contrary, Jefferson chronicled dozens of claims to territorial lands.
Nearly all of the Southwest Territory still legally belonged to the Cherokee and
Chickasaw Nations; Native title had been “cleared,” in Jefferson’s parlance, only in two
small regions. Jefferson estimated that every acre of this purchased land—as well as
large tracts that the Cherokees and Chickasaws still owned under federal law—had been
sold or granted by North Carolina, transactions the federal government was obligated to
honor under the terms of North Carolina’s cession. Besides these claimants, there were
also white settlers throughout the territory who asserted ownership “without Right or
License.”4
The Northwest Territory was similar. The Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, and
other Native nations still owned most of the Territory. Treaties with these nations, with
ill-defined boundaries, purported to sell some land to the federal government, but many
Natives disputed their validity. Nonetheless, there were already myriad claimants for the
purchased lands, as Jefferson traced: “Ancient Companies” (companies that had

3

Jefferson’s report put the amount sold at 150,896 acres. Ibid. Instances of Native resistance to surveying the Seven Ranges appear
in “Message from the Indian Nations to the United States,” 1786, Indians of North America Collection, Burton Historical Collection,
Detroit Public Library; George Brickell and Thomas Girty, “Deposition,” September 13, 1786, vol. 3, Josiah Harmar Papers, Clement
Library, University of Michigan [hereinafter JHP]
4
“Report of the Secretary of State to the President,” 85-100.

38

purchased from the Indians before the Revolution), French villagers in the Illinois
Country, the state of Connecticut, Moravian Indians, Canadian refugees, Revolutionary
War veterans, and others. All told, claims by non-Natives amounted to 13 million acres
of the land Virginia had ceded to the federal government.5
As Jefferson’s report demonstrated, though the Continental Congress may have
envisioned the territories as vacant land awaiting transformation into a neat grid, neither
the Northwest nor Southwest Territory was an empty space to be molded by federal
policy. Both teemed with people who advanced myriad, and contested, property claims
that predated federal involvement. In short, much of this new “federal” land was not only
already owned but also purportedly owned several times over. But by focusing on the
expansive “visions” of eastern policymakers and politicians, many historians of property
have ignored the messy realities that lurked below this westward gaze.6
In both territories, the complicated tangle of claims Jefferson traced resulted from
property pluralism—the proliferation of multiple sources of ownership with disputed
legitimacy. Historians have often cast narratives of property in early America as a
contest between vernacular, anti-statist “squatters” and positivist government officials
and speculators. But the fight over property in the territories was not primarily a struggle
5
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between customary norms sanctioned by long-standing community practice and formal
statutory law. In practice, most of the sources of ownership on the frontier were neither
deeply rooted nor informal. Most land claims in the territories were recent, stemming
from the 1780s; the claims Jefferson labeled as “ancient” stretched all the way back to
1775. And although many of these claims reflected deep-seated views about property,
nearly all had some grounding in positive law, especially state statutes; all claimants
cared deeply about—and fought over—formal law. Even Native land rights, though
grounded in immemorial usage, were refracted through Anglo-American statutes and
precedent, and, for Anglo-Americans at least, increasingly rested on formal legal
recognition.7
In short, the territories’ property pluralism resulted from too much, not too little,
law. In the Revolution’s confusing aftermath, issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty
remained highly unsettled. This was especially true west of the Appalachians, where
grand if poorly defined abstractions such as federalism and Native nationhood overlaid
local factionalism, producing schisms and secessionist movements. As a result,
throughout the 1780s multiple authorities all claimed, and exercised, authority over
property law in what became the federal territories. These contending governments
favored different claimants with differing concepts of ownership. Even as Native nations
insisted on their sovereign land rights, expansionist states strongly endorsed the claims of
7
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white settlers. State statutory schemes originally constructed to benefit smallholders
were twisted by self-interested legislators to facilitate massive and dubious land grabs.8
Precisely because little was settled or well-established, the territories presented
the fundamental question about which sources of ownership would be recognized and
deemed legitimate in early America. As Jefferson’s report indicated, the responsibility
for addressing this question ostensibly fell within the newly established jurisdiction of the
federal government. But the federal government was hampered. State cessions shielded
many land claims, even contingent future claims, from federal involvement. Just as
substantially, the federal government was not monolithic, and legislators and officials
disagreed fiercely over how federal title should be defined. Local disputes within the
territories over the sources and nature of ownership found their echo in debates between
cabinet officers and local territorial officials, or among members of Congress. The result
of these diverging views was that federal land law often seemed inconsistent and
oscillating, as politicians debated which features of earlier land regimes to preserve and
which to reject.
To the extent a federal land policy emerged from these contentions, its core was a
strong preference for clarity, finality, and the absence of conflict—the administrative
virtues. Abhorring the property disorder they watched unfold in the territories and
throughout the early American borderlands, federal officials sought to use their
ownership of federal lands to craft explicit chains of title. Federal lands, one booster of
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the Northwest Territory optimistically if inaccurately wrote, had a “great advantage” over
lands elsewhere: “the Title is indisputable.” Similarly, a senator from North Carolina
argued that his state’s “cession is not nor ever has been viewed . . . as valuable to the
[federal] government, but . . . only desireable in as much as the clashing claims and
encroachments of the St[ates] on their Constitutional powers are thereby silenced and the
government freed from the disgrace and expences enivitably attendant on disputes with
the Indians.” The handful of land statutes the first Congress enacted reflected this
embrace of clarity, particularly in Indian affairs.9
Yet even when the federal government could reach an agreement enshrined
through formal law, it was still only minimally successful at recasting ownership in the
territories. The property mess in the territories proved too tangled, and there were too
many other legitimate sources of land law, for new concepts of ownership dictated from
Philadelphia to succeed. Rather than a resolution, state cessions of the territorial property
morass to the federal government marked merely the beginning of a decades-long
struggle over the source and nature of title in early America.
***
As Jefferson’s report illustrated, title in early America began with Native nations,
who owned the lands Anglo-Americans came to label the Northwest and Southwest
Territories. These owners included, among others, the Cherokees who lived in the
foothills of Blue Ridge Mountains, the Chickasaws who lived south and west of the
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Cumberland River, and the Wyandots, Miamis, Shawnees, and Delawares who lived
along the rivers of present-day Ohio and Indiana.10
By the 1760s and 1770s, when the first Anglo-American settlers settled in the
Indian country that would become the U.S. territories, earlier debates over the nature and
validity of Native land claims had given way to the near-ubiquitous practice of
purchasing Native property rights. In the 1770s, the earliest settlers of Washington
County, North Carolina, which became part of the Southwest Territory, recorded a series
of individual purchases of land from the Cherokees. In Vincennes, a long-standing
French settlement along the Wabash River in present-day Indiana, settlers routinely
purchased lands from the local Piankeshaw Indians. An Anglo-American visitor to the
town in 1789 noted that many of the town’s titles rested on “purchases made from
Individual Indians.”11
The legal controversy over Indian land sales that came to engulf the U.S.
territories, then, was not over whether Natives owned land that they could sell. Rather,
during and after the Revolution, an intense debate raged over the meaning and nature of
Native “consent” to land sales. Both Natives and Anglo-Americans regarded some
indication of Native consent to a transaction necessary for it to be legally valid. But,
despite widespread and shared use of the term “consent,” there was little agreement about
what such consent required or what form it should take. Not only did Natives and AngloAmericans often disagree, but, throughout the 1780s and ‘90s, Anglo-Americans also
10
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fiercely struggled among themselves over how to define legitimate Native consent. This
conflict manifested in three interrelated legal debates centered in the territories: the
legality of private purchases from the Indians, the validity of the doctrine of conquest,
and the extent of the federal obligation to conform to Native law on consent.

Cherokee, Delaware, and other Native nations’ concepts of consent appeared
largely through the complaints they voiced to Anglo-Americans when they felt their
norms had been violated. Despite their diversity, these nations shared fundamental
structures of authority, and long interaction with Europeans had led to a strong sense of
what a legitimate transaction looked like. By the late eighteenth century, Natives, like
Anglo-Americans, insisted on written recordation of land sales. “Writings, when they are
justly executed never Lye,” a group of Miamis told a federal official in reference to past
land sales. “Let them therefore be respected.” Native representatives placed great
emphasis on what the “just execution” of such documents required. It was not enough for
a treaty to be written; the terms of the agreement had to be fully explained and accurately
translated to them for their consent to be valid. 12
Natives’ most substantial concern—one that caused endless frustration for AngloAmerican interlocutors—was that those selling the land possess the proper authority to do
so. Native political culture relied heavily on discussion among councils; one group of
Cherokee representatives described how a land matter had been “fully discussed before
12
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147 chiefs” before a definitive resolution could be reached. In Native eyes, a land sale
was only valid if those who entered it had the requisite authority to agree, and if a council
subsequently ratified their actions. Without such endorsement, Native nations had not
truly consented to the land sale. One Miami chief condemned the sale at the Treaty of
Fort Harmar of 1789, which, he observed, had been made not by “chiefs, neither
delegates” but by “only young men without authority and instruction from their chiefs”;
consequently, the sale would “not be approved.” An Indian agent in Cherokee territory
noted that another purported sale was almost certainly invalid, as none of the “principal
Chiefs, knows anything of the matter.”13
The allocation of authority within tribes was central to Native conceptions of
consent. Most nations of the eastern woodlands divided authority between chiefs, who
exercised control over peacetime affairs, and the “warriors” or “war chiefs,” who
governed military matters. Anglo-Americans well-versed in Indian affairs understood
this distinction, addressing letters to tribe’s “headmen and warriors.” Federal Brigadier
General Rufus Putnam discovered the significance of the division when a chief of the
Wabash Confederacy refused to negotiate with a U.S. army major on the ground that he
was “no more then a war Capttain”; the chief would only permit his brother, a war
captain to go, as “it was proper one War Captain should Speek with another.” Putnam
accordingly shed his military uniform for civilian attire, and adopted the title of agent
rather than general.14
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Traditionally, land sales had fallen within the chiefs’ purview. But this division
was shifting. The ceaseless invasions of Indian country, and the interconnection between
land and violence, gave the war chiefs increasing influence over these decisions. “[O]n
the present occasion no lands will be purchased without the consent of the warriors,” one
agent among the Cherokees wrote. “The Chiefs are governed by them, especially in the
sale of lands.” Matters among the Delawares, Wyandots, and Shawnees were similar.
According to informants in Indian country, the “Warrior Chiefs” of those tribes were
proclaiming that “their Old Counsellors & Kings have given up the land to the Big Knife
[the Anglo-Americans], But we the Chiefs of the Warriors have not given our Consent.”
The warriors repudiated the purchases and vowed to “fight for our land while we have a
Man.”15
Many Anglo-Americans cared a great deal about satisfying Native conceptions of
consent. In Vincennes, for instance, Indian land sales, like other land sales, were
conducted before the notary and enshrined in a written land contract. But unlike other
land sales, the transactions’ witnesses signed only after the interpreter translated the
contract to the Native sellers, “th[e]y understanding him and consenting.” For his part,
Brigadier General Putnam noted that Anglo-Americans might find the distinction
between chiefs and warriors “trivial” or even “Laughable,” but he considered it highly
important. “[W]e ought to accommodate our selves to their ideas of propriety,” Putnam
wrote, “especially those which they consider as binding on them.” These efforts to
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conform to Native ideas about consent were rooted in pragmatism. Anglo-Americans
needed to have land sale agreements that Natives would acknowledge, if only to avoid
conflict and violence. The simplest way to achieve this goal was to follow Native law.16

Not all Anglo-Americans, however, were as scrupulous to obey Native consent
norms as Putnam. For many speculators, the important issue was whether the purported
sale of land would be recognized under Anglo-American land law, which focused on the
written terms of agreement memorialized in land sale records. As a result, questionable
Indian deeds tracing back to the 1770s and ’80s proliferated in the territories. Outwardly,
these documents seemed to conform to the formalized requirements of consent,
frequently recording large payments for the land. But “in reality,” one Miami chief
reported, “none of these titles have cost more than a Gallon of Rum.” The chief also
complained that those selling the land “were never trusted by Indians with any part of
their affairs either in War or peace.” Allegations like these led one Anglo-American to
denounce such sales as “barefaced pocket picking.” Of course, such fraud and deception
were rife in early American land practice, and many white owners poorly understood the
documents they signed. But Natives were uniquely vulnerable, because AngloAmericans often had no ready way to determine their legitimate consent, which required
a deep knowledge of Native authority, and Natives had little access to legal redress.17
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Because of these opportunities for deception, private purchases of Native land had
always enjoyed a dubious legal status. Many colonies had heavily regulated them from
the seventeenth century onward. In 1763, at the end of the Seven Years’ War, the British
imperial government, citing the “great Frauds and Abuses . . . committed in purchasing
Lands of the Indians,” issued a proclamation asserting its sole authority to purchase
Native lands, known as the right of preemption.18
This proclamation little altered actual practice. By the middle of the eighteenth
century, Native consent had become the legal foundation not merely of small-scale local
transactions, but also of speculative schemes to engross enormous chunks of the Ohio,
Illinois, and Tennessee Countries. Land companies—usually unincorporated associations
of wealthy and politically powerful individuals—mushroomed in the years before the
Revolution. These companies pooled assets to buy western territory from Native tribes.
Two of the most significant purchases happened on the eve of the Revolution in what
would become the U.S. territories. In 1775, North Carolinian Richard Henderson, the
head of the Transylvania Company, bought “several millions of Acres” of Cherokee land,
including much of present-day central Tennessee, for “large sums in valuable goods,
wares, and merchandise” at the Treaty of Sycamore Shoals, even though Cherokee
leaders later repudiated the agreement. The same year, the Illinois & Wabash Company
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made its second of two purchases of a similarly enormous tract of land in present-day
Illinois from the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians.19
The companies defended these transactions against charges of illegality by
pointing to concepts of Native consent. As proprietors of their lands, the Indians had the
right to freely alienate them, British restrictions notwithstanding. The companies took
great pains to demonstrate the legitimacy of Native consent and the absence of fraud.
The Henderson Company partners insisted that their purchase had occurred in “the most
fair and open manner,” and, demonstrating their familiarity with the division of Cherokee
authority, stressed that the purchase had occurred “with the consent of the head men and
warriors as [well as] of the said [Cherokee] Nation at large.” For its part, the Illinois and
Wabash Companies argued that consideration for the purchases was valid, the negotiation
“of the most public notoriety,” and the “meaning and interpretation of the parties were
interpreted and explained by persons duly qualified.”20
As long as British law governed, these arguments had little chance at success.
But with the American Revolution, the debate over private purchases recurred, only now
within the states that formally enjoyed sovereignty over the Illinois and Tennessee
Countries. A heated discussion at Virginia’s 1776 constitutional convention resulted in a
provision requiring all purchases to be made under public authority, seemingly dooming
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the designs of the Illinois & Wabash Company. North Carolina’s 1776 Constitution also
banned purchases from Indians; in 1783, the state invalidated Henderson’s purchase,
while awarding him 200,000 acres elsewhere as compensation. After Virginia and North
Carolina’s cessions to the federal government, though, the speculators pressed their case
to the newly created national government, hoping for better results.21
The private purchasers had good reason to anticipate success, for the new federal
government in the 1780s was itself engaged in a bold legal experiment to write Native
consent out of Anglo-American land law altogether, through the so-called doctrine of
conquest. A legal theory founded on bluster and arrogance, this approach claimed that,
because many Native nations had sided with the British, the United States had conquered
them and now owned their land by virtue of Britain’s cession at the Treaty of Paris.
“You joined the British King against us, and followed his fortunes; we have overcome
him, he has cast you off, and given us your country,” congressional commissioner
Richard Butler told 1,000 Shawnees, Delawares, and Wyandots gathered in the Ohio
Country. “We plainly tell you that this country belongs to the United States.” North
Carolina similarly invoked its supposed conquest of Native lands when it enacted a law
limiting the Cherokees to a small parcel of land within the state’s borders.22
Given this hostility toward the long-standing principles of Native consent, the
politically powerful representatives of the Illinois Company had several moments of near
success in persuading the federal government to recognize their land claim. In its waning
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days, the Continental Congress stated that, “however improper it may be in general to
countenance private purchases from the Indians,” this transaction appeared to be “fairly
conducted.” Another Wabash & Illinois Petition secured similar support in the House of
Representatives, where a committee concluded that “principles of justice and equity”
merited relief; the proposal ultimately failed in the Senate. The prospect that ratification
of the Constitution, and especially the creation of the federal judiciary, would reanimate
claims based on these earlier land sales was hotly debated at the Virginia ratification
convention in 1788; James Madison described the topic as one of the “principal topics of
. . . discussion and intrigue” there.23
But at the same time that the Illinois Company seemed to be nearing success, the
United States was discovering that Natives refused to allow it to write their consent out of
the law. In their negotiations with the United States, Natives “expressed the highest
disgust, with the principle of conquest,” and rebutted the legal claims of the United
States. “If . . . a bare march, or reconnoitering a country is sufficient reason to ground a
claim to it,” the Cherokee leader Corn Tassel argued, then the Cherokees now owned the
North Carolinians’ settlements, since “we had last marched over [their] territory.” To the
north, Ohio Country Natives similarly disdained conquest theory as a “lye.” As a group
of Wyandots told a Quaker traveler, “the land belonged to them, and the King of England
could not dispose of them . . . they looked upon themselves as a free people & not
obliged to part with their lands.” When Shawnee and Delaware leaders made the same
23
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argument to congressional commissioner Samuel Parsons, he confessed, “[T]here appears
to me so much Reason in their Observations that I scarcely know a Sufficient Answer.”24
Natives’ legal arguments mattered because Native nations retained considerable
power. The prospect of the United States taking “their [Native] lands from them without
their consent” led “many nations” to unite to form a “powerful” and “formidable”
confederacy. Ultimately, the consequence was an extremely costly war in the Northwest
Territory that consumed five-sixths of the federal budget and resulted in two cataclysmic
defeats for the nascent federal military. Both Natives and federal officials attributed the
conflict to the federal effort to abolish Native consent. “[T]he doctrine of conquest is so
repugnant to their feelings,” Secretary at War Henry Knox concluded, “that rather than
submit thereto, they would prefer continual war.” A chief of the Wabash Confederacy
put it more succinctly: “[I]f your people had not told the Indians that their lands belonged
to you,” he told a federal emissary, “you would have had no war.”25
These tremendous costs led the United States to retreat to Native consent as the
foundation of its land law. As “the main spring of the distressing War on our frontiers,”
federal officials insisted, conquest theory “cannot be too explicitly renounced.” Instead,
to comport with “fundamental Laws of Nature,” Secretary of War Henry Knox urged the
passage of a law protecting Native property. “The Indians being the prior occupants
possess the right of the Soil—It cannot be taken from them unless by their free consent,
24
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or by the right of Conquest in case of a just War.” (Knox was clear that he did not regard
the claims of conquest from the Revolution as “just.”). Echoing Knox, the Northwest
Ordinance provided that Indians’ “lands and property shall never be taken from them
without their consent.” Knox reiterated this principle in a letter to Haudenosaunee leader
Joseph Brant, which he asked Brant to convey to the western tribes at war with the
United States. “[T]he United States require no Indian lands,” he stated, “but those which
have been ceded by treaties made with the full understanding and free consent of the
Chiefs.”26
The return to Native consent led Congress and the executive to reject private
purchases of Native land decisively. The law Henry Knox had called for became one of
the first statutes enacted by Congress, the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790. The law
barred private purchases of Indian lands, unless through federal treaty; subsequent
versions made such purchases criminal and punishable by a fine. The federal embrace of
preemption was, in some sense, overdetermined. It bolstered the power of the federal
state even as it provided a powerful tool to obtain Native lands at below-market rates.
Yet federal officials insisted the purpose of preemption was to safeguard the integrity of
Native land sales. The “design” of these laws, one prominent Washington administration
official stated, “is to protect the Indian Lands [a]gainst . . . bad men,” who “wish[ed] to
cheat . . the Indians.” Though cast as benevolence, this was a hardheaded recognition
that the proliferation of dubious treaties would provide neither peace nor security of title.
Private purchases by “unprincipled persons” had produced “misunderstandings, quarrels,
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and wars with the Indians,” James Madison warned on the renewal of the Trade and
Intercourse Act. It was therefore “highly important that this whole business should be
under the absolute and sole direction of the public authority.”27
The law’s success at recasting title in the territories was mixed. Though the
Illinois Company continued to press its claims, Congress proved hostile. Speculators
who had hoped to follow the Transylvania and Illinois Companies by making enormous
purchases from Indians similarly despaired; since they depended on federal recognition,
the Trade and Intercourse Act “entirely deranged [their] Plans.”28
But for many in the territories, the statute merely forced their schemes
underground, leading them to keep their plans to purchase Native lands “a profound
Secret.” Those engaged in this “Wildest of all Wild Speculations,” as one observer
described the widespread trade in Indian deeds, hoped to persuade or dupe some authority
into honoring their bargains. At federal treaty negotiations, speculators lurked on the
margins to prevail upon Natives. Illinois country settlers remained confident that
Congress would still endorse the Illinois Company’s purchase. Even local territorial
officials themselves purchased interests in ongoing Indian purchases of “immense
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extent,” as they anticipated using their connections with higher-ups to secure
confirmation—albeit through secret letters that they urged then be burned.29
Others defied the law more openly. Some tried to avoid its strictures by leasing
land, a ploy criminalized in 1796. Despite this change, a traveler passing through the
Tennessee country shortly afterward stayed with a man who rented his land from the
Cherokees “at 600 per annum.” Other would-be purchasers, echoing the arguments of
prerevolutionary speculators, rejected federal authority altogether: one group leasing
from the Kaskaskias in the Illinois Country said that “Congress has nothing to do with the
lands but that they belong to the Indians who may dispose of them as they please.”30
By the 1790s, the formal law on private purchases from Indians was remarkably
clear, given earlier confusion: they were illegal, and punishable under federal law.
Native consent, however, had proved too durable a legal concept in the territories to be
transformed by federal edict alone.

As the debate over Indian deeds demonstrated, Anglo-American land law often
turned on arguments about the meaning and scope of Native consent from which Natives
were excluded. Yet Natives had their own views about their consent. On the one hand,
they were deeply suspicious of land speculators and often rejected these men’s claims to
their lands as grounded in fraud. On the other hand, Natives were keenly aware of the
irony that preemption represented: a restriction on the scope of Native consent in the
name of safeguarding that consent’s validity. Natives argued that the federal government
29

Lardner Clark to John Overton, October 18, 1797, Box 4, Folder 10, Murdock Collection of Overton Papers, Tennessee State
Library and Archives; Peter Audrain to Winthrop Sargent, March 23, 1797, Reel 4, WSP.
30
“Journal of Bishop Francis Asbury (1788-1800),” in Early Travels in the Tennessee Country, 1540-1800, ed. Samuel Cole Williams
(Johnson City, TN: Watauga Press, 1928), 312; John Edgar to Arthur St. Clair, August 25, 1797, Reel 4, WSP.

55

had no authority to thus restrict their power to alienate their own lands. “We have never
parted with such a power,” Native leaders told federal commissioners who urged
preemption on them. They turned Anglo-Americans’ rhetoric of Native consent on its
head: “[W]e consider ourselves free to make any bargain or cession of lands, whenever
and to whomsoever we please.”31
Natives also contended with the federal government about the precise meaning of
their consent. On paper, federal officials charged with overseeing Indian affairs,
especially the Secretaries of War, were keenly concerned with obeying Native norms
governing consent. Native consent to the treaties required more than signatures, they
instructed federal negotiators; it occurred only when Native leaders fully understood
treaty terms and possessed proper authority to sell the land. In 1790, Henry Knox wrote
William Blount, governor of the Southwest Territory, informing him of the “explicit[] . . .
direction of the president of the United States from which you must not depart” at an
upcoming negotiation to purchase land from the Cherokees. “However desireable” it was
to obtain a cession, Knox commanded, lands could be purchased only “by the free and
unconstrained consent of a full and fair representation of the Cherokees, who are the
proper proprietors of the lands to be relinquished, and with their full understanding of the
act they are performing, and the consideration they are to receive as an equivalent.”
Knox’s successor Timothy Pickering sent similar instructions to Anthony Wayne in
preparation for the 1795 Treaty of Greenville with the nations of the Ohio Country.
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Wayne should keep careful lists of all the principal chiefs of the various nations,
Pickering urged, as well as recording the statements of the chiefs as to whether there was
an adequate representation from each nation. Wayne also had to give the chiefs “strong
and decided proofs that they are not under even the shadow of duress.” “Let them feel,”
Pickering wrote, “that they are at perfect liberty to speak their opinions and to sign or
refuse to sign.” Above all, Pickering insisted, “[o]ne great principle ought to govern all
the negociations, a rigid adherence to truth.”32
The Secretaries of War showed such solicitude for Native understandings of
consent because, like earlier frontier negotiators, they believed adhering to Native law
would benefit the United States in the end. “The United States may conform to the
modes and customs of the [I]ndians in the disposal of their lands,” Knox informed
Congress, “without the least injury to the national dignity.” In particular, following
Native conceptions of consent would avoid “any difficulties arising from any after
misconstructions on either side.” Pickering made clear the sorts of “difficulties” he
anticipated. Native “[sus]picions,” he urged, “occasion delays, and issue in discontents;
[an]d these in depredations and war.”33
In principle, then, Natives and federal leaders shared a set of norms—full
understanding, the absence of duress, appropriate authority—that governed whether “free
consent” had been obtained. In practice, Natives and federal officials fiercely disagreed
about whether particular treaty negotiations had satisfied those requirements. Treaty
commissioners and Native leaders offered divergent accounts of what transpired on the
32
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treaty ground, leaving federal officials in Philadelphia to parse the truth. In these
deliberations, officials’ commitment to Native consent proved less meaningful than their
desire to uphold federal authority and keep treaties settled.
These considerations appear particularly clearly in the negotiations surrounding
the Treaty of Holston, the subject of Knox’s instructions to William Blount. In summer
of 1791, Blount met the leaders of the Cherokee Nation at the confluence of the French
Broad and Holston Rivers, at the site of what subsequently became the town of
Knoxville. There, Blount met a number of Cherokee leaders who reluctantly attended the
treaty cession, most prominent among them John Watts and Nenetooyah, known to the
Anglo-Americans as Bloody Fellow, the prominent leader of the Cherokee lower towns.
After several weeks of discussions, the Cherokees agreed to a treaty that ceded large
portions of the eastern Tennessee country, as well as a diamond-shaped tract forty miles
around Nashville, for an annuity of $1,000. In November, after Congress ratified the
treaty, President Washington proclaimed the treaty as the law of the land.34
For the Cherokees, and especially for Bloody Fellow, the treaty’s legality was
more questionable. Ownership of the area around Nashville, known as the Cumberland
District, was especially contested. Part of the purported 1775 Transylvania purchase
from the Cherokees by Richard Henderson, the region was included within lands ceded
by the Cherokees at the Treaty of Hopewell, and expanded at Holston. Yet Bloody
Fellow rejected this pat account of legality. He argued that the North Carolinians who
settled along the Cumberland River in the 1770s had done so “before [Cherokee] consent
34
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was asked,” arriving stealthily and taking “possession by force.” As for the cession at
Hopewell and Holston, Bloody Fellow insisted that the agreements were not “free and
lawful treaties,” even if the Americans tried to “make it appear” so. The treaties were not
“explained to the Indians,” who learned their contents only upon arriving home. Nor did
the treaties receive “the general consent of the nation.” Using these “fraudulent means,”
the Americans “usurped the lands of the Indians.”35
Bloody Fellow’s complaints against the Treaty of Holston are particularly
revealing of the complicated issues surrounding Native consent. In one report that
arrived from Indian country secondhand, Bloody Fellow alleged that Blount had
committed outright fraud. Bribing the interpreters to misrepresent the treaty to the
Cherokees, Blount had allegedly changed material terms, reducing the promised annuity
by half, changing the boundary around Nashville from ten to forty miles, and secretly
adding provisions granting a road, navigation of the Tennessee, and a congressional right
to regulate trade.36
In another account, Bloody Fellow offered his own narrative of what had occurred
at the treaty ground. This version alleged, not blatant deception, but a more complicated
negotiating dynamic that suggested more subtle limits to the “freedom” of Native
consent. In Bloody Fellow’s telling, the Cherokees had arrived at the Treaty anticipating
only negotiations to end endemic frontier violence. Instead, Blount demanded Cherokee
lands for seven days nonstop; Blount’s insistence, Bloody Fellow reported, “made tears
come into my eyes daily.” Bloody Fellow and the Cherokee leaders raised a host of
35
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objections, attempting to outlast Blount. The Cherokee leader John Watts expressed
skepticism about Blount’s selection as a federal representative. The Carolinians, the
Cherokees observed, “would not observe the orders of Congress or any body else”; any
assurances Blount offered were worthless, since the Carolinians would “have their own
way.” Hoping to avoid dealing with Blount, Bloody Fellow demanded to go to Congress
to see if he “could not obtain better satisfaction.” Blount said there was no point, as he
was a federal representative, and asked how Bloody Fellow would pay for the journey.37
Blount’s rejection, Bloody Fellow reported, “struck me forcibly.” Realizing that
he and all the other Cherokees were “in his [Blount’s] power”—suggesting a fear of
possible violence--Bloody Fellow agreed to part with a small parcel of land in return for
safe passage. This small concession immediately prompted intense bargaining. Blount
made extravagant demands, which Bloody Fellow repeatedly rejected; after “a good deal
of dispute,” Blount finally pressed on the Cherokees a line along a mountain ridge in
eastern Tennessee.38
The negotiation then shifted to price. Blount offered Bloody Fellow the annuity
authorized by Knox—$1,000 annually. The insulted Bloody Fellow told Blount that the
annuity was too small: the sum “would not buy a breech clout [cloth] for each of my
nation,” while the Creeks had gotten far more for a worse tract. According to Bloody
Fellow, Blount responded by reiterating the doctrine of conquest, emphasizing that the
land had been “purchased with American blood”; Bloody Fellow pointed out that these
37
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events were long past. The impasse resolved when Blount promised to write to Congress
to authorize more funds. In the interim, Bloody Fellow and the other Cherokees signed
the treaty.39
Bloody Fellow relayed this narrative to Secretary of War Henry Knox in person in
January 1792, in a visit he and a number of other Cherokees made to Philadelphia.
Bloody Fellow’s trip made good his implicit threat to speak to federal authorities
unmediated by Blount: “I am come to ask of you,” Bloody Fellow told Knox, “whether
he [Blount] was authorized to purchase our lands.” Aware of the importance of
recordation, Bloody Fellow produced a string of wampum, which, he told Knox,
“answer[s] the same purpose as letters with you, and [is] held in the highest estimation.”
But he also asked that all speeches be done in writing, to be transmitted back to the
nation, and brought George Miller, a Cherokee who knew English, to avoid dependence
on the federal translator.40
Knox proved surprisingly unsympathetic to Bloody Fellow’s complaints about the
treaty. Though Blount’s reported hard bargaining had not employed outright coercion,
the governor had strayed far from Knox’s insistence that placating the Cherokees was
more important than obtaining land, and his continued invocation of conquest was flatly
at odds with federal policy. Nonetheless, Knox told Bloody Fellow that the President,
the Senate, and the cabinet all believed that the treaty was “a good satisfactory treaty, as
well for the red as the white people,” and so “confirmed it, printed it as you here see”
(Knox presumably displayed a copy), “and it has become the law of the land.” To placate
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the Cherokees, though, the United States agreed to increase the annuity to the $1,500 that
Bloody Fellow had requested.41
Knox’s seemingly tepid response likely had several causes. The surviving copy
of the official treaty record, though it did not flatly contradict Bloody Fellow’s account,
portrayed the Cherokee sales as far more consensual. When Blount later read the record
of Bloody Fellow’s meeting with Knox, he complained that the Cherokees “have
egregiously lied as to the Means and Manner of [the treaty’s] being brought about.” But
Knox, ostensibly Blount’s superior, was also heavily dependent on Blount to enact Indian
policy in the Southwest Territory, and so was careful not to undermine the governor’s
authority. Knox in fact reassured Blount that, although the Cherokees’ visit had
constrained him to negotiate “separately from you,” the outcome “will tend to induce a
more perfect confidence on the part of the Indians in your character.” Blount would later
use this official endorsement to crow about his authority to the Cherokees: “Thus you see
you are no more to doubt the truth of what I have said, or shall say to you.”42
As Knox’ comments suggest, however, the sharpest divergence between his
conception of consent and Bloody Fellow’s was the issue of finality. For Knox, the
treaty was settled and had become formal law; the time for deliberation had passed. For
their part, the Cherokees continued to try to renegotiate the treaty. At a Cherokee council
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in June 1792, Cherokee leaders still “murmured” about the boundary around Nashville;
the influential chief Little Turkey, bemoaning that the treaty failed to address Native
concerns, proposed moving the treaty boundary further east. Reading these reports, Knox
expressed “some doubts whether that part of the line [the Cumberland boundary] was
agreeable to the opinion of the Cherokees generally—and it really appears to me that
something will yet be to be arranged on that subject.” Ultimately, Knox papered over
the difficulty two years later—not by altering the line, but by more than tripling than
Cherokees’ annuity to $5,000 per year, likely in an effort to placate the Cherokees.43
This constant reopening of settled law exasperated Anglo-Americans charged
with dealing with Natives. They viewed Native claims of coercion and deception as mere
posturing, strategic behavior to extract more concessions. James Madison, for instance,
described a Native complaint that a treaty had been made by “parts only of the Nations
whose consent was necessary” as mere “pretext,” the “usual” argument Natives made
when they tried to wriggle out of agreements they disliked. “When the White People
give away a thing,” an evidently exasperated federal commissioner lectured a group of
gathered Natives, “they never ask for it back again.”44
Though Native leaders were just as capable of acting strategically as AngloAmericans—even if few matched Blount’s contortions—their complaints were more than
pretext. The Cherokees understood the significance of written treaties, but they regarded
them in relational rather than transactional terms, as an agreement between peoples rather
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than a contract. The text of the Treaty of Holston itself supported this interpretation:
while Anglo-Americans fixated on the concrete boundary provisions, the document also
made promises of “peace and friendship” as well as federal protection to the Cherokees.
Because the Cherokees viewed consent as a process rather than a moment—an ongoing
commitment to justice and fair-dealing—they sought to uphold those provisions just as
firmly as Anglo-Americans insisted on the boundary lines.45
These expectations are apparent in the aftermath of Bloody Fellow’s visit to
Philadelphia. Despite Knox’s hard-edged rhetoric, Bloody Fellow proclaimed himself
satisfied: “[W]e rejoice in the prospect of our future welfare, under the protection of
Congress.” But the federal government failed to meet these expectations. Reports from
Indian country stated that the Cherokees waited six months for their grievances to be
redressed, but received no relief. “The bloody Fellow then said,” this informant related,
“Congress are Liars general washington is a Liar & governour Blount is a Liar.” Several
months later, William Blount passed along intelligence to Henry Knox that Bloody
Fellow was urging the Lower Cherokee towns to war against the United States. The fear
that violation of Native consent norms would produce violence seemed to have been
realized.46

In the wake of the American Revolution, consent became a critical foundation for
Anglo-American law and political thought; relationships previously built on hierarchies
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became reconceived to require free assent. Relations between the United States and
Native nations were part of this process. By the late eighteenth century, after centuries of
contention over the scope and meaning of Native land rights, both Native leaders and
their Anglo-American interlocutors largely shared a legal vocabulary and framework
around property. Most in the territories agreed that Natives owned their lands, and nearly
all—Natives, land speculators, and, after the disastrous failure of conquest theory, federal
officials as well—agreed that Native consent was necessary to alienate Native land.47
But both in Indian affairs and in Anglo-American law more broadly, centering
consent did not resolve the ambiguities of what consent required, and congruencies in
language and law masked deeper disagreements. This existence of a shared framework
merely channeled broader disputes into a legal arena, in which law defined the terms and
scope of the debate. In this case, the early American law of property focused the struggle
around the legal meaning of Native consent, about which claimants sharply diverged.
Land speculators merely sought Native signatures on a formal deed, a formulation that
readily facilitated fraud. Washington Administration officials believed Native consent
required more. Free consent, Knox and Pickering concluded, mandated that purchases
occur in public treaties held under federal auspices, and they at least aspired to ensure
requisite authority, full understanding, and uncoerced assent. Native leaders required
47
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those elements, too, and vociferously pointed out the frequent instances when federal
officials failed to satisfy them. But they also insisted that Anglo-Americans conform to
Native understandings of authority and deliberation to conclude binding agreements.
Native leaders recognized that even when they entered into treaties they well understood,
they had not freely chosen them in any meaningful sense, as the threat of force always
lurked behind federal negotiations with Native nations. “[W]e are strong enough to take
land,” William Blount told the Cherokees at Holston, “but will not do it because we will
not be guilty of injustice.” For their part, the Cherokees “objected to giving up so much
land,” Bloody Fellow reported to Knox, “but, for the sake of peace and quietness, we did
it.”48
Judged by this standard, most Native “consent,” notwithstanding its position as
the foundation of Anglo-American land law, was a legal fiction that disguised an evermore unequal reality. Justice, particularly as construed by people as self-dealing as
Blount, proved to be a thin reed for Native peoples. But in the 1790s, Blount’s bluster
concealed a deeper congruence between the two sides. As the retreat from conquest
theory shows, both Natives and federal officials feared violence, and so both made
concessions to the others’ legal norms, less from principle than for the sake of “peace.”
In the immediate term, the consequence of three different standards of Native
consent was to produce three claims to ownership of the same land. Speculators asserted
ownership based on dubious Indian deeds; the federal government claimed title based on
Indian treaties; Native nations confused Anglo-Americans by sometimes accepted the
legitimacy of these transactions but, in other instances, insisting that their original rights
48
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persisted. Federal supremacy, through the assertion of preemption rights, was supposed
to create unambiguous chains of title unmarred by fraud or abuse. Instead, these
triplicate claims crisscrossed the Northwest and Southwest Territories, spawning
confusion—and violence—in their wake.
***
If Native ownership was one source of confusion about title, state ownership was
another. This was paradoxical, as the territories were the only part of the United States
not incorporated within state borders. But federal sovereignty did not itself ensure what
was then called “right of soil,” or ownership. In their acts of cession, both North
Carolina and Virginia had required that the federal government would continue to honor
state land grants within the Southwest and Northwest Territories. North Carolina’s
cession provided that all state land grants in the Tennessee Country would “have the
same force and effect as if such cession had not been made,” while Virginia reserved a
large tract of land north of the Ohio to satisfy the bounty claims of its war veterans, a
region that became known as the Virginia Military District.49
These carve-outs bound large sections of the Southwest and Northwest Territories
to state land-law systems. Thomas Jefferson calculated that 5.4 million acres (8,391
square miles) of the Southwest Territory had already been granted by North Carolina,
which constituted 20% of the Territory’s entire landmass. Jefferson believed that every
piece of land legally purchased from the Natives had already been alienated. In the
Northwest Territory, the lands promised to Virginia amounted to 15% of the territory of
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present-day Ohio, encompassing the valuable Scioto River Valley (another 11.7% of
Ohio was reserved for Connecticut).50
Jefferson’s tidy lists can make it seem that the federal government was merely
honoring well-established, vested property rights. In fact, many of the lands were set
aside to satisfy contingent future claims based on past governmental promises, while
even those lands that had been “granted” were often in the midst of lengthy and highly
contingent state processes for securing title. The resulting fever of speculation, as
dubiously legal land claims proliferated and were litigated, meant that owning land in the
territories offered both the prospect of tremendous wealth and constant uncertainty. Even
smallholders who sought only self-sufficiency became participants, albeit unwillingly, in
the tremendous scramble for legal ownership that characterized the territories.

The late-eighteenth-century property laws of Virginia and North Carolina were
similar. Both states employed the system known as “indiscriminate location,” enshrined
in statute during and after the American Revolution. Claiming land under this system
involved a number of steps in which individuals would select tracts, pay a modest fee,
and receive state confirmation of title, with disputes sent to the courts through a process
known as caveat.
North Carolina’s Land Law of 1783 was typical. Claimants first appeared at the
state-run land office with a written description of the land they wished to purchase based
on nearby landmarks such as waterways and mountains. Upon payment of the cost of the
50
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lands—ten pounds per hundred acres claimed—as well as required fees, the entry taker, a
state official appointed by the legislature, would record the claim and assign a number.
Three months would follow for competing claimants to come forward and make what
was known as a caveat—a challenge to the claim’s validity.51
Barring a caveat, the entry taker would issue a land warrant—an order to the
county surveyor, a local official paid by fees, to survey the land. The county surveyor
would survey the tract and make plats describing the tract’s boundaries, and record the
number and date of the entry as well as the number of acres. Completed plats were sent
to the office of the state’s secretary, who would issue a land grant, authenticated by the
governor and recorded in the secretary’s office, to the claimant. Challengers to the
survey could also seek a caveat from the governor, who could suspend the execution of a
grant. Otherwise, upon receipt of a grant, formal title to land vested in the claimant, who
was obligated to record the grant in the local county.52
Viewed in hindsight, such a loosely regulated system to administer land seems an
invitation to confusion and contention, a judgment that many contemporaries, as well as
subsequent historians, did not hesitate to render. But the statute did try to police the
system where it seemed most vulnerable to deception. In a world where title hinged so
heavily on written evidence, the law was exacting in specifying just how claims were to
be preserved, even stipulating the size of paper to be used and the margins and spacing in
the entry book. Surveyors were to carefully record the date and number of entries
because of the “many disputes [that] have, and may arise” from failures to do so. The
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governor’s authority to halt grants stemmed from the prospect of warrants being “secretly
obtained on entries heretofore made by artful and designing men, for land to which they
had no just title.”53
Otherwise, though, the statute did nearly nothing to govern the process of actually
locating land. But to many at the time, this minimal oversight was a virtue. From the
perspective of government officials, it allowed them to open up land cheaply, with little
administrative cost. The government’s formal involvement was limited to an entry-taker
and a couple of clerks, paid from fees, who ran the entire system from a single land
office. Expense and risk fell largely on individual claimants. Yet the system’s
proponents also believed it would serve claimants well. Indiscriminate location
comported with notions of justice and fairness current on the eighteenth-century frontier
by rewarding first occupants, whose knowledge of the best land might translate into
entries. Land’s low cost and universal availability enabled even those with modest means
to obtain their own property, which would quickly increase in value.54
Perhaps the most glaring deficiency of the system of indiscriminate location, both
for contemporaries and historians, was the risk of conflicting claims. Indiscriminate
location, one New Jersey congressman complained, simply “create[d] law-suits” that
ended up costing more than “would have been necessary to purchase all the land of the
State.” But for some, this reliance on local courts comported with an ideology of
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ownership that valorized local knowledge in adjudicating property disputes. In his report
on territorial lands, Jefferson noted the spotty records and incomplete maps marking
ownership under this system. “[Y]et, on the Spot,” Jefferson argued, “these Difficulties
exist but in a small Degree; the Individuals there employed in the Details of buying,
selling, and locating, possess local Informations of the Parts which concern them, so as to
be able to keep clear of each others Rights.” When disputes did come up, the caveat
system ensured they benefitted from this local knowledge by referring them to the county
courts for resolution. If a “Conflict of Claims should arise,” Jefferson observed, “a local
Judge will doubtless be provided to decide them without Delay.” In fact, the statute
stipulated that local juries—the institutional arbiter of communal norms and customs,
largely populated by neighbors—would ultimately determine these highly local questions
of ownership.55
The system of indiscriminate location, in short, rested on decentralization,
localism, and close scrutiny of state officials—all features deeply rooted in the AngloAmerican legal tradition. Despite a growing number of critics, the system had its
defenders, too. It had, after all, functioned well enough, if somewhat creakily, for nearly
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two centuries under colonial rule. In extending this law westward, North Carolina’s
legislature was merely perpetuating earlier practice.

What followed, however, was not the continuation of earlier practice. It was a
chaotic land rush, an orgy of greed and speculation that swept North Carolina throughout
the 1780s. Within three years of the opening of the state land office, 4,393,945 acres of
land had been entered. Rather than being distributed to smallholders, much of this land
was concentrated in the hands of a few powerful individuals. As North Carolina’s
governor would lament in 1799 as the state investigated the abuses of this era, the “[m]ost
atrocious frauds and scandals have taken place. . . scheming and capable men executed
their plans and swallowed up the property of the state.”56
This outcome was not accidental; it resulted from what the 1783 Land Law
stated—or, more exactly, from what the law did not address. The limitations the law
offered to prevent the massive engrossment of lands were feeble at best. The law did
attempt to limit any one entry to 5,000 acres, and it set a reasonable price—ten pounds
(equivalent to forty dollars) per acre—that would also have made it difficult for
speculators to amass enough specie to buy such huge tracts. But speculators could easily
circumvent such paper restrictions. They made multiple entries and obtained lands by
using others’ names; a subsequent investigation also revealed mysterious erasures,
forgeries, and unauthorized duplicate warrants in the record books. As for price, the
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statute ensured speculators’ dominance by providing that land could be paid for using
North Carolina’s near-worthless debt certificates from the Revolution. Using their
connections and capital to buy up certificates for as little as 10% of face value,
speculators obtained land at a real price of less than five dollars per hundred acres. Other
speculators took advantage of the military bounty lands that the statute set aside around
Nashville for Revolutionary War veterans. Unable or unwilling to uproot eight hundred
miles, most veterans sold their rights. As late as 1796, the “vast number of Milt[ary]
Warrants in N. Carolina” sold for $10-$100; the land obtained could then be resold for as
much as $640. Others turned to fraud. Nashville resident Andrew Jackson reported a
scene in a tavern in the 1790s in which a major and captain, after initially refusing to sign
military certificates to anyone “who was not entitled to it,” were plied with brandy, and
“very much intoxicated,” signed nearly 500 forged certificates quickly redeemed for
land.57
The interconnection between title and government debt rewarded the wellconnected, who turned the state machinery to their own purposes. No one proved more
assiduous than the Blount family, especially the politically prominent William Blount.
Soon after helping design the 1783 land law, Blount and his brothers John Gray and
Thomas secured certificates, inveigled the entry taker, and served as brokers for others’
claims for a fee of one-quarter of all lands obtained. The result was that the Blount
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family came to own enormous tracts of the Tennessee Country. By 1793, the Blounts
and their relations held 79 square-mile tracts in the Cumberland District and 129 grants
ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 acres in the territory’s western expanses--only a portion of
the supposedly 2,760 entries made by Blount family members.58
A similar process unfolded in the Northwest Territory’s Virginia Military District,
where, as in North Carolina, the system of indiscriminate location was used to satisfy
promises to veterans. There, the most important actors were the surveyors, a profession
that many in the Northwest Territory recognized provided excellent opportunities to
speculate in land. “I do not hesitate to confess that I have views of other advantages than
those arrising from the compensation,” wrote one supplicant seeking a surveying
position, “and I presume you will find few if any of the applicants but what have them
likewise.” The surveyors who relocated to the Virginia Military District from Virginia
quickly seized these “advantages,” engrossing large quantities of land. One observer
described the District as “a Country where there is more Sharpers than any I have been
in.” Many surveyors charged for their services in land, requiring a quarter or even a half
of the tracts surveyed, leading some to complain of “extortionate” rates. Just as in North
Carolina, these surveyors also purchased heavily discounted military land warrants that
they then patented themselves. Through these means, surveyors amassed enormous
holdings: Nathaniel Massie held 75,285 acres; Thomas Worthington, 18,273; Lucas
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Sullivant, 68,785. Taken together, the twenty-five largest acquisitions in the District
amounted to over 1 million acres, 26% of the entire tract.59
This enormous land grab did not go unremarked. In 1794, a grand jury in
Fayetteville, North Carolina, issued a presentment against William Blount’s brother John
Gray Blount and a number of other supposed “land Jobbers,” who through “unsufferable
monopoly” had “accumulated to themselves the vacant Lands of this State.” They argued
that the western lands, intended as an endowment for future generations, had gone to
“establish an Imperious and unconstitutional Nobility.”60
By that point, however, most of the Blounts’ lands no longer lay within North
Carolina. William Blount used his influence to pass North Carolina’s 1790 cession of the
Tennessee Country to the federal government, and then exploited his connections to
secure appointment as the governor of the new Southwest Territory. Blount was thrilled
at news of his new position. “[M]y Western Lands have become so great an object to me
that it had become absolutely necessary that I should go to the Western Country to secure
them,” he wrote a confidant. He was sure that “my present Appointment” would
“enhance[] their Value.”61
Cession served the speculators well. The cessions that created the Southwest and
Northwest Territories both contained grandiose language that the ceded land would be
considered “a common fund for the use and benefit” of all the states. Yet, in both the
Northwest Territory and the Tennessee Country, the system of indiscriminate location
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funneled the public domain to private speculators, whose access to credit, government,
and networks of agents allowed them full advantage of the free-for-all. By explicitly
binding the federal government to earlier state land systems, the cessions made the
federal government powerless to interfere. At the same time, by the time North Carolina
began to realize the enormity of the swindle that had been committed, the lands were
largely out of the state’s control. In this sense, the creation of the federal territories was
less a testament to a national commitment to federal ownership than to the power of
speculators, who could forum shop by shifting territorial control from one sovereign to
another, and, in the process, convert an ostensibly national patrimony to their own
interest.62

If concentration of landed wealth was one consequence of the rapid and cheap
sale of millions of ill-defined acres, confusion and uncertainty about title were another,
even when the system was scrupulously administered. Here again, the problem was what
the law failed to say: other than exempting Cherokee lands south of the French Broad
River, there were no geographical restrictions on land claims. In other words, the statute
threw open for ownership all of North Carolina’s territory to the Mississippi River, an
area that encompassed present-day western North Carolina and all of present-day
Tennessee. North Carolina’s own claim to these lands, grounded in the right of conquest,
was extremely flimsy: Chickasaw and Cherokee title had never been purchased, and the
1785-86 Treaties of Hopewell subsequently enshrined Native ownership in federal law.
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But setting aside the dubious title, the idea that a single land office hundreds of miles
away could process claims to such an enormous region was a fantastical delusion. North
Carolinians knew virtually nothing of the domain they purported to sell: it was nearly
devoid of Anglo-American settlements, its topography barely known. The warrants they
entered into the land office reflected this ignorance. Consider, for instance, warrant
#1159, for 2000 acres of land in the western district of Tennessee, over 500 miles away
from the land office. The statutorily required description stated that tract lay “between
the river Tennisee & Missippi [a roughly hundred mile distance] & upon a small river or
Creek, lying on both sides inclosing a tree Mark M.B. standg among a parcel chopd &
Deaded trees.”63
The 1783 statute permitted such entries for only a brief two-year window. In that
time, bands of speculators frantically staked out similar claims across hundreds of
thousands of acres of what they perceived as unmarked wilderness. Their goal was
simply to enter as many as entries as possible as quickly as possible. In these
circumstances, the checks that Jefferson and others believed would prevent
indiscriminate location from devolving into a chaotic jumble— caveats, local knowledge
and institutions—simply did not exist. As North Carolina’s entrybooks filled with vague
and arbitrary descriptions of parcels of land, there was no way to determine whether land
had already been claimed, and by whom.
The predictable result was myriad disputes, most of which only emerged years
later. Many settlers in the Southwest Territory told similar stories. Having purchased
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what they believed to be good title from speculators—often in the late 1780s when large
numbers of settlers began to migrate into the Tennessee Country—these settlers had been
happily living on their farms for several years when a stranger appeared at their door
bearing a document that asserted ownership of the same land. Others, less dramatically,
learned of competing claims from their neighbors, while still others discovered the
existence of other claimants only when they were hauled into court. But the end result
was usually the same: litigation. Land disputes tracing to the 1780s clogged territorial
court dockets.
These lawsuits rarely conformed to the vision of expeditious justice advanced by
Jefferson as well as the drafters of the 1783 statute. The ejectment suits that filled the
county courts—filed under the fictitious names of Richard Fenn, claimant, and John
Denn, lessee, the real purpose of which was to determine title to fee simple land—dealt
with land grants from years earlier. Questions of title also predominated in many cases
not explicitly about land; the delays in these cases were even longer. Probate cases in
particular reopened long-standing questions about the validity of title after the death of a
purported owner; many of these cases began not with the land itself, but with longstanding promissory notes and other debts that had paid for tracts of land, which then
raised the question of the validity of title in a sale a decade earlier. The uncertainty of
title, along with the vagaries of the land market, encouraged such litigation. Plaintiffs
often hoped that they could secure more in damages than the land was worth on the open
market; one defendant alleged that the plaintiff had stated that “bringing Suit [and
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securing damages]. . . would be the best way to Sell his land” and so refused to accept an
otherwise valid land title to settle a dispute.64
The wisdom of the local jury rarely resolved these disputes. Ejectment suits
might begin in county courts, but many appealed to the superior courts. Even these
decisions were not final: losers frequently challenged adverse judgments issued under the
common law under a separate body of law known as equity, which allowed judges to set
aside verdicts deemed inequitable. These opportunities for second or third chances at
success encouraged continued struggle rather than settlement: one litigant, instead of
negotiating with the prevailing party after an adverse outcome, insisted that “he must
have a pull or twist in Equity.” Ostensibly, equity practice was less formal that actions at
law, and admitted a wider range of evidence. In the territories, however, equity
jurisdiction rested with the more technical superior courts, where judges, not juries,
decided equity cases on the basis of lengthy written pleadings, which inevitably required
counsel.65
The 1783 land law provided plenty of grist for the endless litigation that plagued
the Southwest Territory and later, Tennessee. The law created constant conflict, in
myriad permutations. One of the most straightforward, and common, occurred when
there were two entries, and hence two land warrants, for the same tract. The law dealing
with such controversies was well established: the older (known as the “elder”) entry
prevailed, leaving later claimants without title. This bright line rule displeased the
64
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residents of the Southwest Territory, where the problem was widespread. A number of
inhabitants, including Andrew Jackson, appealed to the North Carolina legislature for
relief, arguing that those holding later entries were “in justice” as entitled to “the benefit
of their Warrant” as earlier entrants, as they had paid the state for their claims.66
Savvy purchasers thought they knew how to avoid the problem of multiple
entries. One land speculator in the Southwest Territory insisted that the region’s “many
disputes and litigations about Titles to land” could be avoided by relying on the “only
sources that could be depended on,” copies of North Carolina’s entry books. Access to
these books, manuscript copies of which circulated throughout the territory, allowed
claimants to ensure they held the oldest entry. Still more common was to require that the
seller of a parcel warrant that his claim to the land was the first and best entry. Often,
though, such guarantees simply converted disputes over title into debt controversies, as
the legal question became whether contractual nonperformance would excuse refusal or
failure to pay a note. In Cuthbert v. Dotson, for instance, Cuthbert entered a 1794
contract to purchase land from Dotson; Dotson warranted that he had the best title to the
land. Cuthbert discovered that an old entry covered much of the land, and so refused to
honor the contract. Four years later, Dotson died, and his executors filed suit and
recovered on the contract; Cuthbert accordingly sought equitable relief against the
executors’ judgment. (The case ended in a settlement). Similar facts appeared in Carney
v. Dunlap, where Anna Moore—the rare female landholder in the Southwest Territory—
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had sold her land in 1783, but then supposedly obtained a patent in her own name for the
same tract before the purchaser could. The dispute again hinged on settling payments
years later.67
Yet neither purchasing senior entries, nor securing title guarantees, necessarily
protected purchasers, given both the haze of confusion and the informality of land
practice in the 1780s. The 1799 case King v. Daniel demonstrated these risks.
According to the parties’ pleadings, Thomas King and John Blair were part of a
small group of men who, in 1781 or 1782, traveled up the Holston River in present-day
eastern Tennessee. After the group informally subdivided a promising stretch of land
along the river, King and Blair were assigned 700 acres, for which they then obtained a
warrant from the North Carolina land office after the enactment of the 1783 law. They
subsequently sold this land to the settler James Daniel for two hundred pounds’ worth of
horses.68
Here, the accounts diverged. According to Daniel, King and Blair told him that
the land was labeled number twenty-one in the entry book. Because the warrants were
numbered sequentially, the low number made it more valuable, as older claims were
unlikely. King and Blair also allegedly guaranteed the warrant. King along with Blair’s
executor disputed this account. The men had used the number twenty-one only in their
informal subdivision of the Holston lands—in other words, it was only the 21st lot, not

67

Dillon to McHenry, May 22 ,1796; Cuthbert v. Dotson (Washington District Superior Court of Law and Equity Sept. 1799), in
Records of Washington County, Superior Court Minutes, Book B, 1791-1804, 65, 103.
68
King v. Daniel (Washington District Superior Court of Law and Equity 1799), in Records of Washington County, Superior Court
Minutes, Book B, 1791-1804, 57-65.

81

entry 21. They did not know the warrant’s entry number, nor did they guarantee the title.
All King and Blair sold Daniel, they insisted, was the right to the warrant itself.69
The contract stipulated that King and Blair would survey the land and obtain the
grant from the state. A few years after the contract was concluded, in 1785 or 1786, a
surveyor appeared at the house Daniel had built on the land. Though the surveyor had a
warrant for the land, he refused to show it to Daniel (it may not have mattered, as Daniel
was illiterate). Daniel assumed the surveyor had come to confirm Daniel’s title, per the
contract. Only later did he learn that the survey had been for Nicholas Perkins, not
Daniel, on a different Warrant. In a subsequent lawsuit, the court determined that
Perkins’s claim was “earlier and better” than the entry made by King and Blair, and so
evicted Daniel from his land.70
As Daniel’s story suggests, smallholders, even when illiterate, well understood
North Carolina’s land law, and sought to protect themselves from conflicting claims. But
Daniel’s efforts to guard his title could not stop what was at best confusion and at worst
deception. Ultimately, Daniel prevailed at law in a suit against King and Blair in a suit on
the contract brought after Blair’s death years later, and he successfully defended that
judgment against a suit in equity. Nonetheless, Daniel argued, the damages he received
for the land were only a portion of the current value of the land. And Daniel doubtless
spent considerable sums on attorneys in the multiple suits required to secure, and
preserve, relief.71
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Many landowners opted not to take Daniel’s approach. To avoid the trouble and
expense of a lengthy lawsuit, many simply bought out competing claimants, in essence
paying for their land again. James Berry did that for 640 acres he owned in Powell’s
Valley, buying a competing entry for two hundred acres. James Miller purchased a rival
claim from a man named Hutchings, not because he thought Hutchings had the stronger
claim but because “it was the easiest mode of quieting the title and saving any difficulty
either in law or equity respecting the title” to his land. Unsurprisingly, this practice only
encouraged more claims, often founded on questionable rights: both Berry and Miller
later confronted additional claimants to portions of their land.72
North Carolina offered its own solution to the problem of conflicting entries.
Under the terms of the state’s cession, those denied land rights by an earlier entry could
obtain so-called “supernumerary” warrants, which could be entered on any vacant claims
not included within another entry. But with no ready way to determine which lands were
encompassed, the supernumerary warrants merely became another potential source of
ownership that floating throughout the Southwest Territory.73
The case of Criswell v. Donalson, from 1800, demonstrates the confluence of the
fraudulent possibilities of supernumerary warrants, North Carolina’s meager recordkeeping, and fruitless efforts to buy off adverse claims. In 1783, a man named Gawen
Leeper located 400 acres on the south side of the Holston River, which Stockley
Donalson, a prominent land speculator, purchased. Donalson resold Leeper’s entry to the
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plaintiff, James Criswell, in 1787, in return for a slave; Criswell moved onto the land.
After a delay in transferring the warrant occasioned by Leeper’s death, Donalson reported
sending in the required survey plat and certificate to the land office, but stated that it had
been mislaid. In 1791, Criswell sent another plat, but heard nothing. In 1795, he
journeyed to North Carolina himself, but could discover no grant or warrant. Hearing
that the warrant was in the hands of a man named Mayberry—who had died—Criswell
met Andrew Jackson, who held Mayberry’s papers; still no warrant.74
Frustrated, Criswell applied to a man named Tyrell to assist him. According to
Criswell’s allegations, Tyrell, rather than helping, allegedly used a supernumerary
warrant he held to claim 500 acres that included Criswell’s grant, knowing that Criswell
lacked any documents showing title. Criswell was forced to buy his land back from
Tyrell in return for lands he held elsewhere. But in the interim, a man named Evans—
who had purchased a portion of the land from Criswell, but engaged in some complicated
negotiations with Tyrell—brought an ejectment suit in county court. Criswell, lacking
“any grant or title which could be admitted to read as evidence in a court of common
law,” lost. He filed an equity suit to overturn the judgment, but it was dismissed for
insufficient notice.75
Many of the same problems plagued the Virginia Military District in the
Northwest Territory. An especially pungent critique of the Virginian land warrant
system, which encompassed the District, came from the state’s foremost jurist St. George
Tucker. “Patents for lands,” Tucker complained, “land-warrants, military rights to land,
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certificates of survey, nay, even bonds to procure, survey, and patent lands, have . . .
become a species of mercantile paper, passing from hand to hand”; Tucker likened this to
the “vast influx of paper money, that has deluged the United States for some years past.”
Virginia’s land system, Tucker argued, served only “[t]hose who wish only to deceive
and defraud others, who buy, merely to sell; who regard not in what miseries or
perplexities they may involve ignorant persons, and foreigners, will, until the bubble
bursts, continue to traffic in parchment.” Tucker urged that a settler who wished
“peaceable possession of his lands” and the ability to “transmit them to his posterity”
should look elsewhere. Subsequent events bore out Tucker’s predictions. As the Ohio
Supreme Court—which heard sixty-four disputes involving Virginia Military District
titles over the nineteenth century—observed in 1825, “the uncertainty of title, in the
Virginia military district, is proverbial, and that in many cases it is impossible to ascertain
the existence of conflicting claims, till they are set up by the claimants.”76
Taken together, suits such as King v. Daniel and Criswell v. Donalson exemplify
the factors that made bargaining in the shadow of the North Carolina’s land law so
complicated. In both cases, the validity of title hinged on handwritten records held
hundreds of miles away. And in both cases, disputes arose years after the initial
transaction, highlighting the role of death in untangling webs of debt spun over a lifetime.
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But they also demonstrate the fundamental unfairness and unpredictability of the North
Carolina land system. Both Daniel and Criswell sought scrupulously to comply with the
law and guarantee their title; yet unreliable intermediaries, as well as the failure of the
state itself, undermined their ownership.

Viewed from the present, it is easy to condemn the system of indiscriminate
location for the confusion that it created. But the system was not designed to produce
clarity and finality. It preserved, rather, the deep localism of early American
understandings of property. And it ostensibly enabled land ownership to be cheap,
decentralized, and democratic, aspects that would benefit marginal claimants such as
Daniel and Criswell.77
These principles, however, had little meaning or coherence when extended to the
vast unknown spaces of the Tennessee and Ohio Countries. For many early Americans,
land stood for independence, as expressed by the Fayette County Grand Jury. Looking
west, they anticipated that land would remain a valuable, secure, and stable asset. But
localism and constancy bore no relation to the abstract tracts of tens of thousands of land,
barely known even by the surveyor, with which speculators filled the entry books. Rather
than supporting gradual accumulation, land became a source of possibly enormous wealth
and equally rapid fall. Purchases made in expectation of value could suddenly become
77
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worthless. Yet for speculators, this uncertainty proved an advantage. Able to buy up
warrants and certificates, with privileged access to state institutions, they tilted the system
to their advantage.
Law played a critical role in this transformation of landed property. In the
territories, physical ground became far less important than title—some sort of
authoritative governmental document that conferred the abstract right of ownership. The
endless litigation produced by state land law only furthered this process of abstraction.
As litigants chased contrasting verdicts through appellate and equity courts, the idea that
property exists only as far as the state acknowledged an individual’s right against all
comers was no theoretical concept, but rather lived experience shared by many territorial
citizens.
This conversion of land into title had few benefits for the smallholders who were
the intended beneficiaries of state land systems. Rather, even for men like James Daniel
and James Criswell who bought primarily to settle and improve, western land became a
speculative investment. The abstraction of title swept them into the maw of the hungry
land market, where their fortunes were entangled with the grand speculators like William
Blount or Stockely Donalson. And any purchaser, no matter how careful, could get
dragged into prolonged, expensive legal disputes to protect their property rights. The
resulting lawyers’ paradise corresponded little with the localist ideal, with the result that
men like Daniel and Criswell, notwithstanding their illiteracy, were forced to become
experts in the intricacies of state land law.
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There was a deep irony that these state land systems reached their full
fluorescence outside the states, within the ostensibly federal jurisdiction and ownership of
the territories. Federal territorial, not state, courts administered and adjudicated the
disputes produced by North Carolina and Virginia’s decision to run their land offices on
the cheap. This frustrated distant federal officials like Jefferson, for whom such
uncertainty was antithetical to the clear chains of title they wished to construct. But the
acts of cession had entrenched state land law, keeping large swaths of these ostensibly
federal domains under state jurisdiction and authority. State land law systems were
embedded in an informal sense, as well, as the federal government had to contend with,
and accommodate, the power of the local notables like William Blount whose
prominence stemmed from their concentration of landed wealth.78
There was another irony, as well. As historians have stressed, the vision of
surveyed and gridded lands enshrined in the Ordinance of 1785 did not lessen the
conflation between land and title; if anything, it sought to remake the physical world to
correspond with paper realities. But the supposedly localist state land schemes, with their
squiggly boundaries, had proved just as adept at converting land into an abstract
commodity that could be bought and sold. As these parallels suggest, how boundaries
were drawn was less significant than the existence of land schemes that transformed
ground into title.
***
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Though rarely served by state land grant schemes, smallholders did manage to eke
out a property law doctrine that seemed to favor them: so-called “preemption rights.”
“Preemption,” in this context, had a meaning different from its application in Indian
affairs: it granted the first settlers of a particular tract of land, who had improved or
modified it in some way, the first right to purchase it from the state, notwithstanding
competing claims.
In their origins, preemption rights rested on legal conceptions of ownership
derived from sources other than positive law. As an attorney argued in the 1794
Southwest Territory case Blevins v. Shelby, “first occupancy agreeable to the Laws of
nature gave . . . an Equitable title to the land.” The principle that occupancy coupled with
improvement—clearing, planting, or building on land—could yield title had deep roots in
Anglo-American legal thought; it supported the earliest justifications of English
colonization of North America in both theory and formal legal documents, and was
enshrined in Locke’s labor theory of value. Though few on the late eighteenth-century
frontier had read Locke or earlier theorists, they shared the vision of the frontier as
“almost a State of Nature,” free for the taking. The discourse of improvement thus served
as vernacular property law in the unsettled borderlands, especially as formal titling
schemes were slow to catch up with rapid settlement.79
Struggles over preemption rights were nothing new. Colonial and imperial
officials had long fought settlers they disdained as “intruders,” fruitlessly attempting to
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extract payment for their lands. Yet the late eighteenth century represented a moment of
transition. As the American Revolution dismantled older barriers, a more populist vision
of property rights gained ascendance. Impoverished first occupants consistently
demanded, and largely received, low prices, generous payment terms, and explicit
acknowledgment of their claims based on occupancy. Privileging rapid settlement and
widespread access over revenue and stability, state officials began to award preemption
rights formal statutory recognition. In 1777, North Carolina granted claimants who
“possessed and actually improved” vacant lands the right to obtain 640 acres “in
preference to all others.” Subsequent statutes, including the 1783 land law, reinforced and
expanded this right. In 1779, the Virginia legislature granted first settlers who had “built
any house or hut, or made other improvements” the first right to purchase 1,000 acres of
land at the nominal state price of roughly two cents per acre.80
Would-be claimants quickly sought to extend preemption rights into the
territories, even though, at least in the Northwest Territory, they enjoyed no statutory
protection. This made little difference. As a federal official in the Territory reported,
“These Men upon the frontiers have hitherto been accustomed to seat themselves on the
best of the lands, making a tomahawk right or Improvement as they term it, supposing
that to be a sufficient Title.” A federal surveyor in the Territory similarly observed that
many settlers sought to “derive a Title to themselves by prior Occupancy according to the
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Mode which has heretofore prevaild in Virginia & Pensylvania.” “[F]rom this Idea,” he
told a traveler, “you will find many Tracts of Land Survey'd & Mark’d.”81
But, though rooted in natural-law and customary practices, preemption rights soon
became yet another source of ownership that freely floated throughout territorial land
practice, particularly when formal law conferred them with legitimacy. This was
especially apparent in the Tennessee Country. Preemption rights there were relatively
formalized: like other land rights, they were recorded in local court records. And like
other promises of future title, preemption rights soon became the subject of a vigorous
market where they were bought and sold. As a result, like the mechanism of state land
grants—of which they were a part—preemption rights purported to be about localism and
protecting small claimants, but were often far more ambiguous. In the 1795 suit of
Tatum v. Winchester, for instance, Howell Tatum managed to secure land rights based on
a 1784 inchoate preemption claim over a formal North Carolinian grant obtained by
James Winchester in 1792, notwithstanding Tatum’s failure to make a survey to take any
other steps to secure an official title. Winchester was a prominent territorial citizen and
land speculator, but Tatum was no smallholder either—he served as territorial treasurer
and later as a state judge, and also speculated widely in lands. In these circumstances,
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preemption rights represented just another legal trump in the myriad contests to secure
lands in the Southwest Territory.82

Yet at the same moment improvement prevailed in state statutes, the creation of
the federal domain opened a new arena for contestation. Federal officials did not share
the vision of ownership adopted by the states. In particular, from nearly the moment the
American Revolution ended, the cash-strapped national government envisioned using the
ceded lands to repay the enormous sums the United States had borrowed to finance the
war. “The only adequate fund I can conceive for the payment of our debts,” a
congressman wrote to John Adams, echoing the sentiments of many politicians, “are our
western Lands.”83
Preemption rights, and the vision of freely available property they represented,
threatened to undermine the promise of revenue. “[A]greeable to established customs in
this Country, cutting down a few Trees planting three Hills Corn & fencing them gives a
right of Soil to 400 acres & a preemption to 400 more,” Jonathan Heart, a captain in the
U.S. army, wrote from his post in the Ohio Valley. If “holding under this Tenure” were
permitted, he argued, “the whole Federal Territory will not raise One thousand Pounds,”
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as “no Man would give 400 Dollars for a Farm which One Days work would serve.” The
Northwest Territory’s governor, Arthur St. Clair, similarly observed that what were
“commonly called improvements” in the region consisted of “marking or deadening a
few trees, or throwing a few logs together in form of a cabin; in which way two or three
persons, in a single week, would cover a large tract of country.”84
Preemption rights threatened the public treasury in another way, as well. Western
lands were not in a state of nature; they were owned by Native nations. Yet granting
preemption rights to the first occupants encouraged Anglo-Americans to intrude into
Indian country, anticipating that, when the lands were purchased from Natives (an event
the settlers regarded as inevitable), they would have the first claim. In 1784, shortly after
Virginia’s cession, the Continental Congress forbade settlement in the Northwest
Territory, north of the Ohio River, because it remained Indian territory. But when
George Washington visited later that year, he found that the proclamation made little
difference. The “rage” for what he termed “forestalling of Lands” meant that “scarce a
valuable spot . . . is left without a claimant.” Washington’s proposed solution was to
deem all steps to secure lands north of the Ohio as “null & void”—in other words, to
negate settlers’ preemption rights. Senator Benjamin Hawkins made the connection
between preemption rights and the flagrant violation of Indian ownership still more
explicit. “[H]itherto all our acts of No. Carolina seem to favour intruders,” he observed.
“[W]henever the land office was opened special provision was made for intruders under
the appellation of occupants.” Thus it was, Hawkins lamented, “however strange it may
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seem . . . that by violating a solemn treaty these people could acquire this right of
occupancy.”85
Officials’ anxiety for protecting Native lands was not particularly altruistic.
Rather, they feared, as Washington did, that the blatant violation of Indian title “would
inevitably produce a war.” Hawkins stated similarly of the Cherokees that the
“encroachments on our part are the true cause of the hostilities on theirs, and as long as
the first is suffered the latter may be expected.” Preemption, in other words, was not free.
“[G]ratify[ing] a few intruders,” Thomas Jefferson bemoaned about the Southwest
Territory, would “cost the other inhabitants of the U.S. a thousand times” the land’s
value, in the form of an Indian war. It was cheaper and “more just,” Jefferson concluded,
to “make war” against the intruders than the Indians.86
In the 1780s and early 1790s, then, the federal government and, to a lesser extent,
North Carolina began anew earlier struggles against occupancy claims. This dispute
focused on two separate regions within the territories. In the Northwest Territory,
officials and settlers contested for the north bank of the Ohio River. Located just across
from present-day Kentucky and West Virginia—then both part of Virginia, where
preemption claims were legally recognized—these Ohio bottom lands were both fertile
and well-located along the main riverine artery into the West. In what became the
Southwest Territory, North Carolinians poured into the valleys west of the Great Smoky
Mountains. This region, too, was defined by water: bounded by the Tennessee River to
the west, the French Broad to the north, and the Big Pigeon to the east, it was usually
85
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known simply as the “French Broad.” The traditional homeland of the Upper Cherokees,
this area contained many of their most important towns.
Under formal law, white settlement in both regions was illegal. Congress had
barred settling north of the Ohio, while North Carolina had specifically set aside the
French Broad region for the Cherokees—the only portion of the entire state where white
settlers could not stake a property claim. These prohibitions had little effect. In 1785, a
federal army officer estimated that there were 2,100 white families settled on the north
shore of the Ohio River, while in 1788 North Carolina’s governor placed the number of
white families south of the French Broad at 1500. Officials, especially federal officials,
had only contempt for these purported criminals, decrying them as “banditti” who “wish
to live under no government.” Their standard description for these “intruders” was
“lawless.”87
Yet settlers disagreed with this characterization both of themselves and the law.
They insisted that they were “faithful subjects of the common wealth of America” in the
words of one memorial. Government officers were surprised to find many of them
submissive and obedient. “We do not pretend Claim Right or title to Land till we obtain
in a Constitutional Manner,” one group of settlers along the Ohio assured a federal
official. Inhabitants south of the French Broad loyally committed their “lives and
fortunes to support [North Carolina’s] laws and Constitution.”88
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In adopting these invocations of lawfulness, settlers were embracing a strategy
that sought to enlist the government to acknowledge their rights. Their claims to
obedience appeared in what seemed an endless stream of petitions, in which their desire
to obey the law served as prelude to pleas for indulgence, cooperation, and legalization.
Sometimes settlers pleaded ignorance and argued that they were just following wellestablished custom. “Thos prohibatory Laws [banning their settlement] are Nevar
sufficiently promulgated and have never hitherto been put in Execution,” one group of
French Broad settlers complained. “[W]e did not transgress your laws from a refractory
disposition, but only followed the practice of the different states who had unapropriated
lands to settled, who from time immemorial confirmed the actual settlers in their
settlements upon their paying the price settled by Law.” Every petition the French Broad
settlers sent concluded by appealing for the opening of a land office and honoring the
settlers’ preemption rights “at a moderate price.” Other times they appealed to officials’
mercy, using moral suasion to make quasi-legal claims. They had placed their lives and
property at risk and suffered the brunt of Indian attacks, rhetorically parading widowed
mothers and fatherless children before the legislators. They were desperate and had
nowhere else to go: if expelled, we “must take up with hunger for [a] companion and
familiarly shake hands with the cold hand of poverty,” as a group of North Carolinian
petitioners stated.89
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And they asked, always, for more time—to bring in their crops, to appeal to yet
another official or legislature who might offer relief. The settlers “generally promise
compliance” with orders for removal, one federal officer along the Ohio wrote, “but I
observe it is with a degree of reluctance, and that they are fond of construing every
indulgence, in the most favorable and extensive manner for themselves.” Unless forced
off, “there will be no end to their craveing for future indulgence.”90
When these appeals to officials were unavailing, as they were both along the Ohio
and the French Broad, the intruders opted for another approach. Employing the rhetoric
of the American Revolution, they would assert rights to what historians have termed selfsovereignty—the right of the people to form their own governments. If the state would
not honor their claims, they would constitute a new state.91
This language of self-governance and autonomy appeared in both the Northwest
and Southwest Territories. In nearly every settlement north of the Ohio, federal officials
discovered an advertisement penned by a settler named John Emerson. Emerson
proposed meetings to frame a constitution for the settlements. “I do certify that all
mankind,” Emerson wrote, “agreeable to every constitution formed in America, have an
undoubted right to pass into every vacant country, and there to form their constitution.”
The settlers manifested these rights to self-sovereignty by electing their own justices of
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the peace who issued writs and decided cases without any sanction from state or federal
governments.92
Paired with this claim to self-governance was a rejection of federal authority over
their lands. An anonymous writer echoed Emerson’s assertions about the right to create
new settlements; unlike Emerson, he cited authorities—the pursuit of happiness in the
Declaration of Independence, the guarantees of possessing property in the Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania Declarations of Rights, and, in particular, the fifteenth article of the
Pennsylvania Bill of Rights, which promised, in the author’s paraphrase, that all men had
a “right to form a new State in Vacant Countrys.” This author went further, however, by
carefully scrutinizing the Articles of Confederation for any provision that might grant the
federal government the power to “determine on the destruction of any Man or his
property.” Congress had a right to conclude treaties with the Indians, he argued, but not
to prevent immigration; the right to levy war, but not against its own loyal citizens; the
authority to resolve disputes involving “territory, Jurisdiction, or Boundary lines,” but not
to determine the right of property. In short, this author concluded, federal officials who
attempted to deprive the settlers of their lands could be held jointly and severally liable
for their actions.93
South of the French Broad, settlers proved equally defiant of North Carolinian
authority. North Carolina’s hold on its western possessions had always been tenuous, the
region’s inhabitants dissatisfied with a government they believed favored coastal
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interests. In the mid-1780s, these disgruntled settlers seceded to form what hostile
observers decried as the “pretend State of Franklin.” The Franklinites, as they were
called, enacted their own constitution, elected their own legislature and governor—a
prominent frontiersman named John Sevier—and created their own court system.94
They also crafted their own land policy. Under their own authority, the
Franklinites entered a dubious agreement known as the Treaty of Dumplin Creek with the
Cherokees. As reported by the Cherokee leader Old Tassel, only a handful of young
Cherokee men had attended the treaty session, all the while insisting to the Franklinites
that they lacked the authority to negotiate a land sale. The Cherokees had promised only
to consult with the nation’s leaders. Nonetheless, on the basis of the purported treaty, the
Franklinites now “call[ed]” the disputed territory “their Ground.” Flouting North
Carolina’s restrictions, the Franklin legislature opened a land office for all the territory
between the French Broad and Tennessee Rivers. Whites began to settle throughout
Cherokee country, even within a few miles of Chota, a “Belovd Town” and one of the
most important locations within the Cherokee Nation. The panicked Cherokees appealed
to state and federal officials for help. “[W]e look upon the white people that Lives in the
new State very deceitfull,” a group of Cherokees told a federal representative. “[W]e
have Experienced them, and are much affraid of them.” North Carolina’s Indian agent
predicted a war. 95
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For their part, the Franklinites promised to “Hold [the land] in Defiance of Every
power.” Indeed, both North Carolinian and federal proclamations ordering the
Franklinites off the Cherokee land proved fruitless, as the settlers refused to acknowledge
either state or federal authority. “[T]hey Had Knowledge Enough to Judge for
themselves,” one group of settlers informed a North Carolinian official trying to expel
them from the land, “that they should not ask North Carolina Nor no other person how
they ware to B. Governd.”96
In 1788, after intense factionalism and a brief battle, Franklin imploded, and
North Carolina resumed control over the region. But the defiance of the French Broad
settlers persisted. Excluded from civil government because their settlement remained
illegal under North Carolina law, they, like the settlers north of the Ohio, established their
own “social compact,” drafting articles of association that adopted the laws and
constitution of North Carolina but kept the civil and military officers appointed by
Franklin in office. And they insisted on the continued validity of the Treaty of Dumplin
Creek, arguing that it was authorized by North Carolina’s governor as well as the state of
Franklin.97
In sum, the supposedly lawless banditti who defied statutes and executive
proclamations were, in their minds, neither. Though divided by hundreds of miles,
settlers violating state and federal law by settling north of the Ohio and south of the
French Broad adopted similar arguments and rhetoric. They did not wish to live under
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“no government”; what they wanted was a government that would honor the claims to
land they asserted. They sought to achieve this through petitions that cast them, and not
distant political elites, as the lawful actors. Failing that, they sought to build their own
states that would validate their claims.

Officials who sought to prevent occupancy claims faced limited options. Law, a
possibility in theory, proved deeply inadequate in practice. “[A]s to the intruders [on
Native and public lands],” wrote Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, in
response to a suggestion to use the courts to constrain them, “the United States had best
at once throw open this Country to every person who pleases to take possession of it, and
give up all hopes of their Land ever being of use in discharging the public debt, for not
one of them, I am certain, will ever be removed of civil process.” Instead of courts,
federal officials seeking to protect federal as well as Native title could select between two
options: harshly punitive measures on the one hand, or negotiation and accommodation
on the other. 98
North of the Ohio, officials largely adopted force. The federal Commissioners of
Indian Affairs authorized the commander of the few hundred federal soldiers along the
river, Colonel Josiah Harmar, to evict illegal settlers forcibly. Secretary at War Henry
Knox reiterated to Harmar that the removal of “all intruders” from federal lands was “the
first object” for his forces: “the payment of the public debt . . . dictate[s] that you make
use of the force under your command, to expel from the public lands, those lawless men
who have acted in defiance of the orders and interest of the United States.” Harmar was
98

Arthur St. Clair to Henry Knox, August 17, 1791, Arthur St. Clair Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library.

101

only too pleased to “give . . . federal Law” at gunpoint. Throughout 1785 and 1786,
detachments of federal soldiers ranged the Ohio, ordering settlers to leave their cabins
and burning the homes and crops they left behind.99
Given the settlers’ unwillingness to acknowledge federal authority, the contest
over the Ohio lands threatened violence. As Major John Armstrong traveled up and
down the river, ordering settlers to leave, he frequently encountered defiance. Some
gatherings of men simply “laugh[ed]” when Armstrong read them his orders. One man
named Ross, after “cast[ing] many reflections on the Honorable the Congress the [Indian]
Commissioners & the commanding Officer,” stated that he “was determined to hold his
possession” no matter where the instructions came from. If Armstrong destroyed his
house, “he would build six more in the course of a week.” Armstrong arrested Ross and
sent him off in chains.

Others armed themselves and promised to resist violently,

backing down only when Armstrong proclaimed that he would fire on any armed party.
When Armstrong entered their homes, he discovered loopholes and barricades.100
North Carolina officials dealing with settlers south of the French Broad dearly
wished to follow a similar course. The state’s Indian agent, Joseph Martin, was certain
that only “an armed Force” could remove the settlers. In fact, in 1784, North Carolina’s
governor instructed Martin to call on local leaders and militia to “drive off those
evelminded persons who have intruded, and still continue on the Indian Lands, beyond
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[the] French Broad River.” But since the local militia was far more likely to endorse
attacking the Cherokees than removing intruders, force was largely unavailable.101
The experience in the Northwest Territory also suggested that force was often
unavailing. Despite repeated evictions, settlers returned, sometimes two or three times.
The lure was simply too great. “While men who wish to act orderly and under good
Government anxiously wait for arrangements being made,” one observer presciently
wrote in 1785, “others of speculative & interpresing genius step forward . . . A few may
be dislodged, but they will soon become too numerous for this to be easily effected.”102
That left accommodation. In North Carolina, the repeated appeals of the French
Broad settlers had an effect. Though a number of bills legalizing the intruders’ status
never passed—too many legislators deemed the claims “impolitic”—the French Broad
settlers secured a key concession in North Carolina’s 1789 cession to the federal
government. The cession, the law provided, “shall not prevent the people now residing
south of French Broad . . . from entering their pre-emptions in that tract, should an office
be opened for that purpose, under an act of the present General Assembly.”103
This provision complicated an already confusing situation for federal officials
attempting to clarify ownership in the newly ceded Southwest Territory. In a territory
already marked by a tangle of ownership claims, the French Broad region presented an
especially thorny challenge, beset by three distinct sets of claimants, all of whom could
point to positive law to justify their ownership.
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The first claimants were the settlers actually occupying the territory. The cession
only protected their rights contingently: their right to preemption depended on North
Carolina’s creation of a land office. But the state’s assembly failed to open an office, in
part because the cession complicated its own right to govern territorial lands, especially
south of the French Broad. The settlers remained, the status of their occupancy rights
uncertain.
The second claimant came to be the federal government. Until 1791, under both
the Treaty of Hopewell and North Carolina law, the Cherokees legally owned the French
Broad land. But at the Treaty of Holston, Governor Blount purchased the Cherokee
rights to the region. By virtue of the government’s position as sole purchaser of Native
title, ownership of roughly 300,000 acres passed to the federal government. As Jefferson
noted in his report, because North Carolina had legally barred settlement in the area, it
was the only parcel of land that the federal government owned free of prior claims under
North Carolina law, and so constituted “the only Lands open to [federal] Disposal” in the
entire territory—setting aside, Jefferson noted, the large number of settlers already
present on the land.104
This struggle, between intruders citing preemptive rights and the federal
government seeking to preserve its own title, strongly resembled the contests north of the
Ohio, though complicated by the cession’s protection of preemption rights. But what
muddied the situation still further was the existence of a third set of claimants, asserting
ownership on still murkier legal grounds. In autumn 1790, soon after he arrived in the
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Southwest Territory, William Blount discovered a North Carolina grant for lands south of
the French Broad, even though such grants would be, in Blount’s estimation, “directly
against both the Words and Spirit . . . of the laws of No. Carolina.” Blount soon learned
that settlers were using so-called supernumerary warrants—the warrants issued under
North Carolina’s 1783 land law for duplicate land claims—to obtain title to the French
Broad lands. Blount duly informed Secretary of State Jefferson of the practice.105
The claimants under the warrants were untroubled that the lands ostensibly
belonged to the United States. Under their interpretation of the act of cession, the federal
government’s obligation to honor North Carolina’s law encompassed the supernumerary
warrants, even though North Carolina foreclosed their application to the French Broad
lands. North Carolina Governor Alexander Martin seemed to agree. Though Martin
issued a proclamation against the practice at Jefferson’s urging, he also observed that the
grants that had been issued, as well as any future grants, were still legally valid, as the act
of cession granted North Carolina “full authority” over vacant lands.106
The French Broad settlers, then, differed from claimants north of the Ohio in the
diverse array of statutory law they could invoke to support their claims. Their situation
also differed from the struggles north of the Ohio in the remarkably solicitous response of
federal officials. Attorney General Edmund Randolph argued for leaving the matter in
Blount’s discretion rather than issuing indictments, and Jefferson urged Blount to require
only a vague acknowledgment of the federal government’s title from the settlers: that
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way, he suggested, “you will secure the right of the U.S. with as little trouble and injury
to the intruders and grantees as you can.”107
This preference for accommodation, rather than confrontation, had several causes.
Unlike Henry Knox and Col. Harmar, Jefferson and Randolph were not military men,
accustomed to issuing orders and expecting obedience. Echoing the settlers’ quasi-legal
arguments, Jefferson even acknowledged that “equitable circumstances” might justify the
settlers’ land claims. But they may also have recognized that federal authority in the
Southwest Territory remained tenuous, dependent on the local goodwill. With few
soldiers in the region, federal policy depended on William Blount and his handful of
lieutenants—all former North Carolinians, selected by dint of their local prominence and
influence rather than nationalist commitments. Blount was in fact even less reliable than
Jefferson or Randolph realized. Before he wrote to his superiors warning of the French
Broad frauds, Blount had written to his business associates to buy up supernumerary
warrants to invest in the “scheme”—“my name never to appear,” he cautioned.108
Yet the shift toward accommodation also reflected a change in the political mood
away from earlier iron-fisted approaches. At the first U.S. Congress, western
representatives pushed for a federal land system that would acknowledge the right of
occupancy for unauthorized settlers on federal lands. “Will you then raise a force to
drive them off?” Representative Scott, from western Pennsylvania, asked on the floor of
the House of Representatives in May 1789. “That has been tried; troops were raised and
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sent under Harmer [sic] to effect that purpose . . . but three hours after the troops were
gone, these people returned again, repaired the damage, and are now settled upon the
lands in open defiance of the authority of the Union.” Scott argued that these settlers “be
indulged with a pre-emption to the purchase,” and the House agreed. The House passed a
bill that would grant “preference” to “actual settlers,” even though dissenters grumbled
that a speculator could simply “spend a few days on his land, and call himself an actual
settler.” But after the House’s bill died from slow neglect in the Senate, the ambiguous
status of preemption rights in the territories persisted.109
In one sense, such ambiguity served the settlers well; it suggested at least
grudging acknowledgment of their informal claims. With territorial officials unwilling or
unable to evict them, the purported intruders remained on their lands, their continued
occupation making mass removal more difficult and costly.
But casting the unauthorized settlers as simply defending a customary legal order
against the state—as wishing merely to be left alone—ignores how fully the settlers were
invested in recognition of their title under formal law. This is especially clear south of
the French Broad, where the settlers’ rhetoric demonstrated that many still craved
legalization, even though their occupancy had acquired quasi-legal status. They
continued, for instance, to petition Congress. In 1794, assisted by a committee from the
first sitting of the territorial legislature, they asked that their “right of pre-emption to their
hard-earned improvements and possessions” be recognized when a federal land office
opened. Even more significant than the settlers’ language, however, was their actions.
After asking Congress to honor preemption rights, they related that many had purchased
109
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North Carolina land warrants and “laid them on their lands,” in the expectation that
Congress would confirm them. They audaciously asked that Congress honor their
warrants—while also preventing “stranger[s]” from using those same warrants to seize
title “from the holder and improver of the land.” In other words, many of the French
Broad settlers were not content to assert preemption rights alone. They grasped at any
available source for ownership that would bolster their claims to the lands they lived
on.110
A similar reliance on multiple sources of ownership to protect title to French
Broad lands appears in the Superior Court case King v. Wilson. Around the time the
settlers were petitioning Congress, Robert Wilson, who lived in the disputed region, fell
into conversation with Robert King, a prominent land speculator. King asked Wilson
whether he wished to obtain a supernumerary warrant for the lands on which he lived.
Wilson declined, though not because he thought his occupancy right sufficient. Rather,
he “did not wish to risque his money for a Grant because he conceived the grants
Obtained in that tract of Country would be illegal and void.” King in response “insisted
that grants in that manner obtained would be good and valid in law.”111
Wilson finally reached an agreement with King that would purportedly protect his
title against the legal uncertainty surrounding the French Broad lands. As the parties
orally contracted, King would obtain a warrant from North Carolina in his own name
from Wilson’s land, but he would also provide a bond for Wilson to obtain his tract “in
fee simple . . . derived from the United States whenever the federal Office for the sale of
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said land should be opened (provided the title and conveyance from North Carolina . . .
should be found insufficient).” It would take many years before this contract in the
alternate could finally be settled.112
As King v. Wilson suggests, notwithstanding federal acquiescence in the presence
of the “intruders,” the French Broad region in the early 1790s was not a squatters’
paradise. It was a place where three forms of ownership—occupancy, state warrants, and
federal grants—comingled as much as they clashed, and where “actual settlers” sought
above all official recognition of their ownership claims. The settlers understood that
there were threats to ownership other than federal bayonets; they recognized that, in the
litigious free-for-all of Southwest Territory land practice, other claimants often
represented the greatest challenge for land ownership.

At its most extreme, the confrontation between settlers asserting occupancy
rights—“intruders”—and the federal government took the form of a physical, and
ideological, standoff: settlers asserting natural-law claims that denied federal authority
against soldiers evicting them at gunpoint, acting on the orders of officials who despised
such defiance of federal directives as “lawlessness.” Following the perspective of the
officials themselves, most histories of the period have fixated on such dramatic
showdowns. But this narrative risks misunderstanding the aims of both the government
and the settlers. The federal government itself oscillated, sometimes tolerating intruders,
and nearly legalizing their claims. Even more significantly, casting the anti-statist as
defenders of customary norms, as many histories have done, flattens their objectives.
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The order they sought to defend—preemption rights—was grounded in statute. And,
although based on rights of occupancy and improvement, preemption rights were not an
unvarnished acknowledgment of vernacular claims; they still depended on state
recognition, recordation, and often payment, to secure legally protected title. These
rights were but one source of ownership that these settlers strategically, and
pragmatically, advanced to try to protect their rights.
In the end, what these “lawless” settlers craved above all was law—law that
would protect their lands in the midst of the tremendous scramble for ownership
throughout the territories. But as the French Broad region suggests, law did not always
provide a solution. Just as with the state land system, preemption rights did not guarantee
security of title. They merely cast settlers into the territories’ litigious sea of land claims.
***
In May 1789, two months into its first sitting, the House of Representatives
returned to the question of the federal land system in the U.S. territories. All the
members agreed that the issue was “deserving of the earliest attention,” in the words of
James Madison. When the House sidetracked to discuss the amendments that would
become the Bill of Rights, Representative Vining of Delaware urged the congressmen to
return to the land issue. “[I]n point of importance,” he argued, “every candid mind would
acknowledge its preference.”113
This sense of urgency concerning federal title reflected both the typicality and
uniqueness of the controversies over ownership in the Northwest and Southwest
Territories. Federal officials and lawmakers were not alone in grappling with the sources
113
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and definition of property in the 1780s and early 1790s. Throughout the United States,
confusion and contention over title occurred wherever jurisdiction and ownership were
unsettled. In what Anglo-American maps labeled as upstate New York, the
Haudenosaunee (Iroquois), the federal government, state officials, and land speculators
all contended over the scope and meaning of Native title and consent. In Kentucky—a
Virginia county sandwiched between the two federal territories until its statehood in
1792—Virginia’s system of indiscriminate location, which closely resembled North
Carolina’s 1783 land law, produced notorious amounts of litigation. “The Titles to the
landed Estates in Kentucky are so very uncertain,” one observer wrote, that “the Chance
is at least three to One, that a Man who purchases there must defend his Title by a
Lawsuit.” And on Massachusetts’s eastern frontier (present-day Maine), speculators
embracing positivist conceptions of ownership contended with settlers who used quasilegal arguments to assert occupancy rights to land.114
But Congress’s hurry to create a land system stemmed from more than a sense of
general crisis; it derived from a view that the territories held especial significance in
recrafting ownership in early America. In part, the territories’ distinctiveness stemmed
from the intensity of property pluralism there: issues of Native ownership, state land law
systems, and occupancy rights all overlapped simultaneously, creating an especially
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complex ownership tangle. For Congress, though, the territories’ salience came from the
fact that they represented the future of land ownership. Already by the early 1790s, by
dint of the North Carolina and Virginia cessions, most western lands were under federal
jurisdiction. Because of the federal government’s sole right to purchase Native title, this
concentration would only increase. At the same time, state-controlled “vacant” lands
were quickly disappearing; in 1789, one congressman declared Kentucky “already full.”
Congress accordingly viewed the Northwest and Southwest Territories as a laboratory for
the creation of federal precedents that would, they anticipated, ultimately govern property
over much of the continent.115
Yet the congressional push to quickly define federal title in the territories, and
thereby make land available for western settlement, failed. It failed because the shadows
of past land systems doubly haunted the federal government, both in the territories and in
the halls of Congress.
As Jefferson’s report underscored, and federal officials quickly discovered, the
federal territories were not a blank canvas for crafting federal policy. They were, rather,
a crazy quilt of the ideas and laws that other people had created about ownership.
Pluralism resulted because the territories were a place of collision: most obviously,
between Native and Anglo-American concepts of property, but also between settlers from
different states with their own land laws; between distant federal administrators, state
governors and legislatures, and local officials; and between smallholders and grandees.
These encounters concentrated and intensified the debates about ownership
already swirling throughout early America. Though these controversies involved broad,
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abstract ideas—questions of land and democracy, the individual and the state, natural and
positive law—in the territories they were the stuff of everyday legal practice, made
manifest through formal deeds, grants, warrants, as well as quasi-legal claims that
appeared through petitions and even violence. This proliferation of paper also made
concepts about property sticky: the persistence of a parcel of land, and the centrality of a
chain of title, meant that long-vanished ideas about ownership remained relevant, and
contentious, for decades afterward. Ideas about how to grant land were, in this sense,
immortal.
The result of all this pluralism was confusion, which even those who profited
handsomely from the disorder claimed to abhor. But if everyone professed agreement
about the problem, not all agreed about the cure. The solution proposed by the Land
Ordinance of 1785—prior survey and the rectangular grid—was controversial in the
territories. For one, it was immensely expensive; many suggested it would cost more
than it would bring in. For another, many insisted the rectangular grid made confusion
worse, not better. Rectangular lines would arbitrarily and unpredictably divide valuable
natural features, while surveyors could be notoriously inaccurate. Far better to have
tracts “so well described with natural Bounderies as to leave no grounds or possibility of
dispute.” Even Arthur St. Clair, the governor of the Northwest Territory charged with
implementing federal law, expressed doubt. Like most at the time, he advocated for
adopting what was most familiar and well-known to him—in his case, given his central
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Pennsylvania roots, the Pennsylvania land system. He often rode this favorite
hobbyhorse in letters to cabinet officials.116
The disagreement in the territories found its echo in the capital, where Congress
was also arguing vehemently about which elements of the past to accept, and which to
reject. Though histories of the federal land system, written with the benefit of hindsight,
often read as if the 1785 land ordinance foreordained later outcomes, the law may as well
have never existed for all the attention Congress paid it. Its debates in the late 1780s and
early 1790s demonstrate, rather, how unformed and unsettled federal land policy
remained. The only principle that seemed to secure universal agreement was that lands
could only be sold after they had been purchased from Native nations. Otherwise,
members disagreed over prior survey, the rectangular grid, the location of federal land
offices, occupancy rights, and the price per acre; they fought over whether federal land
policy should serve large moneyed purchasers or smallholders.117
Though earlier land practice was the primary touchstone for this wide-ranging
debate, the congressmen fiercely disagreed about prior systems’ merits. When one
congressman praised New York’s land practice, another sought to make sure it was well
understood “in order that the United States may avoid it.” When one congressman
lauded indiscriminate location, others attacked the confusion and litigation the system
produced. For his part, North Carolina representative Hugh Williamson observed that his
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state’s land system, as established under the 1783 land law, had allowed “persons rich in
securities and cash” to seize the best lands.118
After two years of debate, the House largely punted. The bill it ultimately enacted
contained concrete provisions guaranteeing the right of preemption (as discussed above)
and, after much disagreement, setting a tentative low price of twenty-five cents per acre.
But it left the hotly contested questions of the “form, time, and manner” of how lands
would be located and patents issued entirely to the Attorney General, who would serve as
superintendent of the general land office. But even this nominal agreement failed in the
Senate, which opted instead to secure more information about the land in the territories—
which produced Jefferson’s report. The apparently overwhelmed Congress abandoned
the land office project, not to be revived for several years.119
One of the bill’s strongest backers, Thomas Scott of western Pennsylvania,
blamed its failure not on ignorance, but on well-placed opposition from federally backed
land companies.120 These land companies were the product of a federal policy adopted a
few years earlier in the waning days of the Continental Congress. By sheer number of
acres distributed, they had a far stronger claim to be the first federal land system than the
ineffectual 1785 ordinance. Its backers and proponents hoped they would offer a solution
to the territories’ property muddle. Events played out differently.
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Chapter 2: Land Companies and the First Federal Land System
In 1787, as the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia and the Continental
Congress drafted the Northwest Ordinance in New York, Manasseh Cutler, a
Massachusetts minister little known to the congressmen and delegates, visited both.
Cutler traveled on behalf of the Ohio Company of Associates, a group of New
Englanders, many of them veterans of the Continental Army, who had subscribed to
shares in a proposed purchase of western lands. The Company had charged Cutler with
negotiating a contract for federal lands in the Northwest Territory. Ultimately, Cutler,
aided by another company representative, Winthrop Sargent, secured an agreement for
1.5 million acres along the Ohio River, in return for a promised payment of one million
dollars in federal securities. The deal Cutler struck “far exceeded any private contract
ever made before in the United States,” one congressional delegate opined; he told Cutler
he had never known “so much attention” paid to a proposal, nor “more pressing to bring
it to a close.”1
Cutler’s purchase represented the beginning of what, in hindsight, can be
denominated the first federal land system—a moment in the late 1780s when the federal
government sold large tracts of territorial land to speculative land companies. In most
histories of public lands, federal sales to the companies represent a brief aberration from
the otherwise steady march from the 1785 Land Ordinance to the federal land office
system of 1800.2 In fact, in empowering non-state actors to pursue important

1
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governmental ends, the large-scale sales were far more characteristic of eighteenthcentury governance than the abortive federal surveys and sales of the 1780s. These
transactions resembled the state land systems in that purchasers, not the government,
would bear the administrative costs and reap the potential profits. The land companies
themselves harkened to prerevolutionary predecessors such as the Vandalia, Indiana, and
(identically named) Ohio Company.3
But the Ohio Company and its primary imitator, the Miami Company, also
diverged from these earlier precedents. Unlike prerevolutionary land companies, which
often existed in uneasy tension and often outright conflict with government, the Ohio and
Miami Companies would not be unsanctioned, autonomous efforts to craft statelets in the
wilderness on the strength of Indian purchases. Rather, at least in aspiration, they more
closely resembled quasi-public corporate entities like the East India Company long used
to subsidize and support imperial ventures. The Companies, in fact, sold themselves
based on their commitment to federal state-building. Purchasing lands directly from the
federal government itself, the companies, especially the Ohio Company, envisioned
themselves as forerunners and participants in the national political project of extending
federal authority and law onto the seemingly ungovernable frontier. As historians have
persuasively traced, the land companies represented a projection of federal power—
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through governance, demographics, finance, and military capacity—along the Ohio
Valley.4
Existing literature has captured less well how the land companies would achieve
these aims. Recent scholarship has emphasized the growth and expansion of corporations
in the early republic, stressing their role as sources of economic and political power and
as polities within the broader polity. What distinguished the land companies from the
era’s wider mushrooming of corporate governance was that they possessed and controlled
territory through ownership. In this sense, the Ohio and Miami Companies were less
forward-looking, toward an age of business corporations, than backward-looking: the
Companies were eighteenth-century municipal corporations writ large, where power and
authority to pursue governmental goals derived precisely from title to property.
Controlling land, and especially how it was distributed, was not only the companies’ core
business but also their promise as an implement of policy, in the eyes of both proponents
and federal officials. The diverse and extravagant promises Cutler and others insisted
settlement would accomplish underscored how central title was to ideas about
governance during this period.5

4

For previous histories of the Ohio and Miami Companies, particularly stressing their status as an investment in federal authority, see
Andrew R. L Cayton, The Frontier Republic: Ideology and Politics in the Ohio Country, 1780-1825 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State
University Press, 1986), 12–67; Bethel Saler, The Settlers’ Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in America’s Old Northwest
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 52–57; Timothy J. Shannon, “The Ohio Company and the Meaning of
Opportunity in the American West, 1786-1795,” The New England Quarterly 64, no. 3 (September 1, 1991): 393–413;
5
The key work in this context is Hendrick Hartog’s insightful study of New York City. Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private
Power: The Corporation of the City of New York in American Law, 1730-1870(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1983). As Hartog argues, especially in the eighteenth century, the corporation’s ‘management of [its] corporate estate [w]as a mode of
public planning and governance”; he especially stresses the importance of the corporation’s exercise of authority by controlling grants
of waterfront lots. Ibid, 43-68.
None of the three companies discussed here ever formally incorporated, although the Ohio Company’s charter contained a provision,
never fulfilled, that called for incorporation either through Congress or one of the states. Articles of an Association by the Name of the
Ohio Company (Worcester, Mass.: Printed by Isaiah Thomas, 1786), 6 Nonetheless, they fit within a model of corporate governance,
drawn from pre-revolutionary practice, in which governments “engag[ed] private entities to finance, construct, and manage civic
instructions and ostensibly public assets”—including, in this instance, the public domain. Brian Phillips Murphy, Building the Empire
State: Political Economy in the Early Republic (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 7. In fact, as Pauline Maier
suggests, incorporation in Massachusetts in the 1780s often focused on land management. The Ohio Company’s elaborate system for

118

One aspect of the companies’ landholding was especially important in recrafting
the territories: the promise of “system.” Though historians have generally interpreted
this commitment as symbolic of a broader Federalist embrace of order and hierarchy, the
land companies emphasized system in a quite literal sense: lands would surveyed and
distributed through a well-defined and explicit process that the companies crafted
deliberately, in contrast to the unplanned and haphazard land practices that had produced
the territories’ property chaos. This methodical approach to selling land would facilitate
other goals—paying down the federal debt, crafting peaceful Indian relations, and, more
broadly, curbing and channeling the seeming anarchic impulses of land speculation. The
companies’ landownership would allow them to regulate settlement and avoid “the
monopoly of lands,” which, undemocratically, “placed much power in the hands of a
few.” In other words, paradoxically, empowering a handful of private land companies
seemed to offer a solution to private enrichment at public expense by creating a form of
governance over much of the territories. Title, in this sense, served as a form of
sovereignty.6
That, at least, was the ideology that underlay the first federal land system. But in
practice, the “system” that the companies promised was largely self-serving rhetoric.
Like William Blount and other predecessors, the land companies succumbed to the
speculative lure of title: visions of millions of acres of lands seduced them into gambling
subdividing its domain in fact resembled the smaller-scale divisions of property within Massachusetts town corporations. Pauline
Maier, “The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,” The William and Mary Quarterly 50, no. 1 (1993): 51, 53-55. For
additional works considering corporations and their implications for governance during this period, see Andrew M. Schocket,
Founding Corporate Power in Early National Philadelphia (DeKalb, Ill. : Northern Illinois University Press, 2007); Hannah Atlee
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on inchoate and uncertain ownership. The clearest example of this process was a third
land company, the Tennessee Company, a creation of Georgia’s so-called Yazoo sales
that became deeply entangled with politics and finance in the Southwest Territory.
Federal officials interpreted the Tennessee Company’s vision of quasi-sovereignty as a
threat rather than a boon to national authority. But in time, it became clear that the
federally endorsed Ohio and Miami Companies were far more similar to the Tennessee
Company than their supporters’ rhetoric suggested.
In the end, corporate control of land by all three companies proved antithetical,
rather than complementary, to federal interests. When their speculative gambles failed
dramatically, all parties came away disillusioned. The companies felt that the federal
government had opportunistically taken advantage of their hazarding of both financial
and personal risk, without providing the support they believed implicit in the partnership.
From the perspective of federal officials, the land companies left property messes that fell
to Congress and the federal government to resolve, exacerbating rather than clarifying the
tangle of title in the territories. “System” proved illusory. After the first federal land
system produced results very similar to the chaotic jumble of ownership produced by the
state land schemes, it was soon abandoned.
***
The Ohio Company began with a 1783 petition by a group of continental army
officers for land in the Ohio country, which they already anticipated would become a
“Colloney of the United States” and ultimately a state. The petition’s drafter and prime
mover was Brigadier General Rufus Putnam, an engineer from a middling family in
120

central Massachusetts who had worked as a surveyor before the Revolution. Though the
petition languished, three years later Putnam convened interested parties at the Bunch of
Grapes Tavern in Boston to draft the articles of association for a land company.7
At the core of the Ohio Company’s plan was federal debt. “The design of this
association,” read the articles’ first line, “is to raise a fund in Continental Certificates for
the sole purpose . . . of purchasing Lands in the Western territory (belonging to the
United States).” Continental certificates were paper promises of future repayment issued
by a cash-starved Continental Congress to pay for the creation and supply of a national
military. By war’s end, these certificates had been issued to soldiers, officers,
tradesmen—anyone with outstanding financial claims against the United States. The lack
of confidence in the new national government’s financial security meant that these
certificates traded at a heavy discount; in 1784, Putnam found them selling for as little as
18-20% of their face value.8
The Ohio Company proposed to raise $1,000,000 in Continental Specie
Certificates, which would then be redeemed for western lands. Rather than purchasing
land outright, investors would purchase a “share” in the Company that would entitle them
to a portion of the lands. There would be a thousand shares in the company, which could
be purchased for $1,000 in certificates and $10 in gold or silver; the hard currency would
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be used to pay the Company’s operating expenses. Individuals were limited to a total of
five shares; multiple purchasers could also pool their resources and obtain a share.9
The Ohio Company met again a year later, after agents had already begun
soliciting subscribers across New England. At this meeting, Putnam was unanimously
appointed as one of three directors of the Company. The other two were Samuel Holden
Parsons, a Connecticut native and Revolutionary War general who had served as
congressional treaty commissioner at the 1785 Treaty of Fort Finney with the Shawnees,
and Manasseh Cutler, former army chaplain and a clergyman in Ipswich, Massachusetts,
with a particular interest in natural science. A fourth man, Winthrop Sargent, was
appointed as the Company’s Secretary. Also from Massachusetts, Sargent had served as
an artillerist during the war, and a surveyor in the Ohio Country for the Continental
Congress. Later that year, they would be joined by James Varnum, a former general from
Rhode Island, as director, and Richard Platt as treasurer. The Company charged the
newly appointed directors to “immediately” apply to Congress to purchase lands. “We
are in Serious earnest,” Parsons wrote a Connecticut delegate.10
In summer 1787, Manasseh Cutler journeyed to New York to reach an agreement
with the Continental Congress. A political neophyte, Cutler nonetheless quickly
insinuated himself into the nation’s political elite, dining with James Madison and
Elbridge Gerry at the constitutional convention, and with Arthur St. Clair (then President
of Congress), and Henry Knox, the Secretary at War, in New York. There, Cutler found
Congress in the midst of drafting the Northwest Ordinance for the governance of the new
9
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federal territory, including the Ohio Country; he proposed a number of (unspecified)
amendments, which, he was happy to note, “have all been made.”11
The actual contract proved harder to secure. To be sure, Congress salivated at the
prospect of retiring large chunks of the national debt, and the “mode of Sale” that Cutler
proposed would also “exempt the United States from the greatest part of the expence” of
surveying and selling the land under the 1785 Land Ordinance. But, as one
congressional delegate complained, Congress found it impossible “to get anything done,”
even the “plainest propositions” like Cutler’s proposed purchase. The largest obstacle
was price. While Congress sought $1 per acre, Cutler insisted on $.33 an acre, which
Congress refused.12
A breakthrough occurred on the evening of July 20, when William Duer called on
Cutler. Duer was the secretary of the Board of Treasury, the congressional committee
charged with negotiating the contract with Cutler. He was also an influential New York
financier. He came to Cutler on behalf of a group of the city’s “principal characters” who
proposed expanding the Ohio Company’s proposal to “take in another Company but that
it should be a kept a profound secret.” Cutler, they urged, would negotiate for a much
larger purchase than originally planned, and this new company—later dubbed the Scioto
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Company, after its location—would pay for the additional land. “The plan struck me
agreeably,” Cutler recorded, and “Sargent insisted on my undertaking [it].”13
Encompassing Duer’s proposed purchase made Congress much more receptive,
since they were now discussing retiring millions of the public debt. The parties agreed
that, although the nominal price would remain a dollar per acre, the actual price would be
reduced to $.66 per acre on account of “bad lands.” But another obstacle remained, due
to intense regional horse-trading over who would fill the newly created positions in the
territorial government created by the Northwest Ordinance. Over dinner with some
southern congressmen, Cutler negotiated that Parsons and Varnum would serve as
territorial judges, while Sargent would serve as the territorial secretary.14
With the deals struck, “matters went on much better,” and three months later,
Cutler signed a formal contract. The Ohio Company would pay $1,000,000 in two
installments: $500,000 up front with a right of immediate entry, with an additional
$500,000 due after the surveying of the tract within seven years, at which point the
government would legally transfer title. The one and a half million acres purchased
would be located along the Ohio River, to be surveyed following the Ordinance of 1785,
with tracts reserved for future sale and to support education and ministers. The actual
price in specie worked out to eight cents per acre.15
The same day, Cutler and Sargent signed another indenture for the “Scioto”
speculation crafted by Duer. It encompassed what Cutler guessed to be 3.5 million acres
13

“An Account of Dr. Cutler’s Work for the Ordinance of 1787.” On Duer—who had a complicated hand in many land speculations
of the era—see Robert Francis Jones, “The King of the Alley”: William Duer: Politician, Entrepreneur, and Speculator, 1768-1799
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1992); Robert F. Jones, “William Duer and the Business of Government in the Era of
the American Revolution,” The William and Mary Quarterly 32, no. 3 (1975): 393–416.
14
“An Account of Dr. Cutler’s Work for the Ordinance of 1787.”
15
Ibid.; “Indenture Between the Board of Treasury and the Agents of the Ohio Company ” October 27, 1787, in TP: Vol. II, 80-84;
Gates, Public Land Law Development, 70.

124

(actually roughly five million) west of the Ohio Company’s purchase to the Scioto River.
There was no immediate payment, but the associates would pay six installments, every
six months, at the same rate of 2/3rds of a dollar per acre. At Putnam’s urging, Cutler
and Sargent had separated the Ohio from the Scioto contracts, entering the second in their
names alone to avoid the appearance of impropriety. But despite this separation, the two
projects remained entangled. The Ohio Company had on hand only $356,000 in
certificates. The remaining $143,000 needed for its required down payment came from
the “Scioto Tract Associates”—Duer’s cabal of financiers. “Without connecting this
Speculation,” Cutler wrote somewhat defensively, “similar terms & advantages could not
have been obtained for the Ohio Company.”16
Cutler’s negotiations proved remarkably successful. Much of the project’s appeal
was financial: Cutler tempted congressional delegates with the promise that the sale
would ultimately retire nearly four million dollars in federal debt. But the purchase’s
fiscal attractions were inseparable from its promise to channel the era’s speculative
impulses to serve the public interest. Rather than undermining or co-opting the state, as
most land speculations of the time did, the Company’s boosters claimed to bolster the
authority of the national state, by creating a “large & immediate settlement,” consisting
of “the most robust & industrious people in Amer[ic]a” who were “strongly attached to
the federal Government.” In other words, the federal government would entrust the
survey and sale of the public lands to the Ohio Company, which would also enjoy de
facto control over the territory’s governance, thanks to the overlap between Company and
16
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federal officials. Cutler particularly stressed that the new settlement would be
“Systematic,” an argument that found a receptive audience in Samuel Osgood, president
of the Board of Treasury and charged with negotiating the contract. Osgood lamented to
Cutler that “System had never before been attempted” in settling western lands,
notwithstanding “the advantages of System in a new Settlement.” This vision of harmony
between federal and corporate interests led Osgood to proclaim the Ohio Company’s
“plan . . . the best ever formed in Amer[ic]a.”17

On April 7, 1788, Rufus Putnam, elected as the superintendent of the new
settlement, brought forty-eight selected men to the confluence of the Ohio and
Muskingum Rivers, the center of the Company’s settlement, after struggling through the
winter snows of Pennsylvania. The first task that confronted Putnam and his men was
surveying. The Company had charged Putnam with implementing its elaborate plan for
dividing the Company’s 1.5 million acres among its 1,000 shareholders. As crafted in the
Company’s first meeting after the purchase agreement, the plan called for a city and
commons centered at the rivers’ confluence, which was ultimately named Marietta. The
town would be carefully laid out into “oblong squares,” in which each shareholder would
receive a houselot. Individual plots of increasing size would then radiate outward: one
thousand eight-acre lots surrounding the city; one thousand 116.48-acre lots along the
Ohio; one thousand 320-acre lots along the navigable rivers stretching north into the
purchase; and one thousand 992-acre lots in the “inland towns” away from the rivers.
17
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Parcels would be assigned to individual shares by lot. “By this mode of Division,” one
investor wrote, “the Proprietors will be enabled to make Settlement by preveously
forming a Sistem by which they will bind themselves to adhere to fixed Principals for
that purpose.”18
As Putnam toiled, “Ohio fever” struck New England, where inhabitants anxiously
awaited reports of the new settlement. “No property commands money like the Ohio
Lands,” Cutler gleefully reported from Ipswich. One man reported that his home was
“thronged with Caracters” seeking to invest in the Company, a craze that extended to
Nova Scotia and even to the Caribbean island of St. Croix. Many of the subscribers were
veterans, but they ranged widely. Some were wealthy and influential, such as Governor
Bowdoin of Massachusetts; others, relatively humble, put down what they could, even if
it was only a few dollars cash. By May 1788, all shares had been subscribed, and now
traded at double their initial cost. “The spark for emigrating to the Western world is
kindled into a blaze,” Cutler told Putnam.19
Not all shared this enthusiasm. Manasseh Cutler satirized the opposition as a
“new disorder” he dubbed “Ohio-Phobia,” the symptoms of which appeared whenever
“the excellences of the Ohio Country” were discussed. Cutler diagnosed the root of this
ailment as venality, since the Ohiophobe bewailed that emigration caused the value of his
New England to fall by half. By contrast, Cutler positioned himself and his allies as
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nationalists: the Company, he stressed, would sink the national debt, “extend the
American Empire--increase our internal wealth--& render us more respectable abroad.”20
Cutler’s vision of harmony between corporate and national authority seemed to be
playing out in Marietta. The Company set about using the asset it had—land—to attach
those federal officers not yet linked to it. It donated houselots to soldiers stationed at Fort
Harmar, the headquarters of the federal soldiers of the First American Regiment that lay
directly across the Muskingum River from Marietta, and inveigled the Regiment’s
commander, officers, and even Secretary of War Henry Knox to become shareholders.
The Company was particularly anxious to attach Arthur St. Clair, the Territory’s
governor, who became a shareholder and was also gifted a number of additional lots in
Marietta. As Ohio Company proprietor John May candidly acknowledged, such gestures
were “a little selfish,” as the Company “wish[ed] [St. Clair] to make the Muskingum the
seat of government, and place of his residence.” This proximity to power would, they
anticipated, make the Company’s lands more valuable.21
When St. Clair finally arrived in Marietta on July 9, 1788, “[a]ll rejoiced at his
coming,” as the governor was greeted with a fourteen-cannon salute and St. Clair gave a
brief speech praising the leaders of the Ohio Company for their commitment to “order.”
“This is the birth-day of this Western World,” May wrote. May’s hyperbole expressed a
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sense that the Territory’s origins lay in the union of the Company’s settlement with
constituted federal authority, as represented by St. Clair.22

St. Clair’s speech to Marietta’s inhabitants particularly recommended treating the
“Numbers of Savage and, too often, hostile Nations” that surrounded the town with
“kindness & the strictest Regard to Justice.” In reply, Rufus Putnam reassured St. Clair
that “[w]e have treated [the Natives] like friends, like brothers.”23
This exchange emphasizes the centrality of recasting Indian affairs for the Ohio
Company’s project—an aspect of governance that dovetailed neatly with the Washington
Administration’s goals. The Company fervently hoped to replace the violence that had
previously characterized the frontier with a warmer cross-cultural relationship. Even
before he arrived in Marietta, Rufus Putnam had written to John Heckewelder, a
Moravian missionary among the Delawares, to reassure him of the Ohio Company’s good
will toward Natives. “I want to embrace them in the arms of Friendship,” Putnam told
the minister, “I want to be made acquainted with them, I want to have them Introduced to
our Settlement in a friendly manner I want them to live by us and with us if they please I
want (if I may be permited to speak it) I want that we should do them good and not
evil.”24
The key to cross-cultural peace was land. Putnam and other Ohio Company
leaders diagnosed the violence that plagued the Ohio Valley as, at base, a land use
problem. The “Big Knives”—the Natives’ term for the refractory Virginians who had
22

“Governor St. Clair’s Address at Marietta,” July 15, 1788, in The SCP, 2:54-55; “Journal of a Journey,” p. 36.
“Governor St. Clair’s Address at Marietta”; “Inhabitants on the Muskingum to Governor St. Clair,” July 16, 1788, in TP: Vol. II,
132-33.
24
Rufus Putnam to [John Heckewelder], February 29, 1788, Box 1, Folder 9, RPP.
23

129

settled along the Ohio River—had ranged all over Indian lands, competing with tribes for
game and illegally settling Native land. The “New England Mode of Settlement” was
different. “Being Farmers or Mecannicks and not Hunters,” the settlers had little interest
in overrunning Native lands. Putnam also embraced the language of consent only
recently adopted by Henry Knox and other federal leaders. “I wish the land may be
purchased from them [the Indians] on the principle of Bargain and Sale,” he wrote,
repudiating the doctrine of conquest, “and not wrested from them as a condition of
giveing them Peace.”25
Indian relations and Company land were intertwined in another sense, as well.
Bloodstained lands had little value. Company officials well understood how specters of
Indian attacks, exaggerated by a constant torrent of newspaper reports of Native
atrocities, haunted the minds of New Englanders. “The greatest present discouragement
[to the Company] is the fear of Indians,” Cutler wrote; he urged Putnam to censor the
first letters back to New England to ensure that the “first impressions” of Indians were
positive. Rumors proliferated anyway. “Terreble Stories” circulated that Putnam’s entire
party had been killed en route to the Ohio. Recently arrived Marietta settlers had to
reassure their families that they had been spared from the “savages.” Samuel Parsons
reported that more than one hundred settlers had halted in Pennsylvania, and some turned
back, on account of “unfounded Reports of Danger industriously spread to alarm the fears
of people.” New Englanders’ hazy grasp of western geography exacerbated the problem.
Reports of attacks anywhere along the frontier—Illinois, Kentucky, or even Georgia—
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occasioned alarms, since in the minds of New England readers “all goes for Western
Country.” Such vague reports of Indians, “magnified . . . a thousand fold,” constituted
“our Principal Obstruction to Settlement.”26
For the Company, then, perceived amity with Natives was a critical business
decision vital to its economic success in attracting settlers and investors. In countering
rumors of Indian terrors, the Ohio Company settlers deployed the alternate trope—that of
“friendly” Indians, a term settlers repeatedly used to describe the Delawares and
Wyandots they encountered around Marietta to correspondents back home. In a letter
sent back to Massachusetts for publication, Putnam reported on his very first meal at
Marietta, a banquet at Fort Harmar with the Delaware chief Captain Pipe and twenty
other Natives who had come to the fort to trade. When Putnam told Pipe of the
Company’s “business,” Pipe reportedly proclaimed that the Natives “should be happy to
live by us.” Samuel Parsons similarly reported that the Delawares “profess a great
Friendship for the Yankees who they distinguish from the Settlers on the Virginia
Shore.”27
Such tidy correspondence between Native views and the New Englanders’ selfconceptions suggests a certain amount of ventriloquism, but the strong relations between
the two groups were not just propaganda. The Delawares and Wyandots who lived in the
area had long experience with Anglo-Americans, and “Pipe”—the Delaware chief
Konieschquanoheel, the most important local Native leader—had pursued a close
26
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relationship with the United States for the past several years. Winthrop Sargent had
befriended Pipe during previous visits, while Fort Harmar’s commander described him as
a “manly old fellow” and “Gentleman.” Such alliances served Native purposes. Given
the blurred lines between the Company and federal authority, there were good reasons for
the Delawares to embrace the Ohio Company settlers; these links furthered their
connections to the United States and secured access to trade goods.28
This seeming harmony between Native and Ohio Company goals made early
Marietta something of a mixed settlement characterized by cross-cultural curiosity,
exchange, and even seeming friendship. After their initial “acquaintance” with the New
Englanders, Wyandots and Delawares—“our Indian friends,” as Putnam dubbed them—
came to Marietta “almost every day.” Manasseh Cutler, who traveled to Marietta in the
summer of 1788 (ultimately his only trip to the Ohio Country), dined with Natives nearly
every night of his visit. A particularly strong bond formed around Marietta’s public
celebrations, as the New Englanders’ love of ceremony and performance found its analog
in Native diplomatic culture, where feasting and ritual served to forge ties. Thus, when
General Varnum died in January 1789, local Native leaders marched in his funeral
cortege. Other Native leaders picnicked in Marietta, where they listened to the
declaiming of verse and then competed against the New Englanders in a foot race. Local
Delawares also attended Marietta’s first July 4 celebration, where toasts were raised to
Captain Pipe as well as Governor St. Clair and the new constitution. Ohio Company
proprietor John May, heading one of the tables, was bemused when one of the Delaware
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chiefs greeted him, “How do you do, brother Yankee.” He seated the Delaware next to
him and watched as he ate freely and tried to join in the toasts. “He labored with all his
might to speak them,” May recorded, “but made very poor work of it.” May noted that
he had shaken hands with most of the local Delawares since his arrival.29
Underneath these avowals of good will, however, ran an undercurrent of
suspicion. Despite his amusement with the Indians, John May thought them “a set of
creatures not to be trusted.” “[N]ot withstanding [the Indians’] professed friendship,” one
Marietta settler wrote, “there is a guard placed every night.” The Ohio Company settlers
knew that the situation further down the Ohio was very different, as bands of Natives
ambushed barges travelling down the river. Governor St. Clair thought war with these
western tribes “inevitable.” Local Natives had their own misgivings about the
Company’s settlement. Captain Pipe, for one, told Putnam that he “did not expect any
people would come on to settle before the treaty [of Fort Harmar],” suggesting discontent
about the federal government’s presumptuous appropriation of Delaware lands.30
The New Englanders displayed little anxiety about living in what threatened to
become a war zone, however, because they believed their land policies mitigated the
Indian threat. In particular, by creating well-organized towns rather than isolated huts in
the woods, the Company’s centralized regulation of land practices had ensured the
settlers’ “safety and wellbeing,” which “depend[ed] upon their establishing themselves in
the most compact possible manner.” This approach, they argued, also improved the value
29
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of lands, which the Indian threat would otherwise make worthless. Repeatedly, Ohio
Company settlers praised the virtue of “compact” settlement, which they were confident
guarded them well against attack. “[T]he Indians themselves remark in their Towns, that
we settle compactly & not in the scatterd manner in which the Frontiers have been
generally Settled,” wrote Samuel Parsons, “& no Attempt [to attack] can be made without
meeting the whole force in the Settlement.”31

Just as the Company’s land policy promised to remake Indian affairs, its elaborate
system of land distribution would, its backers hoped, tamp down on the excesses of land
speculation. All shareholders would receive the same number of acres and kinds of
parcels. And because assignments were made by lot, no investors could engross the
particularly valuable large tracts next to the town, nor would in-the-know speculators be
able to select the best tracts or gerrymander their lots. Theirs was a structured and
egalitarian vision of land distribution, in opposition to the frantic grab for riches that
generally characterized land speculation of the era.
That, at least, was the plan. As Captain Jonathan Heart of the American
Regiment observed, it soon suffered the fate of many designs crafted in the abstract. “The
Division of the land into Cities Towns . . . was a well digested System to read within the
Town of Boston,” he reported, “but . . . on putting the System into execution there were
innumerable embarrassments.” In particular, system proved inadequate to restrain the
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greed that seemed to afflict anyone involved in western lands. As one investor
complained of the Company, “Speculation was ushered in to their System at an early
period.”32
The first struggle was over the eight-acre lots that were to surround Marietta.
When Putnam arrived, he discovered the land around Marietta hilly and wooded; the land
would be poor and require expensive roads. He opted to lay the lots along the Ohio and
Muskingum instead. The lots were then distributed by a lottery held in New England,
but, when many of the proprietors—particularly the agents and directors—arrived, they
discovered their lots were too far from Marietta to be safely farmed, given the Indian
threat. Putnam’s innovations became the target of their ire. “I am told my opinion was
not to govern me,” Putnam complained, “but the Vote of the Company.” Disgruntled
claimants, led by Varnum, “very much disturbed the peace of the Society.” Finally, a
compromise was reached in which the commons would be divided up into three-acre lots,
though, Putnam later recorded, most fared no better in this second lottery either. A
particularly angry contingent of Rhode Islanders was unmollified—Putnam saw “flying
Clouds which indicate another Storm gathering.”33
Concern over the Native threat prompted another significant shift from the
original plan. Anxious for settlers capable of bearing arms, the Company created socalled “donation lands,” withdrawing 100 acres from each share to be granted to actual
settlers gratis as long as they met the Company’s stringent requirements: constructing a
32
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house (“at least 24 feet by 18 . . . with a Chimney of Stone or Brick”), planting fruit trees,
clearing fifteen acres of pasture. Most importantly, the settlers had to carry arms and
ammunition, obey the militia law, and construct proper defenses. These stipulations
ensured these donations would “protect the inhabitants on the Lands to be allotted to
proprietors.”34
Despite the effort to maintain order and system, the new policy “opened such
doors for
. . . speculation on speculation,” in Captain Heart’s words. Few claimants actually
settled; most, “more anxious to fill their purses than increase the Settlement,” resold the
lands to “real settlers” for $50-$100. Meanwhile, the donation committees created to
enforce the system became, in the eyes of some, arbitrary and self-dealing. Proprietor
Ichabod Nye bitterly recalled being stripped of his lot when a self-interested party lied to
the local donation committee. In his small settlement of Bellpre, the committee’s
“tyraney became so notorious that they ware Called the Damnation Committee.” As for
those who actually settled on the lots, most arrived entirely destitute, without animals,
farm tools, or furniture; “not one half . . . had a pot or a Cattle [Kettle]” to cook their
food.35
Even surveying provided a source for controversy. The first lines, hastily drawn,
contained “gross” and “scandalous errors.” Many lots were located on lands reserved for
Congress, and so had to be voided, laying the groundwork for future litigation. One
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investor read this as confirmation of the Company’s ineptitude. “The business . . .
perfectly coincides with most of the transactions of the Ohio Company,” he complained,
which “has generally been conducted in a mode that reflects little Credit on the abilities
or intentions of the various Managers.”36
In fact, the challenges that confronted the Ohio Company were structural as well
personal; they stemmed from its hybrid status as both a company intended to produce
value for investors and an actual settlement. The interests of the Marietta settlers and the
so-called “non-resident proprietors”—shareholders who remained in New England—
fundamentally diverged. Those in New England sought returns, not stability or
flexibility. Fearful of being short-changed, they were “monstriously suspicious” of any
land proposals emanating from Marietta.37
Structural tensions also appeared in the Company’s linkage between land and
debt, by virtue of a deep irony at the heart of the Company’s finances. Though the
Company was both reliant on, and an investment in, federal state-building, its financial
success depended on public perception of federal fiscal weakness, as manifested by the
low price of federal certificates. The ratification of the Constitution—an event the Ohio
Company settlers celebrated—undermined their financial stability: as public confidence
in the nation’s financial health rose, federal certificates’ value also rose. With this shift,
“people . . . began to look upon securities better than western Land.” The value of the
Ohio Company shares accordingly fell. By early 1789, they were selling for “much less
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than the first cost”; many would-be sellers could not find buyers. Some shareholders
wrote demanding back their certificates that had not yet been paid to Congress.38

The small-scale speculations that dominated Marietta’s land divisions found their
echo in the much grander dealings of the Ohio Company’s directors. In the eyes of many
shareholders, Cutler and Sargent, for all their talk of public-spiritedness and
disinterestedness, were the largest and riskiest speculators of all, having conjoined the
Ohio Company with the Scioto Company. The “very great impropriety” of Cutler and
Sargent’s gamble was the “daily . . . subject of Conversation” back in New England.
Seen as a “dirty speculation,” the Scioto investment caused “general . . . dissatisfaction”
among the shareholders. “I cannot allow myself to suppose,” one incredulous
shareholder wrote Sargent, that the Company’s directors “would be concerned in so
disreputable a Thing as speculating upon [the Company’s] Property and at their Expence
for the Benefit of a few Individuals.” Rumors spread that both Cutler and the Ohio
Company’s treasurer had spent “every farthing” of the Company’s money on the Scioto
Company instead. When Cutler visited Ohio, he was much “injured” by the constant
criticism he encountered on the subject.39
Much of this criticism was well-founded: the grasping and unstable Scioto
Company represented precisely the sort of risky and ill-conceived land speculation that
the Ohio Company had sought to displace, one reliant on boosterism, questionable title,
38
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and paper promises to create overnight wealth from hoodwinked investors. The Scioto
Company owned nothing; it held only a contract to purchase lands from the federal
government in the future at a fixed price, “the naked preemption.” To secure the money
for these future payments, the Company’s investors had to sell this contingent promise of
title for immediate cash. The Company’s proprietors opted to market the lands in
Europe, hoping to profit from the disorder of the early days of the French Revolution.
"Now is our Time,” Winthrop Sargent proclaimed as word of chaos reached him, “& the
peaceful Acres of the West, are worth their Weight in Gold.” Apart from this initial burst
of starry-eyed enthusiasm, though, Cutler and Sargent contributed little to the venture,
which quickly escaped their control even as it entangled them in a complicated web of
debt and land companies created by William Duer and his agents. The Company’s agent
in France, Joel Barlow, decided on his own accord that the promise of future title was
“too light and dangerous a ground to attempt retailing upon,” and so created a shell
company that contracted with the Scioto Company for lands, which Barlow then began
selling in 100-acre fee simple parcels.

As with the Ohio Company in New England, the

promise of western lands caused something of a cultural sensation, and the would-be
French settlers drafted a constitution for the “Society of the 24 Associates” for their
proposed city along the Ohio.40
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Cutler and Sargent, “totally ignorant” of all these machinations in Europe, were in
over their heads. As the same rise in securities that challenged the Ohio Company made
the Scioto Company’s planned purchase entirely unaffordable—Cutler estimated it would
cost nearly one million in specie—Cutler and Sargent sought to cut their losses. “I would
be very glad to find a person that would take what I hold,” Cutler wrote, “& free me from
my obligation.” But the plan proceeded, notwithstanding its organizers’ doubts. In late
1790, 400 French settlers arrived to a settlement, grandly named “Gallipolis in their
honor, along the Ohio downriver from Marietta. The “town” in fact consisted of a few
crude huts that Rufus Putnam had hastily constructed.
But the French settlers’ greatest shock was the discovery that “all the apparently legal
Documents” shewn to “Seduc[e]” them with the “Solidity of the Titles”of their lands
were frauds. Though the settlers had purchased land in fee simple, the Scioto Company
held only the “preemption right”—the option to purchase the federal lands. And, even
had Scioto owned land outright, it turned out that Gallipolis was located within the tract
owned by the Ohio, not the Scioto, Company. When Governor St. Clair passed through
Gallipolis shortly after the settlers’ arrival, he found the residents “very discontented and
mutinous.” Without catching the irony in the face of Cutler’s repeated assertions of
serving the national interest, St. Clair lamented how the quest for private gain had
undermined the position of the United States. The “interested speculation of a few men,
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pursued with too great avidity,” he feared, had placed the French settlers “in absolute
ruin” and “would destroy American character abroad.”41
In February 1791, William Duer met with Manasseh Cutler and Winthrop Sargent
in New York to resolve the Gallipolis mess. With it clear that the Company would fail,
the Scioto proprietors now vied to shed themselves of any responsibility for the French
settlers. They finally agreed that Duer would pay for 148 Ohio Company shares that had
been forfeited for lack of payment and that the French would be granted lands from the
Ohio Company’s purchase. Though Cutler and Sargent’s risky gamble had failed to pay
off, they would manage, it seemed, to extricate themselves with little loss to themselves
or the Ohio Company.42

A month before the New York meeting, at sunset on Sunday, January 2, 1791, a
group of Wyandots and Delawares stopped in at Big Bottom, a collection of a little over
twenty settlers up Muskingum Creek from Marietta. Friendly with the local Company
settlers, the Natives conversed and dined with two of them, Francis and Isaac Choate. In
the midst of talking, the Choates heard gunfire. The Natives told the alarmed Choates
they were now their prisoners. Three other men from the settlement were also taken
prisoner; two escaped to seek help.43
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When a relief party of Ohio Company settlers arrived the next day, it discovered a
grisly scene. The settlement’s other twelve settlers, confined in the blockhouse, had all
been killed and the building burnt. Only charred, unidentifiable bodies remained, which
the horrified settlers buried in the blockhouse.44
“Our prospects are much changed,” wrote an alarmed Rufus Putnam on learning
of the attack, which became known as the “Big Bottom Massacre.” “[I]n stead of peace
and friendship with our Indian neighbours a horid Savage war Stairs us in the face.” In
attempting to understand this sudden reversal, the Ohio Company settlers viewed
themselves as the victims of others’ misdeeds. One placed responsibility on the “Big
Knife Virginians,” who had roamed across the river committing a litany of attacks and
violations against the Indians, who, he argued, were “perfectley contented with their new
allies,” the Ohio settlers. For his part, Putnam, consistent with his earlier diagnosis,
blamed a failure of land policy. He had been told by federal officials that the Ohio
Company’s land had been “fairly obtained from the natives.” But when Putnam
examined federal treaties, he discovered that the lands “were rather wrested then fairly
purchased.” Even at the Treaty of Fort Harmar, when the government had agreed to pay
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for Native lands rather than claim by conquest, the tribal representation was “very
partial” and many tribes “never consented to what was don.” In Putnam’s view, the Ohio
Company settlers were sacrifices to this failure to follow the land policy of “fair dealing,”
and secure true Native consent.45
The panicked Putnam was certain that the attack presaged more assaults. He had
heard reports that the Indians, “[m]uch elated with there success,” had “threatened there
should not a remain a Smoak [Smoke] on the ohio by the time the Leaves put out.”
Rumors abounded that an Indian army of two or three thousand would soon attack
Marietta. But, with nearly all the federal soldiers stationed downriver, the Ohio
Company’s settlement was “defenceless.” Putnam appealed to Henry Knox and even
President Washington for assistance. He insisted that, not only was the federal
government responsible for the conflict, but the interests of “united States in General” as
well as the Ohio Company were at stake. If the federal government effectively protected
settlements established “under [its] authority,” then the public lands would “rapid[ly]”
sell, “Sink[ing] many millions of . . . National Debt.” But if the protection was not
forthcoming, “the consequence” was clear. Instead of orderly purchases, the lands would
be “Seized on by privit adventurers who will pay little or no reguard to the laws of the
United States or the rights of the natives.”46
Putnam’s appeals for federal support based on the Ohio Company’s commitment
to and investment in the national interest were unavailing. Concentrating their forces
downriver for an expedition, federal officers lamely offered Putnam a single cannon for
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defense. The message was clear: the Ohio Company would have to rely on its own
resources to survive the war. Meeting days after the attack at Big Bottom, the Company
agreed to call out the militia on its authority. It would pay all expenses from its own
pocket, with the “highest confidence” that Congress would later “reimburse the necessary
expense we shall be at in defending ourselves against the Common Enemy.” Abandoning
their remote settlements, Ohio Company settlers retreated to defensible stockades, while
Native war parties destroyed their houses and stole their cattle. Many began abandoning
the settlement in droves, even the settlers on the donation lands, who had promised to
defend the Ohio Company. Nearly half of the original forty-eight settlers fled. Those
who remained saw the value of their investments plummet, as shares’ value fell even
lower. "Our Settlement does not encrease,” one Marietta resident complained, “we are
circumscribed within narrow Limits & are heartily tired of the Indian War, & with its
present Management see no End to it."47
War also destroyed the apparent trust that had existed between the local Natives
and the Ohio Company settlers. Familiarity led to a particularly brutal and personal
warfare. When a Native killed a “mulatto” boy in the middle of the Ohio River, in plain
view of Marietta, one of the Ohio Company settlers thought he “recognize[d] the Indian,
as one whom he had known aforetime.” Later in 1791, a scouting party—led by a man
whose father had been killed by the Indians—shot a Native man. The party decapitated
the Native and mounted his head on a pole, which was displayed in front of the garrison,
while the body was brought to the river, “where it was literalley Cutt up, & Boiled.”
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News of this brutality spread through Indian country; one Native remarked, “Oh white
Man boil Indian.—No. Good.”48
With Big Bottom and the ensuing war, the supposed harmony of interests between
the federal government and the Ohio Company proved illusory. Earlier confident that
Marietta would be the headquarters for federal soldiers, Putnam was dismayed to
discover that the rival downriver settlement of Cincinnati was selected instead. Thus,
even though the Company was, in Putnam’s view, acting as the federal government’s
land agent, the War Department’s neglect meant that the Company had to fulfill the
fundamental governmental responsibility of protection from its own revenues. Moreover,
the horrors of a war the Company blamed on federal mismanagement and Virginian
Indian hatred destroyed the hopes for an alternative Native diplomacy founded on
friendship. The consequences were financially as well as morally disastrous; few wanted
to buy land in a war zone. From the vantage of Marietta in 1792, the Company’s
investment in federal authority seemed a poor one.49

The Big Bottom Massacre could not have occurred at a worse time for the Ohio
Company. The second installment of $500,000 for its lands, due in 1792, loomed, but the
Company entirely lacked the funds to comply. Under the contract terms, if the Company
failed to pay, it would forfeit the entire tract. “In a High Flame,” the Connecticut and
Rhode Island proprietors sought to cut their losses. The Company, they insisted, should
negotiate with Congress to purchase whatever lands their earlier payment would secure,
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disburse the remainder of the Company’s funds as a dividend, and then issue deeds. If
need be, they urged giving up the entire contract. Cutler initially resisted—arguing he
would rather “suffer death” than turn over the books to the proprietors—but finally
relented.50
In spring 1792, Cutler and Rufus Putnam traveled to Philadelphia to petition
Congress. The claim they advanced rested on the service they had performed the nation.
The war, they insisted, had heavily taxed the Company’s funds—$9,000 out of pocket in
the previous year alone—as well as requiring the creation of the donation lands. Surely
Congress’s goal could not have been “to raise the value of their Land at the expence
exertions and risk of others but to make an actual Settlement.” Yet, under the current
contract, they lacked “a clear title”: if they failed to pay, all their lands and improvements
would “be liable to forfeiture.” They concluded with a threat: unless Congress relieved
settlers “from that state of suspence and uncertainty respecting their title,” they would no
longer defend their lands but “immediately retreat to some place of greater security.”51
The Ohio Company’s request passed through Congress nearly unopposed, an act
Putnam attributed to “Providence” but that likely owed much to the federal government’s
desperate need for settlers in the midst of the Indian War. Congress granted 750,000
acres based on the payment already made, as well as an additional tract of 215,285 acres
based on military bounty warrants the Company collected (the original contract had
significantly limited the number of warrants that could be redeemed). The only
controversial provision was a grant of an additional 100,000 acres as compensation for
50
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the donation lands, provided that the lands would be conveyed in fee simple to the lands’
actual settlers. The Senate evenly split in a vote that divided almost entirely along
regional lines, pitting the New Englanders against others; John Adams broke the tie in the
Company’s favor.52
At the very moment of this triumph, however, came news of further disaster.
Throughout 1791, William Duer and the Scioto Company had failed to pay for 148 shares
he had agreed to purchase, and Richard Platt, the Ohio Company’s treasurer, finally
moved toward legal action. But even as Putnam and Cutler were negotiating in
Philadelphia, Duer’s financial web of credit collapsed in spectacular fashion, destroying
private fortunes “from Georgia to New Hampshire inclusive” and depressing “even the
public Debt & Credit of the United States” as securities’ value tumbled. Duer was
imprisoned, where he largely remained until his death seven years’ later, his debts
unsatisfied.53
Duer’s collapse suddenly constricted the ties of debt that bound together the Ohio
and Scioto Companies. In Philadelphia, Putnam was arrested, and had to pay off over
$2,000 in Scioto debts to obtain release. The crash was even worse for Richard Platt,
who had extensive dealings with Duer. “I am ruined my dear friend,” Platt wrote
Winthrop Sargent, “& know not how soon, I shall exchange a palace which I now live in,
for a Jail.” When the Ohio Company’s directors came to demand that Platt turn over all
52
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cash on hand, they found his accounts at least $80,000 short. As he had predicted, Platt
soon followed Duer into debtors’ prison.54
Duer’s collapse also left the Gallipolis settlers abandoned. Appeals to territorial
authorities produced a vague promise of “justice” from Governor St. Clair; Winthrop
Sargent expressed sympathy with the settlers’ “very embarrassed situation” but a denial
of being “in any degree accessary to your misfortunes” either as a territorial official or a
Scioto investor. The settlers appealed, in the final instance, to Congress. Their
accusations against the Ohio Company were particularly blistering, as they pointed out
the clear overlap in leadership.55
Referred to his consideration, the Attorney General suggested that, although the
settlers might have an equitable claim against the Ohio Company, the jurisdictional and
practical hurdles to filing suit made recovery unlikely. An angry Senate instead passed a
bill demanding that the Ohio Company directors appear before it, threatening to rescind
portions of the Company’s grant; the directors ignored the directive. Finally, in 1795,
Congress resolved the mess by granting the Gallipolis settlers 24,000 acres of federal
land elsewhere in the Northwest Territory. Though the law did not impair suit against the
Ohio Company, in the end the Gallipolis settlers were forced to purchase their town site
from the Ohio Company for $1.25 per acre—nearly twice what the Ohio Company had
paid Congress for the land.56
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With its title secured by Congress, the business affairs of the Ohio Company
wound to a slow conclusion. After four years of surveying, the final division was made
in 1796: each settler received 1173 acres dispersed in six lots. Shareholders even
received a modest dividend of the funds the Company managed to rescue from the
bankrupt Platt, and Putnam’s pressing of the Company’s debtors secured another in 1800.
With that, the Ohio Company largely dissolved.57
Measured against other land speculations, and compared with earlier abortive
federal efforts to distribute land, the Ohio Company was a success. Marietta, of course,
never became the booming center its boasters had anticipated. By the middle of the
nineteenth century, it was a small country town sustained by antiquarian recollections of
its glorious beginnings. But the Company had purchased and conveyed clear title,
secured a modest return for its investors, and created a stable settlement—a notable
achievement in a landscape littered with failed land schemes.58
For those at the time, however, the Ohio Company felt like a failure. The
Company was more than yet another land company; it was an experiment in a federal
land system that could channel the rampant land speculation of the late eighteenth
century to productive ends. The Company had promised much. In the mind of Putnam,
Cutler, and others, title was a critical tool of governance and sovereignty that they could
leverage to simultaneously bolster federal authority, repay the federal debt, recraft Indian
affairs, and establish egalitarian land ownership in the Northwest Territory, all while
securing returns for investors.
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Measured against these goals, the Company came up short, as all the participants
came away disillusioned. Putnam never forgave the federal government’s abandonment
of the settlement at its moment of crisis, when the repercussions of earlier federal Indian
policy, especially the coerced treaties, had undermined the Company’s successes in
recrafting Indian affairs. It was the Company that had ultimately paid for federal failure:
Putnam would later recall, embittered, that, although the Ohio Company had expended
nearly $15,000 on the Indian war, Congress only repaid about $2,600. For its part, the
federal government felt the same way about the Ohio Company, especially in the
disastrous aftermath of the Scioto speculation. Scioto’s failure meant that the promised
enormous payments on the federal debt never arrived. Instead, resentful federal officials
found themselves giving land away for free as they had to resolve, at public expense, the
tangled knot created by private avarice. “[P]rejudices . . . against the Ohio Company”
were felt “very strongly,” one visitor to Congress reported, because the Company was so
“deeply implicated” in the betrayal of the Gallipolis settlers. As for the investors, even
those who never left New England and had even secured dividends were still angry.
They had bargained away valuable securities, and they were frustrated by the endless
complications and machinations of Company governance. “I should be glad to have done
with the business,” one wrote, “And if wishing was not vanity; I should wish I had not
never heard of the Ohio Company.”59
***
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In 1787, all this disillusionment and recrimination surrounding the Ohio Company
lay in the future. By the end of that year, buoyed by the promise of cheap federal land,
three more companies proposed purchasing enormous tracts of land in the Northwest
Territory; all three proposals were explicitly modeled on the Scioto Company’s contract.
For its part, Congress eagerly pursued these deals, enthusiastic at the prospect of
distributing federal land systematically at private expense. In the end, though, only one
of the schemes ultimately came to fruition, a purchase by an entity known as the Miami
Company.60
Unlike the Ohio Company, with its elaborate governance structure, the Miami
Company was largely the project of one man, John Cleves Symmes. A prominent New
Jersey politician, Symmes was elected to the Continental Congress in 1786, a position
that piqued his interest in western lands. After reconnoitering the Northwest Territory in
spring 1787, Symmes asked Congress on August 29, 1787 to permit him to purchase one
million acres between the Great Miami and Little Miami Rivers, just west of the Virginia
Military District, on the same terms Congress had granted Cutler and Sargent in the
Scioto Purchase. Agreement was finally reached in the summer of 1788; like the Ohio
Company directors, Symmes also received a territorial office, in his case as a territorial
judge.61
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Symmes began marketing his lands to purchasers from New Jersey through
pamphlets and newspapers even before the agreement was reached. Symmes’s plan bore
some similarities to that of the Ohio Company. The surveying would be based even more
strictly on the rectangular grid of the 1785 Land Ordinance, and payment would also be
in liquidated federal securities. But Symmes did not issue shares nor assign lands.
Instead, purchasers could select quarter sections (160 acres), full sections (640 acres), or
even entire townships (six square miles; over 19,000 acres), from anywhere within the
Company’s purchase. An initial price of 2/3 of a dollar per acre would, Symmes warned
his readers, rise to a dollar per acre by May 1, 1788, and would later increase above a
dollar per acre. Symmes’s own profit would come largely from his ownership of a
“reserved township” he anticipated becoming the site of a town. In essence, Symmes was
betting on the rise of land values to increase the worth of his own holdings.62
From the outset, Symmes never claimed quite the same public-mindedness
constantly invoked by the Ohio Company settlers. He focused unabashedly on the land’s
promise for his settlers—and for himself. But Symmes’s commitment to self-interest did
not make him equivalent to the reckless land speculators who blithely ignored the good of
the public. In its own way, the Miami Company represented an even bolder experiment
than the Ohio Company: the promise that even a businessman prioritizing profit would,
for reasons of enlightened business practice, still pursue policies that would channel land
speculation toward order and system.
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This approach was clear from how Symmes advertised his lands. To attract
settlers, he sought to differentiate his settlement from other lands, particular those in
Kentucky, which lay across the Ohio River from his purchase. System, and its promise
of clarity, proved one powerful selling point. Symmes reassured potential purchasers
that, unlike in Kentucky, where “titles of land are not easily ascertained [and] frequently
very doubtful[,] . . . title to the Miami lands will be clear and certain, and no possible
doubt thereto can arise.” Symmes similarly crafted rules to avoid absentee landholders,
who had proved “greatly detrimental” in Kentucky. Purchasers of his lands must have
actual settlers and improvements on their parcels within two years, Symmes decreed.
The ostensible motivation of this policy was security: “[I]t is reasonable,” Symmes
argued, “that all who become purchasers should in some way contribute to the defence of
the country.” But Symmes’s rule was egalitarian in effect, if not in purpose. Symmes
would seize one-sixth of the land of purchasers who failed to meet this obligation and
then redistribute it, free of charge, to “volunteer settlers,” who could obtain title after
seven years by making actual improvements. In short, for reasons of pragmatism rather
than principle, Symmes adopted concepts of order and democracy at odds with the
chaotic scramble for riches that marked earlier land grabs.63
This was especially true with respect to relations with local tribes. Like the Ohio
Company, the Miami Company discovered that responsibility over federal lands carried
the burden of serving as a quasi-official representative of the United States to Native
nations. And like the Ohio settlers, Symmes came to conclude that his land business
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would benefit from a new model of Indian affairs. Events in Symmes’s town of “North
Bend” consequently echoed Marietta’s experience.
Established in a half-hearted manner in 1788, North Bend—named for its location
along a curve in the Ohio River—was an Anglo-American island in a Native sea; the
initial settlement consisted only of “one family . . . and a few stragling hunters.” The
isolation troubled the town’s settlers, steeped as they were in stories of Indian terror. In
spring 1789, three surveyors marking boundaries of Symmes’s lands encountered a group
of local Shawnees. The terrified surveyors tried to flee, but, unable to escape, prepared to
fight. One of the surveyors was training his rifle on a Shawnee when he was startled to
see the Native lift his hat, put down his gun, and raised his right hand in greeting. The
surveyors were even more shocked to hear one of the Shawnees call out, in English, that
they were friends. The surveyors led the Shawnees to a nearby blockhouse. This
“unexpected . . . visit” initially panicked the settlers, but assurances of friendship soon
calmed the matter.64
Shawnee efforts at establishing solid relations with the Miami Company settlers
were calculated and deliberate. The Shawnees in the area had long experience with
Anglo-Americans, particularly the fractious settlers from Kentucky. When they learned
that “new white brother’s” were “coming live to live in the Miami country,” the
Shawnees would later inform Symmes, they had held a council and resolved to
“introduce themselves to our acquaintance rather as friends than as enemies.” They
specifically selected George, an Anglo-American they had taken prisoner a decade
64
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earlier, to lead the party to meet the new settlers. It was George who had called out to the
surveyors; even after years in captivity, he still “spoke the english tongue very well.”65
As in Marietta, this initial meeting, with reassurances of friendly intentions on
both sides, created space for cultural mixing and exchange. “[T]he white and red people
began to form a sociable neighborhood,” Symmes reported after this initial encounter,
“our hunters frequently taking shelter for the night at the Indians camps; and the Indians
with their squaws spending whole days and nights at the blockhouse regaling themselves
with whisky.” Symmes found thereafter that the Indians “frequently make me visits from
their towns.”66
The Shawnees were quite explicit in their goals for their relationship with the new
settlers: they sought access to trade as well as federal authority. When Symmes formally
met a Shawnee chief he called “Capt. Blackbeard,” the Native leader “signif[ied] that it
would be very much to their advantage to have free intercourse with us, and exchange
their peltrys for the articles which they much wanted.” After Symmes agreed, the
Shawnee pressed him on “how far I was supported by the United States, and whether the
thirteen fires had sent me hither.” “I answered them in the affirmative,” Symmes
reported, “and spread before them the thirteen stripes which I had in a flag then in my
camps”; Symmes also pointed to the federal troops on parade and the seal of his
commission, which Blackbeard examined with great interest. These symbols, paired with
Symmes’s proclamations, evidently persuaded Blackbeard of Symmes’s authority and
intentions; the chief “appeared entirely sattisfied of the friendship of Congelis (for so
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they pronounce Congress) towards the red people.” The Shawnees then took advantage of
the trade goods promised by their new alliance. For the next four weeks, Blackbeard and
his fellow Shawnees “lived chiefly at [Symmes’s] expense (nor was it a very small one,
as they had whisky at their pleasure gratis),” before departing “in a most friendly
manner.”67
Symmes understood this hospitable approach to Indian relations as a sharp
contrast to the practices of the Kentuckians across the river. “Our living hitherto in the
friendly manner we have with the Indians,” he reported, “has excited the jealousy & ill
will of many of our neighbours on the Kentucky side of the Ohio: and some even threaten
to cross the river and put every Indian to death which they find on the Miami purchase.”
But “perhaps,” he slyly suggested, if the Kentuckians “would act as moderately towards
[the Natives], they might live in as much safety as the people of this purchase.”68
Yet, like the Ohio Company settlers, Symmes similarly confronted the challenge
of recasting Indian relations in an atmosphere of suspicion and ill-defined fear. Symmes
himself did not trust the Natives. “They are a subtil enemy,” he wrote, “& all their
boasted friendship may be only to learn our numbers, and what state of defence we are
in.” (In fact, it was Symmes who sent envoys to Native towns so that, in the event of
war, the army would have a guide into Indian country). This mistrust made both actual
and would-be settlers uneasy, easily frightened by the vague rumors that proliferated on
the frontier. Symmes alleged that the Kentuckians spread false accounts that all his
settlers had been tomahawked. The handful of federal troops in the settlement—whom
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Symmes fed from his own pocket, only to have them trade his food for liquor—were
insufficient. "I have indeed lost sight of any succour from the United States,” he
complained. The settlers felt that the federal government “abandoned [them] to
destruction, and whether the danger they apprehend is real or imaginary tis the same
thing to them.” Symmes wrote to Jonathan Dayton, “I fear I shall be nearly stripped of
settlers and left with one dozen soldiers only.”69
Focused on selling land rather than remaking Indian affairs, Symmes had
discovered that the two could not be separated. Due to federal weakness, his settlement
had become a privatized Indian agency, as Symmes fed and clothed Indians and soldiers
alike from his own pocket. And, like the Ohio Company, Symmes quickly learned that
land sales hinged on Native actions (or rumors about them) as much as his own efforts.

Symmes’s embrace of system and actual settlement also struggled to tame more
speculative approaches to land. When he first arrived, Symmes had been thronged by
Kentuckians eager to settle. Yet, not only were these would-be settlers “very
ungovernable and seditious,” they lacked both the means and the intent to pay. They
“had no other views than speculation,” Symmes complained, and quickly returned to
Kentucky to resell their (still unpurchased) land rights to their neighbors. When they
inevitably defaulted, the Kentuckians “vented their spleen in abuses & calumnies” of
Symmes. The Kentuckians were only some of the would-be purchasers whose appetites
exceeded their means. Speculators constantly contracted with Symmes for hundreds of
69
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thousands of acres, yet rarely paid. Large or smallholders, few viewed land as a source
of steady and reliable gains; the possibility of reselling bare promises of future title at a
tidy profit excited far more interest.70
Symmes’s questionable management exacerbated the problem. “[W]ith
reluctance,” Symmes’s agent Jonathan Dayton passed along the “injurious and unpleasant
reports” circulating about Symmes in New Jersey. “[T]here is scarcely a single one of all
the Jerseymen who have as yet returned from the Miamis, who does not complain of you
or speak of you with disapprobation.” They accused Symmes of promising lands to one
person one day, then selling them to another the next. With so many defaulting on their
payments, and so much calumny surrounding the settlement, Dayton and Symmes grew
anxious. Their first payment of $80,000 was due once the survey was complete, yet they
lacked the required funds.71
There was one bright spot in Symmes’s general gloom. The town of Losantiville,
which soon changed its name to Cincinnati (or Cincinnata—the spelling was contested)
in honor of the fraternal society of revolutionary military officers, was thriving. Located
around the U.S. military post of Fort Washington at the confluence of the Ohio and Little
Miami Rivers, the town became the seat of the newly created county of Hamilton (a name
selected in honor of the Secretary of the Treasury). Moreover, when full-fledged war
broke out against the Northwest Native nations in 1790, Cincinnati ended up prospering,
as Fort Washington became the center of federal military operations, and Governor
Arthur St. Clair moved his residence there. “Judge Sims's Settlement it is apprehend by
70

Symmes to Dayton, May 18, 1789; John Cleves Symmes to Jonathan Dayton, Nov. 25, 1788, in CJCS, 48-53.
Jonathan Dayton to John Cleves Symmes, May 16, 1789, in CJCS, 213-18; Jonathan Dayton to John Cleves Symmes, August 15,
1789, in CJCS, 218-34.
71

158

many is building up at our expense,” complained one Marietta resident. “[T]he principal
part of the Troops are withdrawn from this place & sent to that . . . . & we have
discovered that some of our Great Men are going to move down.”72
Yet the apparent harmony between federal interests and Symmes’s land
investments unraveled in controversy in spring 1791. Symmes, it turned out, was as
grasping and heedless in his land sales as his would-be purchasers: though he had happily
sold the land under Cincinnati on the ground that his application to Congress included all
the land between the Great and Little Miami Rivers, his formal contract with the Board of
Treasury in fact stopped twenty miles west of the Little Miami—thereby excluding
Cincinnati. All of Symmes’s purported sales in the town rested on invalid title.
The clash between Symmes and St. Clair laid bare the challenge that the land
companies’ independent power over ownership posed to federal authority and
governance. The discovery of the illegitimacy of Symmes’s sales deeply angered
Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair, who responded, Symmes complained, “as though
he had lately made a notable discovery of a conspiracy against the United States.” But
from St. Clair’s perspective, Symmes’s actions threatened the fragile efforts to predicate
ownership on proper purchase from constituted authorities. The federal government, St.
Clair wrote angrily, permitted settlement based only on “a regular and proper authority . .
. founded on an actual purchase or previous contract.” In this regard, Symmes and his
settlers were identical to the intruders whom federal “Troops have repeatedly been
employed in dispossessing . . . and destroying [the intruders’] Habitations.” As St. Clair
72
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observed, if a hope or proposal for a contract were enough to claim federal land, “who is
that would not be justified?” Yet Symmes, as Miami Company proprietor and federal
official, was markedly different from the impoverished intruders who defied federal law
to settle public lands. This only shocked St. Clair the more. “I could not conceive,” the
incredulous St. Clair wrote, that “considerable Settlements . . . had been made, not only
without authority, but directly in the face of it, and by a Person invested with high Office
of a Judge of the Territory.”73
Symmes proceeded to demonstrate just how different he was from the intruders,
by dint of both his position and the rights he claimed based on his self-proclamed
ownership of the disputed lands. Much of the power struggle that followed encompassed
federal Fort Washington, the center of the war effort, which lay on land that Symmes
purportedly owned. Attempting to shield “innocent” and “unwary” purchasers but also
guard federal title, St. Clair issued an official proclamation warning against further
settlement and subjecting the settlers around Fort Washington to martial law. Symmes’s
response, as “proprietor of the purchase,” was to observe that he had purchased the land
before the fort was built, and to insist that he would accept only the “justice of the
supreme authority of the United States”—Congress—in determining the question of the
boundary. “[U]njustly wounded” by St. Clair’s “harsh sentences,” Symmes further
questioned whether St. Clair in fact enjoyed the authority he asserting, alleging that
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governor’s actions “border[ed] hard” on “acts of tyranny.” The proclamations, Symmes
told Jonathan Dayton, “have convulsed these settlements beyond your conception.”74
Unlike the petitions of intruders claiming preemption rights, Symmes’s petition,
which came just as Congress was resolving the Ohio Company’s financial implosion, did
not languish. Citing Congress’s generous treatment of the Ohioans as they appealed for
expanded boundaries and a grant of the land he already paid for, Symmes’s agents
managed to secure what they sought. In early 1792, Congress, with no discussion or
apparent opposition, enacted two statutes that granted Symmes relief for both his
boundaries and his finances. The first redrew the borders of Symmes’s purchase to
include Cincinnati; the second authorized the President to grant Symmes as much land as
he had paid for, as well as an additional 106,857 acres, to be paid for with army bounty
warrants. In September 1794 President Washington issued Symmes a patent for 311,682
acres within this survey, including Cincinnati but specifically excluding the land around
Fort Washington. Symmes’s success likely owed to the impossible position that his land
sales had forced upon the federal government. Willing to defend federal title by expelling
intruders who knowingly flouted federal authority, the federal government was
apparently less anxious to dispossess an entire town of innocent purchasers. Symmes’s
ability to create an entire town of intruders forced Congress to ratify his actions
retroactively.75
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That might have been that. Yet Symmes’s tangle with federal law, rather than
dissuading him, evidently encouraged him to undertake still riskier speculation on bare
promises of federal land. The 1792 statute had established clear boundaries for
Symmes’s tract; when surveyed the following year, it turned out these borders contained
a little over 500,000 acres, much less than the one million Symmes had contracted for
back in 1788. Symmes nonetheless self-servingly interpreted the statute to entitle him to
still purchase the promised one million acres, notwithstanding that most of that land fell
outside the statutory boundaries of his tract. Moreover, apart from the 300,000 acres
already granted, none of the land had been paid for.76
In Symmes’s view, all he had to do to obtain these lands was comply with the
terms of the original agreement. He accordingly set out to amass $82,000 to make
another payment. “[T]here are many who envy the lands to us, and [who] will attempt by
means not the Most honorable to induce Congress to withhold them,” Symmes wrote his
son-in-law Peyton Short, appealing to him for funds, “but justice and contract are on our
Side.” Everything hinged on making payment. “Money will be the best argument that
can be r[a]ised,” Symmes stated, “though I had the logic and oratory of a Cicero, and the
right of Adam to the soil.” Yet the same rise in securities that had doomed the Ohio
Company hamstrung Symmes. As 1796 stretched into 1797, there was still no prospect
of payment. Yet Symmes remained convinced that if he could just gather the money, he
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could force Congress’s acquiescence. “I have read so many cases in point,” Symmes
stated, that “if we tender the Money, it is not in the power of Congress, constitutionally to
take [the land] from us.” Desperate for capital and confident of ultimate success, Symmes
continued selling title outside of his bounds of his patent—lands, in other words, he did
not own, and could not reasonably claim—based only on the expectation that he would
eventually receive them from Congress once he made payment.77
Seemingly overwhelmed by the complicated tangle of documents, representatives
in Congress reacted only slowly against Symmes’s freewheeling gambling with the
public domain. Albert Gallatin, a representative from western Pennsylvania with
growing expertise on the public lands, took on the responsibility of mastering and
explaining Symmes’s contract to Congress.

He headed committees that in 1796 and

again in 1797 investigated Symmes’s contract and concluded that he had no right to the
lands he claimed. In 1798 Symmes watched in horror as Gallatin proposed declaring the
lands outside Symmes’s patent forfeit; the bill became law the next year.78
As his house of cards began to collapse around him, Symmes became increasingly
desperate. To obtain influence, he took “infinite pains” to secure the election of his sonin-law, William Henry Harrison, as the Northwest Territory’s delegate to Congress. He
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also turned to another source of authority—his position as a judge on the General Court,
the Northwest Territory’s highest tribunal.79
The overlap between corporate and federal authority in the territory had long
made Governor St. Clair uneasy. Years earlier, he had pointed out that main settlements
in the Territory lay on Miami and Ohio Company lands, and that the Companies’
management had “laid the foundation of endless disputes.” Yet Symmes as well as Rufus
Putnam, while serving as heads of these companies, were also General Court judges.
“Every land dispute will be traced to some transaction of one or other of those Gentlemen
in those capacities,” St. Clair observed, “and they are to sit in Judgement upon them.” St.
Clair feared the risk of “Biass.”80
Now, St. Clair’s fears were seemingly being realized, as Symmes used his judicial
authority to try to stop the proliferating lawsuits based on his dubious land sales. In one
case, Symmes supposedly told some of the purchasers of his lands that they should go
ahead and litigate a suit challenging their title’s validity. If, as was likely, they lost in the
lower county court, “they should remove it into his Court, where they might be sure, he
would not give Judgment against himself.” In Ludlow v. White, an ejectment action
before the General Court, the plaintiff argued that Symmes should recuse himself because
he was “directly interested” in the outcome: the defendant had purchased the disputed
land from Symmes, who had warranted the title (meaning he was legally liable if the title
proved defective). Symmes refused, insisting he had “no interest” in the suit and
presiding over much of the trial. Yet in the middle of the proceedings, Symmes suddenly
79
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reversed himself. Reportedly, he “openly acknowledged that he was the person most
interested in the event of the suit” and stepped down from the bench. He then walked
across the courtroom to the bar, from which he “advocated [the case] for the
defendant.”81
Symmes’s erratic behavior was not confined to the courtroom; he was reportedly
also advocating extrajudicial means to protect his title. In one deposition, a man named
McCashen reported going to Symmes to demand back the money he had paid for his
land. Symmes refused. He instead urged McCashen to go home and “shoot or drown
any person who might molest him.” This approach had worked for the squatters in
Pennsylvania, so, “if the purchasers under [Symmes] would follow th[is] example . . .
their attempt would prove successful.” Symmes had similarly urged others to “hold[]
their possessions by force of arms,” St. Clair reported to the Secretary of State. St. Clair
wondered whether Symmes could be prosecuted under the Sedition Act for these
actions.82
These extreme efforts notwithstanding, the Miami Company crumbled around
Symmes. Besieged by lawsuits stripping him of tens of thousands of acres of land—he
was arrested three times for debt in 1802 alone —Symmes slid toward penury. In a final
appeal to Congress, Symmes stated that its statutes voiding the contract were causing him
“very great hardships, tending to the utter destruction . . . of his whole property.”
Referred Symmes’s petition, the Attorney General presented a lengthy report that
determined that Symmes had no legal rights based on the contract. In fact, the Attorney
81
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General concluded it was Symmes who had violated a provision in his patent and so
owed the U.S. over $15,000 in compensation. Symmes never paid this debt. He died
penniless in North Bend, Ohio—the town he had created—in 1814.83

Both the federal government and Symmes entered the Miami Purchase expecting
mutual benefits; both came away feeling used. In particular, both Congress and Symmes
felt that they had been burdened with all the risk while other party had sought to profit.
Congress’s disappointment was understandable. Instead of producing the reliable
and orderly settlement Congress had anticipated, Symmes had used implicit
congressional backing to spin an elaborate scheme of debt and dubious title. And just as
in the case of the Scioto Company, the costs of these reckless speculations with the public
domain fell on innocent purchasers, and ultimately the federal government, to resolve.
Bombarded with petitions asserting that roughly 2,000 settlers with questionable title
would lose “their only support & means of subsistence, ” the federal government felt
constrained to offer the right of preemption to Symmes’s claimants. But, while these
gestures were more generous than Congress’s treatment of other unauthorized settlers,
federal policy, rather than assuaging the settlers, produced “very great alarm.”
Congress’s beneficence, after all, only granted the settlers the right to repurchase, at two
dollars per acre, lands for which they had already paid one dollar per acre. Many could
not exercise their preemptive rights because they had only verbal contracts with Symmes;
others had no money to make the purchase. Of the roughly 100,000 acres ultimately
83
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purchased under the preemption statute, 30,000 were ultimately forfeit because the
claimants lacked the downpayment necessary; much of the rest fell to speculators rather
than individual holders.84
Symmes emphasized a different sort of risk. Part of the risk was financial.
Symmes had created a “respectable settlement” at his own expense, spending four
thousand dollars supporting “starving emigrants” and paying “presents” to the Indians.
And by removing Anglo-Americans’ “horrid impressions” of the Indian threat, he had, in
his estimate, doubled the value of the unsold federal lands.

Yet all these services to the

nation, Symmes lamented, had “no weight with Government.”85
But Symmes also stressed the broader risk he had taken—a gamble on the process
of colonization and the success of the federal government itself. Symmes saw himself as
a “patriotically bold and adventurous” man who had hazarded his fortune and his life “at
an early day in aid of Government . . . to extend the empire of the United States and
reclaim from savage men and beasts a country that may one day prove the brightest jewel
in the regalia of the nation.” But federal policy favored the timid men who “grip[p]ed
hard their certificates” and “s[a]t quietly by their own firesides,” waiting while Symmes
took on the financial and physical dangers needed to subjugate the country, and only then
swooping in to reap the rewards. “[I]s this what you call fair, sir?” Symmes appealed.86
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Symmes’s self-pitying and self-serving rationalizations ignored the extent to
which his failure was self-created. Nonetheless, others found Symmes’s feeling of
grievance justified. The Attorney General, for one, though he emphasized that Symmes
had no legal claim to relief, nonetheless viewed him as a “pathetic” figure whose
“misfortune” had been “productive of particular benefits” for the nation.87
In fact, both Symmes and federal officials had used each other, by design.
Western land was supposed to unite them: Symmes would secure access to formal,
legitimate title, while the federal government could transform its landed holdings into
revenue without an elaborate and costly bureaucracy, all while creating orderly and
unambiguous ownership. This would-be symbiosis was the heart of the first federal land
system, which envisioned that this alignment of interests between speculators and federal
officials would produce both private gains and public benefits.
Symmes’s failure ultimately spoke as much to the flaws of this vision as to his
personal shortcomings. As it turned out, private and public interests ran in opposite
directions. As Symmes’s experience demonstrated, everyone involved in land in the
early republic—from the small Kentucky claimants to grand investors—was out to secure
a quick return by selling things that they did not yet own. Land speculation was built on
contingencies and future promises of title: Congress itself sold the future right to public
lands based on the promise of future payment, the better to secure higher revenues. But
these features, which made land such a potentially lucrative investment, were
fundamentally at odds with certainty and order; land speculation thrived on confusion. In
the end, though, someone had to resolve the mess, a role that usually fell to the
87
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government. In short, the knot of confusing claims and contradictory title Symmes left in
his wake—yet another source of ownership to be hashed out in lengthy nineteenthcentury litigation—proved the predictable legacy of this failed experiment in distributing
the public lands.
***
The situation in the Southwest Territory was different from that north of the Ohio.
North Carolina’s extensive land grants meant that the federal government had little title
with which to entice land companies. Yet just to the south, Georgia had millions of acres
to offer, and in the early 1790s, it entered into a series of contracts known as the Yazoo
sales that were larger and even more poorly defined than the Scioto or Miami
speculations. Though most histories of Yazoo have focused on the sales’ political and
financial consequences, few have examined what happened in the vast and nebulous
spaces that Georgia purported to sell. Like their competitors to the north, the Yazoo
companies represented an effort to use title to extend governance and state power into
these uncertain regions. But unlike the Ohio and Miami Companies, these companies
existed in tension with, and often in outright defiance of, federal authority. For much of
the 1790s, then, federal officials struggled to suppress these state-backed land companies
by asserting federal law. And though their lands ostensibly lay just over the border
within Georgian territory, much of this struggle between federal and corporate authority
centered in the Southwest Territory.88
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The most significant effort at actual settlement of the Yazoo lands was undertaken
by the Tennessee Company, headed by Zachariah Cox, who would later gain the Creek
title of “leader of the Ecunnaunuxulgee,” which was translated as “those greedily
grasping after land regardless of governmental disapproval.” Like many speculators, Cox
started as a surveyor, working in Wilkes County on the Georgia frontier. Cox first
became interested in western lands in 1785, when he sought to lead a group of Georgia
settlers to the area known as Muscle Shoals.89
Located in present-day Alabama, Muscle Shoals was one of the most strategically
significant locations in the Southeast. The Shoals was located at the “Bent” of the
Tennessee River, the region’s most important waterway, which traced a U-shaped path
between its origin in the Smoky Mountains (present-day eastern Tennessee) and its end at
the Ohio River, linking the Tennessee Country to the Mississippi watershed. The “Bent”
was the Tennessee’s southernmost point, from which a short portage connected to rivers
that ran south to the Gulf of Mexico: one Tennessean described this “small . . . neck of
land” as key to the region’s “intercourse and commerce” with “every quarter of the
globe.” The Shoals also lay at the junction of Cherokee, Creek, and Chickasaw territory,
and so had long served as a center of trade and diplomacy among the three nations. In
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the 1786 Treaty of Hopewell with the Chickasaws, the United States had promised to
establish a trading post at the Shoals, on the site of an earlier French fort.90
These prospects for Indian and riverine commerce early attracted would-be
speculators. Formally within Georgia, the Shoals’ location tied it to the Tennessee
Country and excited the interest of North Carolinians. In 1783, the ubiquitous William
Blount, with several other prominent North Carolinians, finagled the Georgia legislature
into a complicated land deal for the Shoals. The project failed, though, when the
speculation became entangled with the short-lived secessionist state of Franklin.91
After Cox’s 1785 scheme similarly came to naught, he seized a new opportunity
in 1789. Though the federal government urged states to cede their western lands, cashstrapped Georgia proved particularly resistant. Instead of cession, Georgia followed the
federal government’s lead and in 1789 sold off enormous tracts of its western territory to
land companies. One of three newly created speculative organizations, Zachariah Cox’s
Tennessee Company received 3.5 million acres centered at the Shoals, at a heavily
discounted price of 1.3 cents per acre, to be paid within two years.92
Georgia’s model of corporate state-building, however, differed from the federal
government’s. Georgia had little interest in the issues of system, clarity, or governmental
authority that preoccupied federal officials. Its model echoed more closely the
unregulated land schemes of North Carolina and Virginia, except that, while those states
focused on availability to smallholders, Georgia fixated almost solely on profiting as
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quickly as possible from millions of acres formally included within the state but in
practice entirely outside state jurisdiction. The state’s own title to the Yazoo lands was
questionable: nearly all the land was still legally owned by Native nations, a right
guaranteed under federal treaty. This uncertainty of the title was reflected in the bargain
purchase price—1.3 cents per acre, to be paid within two years, far below the sixty-six
cents per acre paid by the Ohio and Miami Companies. Legally, Georgia resolved the
dilemma of title by requiring the land companies to extinguish Indian claims and keep the
state “free from all charge and expences” from Indian affairs.93
Georgia’s plans deeply troubled federal officials, who viewed the purported sale
of federally guaranteed Native lands as a flagrant violation of federal law. Secretary of
War Henry Knox and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson both concluded that the sale
was unconstitutional. Since the United States held the “only constitutional right” of
negotiating with Indians, Knox reasoned, “the state of Georgia could not delegate to the
companies . . . a right which they do not possess.” Jefferson agreed with this legal
conclusion, but urged suasion rather than coercion to resolve the conflict, at least
initially.94
As federal officials debated, Cox began preparations for settlement. Throughout
1790, he distributed advertisements throughout Kentucky and the Southwest Territory,
promising free land to would-be settlers who raised a crop at the Bent. Over the winter,
Cox and his would-be settlers gathered on the Tennessee River in the Southwest Territory
and built boats. In late March of 1791, Cox and thirty-one armed men traveled downriver
93
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to the Shoals. In a letter widely reprinted in eastern newspapers, Cox reported meeting
with Piamingo, leader of the Chickasaws, as well as representatives of the Cherokees.
Both supposedly assured Cox of their friendship, though other reports suggested that Cox
had told the Natives only of plans to trade and kept silent about his planned settlement.95
In Philadelphia, federal officials, including President Washington, read the
newspaper accounts of Cox with alarm. “Notwithstanding the existing laws [and] solemn
Treaties” protecting Indian lands, an angry Washington wrote, “the agents for the
Tennessee company are at this moment by public advertisements under the signature of
a Zachariah Cox encouraging by offers of land, & other inducements, a settlement at the
Mussle-Shoals.” Jefferson forwarded Cox’s advertisements to William Blount, now
governor of the Southwest Territory, with instructions to halt the plan; Knox supposedly
gave Blount orders to prevent the settlement “at all events.”96
Cox’s settlement came at a tricky time for Blount, who was in the midst of
negotiating what would become the Treaty of Holston with the Cherokees. When word
of Cox’s planned settlement reached the gathered Cherokees, they were “exasperated”
and “Indigna[n]t.” The Natives complained to Blount that he was only “amus[ing] them
with friendly Talk” of a treaty while the United States was committing an “open

95

William Blount to Secretary Smith, April 17, 1791, in TP: Vol. IV, 55-59; “Extract of a Letter from Zachariah Cox, Esq. to His
Correspondent in Maryland, Dated Fredericksburg,” Daily Advertiser, August 12, 1791; Holstonian to Mr. Claypoole, August 16,
1791, Western Americana Collection, Beinecke Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
96
George Washington to Edmund Randolph, October 10, 1791, in W. W. Abbot and Dorothy Twohig, eds., The Papers of George
Washington, Presidential Series (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987), 9:68-70; Secretary of State to William Blount,
Aug. 12, 1791, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson: Main Series, 22:29-30; “New-York, Monday, July 18,” Daily Advertiser, July 18,
1791.
Though Washington fixated Cox, Cox’s activities had a parallel in the actions of James O’Fallon, the supposed “general agent” for the
South Carolina Company. Basing himself in Kentucky, O’Fallon attracted the attention of Arthur St. Clair as well as Thomas
Jefferson, who instructed the U.S. attorney in Kentucky to initiate a prosecution against O’Fallon: Jefferson warned, “a well ordered
government [cannot] tolerate such an assumption of it’s sovereignty by unauthorised individuals.” Thomas Jefferson to William
Murray, March 22, 1791, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson: Main Series, 19:598. President Washington also issued a proclamation
against O’Fallon warning that O’Fallon was violating the Trade and Intercourse Act, and that participants in his scheme risked federal
prosecution. “Proclamation,” Mar. 19, 1791, in Papers of GW: PS, 7:605-06.

173

Violation” of their earlier agreements by permitting a settlement “on their usual hunting
grounds.” When Bloody Fellow and other Cherokee leaders visited Philadelphia early
the next year, the Cherokees specifically demanded that the federal government prevent
the Tennessee Company’s planned settlement.97
Cox’s plans similarly angered the Creeks. The influential Creek leader Alexander
McGillivray found himself pursued by a man named Gordon, whom Cox had apparently
sent to “Cajole” Creek support “by the most profuse and wild promises he could invent.”
But McGillivray wanted nothing to do with “these wild Speculators.” “These fellows
must think me as mercenary, base & unprincipled as themselves,” wrote the incredulous
McGillivray. Cox may have won over a few “Infatuated Indians,” but McGillivray
recognized the danger. “The Tennesee Companies Grant,” he observed, “includes every
foot of our, the Cherokees & Chickasaw Hunting Grounds.”98
Trying, and failing, to halt Cox in the Southwest Territory, Governor Blount
sought to assuage Natives by distancing the federal government from Cox’s actions and
relying on Native jurisdiction to enforce federal law. “[T]he Tennessee Company,”
Blount told the Cherokees, “was acting without any Permission or Authority of the
Supreme Government, & contrary to the Views of the Same.” Blount’s statement
implicitly granted the Cherokees the right to attack Cox under the Treaty of Hopewell;
Blount even allegedly encouraged Natives to “intercept” Cox’s party.99
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McGillivray also concluded that federal law—in his case, the recently ratified
Treaty of New York with the Creek Nation—authorized resistance to Cox’s settlement.
“This Measure of Messr. Cox I conceivd to be a flagrant Violation of the treaty, because
Congress had pledgd themselves not to Countenance the Georgia Grants to the Yasou &
Tennessee Companys,” McGillivray wrote, which “left me at liberty to act hostilely
against them if they should presume to Settle the Countrys in question.” Accordingly,
when McGillivray learned that Cox’s men had begun their attempt, he sent a Creek force
to destroy Cox’s settlement. But when they arrived at the Shoals, the Creeks found the
site abandoned. Likely learning of the dangers, Cox and his men had stayed only briefly
to trade with local Chickasaws before heading back upriver. McGillivray posted guards
in case Cox returned.100
Cox and his men retreated to the Southwest Territory. There, Blount ordered
them bound to appear before the Superior Court of the Washington District on charges of
violating the federal Trade and Intercourse Act, which prohibited private purchases of
Native land. But the result was not what Blount wished: “[t]he Grand Jury would [not]
find the bill against Cox and others,” he complained. In the eyes of the territory’s
settlers, federal officials feared, seizure of Native land was no crime; many of the jurors
themselves were supposedly illegally settled on Cherokee land. But Attorney General
Randolph also questioned whether would-be private purchasers like Cox had committed
any crime, because the statute, seemingly through inartful drafting, merely voided private
purchases without attaching any criminal penalties. Cox’s actions led President
Washington to propose a new version of the statute, ultimately enacted in 1793, that
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contained a provision urged by James Madison that specifically criminalized settlement
and surveying on Indian lands.101
In the interim, the controversy over Cox roiled the Southwest Territory. Blount’s
defenders praised his resistance to Cox, since it saved the Territory’s citizens from
entanglement in a scheme “unwarrantable by the Laws of the Union & in Violation of
Subsisting Treaties, which are the Laws of the Land.” For his part, Cox claimed that
Blount’s opposition to his plan had turned many residents against the governor; Blount
himself lamented that the grand jury’s decision “has given the Company a sort of triumph
in the Eyes of ignorant People over Government.” Blount’s deputy Daniel Smith told
Jefferson that Cox’s “acquittal by the Jury at the last Superior Court” led many there “to
believe the laws cannot punish them for settling at the shoals.” The defiant Cox
announced plans to continue his open violation of federal law by returning to the Shoals
the following year.102
In the end, Cox’s proposed 1792 expedition never happened. In part, this was due
to continued federal resistance. Refusing to accept the grand jury’s verdict as the final
word, Blount promised that the federal government held “other means in store” to stop
Cox’s settlement. A gubernatorial proclamation forbade Cox from passing through the
Southwest Territory and threatened that any citizens “so injudicious” as to join him
would be hauled “before the federal court.” In spring 1792, territorial judge David
Campbell issued a lengthy charge to a grand jury reiterating the constitutional provision
101

William Blount to James Robertson, Sept. 3, 1791, in TP: Vol. IV, 79; Washington to Randolph, Oct. 10, 1791; Jefferson to Blount,
Aug. 12, 1791, n.1.; Edmund Randolph to George Washington, Sept. 12, 1791, in PGW:PS, 8:524-26; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, Ch. 19, 1
Stat. 329, 3 Annals of Cong. 827-28.
102
Holstonian to Mr. Claypoole, August 16, 1791; William Blount to James Robertson, Sept. 3, 1791, in TP: Vol. IV, 79; Acting
Governor Smith to Secretary of State, Oct. 4, 1791, in TP: Vol. IV, 83-84; “Extract of a Letter from Zachariah Cox, Esq. to His
Correspondent in Maryland, Dated Fredericksburg,” Daily Advertiser, Aug. 12, 1791.

176

that all treaties made by the United States were the “supreme Law of the Land,” urging
their strict observance by the territory’s citizens. Printed and distributed throughout the
territory, Campbell’s charge “operated much to the disgrace of those Adventurers,”
according to one observer.103
But ultimately, it was Indian power and financial worries, not federal law, that
doomed Cox’s 1792 plans. The Cherokee and Creek threat remained very real: Cox and
his men would be “mad . . . to attempt another Settlement,” one newspaper correspondent
wrote, “unless they can embody a force sufficient to act in opposition to all the Southern
Indian Tribes.” Meanwhile, at the same moment that the Ohio and Miami Companies
were struggling to meet their obligations to the federal government, Cox found himself
unable to scrounge together the money needed to pay Georgia, which (unlike the federal
government) insisted that payment be made in hard currency rather than near-worthless
state currency. “Your good friends the Muscle shoal Compy. have faild to make
pay[men]t,” a gleeful and sarcastic correspondent informed William Blount, “& I am told
have Squandered the[ir] Certificates in such manner as not to be able to settle with their
Associates.”104

Notwithstanding this initial failure, neither Georgia nor Cox was ready to
foreswear such a lucrative scheme because of a few setbacks. Several years later, Cox
and a number of associates revived their plans, liberally plying the Georgia legislature
with bribes. In 1795, Georgia sold the lands once again to several companies, including
103
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nearly three million acres around the Shoals to the Tennessee Company for $60,000.
Unlike the earlier sales, however, this land grab caused tremendous ferment. Outrage
over the legislation, which became known as the “Yazoo fraud,” led to the election of a
new legislature the following year, which not only repealed the earlier legislation as
unconstitutional but literally burned the earlier statute.105
Neither repeal nor controversy daunted Cox, who, following the precedent of
other land companies, constructed a complicated charter for his new settlement. He
would begin by building trading posts for the Chickasaws, making it all the easier to
obtain their lands “under the authority of the United States.” Like the Ohio Company,
the Tennessee Company would then subdivide its lands into various lots. Each settler
would receive 1,001 acres: a single acre houselot in the town of “Ockochappo” and then
one 50-, one 200-, and three 250-acre lots. Rather than paying for their lands, would-be
settlers would obtain deeds by working for the Company for twelve months. But Cox
was adamant that no settlement would occur until he had obtained the “apporbation of
Congress” for his actions.106
As Cox set about his plan, rumors about his intentions reached government
officials. In 1797, Cox returned to Knoxville—now the capital of the new state of
Tennessee, created from the former Southwest Territory the previous year—where he
opened a store. There, Cox reportedly began buying up weapons and ammunition,
including $1200 in cavalry swords, and gathering a private army.107
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Cox reassured every official curious about his mysterious behavior that his
purposes were lawful. He told both John Sevier, the new governor of Tennessee, and the
state assembly, where he spoke briefly, that he “should not proceed until authorized by
the laws of his country.” As for the arms, he would use them only “defensively” to
guard against Indian attacks. Sevier gave Cox his blessing to pass through Tennessee.
Cox also called on Benjamin Hawkins, the federal Indian agent for the Southeast, to
reiterate his obedience to federal law. Cox supplied Hawkins a copy of his plan and
asked for a license to trade with the Chickasaws.108
These proclamations of lawfulness, however, relied on an expansive and selfserving interpretation of the law, as Hawkins recognized. Cox believed himself entitled
to construct a trading post at Muscle Shoals on the basis of an earlier Chickasaw cession
to the federal government at the Treaty of Hopewell, notwithstanding that he himself
lacked federal authority or sanction. The supposed lawfulness of Cox’s plan also
depended on the sympathy and influence of “well wisher[s]” like Tennessee’s newly
elected congressman Andrew Jackson, who, Cox believed, would ensure that the
extension of the Indian boundary to encompass Cox’s lands would “shortly take place.”
“Government will find it a better policy to people a country with their own citizens,” Cox
wrote the sympathetic Jackson, “than to reserve it as an asylum for savages.” Many
Tennesseans strongly supported Cox in this goal. Governor Sevier, for one, regarded the
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federal government’s “prevention of a settlement at or near the muscle shoals . . . a
manifest injury done the whole western country.”109
For their part, Native nations strongly contested Cox’s claims of legality. As
reported by Benjamin Hawkins, the Cherokees and Chickasaws had received remarkably
accurate accounts of the Georgia sales, and intended to resist. The Chickasaws, having
already given Cox “notis” not to “make Attempt to Settel,” threatened to immediately
“strike” any settlement. Nor, they warned, should Cox rely on the agreement of a few
Chickasaws, “for such permision is not By the consent of the Chickasaw Nation.” As for
the Cherokees, a national council wrote to the President appealing for him to “fulfill his
promises” by preventing Cox’s settlement. If that failed, Hawkins reported that the
Cherokee warriors “have their moccasins ready” to resist.110
Federal officials in the Adams Administration, fearful of the consequences of
Cox’s plans, sided with the Native nations. “Tennesee and Cox have a good deal
disturbed me,” Secretary of War James McHenry confided. McHenry believed that
Cox’s plans, if carried out, would “menace[] the United States in an extensive Indian
war.” Insisting on upholding federal guarantees of Native lands, McHenry gave explicit
orders not to allow Cox and his men to pass by U.S. forts, even if they presented state
passports.111
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Federal officials grew anxious when Cox seemed to take the first steps toward
settlement. In 1798, he created a town called Smithland at the confluence of the
Tennessee and Ohio. His somewhat opaque motives seem to have been to use this
location as an eventual springboard for travel up the Tennessee to the Shoals, over two
hundred miles to the south. Smithland itself was in the narrow strip of far western
Kentucky between Tennessee to the south and the Northwest Territory (present-day
Illinois) to the north, where, across the river, federal Fort Massac controlled the Ohio
River. But, despite some confusion over whether Cox’s settlement was on Indian land,
the federal government was largely powerless to halt the settlement. After meeting Cox,
Kentucky’s governor sanctioned the plan, and Cox involved the local militia commander
in the scheme. If the federal government did invoke the Trade and Intercourse Act to
forcibly expel Smithland, word had it that Cox intended to “defend the place as long as
he had a man able to fire a gun.”112
Federal officials were also troubled by reports that Cox was experimenting in
private government, turning Smithland into his own personal fiefdom by establishing his
own courts—“tribunals . . . unknown to the nation,” in the words of one federal official.
Martin Wickliff, a passing trader, reported that Cox had arrested him for violating “the
laws of Smithland” when he got into a fight with one of Cox’s men. When Wickliff told
Cox he “did not think Smithland had any right to make laws,” Cox insisted, “every man
has a right to make himself laws of his own house, and that the houses there were his.”
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Wickliff particularly hit a nerve when he stated he intended to inform the local army
commander. “By God we are not to be threatened with the Federal Officers,” Cox
thundered, before expelling Wickliff from the settlement. Yet, as egregious as Cox’s
“usurpation . . . of the rights of sovereignty” was, it did not violate federal law, since
Smithland lay within Kentucky, not the federal territories.113
The stalemate persisted until July 1798, when Cox and a number of his men
attempted to pass Fort Massac to continue down the Ohio. Their destination was
unknown. Cox proclaimed that he intended only to go to New Orleans for supplies, but
federal officials believed, and later adduced depositions asserting, that Cox actually
intended to travel up the Tennessee and “force a Settlement” at Muscle Shoals. Though
Cox had a pass signed by the supportive Kentucky militia commander, the fort’s
commander, Major Kingsberry, refused to allow Cox and his men to proceed, citing
orders that barred the passage of all armed parties by the fort. If Cox attempted to pass,
Kingsberry warned, he would be constrained to fire on him. Cox ranted against this
exercise of “military prerogative,” a violation of the free navigation of the Ohio
“guaranteed to every citizen by the constitution and laws of the United States.” Finally,
Kingsberry agreed to allow Cox and a few of his men to pass, as long as he could inspect
the boats and no more than a third of the men were armed. Cox complied, but he also
evaded Kingsberry’s orders by sending the rest of his men overland to rejoin him further
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downriver. He then continued, not up the Tennessee to the Shoals, but down the
Mississippi to Natchez, capital of the newly created Mississippi Territory.114
When they learned of Cox’s apparent deception, furious federal officials pursued
him. Cox awoke in his room in Natchez surrounded by what he described as a “battalion
of federal troops, with fixed bayonets.” On the orders of Winthrop Sargent—the former
Ohio Company official and Secretary of the Northwest Territory had just been appointed
as Mississippi’s territorial governor—Cox was arrested and held in federal Fort Panmure.
Allegedly held in “close confinement” and denied letters and visitors, Cox appealed to
Sargent for a hearing, and, subsequently, the writ of habeas corpus, guaranteed to him “as
well as every other citizen of the United States, by the federal constitution.” He received
no answer; his pleas to territorial judges were similarly unavailing.115
Finally, despairing of his situation, Cox climbed over the fort wall and escaped.
Fleeing first to New Orleans, where the Spanish governor refused American demands for
extradition, Cox proceeded through Choctaw Country back to Tennessee, supposedly
pursued by Indians offered a federal reward for his capture. (This measure especially
angered Cox, smacking of “savage or military prerogative” in contrast to the “impartial
laws” that he claimed existed in the states.). Arriving in Nashville, Cox was arrested on a
federal warrant and brought before a federal judge. Attorney General Charles Lee told
the Secretary of State he thought that Cox’s actions “come under the description of
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Treason in levying war against the United States.” But after being detained for an
additional three months, Cox was released, evidently for lack of evidence.116
Despite his ultimate vindication, Cox’s arrest represented the “end to this
troublesome man’s career,” in one newspaper’s words. Cox lost control over the
Tennessee Company, and Muscle Shoals remained Indian country until after the War of
1812. In 1803, Cox petitioned Congress, alleging that he had lost $9,000 in goods—
merchandise, a boat, and a slave—from his arrest. Though it conceded the evidence of
his transgressions was thin, Congress referred him to the courts for relief. Cox moved to
Virginia, where died in the 1830s.117
But even after Cox’s settlement schemes faded, the controversy over the sales to
the Tennessee Company and other Yazoo companies persisted. Zachariah Cox’s deeds
still floated around the Southwest Territory, regarded as “of little Value” by territorial
citizens but ultimately snapped up by investors, who spawned a generation of litigation
over these paper empires. With Georgia’s 1802 cession of its western lands, the federal
government inherited responsibility for Georgia’s dubious land dealings. In the 1810 case
of Fletcher v. Peck, in a decision that intertwined federalism, Indian affairs, and land
policy, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Georgia’s 1796 repeal of the Yazoo land sale
violated the Constitution’s Contract Clause. In 1814, a compelled Congress compensated
purchasers, including the latest shareholders of the Tennessee Company, with the
promise of $5 million in proceeds from future land sales.118
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It is easy to follow Alexander McGillivray and read the Tennessee Company as a
“wild speculation.” The colorful Zachariah Cox presented a sharp difference from the
respectable New Englanders who established the Ohio Company, who saw themselves as
advancing federal authority and interest. By contrast, Cox—notwithstanding his constant
protestations of obedience to “any constituted authority derived from our government”—
demonstrated a loose and permissive approach to federal law, skirting outright defiance.
Cox’s opportunistic machinations represented precisely the kind of land speculation that
Congress had hoped to forestall.
Part of the difference for Cox was federalism. The state he was bolstering was
Georgia, not the United States, and he readily hopscotched across jurisdictions, securing
support from Kentucky and Tennessee, even as his enterprises took him into domains
governed by tribes or the federal government, often represented by the army: the
“savage” and “military” authority Cox so despised.
Cox’s scheme also underscored the interrelationship between land companies and
Indian affairs. Unlike Putnam and Symmes, Cox had little sense that recasting Indian
affairs to correspond with the federal government’s newly solicitous approach would
yield dividends. For Cox, as for an earlier generation of land speculators, Native nations
only represented an obstacle; their leaders were to be cajoled or bribed into providing a
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fig leaf of legality to settlement, with the ultimate aim of removal and dispossession.
Natives actually were a barrier for Cox, as Native jurisdiction proved far more effective
than federal justice at forestalling his settlement. It was Creek, Cherokee, and Chickasaw
resistance, not Blount’s ineffectual legal efforts, that ultimately prevented Cox from
controlling Muscle Shoals. But as Cox understood, the boundaries between Native and
federal authority proved blurry. In contrast to the Delawares’ and Shawnees’ studied
cultivation of the Ohio and Miami Companies as federal proxies, Native leaders south of
the Ohio recognized that Cox lacked federal support and so could be punished with
impunity. In fact, thanks to treaty provisions as well as the encouragements of Blount and
Pickering, Creeks, Cherokees, and Chickasaws were implicitly enforcing federal as well
as Native law when they threatened to expel Cox.
Yet Cox’s efforts were not as different from the Ohio and Miami Companies as
federal officials imagined. Land in the early republic was powerful and disruptive.
Cox’s settlement in Smithland demonstrated, just as Marietta and Cincinnati had, that
ownership often bled into jurisdiction. The difference was that schemes in the Northwest
Territory had ostensibly sought to harness land’s power to bolster federal authority, while
Cox’s self-aggrandizing efforts were seemingly freed from all restraint, and thus
“inimical to our government.” The extreme reaction to Cox underscored the perceived
seriousness of his threat: without settling a foot of land at Muscle Shoals, Cox’s plans
convulsed the Creek, Cherokee, and Chickasaw Nations, the Southwest Territory, and the
Washington and Adams Administrations.119
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The final result, however, was strikingly similar. The Miami and Ohio schemes
had ultimately ended with speculators struggling to use their authority and control
against, rather than on behalf of, the federal government. The Tennessee Company
merely laid bare the tension between corporate and federal sovereignty that the Ohio and
Miami Companies had attempted, largely unsuccessfully, to paper over. Ultimately,
Cox’s would-be enrichment at public expense was merely more obvious and flamboyant.
Ironically, thanks to the Supreme Court’s intervention requiring that the Yazoo
Companies’ shareholders be compensated, it also proved the most remunerative.
***
In 1790, as the second session of the first Congress began, Abraham Baldwin,
congressman from Georgia, wrote to Joel Barlow, overseas in France selling land on
behalf of the Scioto Company. Predictably, land matters dominated the letter: Baldwin
discussed plans to purchase federal lands in the Illinois Country, Georgia’s sale of the
Yazoo lands, the Scioto Company’s dealings, and a visit from Rufus Putnam and
Manasseh Cutler. But above all, Baldwin wrote to reassure Barlow, who, despite his
foreign posting, had managed to get hold of the congressional journal and read about
Congress’s debates over opening a land office. “From the whole you conclude that there
is nearly an end to the plan of selling in large tracts, and say we are impolitic &c,”
Baldwin stated. “There is no such thing . . . Everybody is in favour of selling in large
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tracts, rough & smooth, if we can.” Baldwin pointed toward two favorable congressional
reports on recent petitions to purchase still more lands.120
As Baldwin’s letter demonstrates, the lure of the first federal land system—largescale sales to speculative land companies—remained strong into the 1790s. The appeal
for Congress was undeniable. Distributing title through the companies offered a potent
tool to pursue orderly title and restrain speculation, or so federal officials believed. And
land companies promised to achieve these goals without requiring the creation of
expensive bureaucracies or systems of office-holders. In fact, throughout much of the
Northwest Territory, the Ohio and Miami Companies provided both the framework and
the personnel on which federal territorial governance was built.
In ways difficult to appreciate now, title provided a form of governance that the
companies were to use to pursue policy aims that dovetailed with federal goals. To
borrow Arthur St. Clair’s phrase, owning and selling property implicated “rights of
sovereignty,” including fiscal state-building, diplomacy and war with Native nations, and
dispute resolution. In the early American west, this corporate sovereignty existed
alongside, and intersected with, Native, state, and federal sovereignty, in ways that
suggest continuities with both the colonial past and broader global imperialism. The irony
was that the federal government empowered the Ohio and Miami Companies to act at the
same moment that it was asserting its sole authority to govern in these areas against rival
claimants such as states, foreign nations, and private purchasers from Natives. It came,
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too, as the long-standing link between property and governance was dissolving in the
wake of the American Revolution.121
Perhaps for these reasons, the late-eighteenth century land companies were a far
cry from the East India Company; in practice, the power that they enjoyed was thin and
highly dependent on the federal government. Ohio and Miami Company officials
adjudicated disputes, but they did so as federal officers, even if Symmes heavily blurred
the boundaries. They conducted their own diplomacy with Native nations, but, at the first
sign of trouble, insisted on their entitlement to federal military protection. And the
companies’ financial success and failure, it turned out, rested not only on the state of
federal finance but also on Congress’s willingness to rescue them from their own
excesses.
Similarly, although some of the companies’ proponents may have dearly believed
in the “system” they promised, in the end they were selling a bill of goods. In this sense,
the Ohio and Miami Companies were no different from Cox’s scheme. Lured by the
promise of paper fortunes, Symmes, Sargent, and Cutler happily built settlements, like
Cincinnati and Gallipolis, that rested on the same (dubious) legal footing as the intruders
that the federal government evicted at gunpoint. But it was in failure, rather than success,
that the companies demonstrated just how much authority they really enjoyed. As the
federal government’s panicked response to Zachariah Cox suggests, the entanglement
between title and jurisdiction gave the companies considerable power to disrupt as well
as further federal aims. The companies used their quasi-governmental role to force the
national government to bear the costs of their avarice, a reality Congress discovered when
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it felt morally (or, in the case of the Tennessee Company, legally) obligated to relieve the
unwitting victims of the land companies’ speculative schemes.
As a result, it was Barlow’s prediction, not Baldwin’s, that proved more accurate.
Congress did not continue selling large tracts to speculators. The era of the great land
companies proved brief, and the Ohio, Scioto, and Miami Purchases were, in the end, the
only direct sales of federal land to companies. Similarly, after Georgia transferred its
domain to the federal government in 1802, states no longer had vast tracts of land to sell.
The result was that, going forward, the federal government, and its officials, would
dispense and determine the validity of title directly. “[S]elling lands,” one congressman
argued as Congress debated a land office in 1796, “should always be kept in the hands of
Government, and not in those of speculators.” The experiment of the middlemen was
over, at least for the time being.122
The deeper legacies, however, remained. As landholder, the federal government
still used its power over title to try to shape policy, reserving lots for education and
religion, subsidizing internal improvements, and paying its soldiers in public lands.
Much later, far larger corporate quasi-sovereigns fueled by the federal domain returned,
in the form of the transcontinental railroads. And the states subsidized a new generation
of speculators who proved just as adept at holding out the prospect of public goods while
using government support to underwrite their own risky ventures. In this sense, the
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tension between corporate and governmental sovereignty remained deep within American
legal and political thought and practice.123
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Chapter 3: Rise of Federal Title
In October 1789, the recently inaugurated President Washington wrote to Arthur
St. Clair, newly appointed as governor of the Northwest Territory. Among other
directives, Washington urged St. Clair to head to the town of Vincennes “as soon as
possible,” telling St. Clair it was a “circumstance of some importance” that the
inhabitants be guaranteed their lands “by some known and fixed principles.” The
President later received a lengthy and highly detailed report from St. Clair about
Vincennes lands, as well as three separate petitions from the town’s inhabitants on the
subject, which he forwarded to Congress.1
Addressing the minutiae of land practice in a small and distant village—
Vincennes was a settlement of several hundred French settlers along the Wabash River in
present-day Indiana—is likely not what the Constitution’s drafters had had in mind when
they created the Presidency two years earlier; nor does it comport with present-day
visions of the weighty matters that occupied the first president. Yet Washington was not
alone. Resolving the land claims in Vincennes and other French settlements in the
Illinois Country produced voluminous reports from Governor St. Clair and territorial
secretary Winthrop Sargent, lengthy correspondence involving cabinet officers,
especially Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and two separate acts of Congress, along
with numerous petitions and congressional reports. As for the issues that occasioned
these deliberations—the validity of villagers’ claims to title to small town lots or

1
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neighboring vacant farmland based on decades-old grants —they were more typical of a
local county court docket than the national legislature and executive.2
But, as surprising and unfamiliar as this federal attention to these small-bore
disputes may seem in the present, it was characteristic of federal land practice in the
1790s. To call this a system or policy would suggest a level of planning and forethought
that was absent. Rather, as in the case of Vincennes, the federal government was dragged
into one parochial, fact-intensive property controversy after another. Like the Illinois
settlers, Native nations arguing over their borders with one another and military bounty
holders alleging fraud and theft all advanced claims to territorial lands, thrusting the
federal government into complicated tangles of competing ownership. Often, their
asserted property rights rested on unfamiliar and foreign bodies of law that nonetheless
required acknowledgment, even if implicitly, within Anglo-American law.
Considered in parallel, a certain pattern emerges from these seemingly disparate
and disconnected disputes. Most saliently, in all these conflicts, it was the federal
government—sometimes Congress, but more frequently federal officials and
administrators—who became the arbiter of property rights. This was not wholly
accidental. The federal government’s authority to resolve property conflicts served its
own ends, even when it had no material interest in their outcome. As Washington’s letter
suggested, merely creating property based on “known and fixed principles” made
property rights more legible, and their administration simpler, for the federal government.
There is another sense, though, in which federal officials became the arbiters of
these disputes almost by default. As the only “constituted authorities” within the U.S.
2
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territories, federal officials became saddled with the responsibility to resolve property
disputes, even when they would rather not have done so. Sometimes, this charge came
from above, as when Congress and the President burdened St. Clair and Sargent with the
thankless job of adjudicating French titles. Just as often, the pressure came from
claimants themselves. When charged with buying Indian land and granting military
bounty land, most federal officials had little interest in determining the intricacies of
Native property under Native law or in resolving fact-bound allegations of fraud in
conveyances. But Native leaders and military veterans pressed their claims and insisted
on federal intervention; federal officials, with varying degrees of eagerness, were
constrained by their sense of obligation and duty to give these contentions at least some
consideration.
An alternative would have been to rely on courts, especially local courts, which
were well versed in small-scale property disputes of this nature. In fact, some federal
officials sought to devolve responsibility to the judiciary, particularly in the contentions
involving military bounty lands. But, though courts intervened in these controversies in
the long run, they rarely did so in the 1790s. As slow and individualized institutions,
courts could not create an entire property scheme from hundreds of existing claims, as
territorial officials did in Vincennes; nor did Anglo-American courts enjoy authority over
the diplomatic arenas in which negotiations over Native property rights played out.
Federal officials confronted a jurisdictional and competence gap that they were often
forced to fill.
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By circumstance as much as by design, then, the federal government found itself
repeatedly serving as arbiter in territorial property controversies. Contemporaries, as well
as later historians, paid little attention to this process: they were fixated on the lengthy
and fruitless debates over the creation of the federal land offices and public sales. But as
Congress dithered, throughout the 1790s the federal government was already engaged in
real property work, out in the territories. Unlike the land offices, this work focused on
adjudication, not distribution; rather than creating new property rights, officials sought to
weigh existing claims and translate them into an authoritative title. And, because this
process was improvised, this had little of the routinized feel of the later land office.
Nonetheless, by the end of the period, this ad hoc solution to the challenge of the
multiplicity of title had crystallized into precedent, providing the template for the
property adjudications that followed.
As they sifted through these conflicting claims, federal officials were also shifting
the meaning of property in the territories. In all these disputes, the final outcome of the
federal government’s deliberations was a piece of paper from the federal government
conferring title: a federal land grant, in the case of the French settlers and the military
veterans; a formal treaty with written guarantees of territory, in the case of Native
nations. As a result of these adjudications, then, ownership came to derive from the
authority of the United States, rather than from the plural sources that had previously
undergirded property rights. This transformation toward a more positivist conception of
ownership, centered in the national state, provided the necessary support for the land
offices and the century of expansion that followed.
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***
Title in the federal territories always began with Native nations, as we have seen.
Even within the blinkered legal conceptions of Anglo-Americans, Natives could only
alienate what they owned. This seemingly straightforward requirement paradoxically
meant that federal officials had to decipher Native land claims at the same moment they
sought to “extinguish” and erase them. But as officials discovered to their dismay, the
only basis for assessing the validity of competing Native claims to title were Native
ownership concepts themselves. This structural feature of early American land required
federal officials to become the often reluctant arbiters of Native property law as they
dimly understood it. In one sense, this constraint reflected Native power and federal
weakness, in the sense that Native legal systems could not be ignored or disregarded. Yet
at the same time, adjudicating Native title aggrandized federal authority and made Native
ownership rest on the questionable interpretations of Native legal concepts made by
federal officials who were far from disinterested.3

In the late eighteenth century, Natives and most Anglo-Americans agreed that
Native nations owned most of the Southwest and Northwest Territories, even if the
precise nature of that ownership was unsettled.

The Southwest Territory encompassed

the heart of what historians now call the Native Southeast. The Smoky Mountains and
3
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their foothills, where the Anglo-drawn borders of the Southwest Territory, North
Carolina, and Georgia converged, were Cherokee territory, while to the south, largely
within Georgia’s purported borders, were the lands of the Creek confederacy. The
territory of the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations lay further west and south, between
present-day Nashville and the Mississippi River. North of the Ohio River, in the
Northwest Territory, the United States confronted diverse tribes that Anglo-Americans
struggled to distinguish. Some, such as the Miamis, Weas, and other tribes of what
federal officials dubbed the Wabash Confederacy, had long lived along the Miami and
Wabash Rivers. Others, such as the Delawares and Shawnees, were more recent arrivals,
pushed from ancestral homelands along the eastern seaboard by Anglo-American
dispossession.4
Despite differing concepts of ownership, these diverse nations shared overlapping
understandings of personal and national property and territory that they articulated in
negotiations with Anglo-Americans. Most fundamentally, life in these nations centered
on villages surrounded by cornfields. Long-standing occupation of these lands conferred
ownership. The Miami chief Little Turtle told federal commissioners that his nation
owned its lands because they were “enjoyed by my forefathers time immemorial”;
throughout the territory,“[t]he print of my ancestors’ houses are every where to be seen.”5
Beyond these Native hubs were the broad territories that Anglo-Americans
denominated as the nations’ “hunting grounds.” Natives measured these lands and their

4
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boundaries less through formal markers than through a sense of distance and their
relational position. One Delaware informed missionaries that even though he “did not
rank with the for[e]most . . . he possest as much Land as a man could walk over in the
best part of a day.” This Delaware’s statement exemplifies the complicated coexistence
of individual, clan-based, and national claims to property. Many Native rights to
property consisted of use rights in a commons shared among multiple tribal members,
and even multiple nations. The Cherokees, for instance, repeatedly rejected U.S. efforts
to obtain the land around Muscle Shoals by informing federal officials that they could not
sell them “as they were not clearly our property” alone, since they were held as “a sort of
common property” for hunting among the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks, as well as
the Cherokees.6
Migration further complicated Native property claims. Particularly in the Ohio
country, as tribes arrived from the eastward to settle among other nations that had been
long resident, they worked out arrangements whereby the newcomers acknowledged
prior occupants’ title. One Anglo-American discussed Ohio country tribes’ appropriation
of lands as a “new District” to recently arrived Shawnees. When an emissary bearing an
invitation to an Anglo-American treaty arrived at a Kickapoo village north of Vincennes,

6
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the Kickapoos informed him that they could give no answer “without consulting the
Ouiatonons [Weas], being the owners of their [the Kickapoos’] lands.”7
Encounter with Euro-American law also transformed Native conceptions of
property. By the late eighteenth century, years of experience had schooled Natives on
Euro-American conceptions of ownership, and they worked to translate their longstanding views on property into forms that their Anglo-American interlocutors would
understand. This was particularly true with respect to Native methods of recording
property claims. To supplement methods of preserving territorial claims such as oral
testimony, marks on the landscape, and wampum belts, Natives began to use written
records of land transactions. So Native leaders carefully preserved copies of the treaties
and other papers given them by Europeans, presenting them to later Euroamerican
negotiators as proof of their land claims. At one treaty negotiation, “the Indians produced
a bundle of papers as records & ratifications of former treaties.” Native access to written
texts often caused alarm among federal officials as producing claims that were too legible
in Anglo-American law. In 1797, U.S. Army General James Wilkinson was highly
“embarrass[ed]” when a group of Natives in the Northwest Territory presented him with
a document “asserted to be the original counterpart of the Treaty of Greenville left with
the Indians” by the federal commissioners. This copy, Wilkinson noted with anxiety,
outlined borders that differed from the version ratified by the President and Senate.8
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As these instances suggest, though Native concepts of property diverged from feesimple ownership, they were neither unfamiliar nor illegible to Anglo-Americans.
Community-held commons, as well as parcels subdivided into various interests, had deep
roots in the Euroamerican legal tradition. And unclear and uncertain boundaries were
characteristic not just of Native property rights, but of property practice of the era more
generally. The worn copies of treaties that Natives presented federal negotiators were
simply yet more documents asserting ownership amidst the maelstrom of warrants, deeds,
and grants engulfing the early American borderlands.9

This similarity between Native and Anglo-American concepts of ownership in the
borderlands provided cold comfort to federal officials. For them, it merely meant that,
like other property claims in the borderlands, Native property and territorial divisions
were “extremely vague,” as one federal official complained, requiring those officials to
extract order from a complicated and ill-documented history. The diverse forms of
communal and shared ownership made parsing out chains of title, as well as obtaining the
consent of all the owners, highly challenging. But, as in other instances of line-drawing,
the stakes for the federal government were high. Constructing explicit lines of Native
property and territory served national interests, bolstered federal authority, and created a
clear basis for ownership. As congressional commissioner Samuel Parsons observed,

9
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“the security of the Title to those [western] lands is much concerned in procuring the
confirmation . . . of the Indian Title.” 10
Creating unambiguous delineations of property was even more salient in the
context of Indian affairs because of the risk of conflict. Many federal officials blamed
violence between Natives and whites on ill-defined borders. President Washington
insisted that Indian boundaries be “very distinctly marked,” so that “ignorance may no
longer be offered as a plea for transgressions on either side.” Thomas Jefferson proposed
giving Natives letters protecting their lands with “marks of solemnity”—printed on
parchment with seals and in tin cases—to guard against intrusions. Natives, too, often
sought explicit borders in an effort to curb Anglo-Americans: the Shawnees and
Delawares of the Ohio Country demanded that one treaty line be marked by a “great
road” cut by axemen to “prevent the White people from settling on their hunting
grounds.” For differing reasons, then, both Natives and Anglo-Americans saw the
formalization of informal land practices as essential to cross-cultural harmony.11
Boundaries between Native and U.S. territory were one thing, boundaries among
Native nations another. Many federal officials attempted to steer clear of these disputes.
Secretary of War Timothy Pickering found these “altercations among [the Indians] about
their boundaries” to be “tedious and . . . inconvenient,” and urged federal commissioners
at the Treaty of Greenville to enter a single treaty with all the tribes at once to obviate the
need to adjudicate Native boundaries: “one instrument,” he wrote, “will save much time
10
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and trouble.” At the earlier Treaty of Hopewell, federal commissioners merely guessed
at borders between southeastern nations by marking them on the map with a dotted line
and describing tribal territories only by referring to neighboring tribes rather than
establishing clear boundaries. They told the Chickasaws that they left the question of
intertribal boundaries to “the respective tribes.”12
Yet the federal government found that it could not extract itself from adjudicating
property among tribes. The question of which Native nations were “true owners” of
disputed lands, for instance, recurred at the Greenville negotiations, despite Pickering’s
instructions. The commissioners at Hopewell ended up promising the Chickasaws that,
once they had “agree[d] with the neighbouring tribes respecting their boundary,” the
United States “would send a white man to [be] present with the Indians and see them
mark it.” (This promise went unfulfilled.) Even Pickering himself sometimes violated
his own prescription to avoid intertribal property disputes. When the Chickasaws
proposed creating a trading post along the Tennessee River, Pickering authorized it only
“if the Chickasaws indisputably own the land, and the Cherokees do not claim it or also
consent to the measure.” Pickering even implicitly conceded the role of the United
States in resolving intertribal property disputes in yet another controversy about
Chickasaw territory, this time about the proper interpretation of a presidential
proclamation protecting the Chickasaws. President Washington, Pickering insisted, had
clearly not intended “to decide the boundaries between the lands of different Indian
nations.”—“at least on the mere representation of only one of the parties,” Pickering
12
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quickly continued. As this caveat demonstrated, even Pickering acknowledged that the
federal government would intervene to arbitrate property disputes among tribes.13
One reason federal officials could not avoid intertribal property claims was that
Natives themselves insisted on federal involvement. At the Treaty of Hopewell, for
instance, the question of the Chickasaw boundary with the Creeks only arose when an
unnamed Chickasaw chief demanded of the commissioners to show him his nation’s
boundaries on the map: “he wished,” the commissioners reported, that “Congress would
point out his lands to him, he wanted to know his own.”14
Subsequent incidents help illuminate why a Native leader would ask United States
officials to clarify his own nation’s territory. Natives were not ignorant of their own
boundaries, but they were eager to learn—and codify—which property rights Congress
would protect. At the Treaty of Fort Harmar, for instance, the Wyandots “strongly
insisted” on their claim to the lands that the treaty acknowledged as belonging to the
Shawnees, even going so far as to demand an explicit treaty provision to recognize their
claim. The Wyandots told Arthur St. Clair, serving as treaty negotiator, that they “so
much insisted” on this claim because they were certain that the Shawnees would continue
their attacks on the United States. As a result, unless the Wyandots’ separate property
claim was protected under Anglo-American law, the Wyandots would forfeit their rights
alongside the Shawnees when the United States punished the recalcitrant Shawnees. The
Chickasaws offered similar logic at a negotiation several years later. There, the
Chickasaws reportedly told the Cherokees, “Your nation . . . must look upon our lands
13
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apart from yours. . . . We want ours separate.” The Chickasaw fear was that the
Cherokees were so “stained with the blood of the white men” that it must “end in [the
United States] driving you from your lands.”15
As these instances exemplify, there were good reasons why Native nations sought
federal confirmation of intertribal boundaries. Because the effectiveness of Native title
increasingly hinged on U.S. acknowledgment, there were strategic benefits for Natives to
write their ownership of disputed territories into federal treaties, thereby enshrining those
claims in future disputes with the United States. In the process, Natives forced federal
officials to adjudicate property disputes they would have gladly avoided.

Defining Native territory—whether to purchase it or to assuage Native
demands—required some basis for determining Native property rights. Anglo-American
property law provided little help: interested in taking, not defining, Indian lands, even the
most ardent expansionists did not assert that these doctrines, rooted in British common
law and state statutes, extended into territory still acknowledged as Indian country.
Expansionism did, of course, lead many Anglo-Americans to argue that Natives held few
legally protected property rights. Yet, not only had the federal government rejected this
position, assessing whether Native title was equivalent to that enjoyed by whites was
irrelevant when resolving property disputes among Native nations.
Only one form of property law, then, seemed to exist in Indian country: Native
property concepts themselves. In the absence of any other basis, adjudicating tribal
15
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property involved determining which tribes were proper owners under Native law. This
requirement thrust federal officials into the unlikely role of trying to understand,
interpret, and apply Native concepts of ownership.16
To gain this information, federal officials came to rely on both Native and nonNative informants. When Knox met with Native leaders, he engaged them in long
conversations about the histories and origins of their nations; he also copied ethnographic
tracts by travelers in Indian country like William Bartram. For their information, St.
Clair and especially Blount turned to a network of official and quasi-official Indian
agents, many of whom were intermarried with Native women, knew Native languages,
and had long lived in Indian country. Blount praised temporary agent John McKee,
previously a trader among the Cherokees, as possessing a deep “knowledge of Indians,
their habits & dispositions”; he similarly commended interpreter James Carey, whose
“long and intimate” relationship with the Cherokees, “understanding [of] their language
and connexion with them,” made him a reliable source on Cherokee country.17
In particular, to find out Native ownership rights, federal officials were often
instructed simply to ask Natives directly. As Henry Knox instructed a federal negotiator
to the Ohio Country, one of the “first objects” of the treaty was “to ascertain from the
Indians what tribes are the allowed proprietors” of the lands under discussion. Echoing
this view, President Washington instructed the Attorney General to determine which
16
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Native nations were the “acknowledged proprietors” of disputed land in the Ohio country
based on which nations’ claims were “conceded generally by other Indians bordering”
those lands. Washington continued: at least “as far as the information shall be
attainable.”18
As Washington’s caveat reflected, parsing Native ownership often confounded
federal officials, who disagreed in their interpretations of Native property law. In the
Southwest Territory, U.S. representatives struggled to distinguish the overlapping
territories of the Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, and Choctaws. One particularly
contentious issue proved to be Native ownership of the Cumberland district around
Nashville. Both the Creeks and Cherokees objected to Anglo-American settlement,
repeatedly informing federal officials that the Cumberland lands were hunting grounds
communally owned by them as well as the Chickasaws and Choctaws. They acted on
their property rights through near-constant raids: one Cumberland resident complained to
congressman James Monroe that the “incessant . . . indian depredations & murders”
experienced in the region could “hardly [] be conceived at a distance.”19
William Blount, the Southwest Territory’s governor, waded deep into what he
understood as Native law to dismiss Cherokee and Creek property claims as mere
pretence. Based on “the greatest contiguity to hunting grounds, and the prior use of
them”—which, he argued, provided “the best claim Indians can establish” for
ownership—the lands properly belonged to the Chickasaws (who had, conveniently,
already ceded their claim). Indeed, he argued, in various discussions with federal
18
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representatives that the Cherokees themselves had “admitted the Chickasaw claim was
just.” Nor did the Cherokees have a sound basis to establish their own property right.
“[B]y the best information I can collect,” Blount told the Secretary of War, “the Claim of
the Cherokees to the lands lying on Cumberland is a recent thing,” undermining any basis
in long-standing usage. As he pointed out, the Cherokee homelands lay considerably
further east, along the Smoky Mountains. It was only as the Cherokees had drifted down
the Tennessee in the wake of the Revolution, Blount noted, after ceding their eastern
lands, that they showed any interest in the Cumberland territory.20
Blount found the Creek claim even more unfathomable. Blount’s Cherokee and
Chickasaw informants told him that the Creek hunting grounds traditionally stopped well
south of the Tennessee River, and that the Creeks had hunted along the Atlantic coast
until the Georgians forced them inland. Moreover, he observed, the nearest Creek village
was two hundred miles away from Cumberland, while McGillivray, the Creek leader,
lived over three hundred miles away. Blount obtained confirmation of these views at
Tellico in 1794, where he grilled Cherokee leaders. “[I]s it not a fact,” Blount leadingly
asked Cherokee John Watts about Creek lands, “that in the division of the Lands among
them red people . . . . [the] Tennessee bounds them on the North?” “What you say about
the Boundary of the Creek Land is right,” Watts reportedly replied. Thus, “from
anything I have ever heard,” Blount concluded that the Creeks had not even the “colour
of claim” to “a foot of land” north of the Tennessee River.21
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Blount’s interpretations reflected more than self-dealing and arrogance, though
they contained a healthy dose of both. As blinkered and ethnocentric as Blount was, he
nonetheless keenly felt the need to explain and justify his views based not on AngloAmerican law but on Native law as he constructed it, legitimated by Native statements
themselves. Yet his interpretation differed sharply from that of the Natives themselves,
for two reasons. First, he deprecated Native nations’ own statements of their property as
opportunistic, favoring the views of neighboring (though hardly disinterested) tribes.
Second, he insisted on Native national territory as fixed and unchanging and was
unwilling to acknowledge the migrations resulting from Anglo-American colonialism.
This position was especially ironic for a man whose political career stemmed from the
territorial expansion of the United States and whose personal wealth derived from
rampant speculation in western lands.
Not everyone in the Washington Administration agreed with Blount’s approach to
Native property in the Southwest Territory. Secretary of War Timothy Pickering, for
instance—who had a fraught relationship with Blount—found Blount’s rejection of
Native testimony, and their own actions, unaccountable. “The inveteracy with which the
Creeks committed depredations on Cumberland,” Pickering wrote Blount, “satisfied me
that they had some latent claim to the lands,” implicitly rebuking the governor.
Consulting with James Seagrove, the U.S. agent to the Creeks, Pickering found “his
answer justifies my suspicion. The Creeks said their claims on those lands had never
been extinguished.” As further proof that the Creeks had a legitimate claim to
Cumberland, Pickering pointed to the recent treaty of Colerain, in which the Creeks had
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relinquished their claim to the area. Since then, incessant Creek violence against the
Southwest Territory had ceased. For Pickering, these actions, rather than the testimony
of neighboring tribes or immemorial usage, constituted the strongest evidence of Native
property rights.22
A similar conflict played out in the Ohio Country, where federal officials
confronted an even more complicated set of overlapping claims produced by an even
longer history of Native mobility. The Wyandots, Shawnees, Delawares, Ottawas,
Chippewas, and Senecas, for instance, all claimed ownership over the lands between
Ohio River and Lake Erie, present-day eastern Ohio. Some of these tribes, such as the
Wyandots, had been long resident, but most, particularly the Shawnees and Delawares,
had arrived from elsewhere. Following Blount’s emphasis on immemorial usage, some
federal officials concluded that, under Native law, these newcomers lacked any
ownership rights. Congress, for instance, opined that the Shawnees “are not considered
by the Indians as a Nation having any Claim of Territory.” Or, as treaty commissioner
Samuel Parsons put it more bluntly, the Shawnees “do not own a Foot of Land in the
World”; an Indian country trader told a federal military commander that the same
principle applied to the Wyandots and Delawares as well.23
Other officials followed the course charted by Pickering and credited nations’
ownership claims based on occupancy, regardless of earlier history. Secretary of War
Henry Knox, for instance, instructed negotiators to acknowledge title in the tribes “who
were the actual occupants of the lands as the proper Owners thereof.” This argument
22
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rested in part on analogy to Euroamerican legal concepts. In the eyes of one army
officer, the Delawares were the “actual proprietors” of the lands in the eastern Ohio
Country. But because other nations “now reside and hunt on those Grounds,” they “by
possession have attended a kind of claim.” As these statements suggest, AngloAmericans believed that under Native law, as in Anglo-American law, occupancy itself
could yield title. Occupancy as the basis for ownership had the added benefit of clarity in
the midst of an often confusing muddle.24
Occupancy became a particularly salient legal concept as federal officials waded
into the question of Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) ownership of the Ohio Country. Decades
earlier, at the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix with the British, the Six Nations had ceded
land south of the Ohio that they purportedly owned through conquest, much to the anger
of Shawnees and other tribes who actually inhabited that territory. In the 1784 Treaty of
Fort Stanwix, this time held with federal commissioners of the United States, the Six
Nations now ceded the United States lands north of the Ohio, claimed “by virtue of [the
Six Nations’] former conquests,” a cession reconfirmed at the 1789 Treaty of Fort
Harmar.25
Federal officials now came to question the validity of these claims to ownership
under Native law. When Timothy Pickering asked the Six Nations about the Ohio
Country, for instance, the chiefs declared “their title to the lands . . . was acknowledged
by all the Western Indians.” But when Pickering pressed the Six Nations to cede these
24
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lands to the United States for a third time, the chiefs “confessed that the four most hostile
tribes denied their right to it.” Pickering concluded that, “whatever claim the Six Nations
might formerly have to the lands Westward of the Allegany, they long relinquished the
same to the Delawares and others of the present Western Indians.” All the earlier
cessions of the Six Nations, then, “I consider as affording us but the Shadow of a title” to
the Ohio Country; the federal government would have to negotiate with the lands’ actual
inhabitants to extinguish their claims.26
In the end, whether they happily made supposedly authoritative pronouncements
on the validity of Native property, like Blount or Parsons, or waded into the morass of
competing assertions only grudgingly, as with Pickering and Knox, federal officials all
became interpreters of Native property law. In determining which property rights the
federal government would honor, Pickering and Knox’s broader approach, favoring
occupancy and tribes’ own statements of ownership, prevailed over the more crabbed and
static vision of Blount, in which tribes’ property rights derived from immemorial usage
alone. In part, this was a matter of expediency. As Pickering’s instructions at Greenville
suggested, it was easier to simply compensate tribes than to haggle over property rights
or risk conflict. But it was also a matter of the legibility of Native property law. The
ubiquity of occupancy as a source of ownership in Anglo-American law made it difficult
to deny Native rights grounded in the same principle. Occupancy was also more
workable: ironically, given its stinginess, Blount’s approach required wading into history
to uncover the “true” owners, while occupancy afforded a bright-line rule for
adjudicating Native disputes like that over the Ohio country. In working through these
26
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disputes, federal officials created their own federalized version of Native property law, as
they wished to understand it.

The history of federal adjudication of Native property rights presents a
paradoxical view of the rise of federal authority over title. On the one hand, as eager as
federal officials were to seize Native land, most had little desire to determine questions of
Native property law. It was the structure of early American land law that made federal
adjudication of Native ownership inescapable. Natives could only alienate what they
owned, and, with the federal government the only legitimate purchaser, federal officials
had to decide thorny questions of Native law as they interpreted it, for they had no other
basis to determine the legitimacy of Native property rights. The role of arbiter of Native
property law was also thrust on reluctant federal officials by Native peoples themselves.
For all that westward expansion involved the denial and erasure of Native governance
and property, then, the requirement of valid title entailed federal officials’ implicit
recognition and attempt, however half-hearted, to understand Native law.
But on the other hand, the consequence of this constrained choice by federal
officials was the aggrandizement and expansion of federal power over property. This
outcome reflected the constrained choices that Native peoples confronted: federal
acknowledgment of Native title, especially in formal Anglo-American legal documents,
presented one of the only viable avenues to attempt to preserve Native lands against
Anglo-American encroachments. But the effect was that property disputes under Native
law came to be adjudicated within a federal forum, relying on incomplete federal
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understandings of indigenous legal orders. This pattern, which held throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, had pernicious consequences for Native peoples. It
made Native title appear as if it existed merely at the sufferance and whim of federal
officials, and transformed Native property rights into “claims” whose validity hinged on
legibility within highly formalized Anglo-American law. In this sense, even though
federal officials embraced a vision of Native property more sympathetic than most
Anglo-Americans of the time, the rise of federal title came at the expense of Native
ownership.27
***
At the same time that federal officials were struggling to make sense of Native
property law, some of those same officials were working to interpret another body of
foreign law to codify customary property practice within the U.S. territories. The law in
question was that of the French inhabitants of villages stretching along the Mississippi
and Wabash Rivers in the Northwest Territory. Both the law of nations and the
Northwest Ordinance guaranteed the property rights of these settlers. Yet implementing
this promise by determining the title of these few hundred settlers proved daunting.
Beginning in the late 1780s and lasting for over a decade, adjudicating these French
property claims occupied inordinate amounts of federal administrative attention. The
governor and secretary of the Northwest Territory spent years untangling the settlers’
rights As in the case with Native title, though, the result of this process was more than
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the sum of its parts. In working through these seemingly penny ante disputes, federal
officials established precedent for resolving what came to be known as private land
claims, and entrenched the principle that land claimants looked to the national
government for secure title.

French settlers arrived in what was then known as the Illinois country in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. They built villages along the rivers linking
French Canada and Louisiana: Vincennes, along the Wabash River in present-day
southern Indiana; Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Prairie du Rocher, along the Mississippi River
in present-day downstate Illinois. Remote outposts whose residents were closely tied to
surrounding Native nations through kinship and intermarriage, these towns capitalized on
their proximity to Natives to serve as entrepots in the Indian trade between the
continent’s vast Native interior and the Euroamerican commercial centers of Montreal
and Detroit.28
Despite their isolation from other European settlements, the villages’ strategic
location along the Mississippi and Wabash made them integral in the long contest for
control over the continent. By the time federal officials arrived in the late 1780s, formal
sovereignty over the territory had switched three times. First, at the end of the Seven
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Years’ War, the British had replaced the towns’ French government. Then, during the
American Revolution, the Virginians invaded, at once displacing the British and ravaging
the towns’ economy, as the militia freely pillaged from the people they had supposedly
liberated. Finally, sovereignty passed again when Virginia ceded both ownership and
jurisdiction over the region to the federal government in 1784.29
When federal officials at last arrived at the villages beginning in the late 1780s,
they were unimpressed by what they saw, filtering their impressions through a haze of
class and cultural contempt. Vincennes, the largest of the three settlements, held only
330 families. With its economy wrecked by war, the town’s buildings were “low, Old,
and ugly,” many in “decay’d & even ruinous condition.” (The situation in the other
towns was similar: Kaskaskia was reportedly “nothing more then [sic] a heap of ruin.”)
Anglo-American visitors had little respect for the inhabitants, whom they found “very
Ignorant,” even though, not knowing French, many officials could not speak with them.
Their disdain also had a racial element. As a result of the inhabitants’ “vicinity, trade,
and intermarriages” with neighboring tribes, Vincennes residents were “a good deal on
the savage establishment” and “barely . . . removed from the Indians”; many wore Indian
clothes and had “brown complextions.” Federal officials thought these residents illsuited for American governance. “The people will not relish a free government,”
territorial judge John Cleves Symmes reported after a visit to Vincennes. “[T]hey say our
laws are too complex, not to be understood, and tedious in operation—the command or
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order of the Military commandant is better law and spedier justice for them & what they
prefer to all the legal systems found in Littleton and Blackstone.”30
Symmes’s sneers notwithstanding, the French settlers possessed a legal system
that depended on more than military whim. Their property law, based on a French legal
code known as Coutumes de Paris, was grounded in notarial practice, with formal,
written deeds in standardized language sworn before publically appointed notaries. The
settlers employed community schemes of marital property, required wives’ consent for
sales of communally held lands, and measured lands in arpents, a standard French unit
slightly smaller than the Anglo-American acre. They had developed a tripartite division
for their lands—individually held townlots, river lots divided in French fashion into long
strips, and commons. Individuals owned the river lots, but they were worked
communally through an open-field system.31
Yet, just as Littleton and Blackstone were poor guides to the property law on the
Anglo-American frontier, the French villagers’ property practices reflected the exigencies
and customs of the borderlands as much as they did the Coutumes. In particular, land
ownership did not have the salience for the habitants it held for the land-crazed AngloAmericans. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Illinois Country had been the center of a
booming flour trade, producing wheat and livestock that was transported downriver to
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Louisiana. But thirty years of war, competition from Anglo-American farmers up the
Ohio, and an exodus of many into Spanish-held Louisiana led the remaining habitants to
live mostly by commerce, describing themselves as “chiefly addicted to the Indian trade”;
Anglo-Americans ironically disdained the French they encountered as “indifferent
Farmers.” Moreover, communal farming and the settlements’ remote location meant that
there was little to be gained by engrossing enormous tracts in the fashion of AngloAmerican speculators. Land held little value as a commodity without the prospect of
ever-increasing land values driven by constant immigration. As a result, land practice in
the French villages reflected the informality of life in close-knit communities where
residents knew each other’s holdings. Boundaries were drawn haphazardly and
imprecisely; Vincennes was remarkable, an Anglo-American surveyor observed, for its
“extreme irregularity.” Written deeds spoke vaguely of lots extending “of the depth of
one street to the next” and referenced locations based on neighboring owners. One land
contract contained only a promise to sell along with the assurance that, “as soon as we
see each other again I will straighten all things out.”32
Anglo-American law guaranteed the persistence of French property law and
norms in the villages after the cession to the United States. Under the law of nations,
private property rights within transferred territory could not be invalidated. Honoring
this requirement, Virginia’s cession to the federal government required that the French
settlers “shall have their possessions and titles confirmed to them.” The Northwest

32

“Journal Kept by George Hunter of a Tour from Philada. to Kentucky by the Illinois Country,” July 14-Oct. 15, 1796, American
Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, Penn.; “Land Sale Contract Btw/ Dominque Burguant and Josete Poirier and Vital Bouche,”
(typescript translation), December 24, 1782, Translation, I.164, Lasselle Family Papers, L127, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis,
Ind.; “Land Contract,” (typescript translation), February 28, 1792, I.291, Lasselle Family Papers.

217

Ordinance in turn promised that French settlers’ “laws and customs” concerning “the
descent & conveyance of property” would remain valid.33
In June 1788, responding to petitions from the French villages, the Continental
Congress sought to fulfill these guarantees by legislating that “ancient settlers” who had
lived within the villages in 1783 would have their claims confirmed; they would also
each receive nearby tracts of 400 acres, to be laid in parallelograms. It directed the newly
appointed territorial governor Arthur St. Clair to adjudicate and confirm the settlers’
titles, “according to the laws & Usages of the Governments under which they have
respectively settled.” Congress even recognized that that the settlers “may have acquired
equitable Titles to lands under some peculiar Customs established and recognized in the
ancient French Colonies where no actual grants have passed.” It accordingly ordered St.
Clair to honor these “equitable or Customary rights to Lands” rather than dispossess the
villagers.34
St. Clair finally reached the Illinois and Wabash Countries in summer 1790. He
and his second-in-command, territorial secretary Winthrop Sargent, instructed the towns’
residents to appear before them with the papers and witnesses necessary to establish their
claims to land, on which St. Clair and Sargent would then pass judgment.
This task proved more daunting than either Congress or Washington anticipated
when they charged the territorial officials with this responsibility. Part of the problem
was volume: St. Clair received over 4,000 land claims to adjudicate. An even more
33
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substantial problem was evidence. St. Clair and Sargent were accustomed to AngloAmerican land recordation schemes, in which counties tracked parcels in official ledgers.
The villages lacked anything comparable. “[N]o records are preserved,” one official
lamented. There had been written grants from French and British officials, but they had
been scribbled on “small scrap[s] of paper,” Sargent complained, then passed to notaries
who recorded them on “loose sheets.” These notarial papers rarely survived. One notary
had reportedly run off with all the public records, while the other papers were simply
scattered upon a notary’s death. Notaries also passed deeds into the hands of owners, but
these records were either later “fraudulently destroyed” by interested parties, or, entrusted
to people Sargent thought “unacquainted with their consequence” who then lost them:
“for, by the French usage, [these deeds] are considered as family inheritance, and often
descend to women and children.” Sargent thus read the difficulty as one of cultural
difference—the failure of French law to conform to Anglo-American legal and gender
norms. In fact, the villages’ “usage” reflected less differences in formal law than the
legal norms of a society where the absence of a land market among strangers created little
need to establish clear chains of title.35
This informality extended beyond recordkeeping to encompass the sources of
ownership. “The confusion of title here is a labyrinth of perplexity,” Judge Symmes
reported from Vincennes, “which requires the utmost care nay tenderness to set right.”
Symmes noted the “variety” of titles: “prescription, bar[e] possession—fraudulent deeds
from those who had no right to sell.” Title to much of the land around Vincennes rested
35
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on a purchase from the local Piankeshaw Indians that had been made, the town’s
inhabitants insisted, in “utter[]” ignorance of the “laws of America, respecting landaffairs.” Other portions of land were commons, which some settlers now sought to have
distributed in individual tracts.36
The fundamental challenge that confronted St. Clair and Sargent, then, was
translating a customary land system suited for local needs into a formalized framework
legible in Philadelphia and elsewhere, one in which ownership rested on legitimate
sources of title established by written, impersonal evidence. Overseeing this act of
translation gave St. Clair and Sargent tremendous discretion in determining which claims
to honor and which to reject. The paucity of written evidence presented them—“there is
scarcely one case in twenty where the [written] title is complete,” Sargent lamented—
meant that they had to rely on “oral Testimony” about land ownership (though, in a rare
fit of optimism, Sargent conceded that much of this testimony was “very good”).37
This task also thrust the Pennsylvanian St. Clair and the New Englander Sargent
into the unlikely role of experts on French colonial land law, addressing questions for
which, as in the case of Native title, there was no basis for adjudicating other than
reference to validity under prior local practice. In one case in the town of Kaskaskia, St.
Clair rejected the claim of a man named Cruelly, who proffered testimony from a Mr.
Bughet that he had received a land grant. St. Clair nonetheless disallowed the claim on
the ground that, based on Bughet’s testimony, the grant appeared to be on Jesuit land.
But if Cruelly had obtained the land from the Jesuits, it could only be a leasehold, since
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under French practice, as understood by St. Clair, Jesuit land “could not be alienated.”
St. Clair also faced a question of land tenure when ruling on the titles of settlers who had
crossed the Mississippi to Spanish territory. Because these grants were not in fee simple
but reverted to the king’s domain when vacated—or at least so St. Clair concluded—
these tracts “strictly” belonged to the United States as the king’s successor, though St.
Clair hinted to the Secretary of State that he thought some temporary relief warranted.38
The thorniest question confronting St. Clair and Sargent, though, was not an
“ancient” claim at all, but a hybrid issue of custom and federalism that had arisen only a
few years earlier. Shortly after the Virginians arrived in the Illinois Country, their
regional commander, Lieutenant Todd, had authorized the local courts to make land
grants, which they did right up through 1787, to the amount of 48,000 acres. Todd
claimed this authority based on precedent: local court officials explained to Sargent that
“since the Establishment of this Country, the Commondants have always appeared to be
vested with the powers to give Lands.” Local courts then issued land grants citing both
Todd—inflated into the “Chief Justice for the United States”—and “utmost necessity” for
authority, while also stressing that the granted lands had not been given or owned by
anyone.39
St. Clair recognized none of these authorities. In his view, Todd’s grants were
triply invalid. First, Todd held no authority to grant land under Virginia law; second,
even if he had, he could not delegate this power to the courts; and, third, since most of the
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grants had occurred after Virginia’s cession to the United States, they were “absolutely
void.” St. Clair accordingly “uniformly rejected” these grants as “altogether
unauthorized” and “usurpation[s]” by “self created” officials.40
The irony in these assessments was how little they resembled the operation of a
“free government” as envisioned by Judge Symmes. St. Clair and Sargent were not lawtrained judges determining title in adversarial cases turning on the fineries of Blackstone.
They were unelected federal administrators, appointed by a distant legislature without
any involvement of the French villagers, passing judgment based on their own
impoverished understandings of French land law and practice. They became, in short, the
latest in the line of “commandants” to rule over the villagers and their property. Yet they
differed from their French and British predecessors in their insistence on formalizing
local land practices. By the end of 1790, St. Clair, with Sargent’s assistance, had ruled
on the myriad claims presented him. Now, in place of the plurality of sources of
ownership that had previously governed village life, St. Clair aspired to substitute a
single valid title—a patent, issued by an authorized representative of the national
sovereign, with the promise of the clear and authoritative point of origin that St. Clair and
Sargent had found so lacking.

If the United States was more autocratic than Symmes believed, the French
settlers proved both less acquiescent and better equipped to navigate the “free”
institutions of their new government than he anticipated. Rather than passively accepting
St. Clair’s judgments, petitioners from the villages importuned Congress to allow claims
40
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based on Indian purchases as well as on Todd’s grants. The French foray into the early
American culture of petitioning proved successful. Likely anxious to secure the
allegiance of the French villagers in a volatile borderland, Congress granted relief to
many of the claimants St. Clair had denied. Under a 1791 statute, both Indian purchases
and Todd’s grants were allowed as long as the lands had been “actually improved.”
Congress responded to further complaints from the villagers in another statute two years
later, promising to pay for surveying at public expense.41
Yet the French settlers confronted another, less appealing facet of AngloAmerican governance when they faced interminable delays in securing their title. The
villages’ informal land system had had little call for the elaborate boundary-drawing that
employed so many young Anglo-American men as surveyors: unlike Cincinnati or
Marietta, where nearly every man of property had started as a surveyor, the Illinois
Country had only one man “who could run a single line,” in St. Clair’s estimation. When
this single surveyor became ill, St. Clair struggled to find a replacement to mark out the
new tracts. Centralizing the authority to grant lands in the federal government also held
matters up, as administrators debated the legal niceties of authority. St. Clair had first
flagged the question of whether he held the authority to issue patents early in 1792; in
1794, U.S. Attorney General William Crawford was still discussing the question. He
concluded that the 1791 statute only implied, but did not specifically provide, that this
authority should be held by the territorial governor; nor did the Constitution or the laws
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authorize the President to fill this breach. The residents would have to wait, the Attorney
General concluded over Winthrop Sargent’s objections, for Congress to act.42
This delay turned the forthcoming federal grants into yet another paper promise of
land circulating freely and widely through the early republic, luring speculators. AngloAmericans had arrived in the French villages early after the American Revolution,
attracted by word of the French charters that promised solidity of title. Now, with the
promise of federal patents, the French lands became commodities, casting them into the
churning sea of early American land speculation. The French residents—many of whom
were part of a trading culture that held that “Merchants ought to have nothing to do with
lands,” others of whom had already moved across the Mississippi River into Spanish
territory—largely cashed out, transferring the promise of their grants to a “few
speculators.” When territorial judge George Turner came to Vincennes in 1794, he
reported that “[b]y far the greater part [of the French settlers], having neither patience
nor, as they say, much confidence left in the promise of Government, have sold their
rights for little or nothing,” reducing the poorer residents to living as tenants on their
neighbors’ lands. Supposedly a federal grant could be purchased for a rifle or a mediocre
horse. When Governor St. Clair at last returned to the Illinois and Wabash Countries the
next year to rule on expanded land rights authorized by the 1791 statute, he found the
claims had proliferated: both the “old rights and the Court Grants had become subjects of
traffic, and scattered in different parts of the United States.”43
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St. Clair’s return visit to the Illinois Country in 1796 was, in many respects, a
repeat of his first. Once again, he faced the challenge of adjudicating claims based on a
vague standard, although in this case the source was not French but federal law.
Congress’s 1791 law protected the rights of settlers who had constructed an “actual
improvement”: this, St. Clair complained, “is not a very definite term.” St. Clair
delegated the task to Sargent, who, in 1797 and ’98, parceled out tracts of 400, 200, or 25
acres, based on his assessment of a parcel’s state of improvement. After Sargent left to
serve as governor of the Mississippi Territory, St. Clair struggled to make sense of the
notes he had left behind. “[I]t is not easy to discover by what rule [Sargent’s grants] were
governed,” he lamented. “[T]he people are extremely dissatisfied.”44
Patents to the lands finally began to be issued in 1799. But, as with many land
sagas, conflict and confusion over title in the Illinois and Wabash Countries dragged
on—past the creation of a new and separate Indiana Territory with Vincennes as its
capital, from the Illinois and Wabash Countries, and even past the admission of Indiana
and Illinois as states. Congress ultimately created a board of commissioners in 1804 to
weigh unexamined claims anew, and 1812, established another board to reassess the
validity of the grants made by St. Clair and Harrison. These boards demonstrated that St.
Clair’s promise of definitive ownership, resting on a clear chain of ownership, was
illusory. On the contrary, they spoke of St. Clair just as the governor had dismissed the
land practices of Todd and others. St. Clair had managed the “business” in a “loose
325-26; Gov. Arthur St. Clair to Secretary of State, January 1796, TP: Vol. II, pp. 542. For examples of residents selling their lands,
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manner,” they lamented, relying on ill-defined “bundles of papers” to determine claims,
and sometimes exceeded his authorization from Congress. Throughout the entire
process, they discovered copious evidence of fraud and self-dealing, in the form of
perjured affidavits, faked transfers, and illegal interpolations in the entry books. And
they hinted that St. Clair had colluded in the process, confirming tens of thousands of
acres in dubious grants obtained by his sons as well as St. Clair’s associate, the local
magistrate John Edgar. They did not wish to “impeach the character of any man,” the
commissioners observed, but if the facts made it “appear that something has indeed been
‘rotten in Denmark,’ we cannot help it.” The stream of petitions and congressional
interventions did not finally end until the 1830s. In the end, many of St. Clair’s
seemingly questionable grants stood, receiving confirmation through congressional
statutes that simply confirmed titles that the commissioners had questioned but not
rejected outright.45
The commissioners cast their struggle in moralistic terms, describing themselves
as wading through the “very mire and filth of corruption.” Yet, as we have seen, St. Clair
and Edgar were hardly alone in using official positions to pursue land speculation. In the
territories, the ability to tilt property confusion to personal advantage was less a character
flaw than a requirement for office—quite literally, given how many territorial officials
45
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owed their appointments to their prominence as landholders. By personalizing the
confusion and placing the blame on St. Clair’s self-dealing, the commissioners
overlooked the deeper roots of what happened in Vincennes and the Illinois Country.
Fraud and deceit were the consequence of the collision between informal village land
systems with multiple, poorly documented sources of ownership, and the rapacious early
American land market. Congress exacerbated the problem when it granted a single
official expansive discretion, and confusing instructions, to parse thousands of poorly
documented claims that he barely understood. Clarity of title, the federal government
discovered, could not be so easily or so cheaply bought.46

The struggles to address the title of the French settlers were a harbinger of things
to come. Even before Sargent had finished his work in the Illinois Country, he found
himself replicating the process in Detroit, which passed to U.S. sovereignty in 1796.
Once again, Sargent was shocked by how “extreme loose[ly]” the inhabitants had dealt
with land, with “scarcely a single Deed made where a Boundary was expressed”; he once
again set about attempting to create what he saw as order from perceived chaos. There
were more Vincennes and Detroits down the line as the United States expanded. Even as
the federal land system envisioned tidily surveyed rectangular tracts marching across
vacant land, the territory the United States sought to incorporate was seldom empty or
unclaimed by Europeans, let alone Native peoples. Recognizing and resolving these
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claims consumed enormous amounts of federal time and resources over the nineteenth
century.47
The challenges presented by prior Native and European ownership were more
similar than the sharp dichotomies drawn between Natives and Euroamericans then and
now—between oral and written cultures, or between customary and formal law—would
suggest. In both Native and French villages, land practice reflected societies in which
ownership was informal and localized, and where title relied on a hybrid of oral and
written remembrance for proof. The structure of early American land law similarly
constrained the federal government to acknowledge the property law of both sets of prior
claimants to the land, even if the recognition of Native law, unlike the formal
incorporation of French law, was implicit and partial at best. As a result, in both
instances, often reluctant federal officials found themselves mired in the details of alien
property regimes, as they sought to use incomplete and contradictory evidence to
translate informal ownership practices into a system where official documents granting
well-defined and unambiguous title circulated as commodities.
The difference lay in the purpose, not the nature, of the assessment. Federal
officials sought to interpret Indians’ title in order to extinguish it; they sought to
understand the French villagers’ title to confirm it, even if they regarded the French
settlers as barely distinguishable from Natives. Undoubtedly racial, this distinction also
owed much to the contrast between the quasi-foreign status of Native nations and the
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position of the French settlers, however unwilling, as newly minted “citizens” of the
United States.
Another parallel between Native and Euroamerican claims concerned the role of
the federal government. As with Native title, arbitrating property rights within the
French villages both constrained and expanded federal authority. Congress’s decision to
task federal territorial officials with this job did not result from a thoughtful deliberation
that the territorial governor was well equipped to wade into the villagers’ land problems;
rather, urgent petitions from the French settlers forced the federal government to fulfill
the abstract promises extracted by Virginia in its cession, and St. Clair and Sargent were
already there. But making these local land decisions a federal responsibility granted a de
facto right of appeal to Congress and the executive branch. As a result, though neither
the President, his cabinet, nor Congress had expertise, nor likely much interest, in
colonial French land practice, they confronted constant petitions and appeals to recognize
settlers’ land claims. In this manner, the settlers and claimants claimed an unlikely and
outsized presence on the national agenda and forced the federal government to repeatedly
intervene in their jejune land disputes.
The claimants, of course, were pursuing their self-interest, not trying to bolster
federal authority. But the consequence of their actions was the considerable
centralization of these small-bore disputes in the federal government. Most title disputes
in early America were settled in local courts, a precedent Virginia happily followed in the
Illinois Country by devolving all authority to local judges and then entirely neglecting the
region. Title in Vincennes and elsewhere, by contrast, became a federal question
229

adjudicated by federal administrators. The result, though largely unintended, was the
creation of a precedent that questions of preexisting ownership claims by Euroamericans
would be resolved, extrajudicially, by federal administrators. These bodies would
evaluate claims based on earlier property systems and laws and translate these
preexisting, often inchoate rights into definitive, federally recognized land title. As a
result, Congress ensured that petitions and appeals from remote borderlands villages,
burdened with the minutiae of local property disputes, would continue to flow eastward
to Washington throughout the coming century.
***
Throughout the 1790s, the federal government found itself entangled with
resolving earlier claims to land. The settlers at Vincennes were only one of a number of
groups who pressed their land rights on Congress, resulting in an ad hoc process of
confirmation. Since 1785, Congress had promised land to the Moravians, a German
religious order whose settlements of converted Delawares along the Muskingum River, in
the Northwest Territory, had been brutally attacked by Anglo-Americans during the
Revolution. Their lands were finally surveyed, and title confirmed, in 1797. A territorial
resident named Ebenezer Zane secured a bill confirming his land rights based on his
development of a road, while his brother Isaac, long held captive among the Wyandots
and subsequently a federal Indian interpreter, later won a similar confirmation based on
an old Indian grant. In the Southwest Territory, meanwhile, federal officials were
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occupied with resolving conflicts between the lands sold by North Carolina and Native
land rights as guaranteed under treaties.48
All the while, even as it worked through these claims, Congress, as well as wouldbe purchasers, anticipated the opening of a land office—the symbolic moment when, preexisting claims resolved, the remaining vacant land could be sold to individual
purchasers. Much of the West, John Cleves Symmes wrote at one point from near
Cincinnati, was “running mad with expectations of the land office opening in this
country.” Debated since 1789, proposed in an influential report by Secretary of Treasury
Alexander Hamilton the following year, the opening of this office was perennially
expected, and perennially delayed. Part of the delay reflected the fact that, in the wake of
Jefferson’s 1791 report and the confusions surrounding the Ohio and Miami Companies,
it was unclear which lands the federal government could in fact sell. But most of the
delay seemed to stem from the ongoing war against the Northwest Indian Confederacy.49
Congress returned to the question of the land office only at the end of 1795, after
the Treaty of Greenville. “There never was a bill of greater importance than that before
the House,” stated one representative at the outset of the debate, “[T]hat House were the
fathers of the country.” But Congress turned out to be full of bickering parents. For over
two weeks, debate over the land office was the “principal business” of the House of
Representatives. None of the contentions from four years earlier, when Congress had last
48
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debated the land office, had been resolved. Many still strongly advocated for the system
of indiscriminate location; others, arguing that this made it “impossible . . . to make titles
certain,” insisted on the rectangular survey. The congressmen disagreed about the size of
the lots sold, the amount of land to be sold, where sales should be held, whether sales
should be through auction or land offices, which executive department should oversee the
sales, and whether purchasers should be required to actually settle on the purchased lots.
The weight of earlier precedent weighed heavily in their deliberations: James Madison
remarked that he “was not surprised to hear different opinions on this question, according
as members felt from the usages of the States to which they belonged.” But there were
now also new, federal precedents to draw from: several members cited the experiences of
the Ohio and Miami Companies in their arguments, largely as cautionary tales.50
Overlaying all these disputes was the broader question of which claimants the
new land system should serve. The committee that drafted the bill had been tasked
primarily with crafting a system that would sell as much land as possible as quickly as
possible to extinguish the national debt. “It is immaterial to us who buys the lands so
[long as] we get a good price for them,” John Stanwick, a Democratic-Republican from
Philadelphia observed, voicing this perspective. “I think it worth while to employ the
present moment of avidity to speculate in our lands, so as to clear off our Debts.” But
many members, particularly from western regions, were strongly opposed to a system
that would privilege the wealthy. Setting out to “destroy that hydra, speculation, which
had done the country great harm,” they argued that it was possible to “raise money and
50
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invite settlers” at the same time. “Persons of property . . . can generally accommodate
themselves,” John Williams, a representative from upstate New York insisted. “[W]e
ought to accommodate the lower classes of the people.” In fact, both goals seemed to
secure broad agreement from the congressmen; where they disagreed was over means.
Many insisted that small lots served the interests of smallholders as well as the United
States: Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, outspoken during the debate, argued that this
approach “will give to the Government all the profits of the speculator. Government
would be, in effect, its own speculator.” Others, however, insisted that smallholders
would never purchase even the small lots. There were also strong disagreements over
whether settlement requirements would advantage poor claimants or merely depress the
price of lands.51
The statute that these debates produced was, unsurprisingly, a compromise. It
provided that lands would be auctioned, at both Philadelphia and Pittsburg, at a minimum
price of two dollars per acre. The lot size, determined after much contention, was settled
at a compromise of one section of 640 acres, or one square mile. In the end, the
rectangular survey prevailed and was written into the statute.52
What was arguably most significant about the 1796 law, though, was its
existence. After long delay, Congress had at last enacted its first forward-looking land
statute, envisioning a system that, in design, was the antithesis of the arbitrary and posthoc systems that had emerged to resolve prior Native and European claims. The statute
created a federal officer, the surveyor general, to oversee a team of surveyors who would
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map out vacant lands into neatly demarcated square townships. Meanwhile, in place of
the vague directions given St. Clair and Sargent to adjudicate private claims, the
Secretary of the Treasury created elaborate and detailed instructions on the rules to
govern the land sales. The hope, as with many of the territorial land schemes of the era,
was to create security of title at the outset. In this sense, the 1796 statute, rather than the
1785 Ordinance, represented the true beginning of the later federal land office system.53
Yet even this origin story is doubly misleading. For one, the new statutory and
administrative scheme relied on structures in the Territory created by previous land
efforts. The 1796 statute placed the responsibility of overseeing auctions in the hands of
the ubiquitous Governor St. Clair. Meanwhile, the newly created post of Surveyor
General fell to Rufus Putnam just as he was wrapping up his responsibilities as director
of the Ohio Company. Putnam neatly transitioned from overseeing the Company’s
surveyors to supervising the federal government’s—who were often the same people;
others had worked for Symmes and the Miami Company.54
For another, the statute’s actual operation proved a flop. Congress, it turned out,
knew very little about what was actually happening in the territories, an ignorance many
representatives freely confessed. One observed that, even though he was on the
committee that drafted the statute, he was “very imperfectly acquainted with the subject.”
Representative Coit of Connecticut argued that the House should delay acting until a
survey had been done, since “they were legislating on a subject upon which they had very
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little information.” But Coit was shouted down on the grounds that the “present” was the
best time to sell, “when speculation was at so high a pitch.” But the federal government
actually had very little land ready to sell, much of which had already been available.
Speculators proved more interested in the cheaper, and choicer, lands already available
through land companies or the states. Sales at the first public auction under the law, held
in Pittsburgh in October 1796, were so disappointingly small that it was not repeated, and
ended up as the only auction held under the 1796 statute. For his part, Governor St. Clair,
after complaining about the expense and inconvenience of the travel, further moaned
about the auction itself. “[T]he whole business” remained in “a state of disorder,” St.
Clair grumbled, the elaborate precautions of the Secretary of the Treasury
notwithstanding.55
In the end, it was not the hotly debated terms of sale that were the most
consequential legacy of the 1796 statute, but the labor-intensive work of surveying.
Putnam and his surveyors had to first survey the Treaty of Greenville boundary, and only
then proceeded to mark the grid established under the law over much of present-day
Ohio. The pace was frenetic. In 1798, Putnam oversaw the survey of over 3 million
acres. Putnam claimed he and his men worked longer hours than “any Public Office
within my Knowledge.” This system of prior survey consumed tremendous sums—over
$25,000 in 1799 alone, nearly three times what the government annually paid Native
nations of the Ohio Country for the same land.56
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The purpose of these expansive and expensive efforts was to avoid the challenges
that had made earlier sources of title such an abundant source of confusion. Yet this
elaborate solution misdiagnosed much of the problem. The challenge with the
preexisting claims was only partly that they were vague and confusingly marked. The
more fundamental issue, as the federal government’s experience with Native and
Euroamerican claims showed, was that acknowledging land rights rooted in the past, even
the very recent past, commodified them. Suddenly valuable, papers and certificates
establishing these rights proliferated, their pedigree difficult to trace. Federal officials
struggled to distinguish legitimate from opportunistic or fraudulent claims, a task in
which neat grids and elaborate rules helped little. Rather, as in Vincennes or in
Cumberland, claimants dragged reluctant officials into the mess of adjudication, forcing
them to address the consequences of speculation.
This quickly became apparent even in the newly gridded public domain. Thanks
to federal efforts to resolve or “extinguish” Native, state, and private rights, title to this
land now vested in the federal government—most of it had never been legally settled by
Anglo-Americans—but even the public domain already had existing claims. The federal
government had already promised enormous portions of the public land being surveyed in
the Northwest Territory to satisfy the military bounties offered to Revolutionary War
veterans.
Like the states, the Continental Congress had recruited soldiers with promises of
land at war’s end. Recruits had been pledged parcels ranging from 100 acres for privates
Military Lands,” December 30, 1797, Box 2, Folder 9, RPP ; “Jonathan Stone and Jeffery Mathewson, Copy of Account to Rufus
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and noncommissioned officers up to 1100 acres for a major general. Just as with public
land sales, satisfying these warrants was long delayed. A handful were located on land
set aside under the 1785 Ordinance. In 1788, Congress created a system for redeeming
the remaining bounties, but did not assign any lands. Eight years later, when Congress
created the system of public land sales, it also created a framework for at last satisfying
the warrants. A large part of the Northwest Territory was designated as the Military
Tract, to be surveyed by the Surveyor General, from which lands would be apportioned.
Those holding warrants were required to submit their claims to the Secretary of Treasury,
and then, the Secretaries of the Treasury, War, and State would gather to hold a lottery to
determine the order in which the confirmed warrants could select their lands. With
repeated extensions by Congress, this lottery was not held until February 1800.57
Federal bounty land warrants suffered the predictable consequence of federal
promises of land early made and long delayed. They quickly became a speculative
investment. When Congress discussed the warrants, one representative said that the did
not know a “single soldier” who still held one; another observed that they could be
purchased in New York for a “mere trifle.” Speculation in the warrants was particularly
intense in the Northwest Territory, where residents marketed themselves as possessing
superior knowledge about western lands. Stationed in the Territory, U.S. Army Captain
John Armstrong attempted to involve his eastern acquaintances in a scheme for 17,000
choice acres of bounty lands that, he asserted, only he knew of, including secret
information about coal and iron deposits; he was simultaneously involved in a separate
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plan to engross 30,000 acres that included valuable salt springs. One of Armstrong’s
eastern correspondents took him up on these proposals, purchasing 5,000 acres in military
warrants until “the soldiers have quit calling on me.” Armstrong had an advantage here,
too. As an army captain, he had ready access to soldiers, many of whom were
revolutionary veterans. Armstrong set about buying up the bounty rights from the
soldiers under his command for a little over 1 pound a piece.58
This freewheeling market in bounty land certificates presented a challenge for
speculators and the War Department alike. Congress felt obligated to regulate the bounty
market at least minimally, but was permissive about the legal niceties required for a
transfer. Because many soldiers had sold their bounties “without any formal
Conveyance,” it required that the Secretary of War honor either written conveyances or
the presentation of soldiers’ discharges from the army, unless “fraud in Obtaining such
discharge shall be proved.”59
These seemingly nominal requirements nonetheless often foiled speculators, who
in their zeal for purchasing had ignored even basic formalities. Captain Armstrong, for
instance, found many of his claims rejected because he lacked discharges, because the
conveyances had not been “registered and acknowledged before a magistrate,” because
the land had already been claimed, or because the soldiers were ineligible. Another
speculator found that 1400 acres of his 2600-acre claim were rejected—some
conveyances lacked the proper power of attorney; others lacked a year or date; others, as
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in Armstrong’s case, had already been claimed. John Cleves Symmes’s associate
Jonathan Dayton complained that the military rights Symmes had purchased caused him
“an inconceivable amount of trouble”; despite over twenty visits to the War Office, he
had still not received his land warrants.60
At the same time, these minimal bureaucratic precautions seemed to do little to
halt actual fraud and abuse, complaints of which overwhelmed the War and Treasury
Departments. As under the state law system, disgruntled soldiers and claimants sought to
file caveats that would prevent land entries from being issued. Many alleged that the
purported conveyances were fraudulent. A man named Henry Hill noted that the
conveyance of his claim was supposedly executed in New York, where he had never
been. Judah Alden alleged that “two swindlers” on State Street in Boston had taken his
warrants. Others claimed that they had lost or misplaced their warrants, including the
executor to the estate of Baron von Steuben, the prominent general who had helped train
the Continental Army at Valley Forge.61
Federal administrators were conflicted on how to address these contentions.
Secretary of War James McHenry was unwilling to allow “[e]very devise of dishonest
cunning,” as he described these frauds and misrepresentations, to defeat the “hard earned
dues of Offices and Soldiers.” He attempted to forestall the proliferation of forgeries by
distributing a printed broadside requiring that all magistrates must swear that the
transferer was personally known to them before registering either deeds or powers of
60
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attorney conveying bounty rights. Furthermore, the magistrates would need to provide
the War Department evidence that they were, in fact, Justices of the Peace.

And,

lacking any “other guard for individual rights to military lands,” McHenry enjoined
“strictness and caution . . . at the War Office,” requiring that his clerks closely scrutinize
all the warrants presented.62
Nonetheless, McHenry lamented, even such careful examination “must often be
ineffectual,” due to “the great diversity of the Arts practiced to deceive.” He urged
Congress to adopt a more comprehensive administrative solution. He noted that the 1796
statute provided no relief, although the customary practice before his arrival, without any
statutory authorization, was to permit claimants to file caveats. Going forward, McHenry
advocated an administrative proceeding similar to that used in Pennsylvania, where the
Board of Property had adjudicated disputed rights to land.63
Though he likely did not realize it, McHenry’s proposal echoed earlier calls for
some sort of federal administrative tribunal to adjudicate disputed land rights. In his
1790 report proposing the creation of a public land office, Alexander Hamilton had urged
that the land office commissioners should be empowered to “determine[]” the
“controversies concerning rights to patents or grants of land” that arose in their district.
A year later, Thomas Jefferson observed that he, too, had argued for “the establishment
of a proper judicature for deciding speedily all land controversies between the public and
individuals,” but that Congress had not acted.64
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McHenry’s similar plan envisioned that appointed federal officials would hear
evidence on the land warrants and rule on their validity. For him, the important benefit of
this approach was that it would not require defrauded claimants to file suit, where they
would bear the burden of proof. Rather, because the “rights appears [sic] to strongly to
center” in the original holders, they should “stand upon the footing of Defendants,” with
the burden of proof “on the other party to make out his own rights (as is understood to be
legal principle) compleat.”65
McHenry’s proposed administrative adjudication contrasted with the approach
advocated by Oliver Wolcott, who as Secretary of Treasury was responsible for
administering the actual distribution of lands (as opposed to the registering of bounty
rights). Wolcott concluded that the 1796 statute granted “no power to investigate or
decide on the titles of the holder of military land Warrants.” Exhausted by the constant
filing of caveats, he directed the recorder of deeds to inform the claimants that “the merits
of their claims can only be determined at Law”—that is, through the courts. This
approach reflected both a statutory textualism as well as a grounding in the practice of
most states, where disputes were referred to courts rather than being adjudicated by the
executive. Wolcott adopted a similar approach for disputes that arose through the Land
Office.66
On paper, Congress sided with Wolcott, if only through inaction. A committee
was appointed to “inquire into the expediency or inexpediency of passing a law to
lands, discussed at the outset of Chapter 1. He was likely referring to his statement that a “local judge will doubtless be provided” to
decide these disputes. “Report on Public Lands,” November 8, 1791, in PTJ:MS, 22:274, 283-84.
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regulate the manner of entering caveats to prevent the issuing of patents for land granted
for military services,” but its report does not seem to have survived; at any rate, no
legislation passed, and Congress later rejected a petition from claimants arguing that their
lands had been fraudulently obtained, urging them to obtain “full and complete relief”
from a “court of competent jurisdiction.” Yet the War Department continued to assess
the validity of land warrants: in the decades following 1800, it rejected nearly four claims
for every warrant that it issued. And in some respects, Congress itself fulfilled the role
McHenry urged, albeit in ad hoc fashion. It constantly extended the deadline for filing,
and, even while paying lip service to opposing legislative resolution of individual claims,
it passed statutes authorizing relief for individuals who had lost their bounty rights. After
the War of 1812, it attempted to preemptively forestall the recurrence of the problem by
barring the transfer or sale of bounty rights; only soldiers themselves could claim them,
though they could then sell the land warrants. This prohibition failed, and the land office
found itself once again confronting caveats filed by disgruntled claimants; the new
Secretary of War ended up making policy by banning filings from attorneys altogether.
In short, however much Congress and the executive wished to avoid getting dragged into
determinations on individual claims, it proved difficult for the federal government to
avoid making quasi-judicial decisions to afford claimants relief.67
The federal government’s experience with the military bounty lands underscores
that the earlier (and ongoing) struggles over Native and French title represented more
than the resolution of prior claims necessary before the federal government could itself
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divide and alienate the public domain. Rather, even as the federal government sought to
parcel out lands over which it claimed ownership, it continued a pattern in which federal
administrators, or even Congress itself, passed judgment on the validity of individual
titles. Judicial involvement, when it occurred, came much later, and usually granted
considerable weight to earlier federal pronouncements.
As this process suggests, it was not vague boundaries or multiple sources of
ownership alone that forced the federal government to wade into the morass of
conflicting property rights. Even when the federal government itself created the terms of
ownership, disputes arose that required federal intervention, in large part because of the
paper promises that floated freely through the early republic and made exploiting the land
system too tempting to forego. Federal administrators’ incessant despair over fraud and
confusion—whether in Native, French, or veterans’ claims—was the result. As these
complaints demonstrate, officials were rarely anxious to adopt this role: some, like
Wolcott, attempted to avoid it altogether, while others, like McHenry, saw it as part of a
national commitment to the veterans. But like earlier adjudications, the pressure to
arbitrate these questions came from claimants themselves, who demanded resolution
from the federal apparatus.
Like the settlers in Vincennes, bounty rights holders were merely following the
chain of authority. But this process also oriented claimants toward Philadelphia, and
later, Washington. The most influential speculators became those who, like Captain
Armstrong, had some sort of privileged access to federal power. Others from the
territories served as intermediaries, gathering claims to make the journey to the capital,
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where they could press their case in person. Those who could not travel wrote letters and
sent petitions to Congress instead. This process, of course, favored the wealthy and wellconnected over smallholders. But it also meant that, for citizens scattered throughout the
United States, their prospect of landed wealth rested on the determinations of the federal
government. Their fates rested with a distant bureaucratic office, in which beleaguered
clerks hoped their close scrutiny could thwart the “dishonest cunning” that seemed to
infect all early American markets in land.
***
As they delved into local property disputes throughout the U.S. territories, federal
officials felt, perhaps, a sense of déjà vu. Despite dramatically different contexts, these
officials were called on repeatedly to assess the validity of property claims, often under
unfamiliar legal orders, and translate them into definitive federal title.
Unlike the land systems that preceded or followed it, this adjudicatory role of the
federal government was not planned in any meaningful way. It happened because AngloAmerican law made the federal government sovereign over the territories, with the
consequence that the constant property disputes that resulted from the proliferation of
title in territories became a federal responsibility. Natives, French settlers, and military
veterans all pressed their demands for the government to honor their property rights,
rooted in ambiguous title histories, and federal officials sought to determine which claims
were legitimate. In the process, they distilled the complicated and plural sources of
ownership in the territories into a single document, a federal title that issued—
eventually—under federal authority.
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In the long run, the rise of federal title was not a boon for most individual
claimants. Precisely because federal land grants were legible and purportedly
authoritative, federal guarantees turned out, in practice, to undermine the smallholders’
security of title. Natives, French settlers, military bounty holders—all were swept into
the voracious maw of the early American land market, which alienated their federally
recognized ownership rights through transactions sometimes coerced, and always marked
by dramatically unequal bargaining positions. This result occurred not because the
claimants were naïve, but because they confronted constrained choices, of which federal
protection seemed the least bad option. Ironically, the real winner in this struggle was the
federal government. This was not just because land was a valuable asset, but because
throughout early America land ownership was a tremendous source of power. Just as the
federal government discovered that sovereignty reinforced ownership, title, it turned out,
became a potent source for exercising sovereignty in practice.
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Chapter 4: Federal Sovereignty
Soon after Washington’s inauguration, Secretary of War Henry Knox drafted a
series of highly influential reports urging the transformation of federal policy toward
Native nations. In one of them, Knox’s the Secretary observed that, when the federal
government gained control over the territories, it had gained authority over a world of
violence and casual brutality. “For some years past,” Knox informed Washington, both
Natives and non-Natives in the borderlands had “exercis[ed] indiscriminate hostilities on
each other.” At that point, it would be futile to “ascertain the original aggressors”; the
only clear fact was that the “the innocent on both sides suffer more frequently than the
guilty.” Knox argued against the view that this violence between Natives and U.S.
citizens was the natural and inevitable state of the borderlands. He believed that the
federal government could “remedy” these evils—but only if “the administration of indian
affairs” were “conducted by fixed principles established by Law, and which being
published should be rigidly enforced.”1
Knox’s report epitomized the Washington Administration’s vision for remaking
Indian affairs, one that, to paraphrase Lisa Ford, might be called “federal sovereignty.”
But the federal sovereignty of 1790s was very different from the settler sovereignty that
Ford describes emerging in the Georgia borderlands in the 1820s and 1830s. Federal
sovereignty was not primarily focused on the extension of territorial sovereignty, nor was
it directed solely against Native peoples. Rather, at the core of Knox’s plan was the
concept, familiar to historians of early federal law more broadly, that the federal
government alone could serve as a neutral arbiter in the seemingly intractable and violent
1
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disputes between Natives and non-Natives. Knox believed firmly in the majesty of a
supreme and impartial law, forcefully applied against both Natives and citizens of the
United States who violated it. The federal government, Knox wrote, “must keep both
[Indians and whites] in awe by a strong hand, and compel them to be moderate and just.”2
These views formed the basis for the Trade and Intercourse Acts, a series of laws,
enacted and expanded several times over the course of the 1790s, that robustly asserted
federal criminal and regulatory jurisdiction over the borderlands. These laws applied
anywhere in the United States that Native territory—what the statute labeled “Indian
country”—existed, but they had particular importance in federal territories, which was
where most Indian country, and most Indians within the United States, were. The statutes
sought to preempt borderland violence in two ways. First, the federal government would
create, police, and regulate well-delineated physical boundaries between Natives and U.S.
citizens. Second, the federal government would assume jurisdiction over cross-cultural
crime, vigorously punishing both Native and white offenders.3
As an effort to prevent violence and crime, the Acts, and federal sovereignty more
generally, failed. Such boundaries as there were remained permeable, and federal efforts
to hold Natives and whites legally accountable for their crimes rarely succeeded. In
explaining this failure, federal officials constantly wrung their hands at federal
powerlessness, as they found themselves unable to compel either Natives or their own
citizens to obey the law. Scholars have since expanded and refined this contemporaneous
2
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complaint. One line of scholarship, drawing on work on the rise of sharp racial
boundaries between “red” and “white” people in the late eighteenth century, has
emphasized the dominance of a “language of exterminatory anti-Indianism,” in the words
of Peter Silver, that undermined official efforts to secure justice for Native peoples. Lisa
Ford’s work, by contrast, demonstrates how governments’ necessary reliance on both
Native diplomacy and localism entrenched long-standing customary practices of
reciprocity, retaliation, and justifiable violence shared by both Natives and white settlers.4
These works powerfully and compellingly elucidate many of the dynamics in the
borderlands, but their focus risks obscuring the institutional factors that allowed popular
practices and narratives to prevail. In embracing the triumph of custom over formal law,
they fail to consider the limitations of federal officials’ own vision. In particular, Knox,
as well as others in the Washington Administration and in territorial government, had
little sense of law’s limits. Many of them were military men, and so embraced an
extreme positivist model of law as command and coercion. But as a descriptive matter,
this was a poor understanding of early American law, in which courts and other legal
institutions were arenas for contest far more than they were institutions for enacting the
sovereign will. Knox and others failed to appreciate how the formal limits within federal
4
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law, including the explicit acknowledgment of other jurisdictions, the conflict of laws,
and local autonomy, worked to cabin federal power.
The net effect of the Trade and Intercourse Acts, then, was not to end centuries of
violence and discord; it was to channel these fierce contentions over Indian affairs into
legal language and legal forums. But it would be a mistake to regard this outcome as a
simple story of failure. Those resisting the federal government—to some extent Natives,
but even more territorial citizens—came to rely on the tools of federal law to craft their
argument, which, paradoxically, worked to legitimate and enhance federal authority. In
this sense, the early effort to establish federal sovereignty created the parameters of legal
debates over Indian affairs for the century that followed.
***
To the untutored eye, frontier violence seemed to stem from lawlessness. But
although federal officials sometimes slipped into this language, they generally thought
they knew better. The problem was not law’s absence, but that the wrong kind of law
dominated the frontier. They dubbed this law “the Savage principle of retaliation,”
described elsewhere as the “Indian Construction and Operation of the Law of Blood for
Blood.”5
As Anglo-Americans understood it, retaliation was the foundation of the Native
legal order. When applied to murder, Native law required that deaths be avenged by
killing those from the same clan, nation, or ethnic group as the killers, even if those so
5

William Blount and Andrew Pickens to Secretary of War, August 6, 1793, in TP: Vol. IV, 296; Edward Telfair to Henry Knox,
December 5, 1792, Reel 2: The Territory Southwest of the River Ohio, Senate Territorial Papers (microfilm), M200, U.S. National
Archives. I refer to crime between Natives and non-Natives as “cross-cultural” for lack of a better term. “Interracial” adopts too
readily the racial frame that I argue elsewhere in the paper was often problematic for understanding crimes between Natives and nonNatives; and “cross-national,” while perhaps more accurate for how many federal officials and Natives interpreted these incidents, is
too distant from current usage. “Cross-cultural,” though imperfect, has the benefit of capturing the blurry boundaries between Native
identity as both race and nationality during this period.

250

executed bore no personal responsibility. This form of collective guilt based on ethnic
and national affiliations was termed “taking satisfaction.” Anglo-Americans believed that
the commitment to this principle was deeply rooted in Native character and law. “The
passion for revenge implanted in the earliest infancy of a Savage mind, and cherished by
the force of habit,” Henry Knox reported, “is almost uncontroulable.” Knox may have
derived this understanding from William Blount, governor of the Southwest Territory,
who took great pains to explain Cherokee legal principles to Knox. Blount attributed
retaliation to the Cherokees’ “Clanish Law,” which required that “each clan shall protect
and take satisfaction for all injuries offered to person of each individual of it.” To bolster
this argument, Blount recounted a story of how the Cherokee leader Bloody Fellow had
executed another Cherokee who had turned over Bloody Fellow’s brother to the British
for killing a white man.6
In casting retaliation as a Native legal principle, federal officials sought to
differentiate it from Anglo-American law, in which the society at large adjudicated the
guilt and innocence of individuals, not groups. “[W]hatever friend, Father, brother, or any
other relation are lost in War, revenge is never sought for by the Whites,” army officer
Henry Burbeck told gathered Anishinaabe at Michilimackinac. “[T]hey are buried with
the Hatchet.” Henry Knox conveyed similar information to the Cherokee leader Hanging
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Maw. “We do not permit an individual who has been wronged to be his own avenger,”
he wrote. “This is never allowed among the whites, when the society is well regulated.”7
But even as he mouthed these pieties to Native leaders, Henry Knox well knew
that Anglo-American society in the territories was far from “well regulated,” at least as
Knox envisioned it. On the contrary, territorial citizens explicitly adopted both the legal
logic and the very language of their Native neighbors, based largely on the insistence that
this was the appropriate body of law to govern cross-cultural conflicts. “Let the laws of
retaliation be enforced,” one inhabitant of the Southwest Territory insisted in response to
Cherokee and Creek attacks. William Blount had frequently informed Henry Knox that
Anglo-American relatives of those killed by Natives in the Southwest Territory
“thirst[ed] for revenge, or, what is here termed, satisfaction.” Like the Native satisfaction
it aped, Anglo-American retaliation was indiscriminate, based on collective, not
individual, responsibility: those whose relatives died at Native hands sought to “fall[] on
the Indians and tak[e] satisfaction, without regard to age or sex.” White residents north
of the Ohio felt similarly. As Arthur St. Clair complained to President Washington, “they
are in the habits of retaliation perhaps, without attending precisely to the nations from
which the injuries are received.”8
But, although retaliation had deep roots in both Native and American legal
thought in the borderlands, by the 1780s and ‘90s it was the subject of vigorous challenge
by both Native and American leaders. The critique was twofold. The first was it was
7
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indiscriminate, entirely disconnected from personal responsibility. “Let men die for their
own crimes, when they commit such as are worthy of death,” the prominent Virginian
Arthur Campbell urged the Cherokee leader Hanging Maw in a letter reprinted in the
Knoxville Gazette. John Sevier, former governor of “Franklin” and the first governor of
Tennessee, proclaimed that he held “the principle of retaliation . . . in the utmost
detestation”; he sought “not the blood of the innocent, but that of the guilty.” Some
Native leaders reportedly espoused the same view. The Chickasaw John Morris, on his
deathbed after being shot by an anonymous white settler, urged that punishment be meted
out only to the guilty. In another story, relayed by federal Indian agent Silas Dinsmoor to
his children, a group of Cherokees plotted to kill Dinsmoor in revenge for the senseless
murder of an old Cherokee man by two white hunters; the Cherokees demanded “pay,
and good pay” for the murder. Discovering the plot, the Cherokee leader Bloody Knife
berated the conspirators: “[S]uppose a mad dog should bite one of your children, would
you kill all the dogs?” In Dinsmoor’s telling, the “logic was convincing and [the
Cherokees] left, looking very sheepish.”9
But there was a second critique that was even more pressing for Anglo-American
leaders, whose primary goal was to preserve a lasting peace. They lamented that
retaliation’s demand that no death go unavenged required an endless and selfperpetuating cycle of violence. “[A]s the thirst of war is the dearest inheritance an Indian
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receives from his parents, and vengeance that of the Kentuckians,” Major Hamtramck
wrote to Arthur St. Clair, referring to white settlers who proved most troublesome to
federal authorities in the Northwest Territory, “hostility must then be the result on both
sides.” The result was that relations between Anglo-American settlers and Natives were
perhaps irrevocably poisoned. “An immortal hatred subsists in the breast of one against
the other,” one frontier inhabitant reported. Whenever “a backwoods man meets an
Indian he will kill or be killed, being possessed by this fury, no distinction of friendly or
unfriendly Indians will be made.” The result was that all Indians would very quickly
become unfriendly, and “every Nation will join against us.”10
The costs of retaliation were especially troubling to Secretary of War Henry
Knox. Under the doctrine of retaliation, “the slightest offence occasions death—revenge
occasions.” The result would be a “merciless war” which destroyed “the innocent and
helpless with the guilty.” He specifically castigated the frontier settlers for “exercise[ing]
indiscriminate revenge against all persons bearing the name of indians, under the
specious pretext of retaliation.”11
Native leaders, too, were increasingly moving to abandon retaliation for the sake
of peace. When two Cherokees were killed stealing horses in 1795, federal Indian agent
Silas Dinsmore reported that the tribe’s “headmen,” who were “firmly disposed for
peace,” had convinced the victims’ relations to “not take satisfaction.” By the late 1790s,
both the Creek and Cherokee councils had voted to abolish aspects of retaliation; in 1797,
Dinsmore’s superior, Indian agent Benjamin Hawkins, reported that the Creeks had
10
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publicly executed six men, including one white man, for murder, which he stated “gives a
hope that the right of revenge might be transfered from private hands to a public
jurisdiction.” Though Creek and Cherokee leaders were responding to pressure from
federal representatives, they were also trying to remake their societies to abandon a legal
principle that proved so costly.12
Like the Creeks and Cherokees, Knox was also attempting to shift legal authority
to a “public jurisdiction.” He particularly emphasized the need for some impartial arbiter
to resolve disputes. “There can be neither Justice or observance of treaties,” Knox wrote,
“where every man claims to be the sole Judge in his own cause, and the avenger of his
own supposed wrongs.” In both federal Indian treaties and the Trade and Intercourse
Acts, drafted largely by Knox and enacted first in 1790, Knox advocated a new law to
govern cross-cultural relations—federal law—and a new judge—the federal
government.13
As described earlier, the Acts codified three distinct legal principles that Knox
and other federal officials believed would secure cross-cultural peace. The first was
physical separation. “[D]eep rooted prejudices,” Knox argued, held both “by the Whites
and Savages,” would “ever prevent their being good neighbours.” Other federal officials
echoed this view: William Blount argued that the United States should prevent Natives
and whites from “a too frequent promiscuous Intercourse with each other.” Some way to
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sharply divide Natives and whites was necessary. President Washington and members of
Congress spoke wishfully of a “Chinese wall” to divide the two groups. Blount, for his
part, was besotted with the idea of a river, rather than an easily transgressed “immaginary
line,” keeping Natives and whites apart.14
The Trade and Intercourse Act adopted more pragmatic approach. It drew a sharp
legal boundary between “the Indian country,” a phrase the statute used to describe the
territory under Native jurisdiction and ownership, and what was sometimes called the
“ordinary jurisdiction” of the states and territories. From 1796 on, this boundary was
written into the text of the statute itself. Crossing the boundary was increasingly
regulated. At first, the Acts focused on requiring licenses and bonds from Indian traders,
the most frequent non-Natives within Indian country. But subsequent versions expanded
to require that any person who travelled into Indian country, at least south of the Ohio,
would have to obtain a passport. Crossing into Indian country to hunt, settle, or survey
Native lands were all criminalized, prohibitions enforceable by the federal military.
Though shy of a wall, Henry Knox did set about creating a “chain of [federal] posts” to
regulate the border.15
The second was federal jurisdiction over cross-cultural conflicts. “The right that
each party assumes of being judges and prompt executioners in their own cause prevents
all effectual interference,” Knox observed, “excepting by a legal coercive power, which
shall make the necessary sacrifices to Justice, let them belong to which side they may.”
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Justice, impartially administered by the federal government, was a leitmotif for Knox; he
insisted that both Natives and whites be judged and held accountable by the national
government.16
At first blush, the Trade and Intercourse Acts seem a patchy and tepid expression
of Knox’s view. They asserted authority only over crimes committed by U.S. citizens
against Natives, and only within “Indian territory.” They did not displace Native
jurisdiction over Indian country or claim jurisdiction over Natives. From this
perspective, the Acts were, as Lisa Ford rightly notes, examples of legal pluralism,
suggestive of how jurisdiction could quickly collapse into diplomacy, in which law
enforcement required negotiations among sovereigns.17
But the Acts did not exist in isolation. Territory outside Indian country was
already under federal sovereignty: “[A]ll the laws of Congress,” Attorney General
William Bradford wrote, “are, in their operation coextensive with the Territory of the
United States, and obligatory upon every person therein, except independent Nations &
Tribes of Indians residing on Indian lands.” If a crime by or against Natives were
committed outside Indian lands, it would already fall within either state or, even more
likely, territorial jurisdiction. Extending federal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens within
Indian country thus closed a jurisdictional gap. It was also a bold assertion of federal
sovereignty, though this is less apparent in hindsight, given that the Trade and Intercourse
Acts presaged further, more aggressive assertions of federal jurisdiction over Indian
lands. But in the late eighteenth century, when most of the Anglo-American political
16
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elite still regarded tribes as “nation[s] of independent government,” exercising U.S.
jurisdiction within Indian country, even over U.S. citizens, was a power grab, not a show
of restraint; the United States was intruding into territory controlled by a quasi-foreign
sovereign.18
As for Native people, treaties of the era all contained jurisdictional provisions
requiring that signatory Native nations “deliver up” Indians who committed murder or
robbery against a U.S. citizen, “to be punished according to the laws of the United
States.” Knox made clear that his vision of federal supremacy embraced both Natives
and white settlers: Indians as well as U.S. citizens, he argued, had to be shown “the
absolute necessity of submitting to the justice and mercy of the United States.”19
Viewed in this frame, the Acts represented a muscular assertion of federal
criminal jurisdiction with few parallels in the early republic. Not only did they create a
category of crimes punishable by fines, imprisonment, or even death, but they also
provided that offenders could be tried in federal courts anywhere in the United States.
And, if a U.S. citizen committed a crime in Indian country prohibited by the act, he or she
could be arrested under military authority anywhere in the United States, even within
state borders. Given these provisions, the statutes were read at the time as aggressive,
and controversial, projection of federal power. Erstwhile Franklin governor John Sevier
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denounced the law as “an infamous act” that “had given more umbrage” to the citizens of
the Tennessee Country “than any act ever passed since the independency of America.”20

The original Trade and Intercourse Act was brief: seven sections, barely two
printed pages long. But for the federal officials who crafted it, especially Henry Knox, it
represented a foundational charter for asserting federal supremacy over Indian affairs.
Federal officials distributed embossed parchment copies, in tin containers, to Native
nations; Washington cited it to Native leaders as evidence of the “fatherly care the United
States intend to take of the Indians.” Copies of the statute were freely distributed
throughout the territories, reprinted in territorial newspapers, and read verbatim by
territorial judges to grand juries. Despite its brevity, the Act authorized an expansive
“legal coercive power” that reflected Knox’s vision for how federal law would replace
the law of retaliation, as the federal government would separate Natives from U.S.
citizens and arbitrate the crimes each committed against the other. Over the ensuing
decade, federal officials—territorial governors, judges, and military officers—would
struggle to implement these provisions.21
***
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Knox’s principle of separation never gained much traction in the territories. Part
of the problem was simply that Native and whites were too entangled to be so easily
divided; the clear lines that Knox and others envisioned had no basis in reality. Just as
significantly, accounts of mutual hostility and implacable hatred fundamentally
misunderstood, and even exacerbated, the problem. Much of the violence between
Natives and whites did not consist of skulking, vengeful attacks. It began, rather, in
taverns and houses, often in the heart of towns like Vincennes and Knoxville, and usually
started with sociability, not hatred. But when these everyday encounters rapidly shifted
from camaraderie to bloodshed, the ensuing violence was interpreted, especially by those
outside the borderlands, in light of the fraught diplomatic and racial overtones that
colored cross-cultural interactions.22
Throughout the territories, Natives and Euro-Americans had lived alongside one
another for centuries before the United States arrived. Living in small isolated
communities surrounded by Natives, Euro-Americans had forged extensive and
intertwined ties of trade, debt, and sociability with their Native neighbors. The advent of
U.S. sovereignty sometimes strained, but did not sever those relationships.
The French settlement of Vincennes in the Wabash Country in the Northwest
Territory, for instance, remained a hub where Natives and non-Natives continued to
intermingle throughout the 1780s and ‘90s. Because the town was a center of the fur
trade, surrounding Native groups were “continually coming to and going from this
place,” trading their skins for liquors and remaining “eight or ten days.” Court and
22
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church records suggest the close relationships that resulted, recording cross-cultural
debts, Native baptisms, and Indian residents: when John Toulon passed away in 1797, he
left behind items belonging to a Native “who used to lodge in the House.” AngloAmerican visitors were often shocked at how freely Natives and local inhabitants mixed.
Passing through Vincennes, the traveler George Hunter stayed with a man named Smalls.
“Here is a considerable resort of Indians,” Hunter recorded, “they are constantly thro &
about this house at all times, like as many pet Lambs, at present there is a Man, his Squa
& child sitting by the kitchen fire.”23
Such mixing appeared in other long-standing settlements in the Northwest
Territory. In Michilimackinac, a federal outpost in the heart of Anishinaabe territory in
what is today northern Michigan, the federal commandant allowed Natives “free
intercourse” to the village, allowing them to come “either by day or night . . . at
pleasure.” In Detroit, Winthrop Sargent complained about the very “great Resort of
Indians.” Legal records there also indicate ongoing commercial relationships.24
But Natives and non-Natives coexisted in newly founded Anglo-American towns
as well as long-standing French settlements. In Cincinnati, Winthrop Sargent reported
seeing “a number of Indians mixing with the Inhabitants of the Town.” Knoxville,
created from whole cloth as a federal administrative center in 1791, rivaled Vincennes in
23
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the intensity of relationships with neighboring Natives. Much of this collegiality
occurred around what one early historian described as the “court” of William Blount.
Blount spent an inordinate amount of time socializing with Natives, especially
Cherokees. Entire days passed in recreation, “unalloyed with public cares”; the governor
reported one Knoxville meeting with the Cherokee leader John Watts nearly entirely
“devoted to eating, drinking and jocular conversation, of which Watts is very fond.”
During the Treaty of Holston, another Cherokee named John Taylor “lived with
Governor Blount as one of his family . . . ate and drank at his table as one of his family,
and slept by his side.” Blount’s social ties to the Cherokees were especially strong, but
such connections characterized Knoxville more generally. Blount’s successor, Tennessee
governor John Sevier, reported from the city that, “as the Cherokee settlements are in our
vicinity . . . they frequently resort among our inhabitants, and particularly at this place.”25
As had long been the case, intercultural sex accompanied, and paralleled, such
commercial and social connections. French men had long had sexual relationships with
Native women, but recently arrived Anglo-Americans often followed suit. In one
instance, an army officer stationed at Fort Finney supplied a Wyandot woman, “Young
Polly,” and her mother with stolen goods from the garrison; the women were to “remain
in the neighberhood” until the officer’s enlistment expired and he could bring her to
Pittsburgh. There were also alleged instances when white women became involved with
Native men. In one case, the Knoxville Gazette reported that a Philadelphian woman had
25
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eloped with a Cherokee called “Young George”; the paper urged that she be taken up for
vagrancy. Several years later, the Gazette published an account of a Mrs. Abbott, a
military wife, who absconded with a Cherokee after he paid her “great attention.” The
Cherokees, the newspaper stated, threatened to “continue to take [white settlers’] wives
for pay” for their lands.26
These close ties that existed between Natives and non-Natives throughout the
territories did not obviate questions of power. Rather, as a generation of scholars have
emphasized, intimacy often reinforced, rather than mitigated, inequalities. Commercial
ties ensnared Natives in debt, while officials like William Blount sought to use their
relationships with Native leaders to bolster U.S. leverage. Cross-cultural sex was
especially fraught. Even as white men’s relationships with Native women built on longstanding Native practices of using sex to forge ties with, and even control, outsiders, they
also corresponded with Anglo-American men’s exploitative views of Native women as
sexually available. Prior to becoming governor, for instance, William Blount wished
travelers to the lower Cherokee towns “greate Choice and Great plenty of Cheekamagga
Squaws.” As for accounts of sex between Native men and white women, it is hard to
know whether they were real or mere projections of white men’s sexual panic.27
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But, as tense as these intimate links between Natives and whites were, they
represented the antithesis of the “Chinese wall” that men like Washington, Knox, and,
ironically, even Blount hoped to construct between Native and American societies. They
also did little to prevent conflict. If anything, they heightened it—particularly when
mixed with alcohol, which seemed to so easily blur the boundary between conviviality
and violence.
Formally, selling alcohol to Natives was illegal, at the least in the Northwest
Territory. But territorial law was openly flouted. The alcohol trade was also too
profitable, and too engrained, to be prohibited; one of the participants in Vincennes was
even a county official. Ultimately, federal officials capitulated to reality. Winthrop
Sargent, acknowledging that Natives would get it “from some Quarter or other,”
explicitly authorized its sale by a few trusted individuals. To the south, the federal
government felt constrained to sell rum and whiskey at the federally run trading posts it
opened in Cherokee and Creek country, because the “habits of the Indians in this respect
could not be controuled.”28
The availability of liquor drew Natives into territorial towns, where they would
trade their peltry for alcohol and go on extended benders. Vincennes residents regarded
themselves as particularly plagued with roving bands of intoxicated Indians, who
“destroy[ed] the peace and good order of the Village.” One local magistrate reported
how a party of “drunken tho friendly Indians” had accidently burned down the house of
one of the village’s poorest residents; another house, inadvertently set ablaze three days
28
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later, was saved only by the federal soldiers from the fort. “Our village is stained with
blood every day,” Catholic missionary Jean Rivet reported to his superior from
Vincennes. Alcohol was an “inexhaustible source of quarrels . . . thefts, murders, and
disorders of all kinds,” Rivet related, before offering a lengthy catalogue of violence: the
“son of a great chief” killed by a “negro”; a white man stabbed by an Indian, who was in
turned stabbed by another white man; a mother and choir singer shot at twice by an
Indian; a village elder attacked by an Indian armed with a knife. “All these horrors,”
Rivet lamented, “are the sad consequences of the drunk[e]ness of the savages.”29
Criminal cases from Vincennes underscore Rivet’s link between alcohol and
violence, though they make it clear that Rivet’s attribution of blame ignored the white
residents’ own role in drunken mayhem. Vincennes resident Lambeir Burway, for
instance, seemed to have a knack for finding himself in the midst of cross-cultural brawls.
In 1796, his home was the scene of a battery against a Pottawatomie known as the brother
of Grand Poo, for which Leno Burway (presumably a relative) was indicted before the
county court. A year later, Lambeir was himself indicted before the General Court of the
Northwest Territory for a battery against a “Certain Indian Caled the Leaf.” The affair
began as yet another drunken tavern brawl, where the Leaf, after employing “a grate dale
of insulting Language” against a village resident named Mr. Rambout, drew his knife and
stabbed Rambout. Just as the Leaf was about to make a second stroke, Burway
intervened to separate them, at which point the Leaf started attacking Burway and
Burway “in defence of his Own Life struk the said Indian with His Knif nere about the
29
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senter of his Brest.” The Leaf collapsed to the ground and was carried to a nearby house
by the other Indians, where he died.30
A similarly tangled skein of facts appeared in the prosecutions of James Cooney
and Thomas Coulter in relation to the death of a Delaware named George Allen a couple
years later. The alleged crime occurred at Thomas Coulter’s inn in Vincennes, where a
Delaware and a Frenchman were scuffling over a tomahawk. Three or four more Indians
rushed in to help their countrymen, prompting the “white people” to push them all out of
the tavern. But the Natives began to attack the windows and doors of the house, leading
Thomas Coulter to fire a gun at them; still their attack persisted. James Cooney then
grabbed the gun, reloaded, and fired again, at which point “the people cried out that an
Indian was killed.”31
Matters to the south were similar. In 1792, William Blount investigated
complaints by the Cherokee leader White Man-killer that he had been attacked by
Knoxville residents. Blount discovered that the Cherokee had been “drinking with some
people, in a tavern.” A drunken White Man-killer insulted Mr. John White, also drunk,
who struck the Cherokee, “but not with an intention to kill.” Blount concluded: “It was a
drinking affair only, and I understood was so settled when the parties got sober.”32
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Another incident, from after the Southwest Territory gained statehood as
Tennessee, demonstrates especially clearly how alcohol-fueled camaraderie could
quickly turn deadly. As recounted in a lengthy letter by A.M. Hoar to federal interpreter
James Carey, two Cherokees, one named Johny, the other Samy, passed by Hoar’s home
on their way to return a horse to its white owner. Sammy was well-known to Hoar and
his neighbors, and enjoyed a good reputation, so Hoar “Got Some Whiskey and treat[ed]
them” as a reward for “So friendly an Act to the Whites.” Soon, Hoar’s house was full of
people from the neighborhood, all “freely” drinking whisky; everyone was “friendly and
in Good Humour.”33
At this point in the impromptu party, a small white man with the odd name of
Barefoot Runion, “Very Much Intoxicated,” began to “Rastle or Scuffle” with Johny.
Johny asked Hoar if Barefoot was not angry and a “bad man”; Hoar told him he had
simply had “Too Much Whiskey.” The wrestling continued, with Johny sometimes
flinging Runion, and sometimes vice versa; they frequently paused to go up to the table to
drink together. Everything appeared to Hoar to be “in freen[d]ship and Diversion . . . .
Nor Neither did I in the Least Expect Any Mischief.”34
At some point, however, the situation turned, and the two men began to “fight in
Earnest.” Hoar intervened to separate the two men, grabbing Johny. But at the same
moment, Samy, the other Cherokee, who had been lying drunk on the floor, awoke and
began to fight with Runion. Runion threw Samy onto the short leg of a stool. Samy
complained that his belly hurt; Hoar inspected it, but could see no outward mark. The
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Cherokees spent the rest of the night at Hoar’s house and began the journey back home
the next morning. Samy left still complaining about pain; Hoar later learned that he died
on the journey. Hoar was very contrite and “Much Troubled” by the affair; he
particularly “Much Lament[ed] that Too Much Whiskey Was Amongst the people.”35
Such instances of drunkenness, violence, and even manslaughter did not mean
that Natives and Anglo-Americans were not neighborly. On the contrary, as judged by
local court dockets, white neighbors in the territories behaved exactly the same way.
Towns like Knoxville, Cincinnati, and Vincennes were hard-drinking, violent places
where drunken men, and sometimes women, regularly slandered, assaulted, and even
killed one another. Alcohol-fueled camaraderie could turn to murder just as quickly
when whites drank among themselves as when they drank in mixed company.36
But if the violence that occurred between Natives and whites in territorial taverns
was quotidian, the wider setting was not. Unlike much of the violence among whites,
assaults and murders committed by and against Natives occurred against a broader
background of low-level warfare, racial tension, and diplomatic negotiation. In this
context, ordinary conflicts between neighbors could take on political and diplomatic
importance. Often it was difficult to tell whether a particular death should be regarded as
an ordinary crime, the product of happenstance, or an act of war. In Vincennes, for
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instance, a local magistrate investigated the death of one Laviollette, killed “by the
Savages.” At first it appeared that Laviollette was the victim of an Indian attack, a
common occurrence on a frontier in the midst of war; but it turned out that killing
stemmed from a local Piankashaw’s “personal resentment” against Laviollete due to a
“dispute about a Perogue” (a canoe-like boat). In other instances, the line between a
“drinking affair” and warfare proved blurry. At Hays station, near Nashville, two
Cherokees were drinking with the inhabitants when, “a little intoxicated,” they “boasted
of their war exploits,” including killing two white men. The two Cherokees were found
in their camp the next morning, “both dead, and shot through their bodies.” Officials
regarded their death at the hands of unknown white assailants as murder, but the
surrounding events also made it a plausible wartime killing.37
The situation was complicated, too, by the rise of a widespread anti-Indian
rhetoric throughout much of the territories. As Peter Silver has traced, years of warfare
in places like Virginia and Pennsylvania had produced societies where the ritual appeal to
Indian atrocities and the rhetorical parade of suffering victims made Indian-hating a
staple of shared political culture. As migrants from these places moved west, and faced
more warfare, they brought these views with them. Such rhetoric was arguably strongest
in Kentucky, which suffered Native attacks but where few white residents encountered
Natives in everyday contexts, but it was also widespread in both the Northwest and
Southwest Territories, where anti-Indian language infected territorial print culture,
especially newspapers. Though often read in class terms, as a trait of the impoverished
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intruders on the public domain, these views’ foremost proponents were often local elites
vying for political prominence who supposedly sought to pander to popular prejudice—
men like Henry Hugh Breckenridge in Kentucky, or William Cocke in the Southwest
Territory, a rival of William Blount whom the governor excluded from office. AntiIndian rhetoric proved, too, to have widespread currency among the middling sort: the
citizens of Cincinnati, for instance, who banded together to offer a scalp bounty during
the Northwest Indian War, or army officers whose correspondents casually dismissed
Indians as “Copper faced Sons of whores.”38
Yet these views never entirely dominated the territories. The pages of the
Knoxville Gazette, for instance, the Southwest Territory’s only newspaper, were a
battleground where writers under adopted Indian identities such as the Cherokee Hanging
Maw not only rebutted the arguments offered by Breckenridge and Maw but mocked
them for not enjoying any actual political power or authority. William Blount even
borrowed explicitly from earlier fights when he had the Gazette reprint Franklin’s
pamphlet condemning the Paxton Boys’ attacks on the Conestoga Indians thirty years
earlier in Pennsylvania. And anti-Indian views were more likely to translate into political
fighting—or, as we shall see, mass action—than private murders. But federal officials,
particularly in Philadelphia, often wrote and spoke as if all territorial citizens shared these
views and acted on them. Those who live “remote from the seat of government,”
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Secretary of War Timothy Pickering wrote, “do not deem Indians entitled to the common
rights of humanity,” and so “murder & plunder Indians whenever they can.”39
An incident in Vincennes, from 1791, underscores especially clearly how
outsiders, fixated on these racial and class divides, could quickly escalate local, drunken
disputes into full-blown diplomatic and diplomatic incidents. According to the report of
the county magistrates, the affair began as yet another drunken argument. A number of
Natives in the village routinely received whiskey from a man named Simpson. One
night, the Natives returned to Simpson’s and became “intoxicated.” Also at Simpson’s
was Lieutenant Dirck Schuyler, a soldier stationed at Fort Knox known to his
commanders as a bad egg given to “continual drunkenness” and “other base conduct.”
Schuyler was drinking with several companions, other young white men whom the
magistrates deemed “unworthy” companions. Simpson refused to give the Natives liquor
without payment in furs, “whereon some disputes arose altho’ they did not understand
each other, and Simpson struck the Indian.” Schuyler and his companions then seized the
Native and took him prisoner, parading him through the streets “in a riotous manner.”
But the Indian soon escaped from the drunken men.40
The matter might have ended here, yet another drunken fight over debts between
Indians, a shopkeeper, and the soldiers. But Schuyler and his companions pressed on.
The arrival of Anglo-American newcomers such as Schuyler, many of whom could
barely conceal their disdain for both Natives and the French settlers, had riven Vincennes
39
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with racial and ethnic tensions. Schuyler and his companions used the brawl as an excuse
to uncork these discontents. After the unknown Indian escaped, they proceeded to attack
the house of a Frenchman named Joseph Andre, where one of the men beat Andre’s
pregnant wife, fired a pistol into the door, and seized Andre’s son. Andre pleaded that
they were Frenchmen—presumably insisting on their difference from the Indians—but,
when asked if they had come to kill the French, Schuyler and his companions shouted,
“Yes, kill them, kill them.” Schuyler and company then proceeded to the neighboring
house of Jean Baptiste Constant, a local Indian interpreter, where they seized “an Indian
and his Wife and Children,” and conveyed all of them to the guardhouse.41
At this point, town residents intervened. Their primary concern was how the
surrounding Natives would interpret the affair. Pointing to the “extreme Weakness of the
Village” and the need to “conciliate as much as possible the affections of the Indians,
who . . . might in a great measure effect our ruin,” the magistrates pleaded with Schuyler
to release the captured Native. Indeed, “alarmed” local Natives had already begun to
mass ominously on the opposite bank. Eventually, Schuyler released the Indian. The
villagers dispatched a prominent local to inform the Natives that Schuyler and his
companions had been indicted before a special session of the general quarter court of the
peace, and would “endeavor to prevail on them to forget the whole Affair.” In the end,
Schuyler was punished—but not by the civil courts. Because of his military post,
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Schuyler was cashiered and threatened with court martial; he opted to resign instead. A
precarious peace persisted in Vincennes.42
The Schuyler incident helps illustrate why Knox’s vision of a strictly enforced
separation—a “Chinese Wall”—between Natives and whites could not be realized. In
part, this reflected the shortcomings of formal law: a neat boundary line could not undo
the commercial, social, and sexual entanglements that bound together Natives and U.S.
citizens. Indian country and the U.S. territories bled imperceptibly together; ostensibly
American towns like Vincennes, Nashville, and Knoxville were also central sites of
Native diplomacy and trade. Not only could the federal government not simply separate
the groups by fiat, but, as William Blount’s close ties to the Cherokees demonstrate,
federal officials also relied on, encouraged, and benefitted from such intermixing.
But the Schuyler incident also underscores the flaw in Knox’s belief that only
federal jurisdiction, untainted by the biases of both Natives and territorial citizens, could
supply justice. Distance had a cost as well as a benefit. Local Natives and whites were
not color-blind; they well understood the racial and cultural barriers that divided them,
and did not always like one another. But they also knew the local connections that bound
them together, and recognized that cross-cultural violence, like violence in the territories
more generally, often resulted from a potent mix of alcohol, personal disagreements, and
happenstance. Those who witnessed such crimes often argued, as A.M. Hoar insisted in
the death of Samy, that there was no intention of killing. 43
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Yet that first-hand knowledge was often lost as reports of the violence spread to
those further removed from the territories, especially federal officials. Preoccupied with
broader concerns about diplomacy and Indian affairs, these men fixated on divisions
between opposing national and racial categories, and, because they saw the world that
way, they assumed that all borderland residents did, too. On several occasions, St. Clair
and Sargent quickly interpreted instances of cross-cultural violence in light of this
narrative, only to discover that they had misread a local dispute as a racially motivated
killing. Yet once this narrative of borderland violence as a product of racial hostility was
established, it was remarkably durable. Violence became evidence of racial hatred, while
the existence of racial hatred in turn allowed intent in any cross-cultural crime to be
inferred. But as a result, more and more people like Lieutenant Schuyler—strikingly,
both an outsider and a federal officer—came into the territories. Dividing the world into
separate and hostile racial groups, men like Schuyler increasingly transformed the
violence of everyday life into political violence intended to convey overt racial meaning,
turning their narrative into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
***
Knox’s second principle, the establishment of federal jurisdiction over crimes
between Natives and whites, proved equally fruitless. The problem was not lack of
effort: territorial officials took Knox’s admonition that “justice” should govern Indian
affairs very seriously, and intervened in dozens of instances of cross-cultural crime in the
territories. And like Knox, they advanced a vision of colorblind justice, under which
both territorial citizens and Natives would be liable under federal law for the harms they
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committed on the other. As Winthrop Sargeant told Ottawas and Chippewas gathered at
Michilimackinac, “[W]e are determined to obtain the same Rule and make no Difference
between Red and White People.”44
In the end, however, the federal government largely failed in its efforts, both to
punish Natives for crimes committed on U.S. citizens, and to punish citizens for crimes
they committed against Natives. The two circumstances were very different, yet the
fundamental cause of failure was, in broad strokes, similar: the formal limitations built
into the scope and reach of federal law.
These institutional constraints checked territorial officials’ power to exercise the federal
jurisdiction they ostensibly enjoyed.

On July 24, 1794, an unknown group of Natives killed and scalped John Ish, a
white settler, while he was at his plow on his farm eighteenth miles below Knoxville on
the south side of Holston River, in the Southwest Territory. The killing, William Blount
stated, “much exasperated the Frontier People.” Eight days later, on August 1, a
territorial Court of Oyer and Terminer in Knoxville tried, and a territorial jury convicted,
a Creek Indian named Apongphohigo for Ish’s murder. He hanged three days later, at
four in the afternoon. “Your Muscoga acquaintance took a civil swing,” a territorial
resident wrote to Indian agent John McKee upon witnessing the execution. ““[H]e died
with firmness.”45
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Apongphonhigo’s trial and hanging was likely the first time the federal
government exercised criminal adjudicatory jurisdiction over an Indian. Federal officials
celebrated it as “an example, worthy of imitation, of how federal criminal jurisdiction
could replace retaliation in punishing Natives accountable for their attacks. John McKee
argued the Creek’s conviction would “spare the innocent from the rage of the exasperated
frontier inhabitants.” In a grand jury charge, territorial judge Joseph Anderson insisted
that “the late punishment of the Creek Indian, for the murder of Ish,” showed citizens that
they must “not be your own avengers . . . but rest your hope on the due administration of
the laws.” And Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton praised the proceeding as “an
example of justice and fair dealing” in urging the Governor of Georgia to adopt similar
measures to prevent citizen attacks on Natives.46
Yet United States v. Apongphigo, as the case was officially captioned, was also
the only recorded prosecution of a Native in the Southwest Territory. The Northwest
Territory situation was similar: records survive of a single capital prosecution, United
States v. Wapikinomouk, that occurred just as Vincennes was transitioning from an
outpost of the Northwest Territory to the capital of the newly created Indiana Territory.
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Understanding why events federal officials believed so worthy of emulation occurred so
rarely requires digging more deeply into the circumstances of the two cases.47
The accounts of Apongphigo’s trial—a brief court record and a slightly fuller
newspaper version—reveal a court that adhered scrupulously to the legal process that
would have been afforded a non-Native defendant in a murder case. Apongphohigo—
“an Indian of the Creek Nation late of the Town of Tookcaucaugee; or Punk Knot on
Oakfuskry River”—was indicted by a grand jury for murdering Ish “feloniously willfully
and with malice aforethought.” James Carey, the federal Indian interpreter, explained the
indictment to the Creek, who reportedly “confessed the fact.” But the court, “willing to
afford the prisoner the benefit of trial by a jury, (permitted him to withdraw his plea) and
plead not guilty.” A petit jury was then sworn, and Apongphohigo had John Rhea
assigned him as counsel by the court. (Rhea was an “early settler” on the Cherokee lands
south of the French Broad River.) The jury heard the “fullest testimony” on the case,
which does not survive, although the witness list does: it included James Carey, the
federal interpreter, as well as four other territorial citizens, including Joseph Sevier, John
Sevier’s son. The jury voted to convict, and Judge Anderson, who oversaw the
proceeding, pronounced the sentence of death in the “usual form.”48

47

Both of these claims are, of course, subject to the limitations of the surviving court records. Most of the records of the Southwest
Territory survive; Apongphohigo’s prosecution is the only instance I have found where the territorial courts exercised criminal
jurisdiction over Indians. The records in the Northwest Territory, especially of the General Court, are much patchier. I have found
only one other instance where territorial courts there exercised quasi-criminal jurisdiction over an Indian. In 1798, Antoine Marchall,
a Vincennes resident, filed suit against “John a Deleware Indian, with the advantage of only one Eye” for an assault and battery,
seeking $700 in damages. But the case was dismissed after the parties failed to appear. “Antoine Marchall v. John (A Delaware
Indian)” 1798 in Minutes of Common Pleas Court (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Historical Records Survey, 1940), 132; Warrant, May 14,
1798, Antoine Marchall v. John (A Delaware Indian), Knox County Court Records, Knox County Library, Vincennes, Ind.
48
“Knoxville, Monday, August 4,” Knoxville Gazette, August 4, 1794; United States v. Apongphigo, Minutes of Oyer and Terminer
Court. Since Carey was the only witness who could converse with Aponghohigo, it was unclear what the other witnesses testified to.
They may have been eyewitnesses, although the accounts seemed to indicate that Ish was alone when he was killed.

277

Given Apongphohigo’s confession, the most interesting legal issue in the case
was jurisdiction. The indictment had stated that the Creek’s crime had been “contrary to
the laws of the United States and Treaties of peace made with the Creek Nation and
against the peace and dignity of the United States.” Carey further explained to
Apongphohigo that in the Treaty of New York “it was agreed that if any Creek Indian or
Indians should commit a murder upon any citizen of the United States, he or they should
be given up, and tried according to the laws of the United States.” Apongphohigo replied
that he was “well acquainted with the talk that was held at New York, for it was well
sung in their ears by the chiefs after their return to the nation: But that the Upper Towns
had thrown away that talk, and taken up the hatchet.” Apongphohigo’s reply was,
perhaps, an implicit jurisdictional rebuke to the court; it implied that the Upper Creeks, at
least, had never ratified the treaty, and so could not bind them. But this jurisdictional
wrinkle did not attract any attention.49
Even absent the Treaty of New York, however, Apongphohigo would likely have
been subject to federal prosecution. Apongphonhigo’s killing of Ish had happened within
lands that the Cherokees had ceded the United States at the Treaty of Holston, and so
within the jurisdiction of the federal territorial courts. Here, the international-law
principle, documented in Vattel, that a nation’s courts presumptively enjoyed jurisdiction
over all persons within their jurisdictional limits regardless of nationality seemed to
operate. Two years after Apongphonhigo’s execution, section 14 of the 1796 Trade and
Intercourse Act would specifically codify what it implied was preexisting legal authority
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by specifically reaffirming the power of “legal apprehension or arresting, within the
limits of any state or district, of any Indian” who had “come over or across the []
boundary line, into any state or territory” and stolen from or killed inhabitants there.
Section 17 of the same act, which allowed the arrest within the states or territories of
“any person” who had violated the statute, also plausibly warranted Indians’ arrest and
trial, as one official argued.50
Apongphonhigo’s trial, then, presented a pageant of the triumph of federal law
and jurisdiction. But this appearance was only a facade. In fact, Apongphonhigo’s
subjection to federal criminal jurisdiction was due almost entirely to Cherokee law. The
most important legal issue was not what happened to Apongphohigo in the Knoxville
courtroom, but how he got there in the first place.
After Ish’s death, two territorial militia leaders, Major King and Lieutenant
Cunningham, set off to pursue the killers. They followed the trail into the Cherokee
Nation, but they proved incompetent woodsmen. Arriving in the Cherokee town of
Willstown, where the influential Cherokee leader Hanging Maw lived, they learned from
the Indian trader William Springston that he had seen Ish’s scalp and the party of Creeks
that had taken it. Though the Creeks had not gotten far, Springston reported, King had
missed his chance to capture them.51
Here, Hanging Maw intervened, offering assistance on how to “overtak[e] and
punish[] the Murderers of Ish.” Maw in fact dispatched eleven Cherokee warriors,
including Willoe, his own son, to assist King and Cunningham in their pursuit. Their
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hunt led them south, to the Cherokee town of Hiawassee, where the residents told them
that the killers were indeed Creeks who had recently passed through the town, and who
would likely camp the night at the town of “Wocoee” (Ocoee, further down the Hiwassee
River). Continuing their pursuit, they thought they had the killers in sight, when a runner
from Hiawassee arrived and alerted them that one of the killers had remained behind.
The party turned around, found the Creek—Apongphonhigo—and quickly surrounded
him.52
The question then became what to do with Apongphonhigo. No one seemed to
think of his apprehension in criminal-law terms—there was no warrant, and no civil
officer present to arrest him. Blount himself, in his instructions to the Cherokees, had
been indifferent as to the murderers’ fate, as long as they were punished: either the
Cherokees could kill the murderers “and their Hair brought in fresh,” or they could be
“taken alive and delivered . . . to be by my order put to death at this place [Knoxville].”
But the issue became who would take the Creek prisoner. For their part, the Cherokees
urged King to “kill or take him.” The reason for this insistence was not specified, but the
Cherokees likely considered the Creek as the enemy of the United States and so deferred
to the Anglo-Americans. But King refused to do so, instead arguing the “propriety of
their doing one or the other.”53
Although he offered no explanation for his actions, King’s hesitancy and
deference to the Cherokees are illuminating. In refusing to arrest Apongphohigo, King
was following federal law as it then existed, which did not extend criminal jurisdiction
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over Natives within Native territory. For most purposes, the federal government regarded
Native lands as a foreign and autonomous jurisdiction, a result that the Washington
Administration believed derived from the customary law of nations as long practiced in
North America. Most of federal legal practice with respect to Native nations—the
emphasis on diplomatic negotiation, the codification of the relationship in treaties, the
preemption of state law—reflected this legal position. Territorial citizens sometimes
attempted to use Native territory’s foreign status to their own advantage. Robert
Slaughter, charged with the 1798 murder of Joseph Hardin, argued that the alleged crime
had occurred “on the Indian Lands, without the jurisdiction of this Court and within the
limits of another nation at the time the offence is charged to have been committed”; his
success is unclear. In 1794, when Zachariah Johnson sued Charles Raygan for an assault
that happened in the French Broad region of the Southwest Territory before the
Cherokees had ceded it to the United States, Raygen’s attorney argued that the lands
where the tort occurred were “out of the protection of the United States.”54
As Raygen discovered, there was an important exception to the lack of federal
criminal jurisdiction within Indian country: the United States could exercise personal
jurisdiction over its citizens even within Indian country, a power codified in the Trade
and Intercourse Act. Thus, in Reygan’s case, the court and the jury seemingly agreed
with Johnson’s attorney’s argument that the assault and battery “is [a] personal action and
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always follows the person, is not local”—the territorial court, in other words, could
exercise personal jurisdiction over Raygen.55
But Apongphohigo was neither within ordinary territorial jurisdiction of the
United States nor a U.S. citizen; King had no legal basis to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over him. In the end, it was Willioe, Hanging Maw’s son, who bound Apongphonhigo
and brought him to federal Indian agent John McKee at the Tellico Blockhouse, a federal
outpost within Cherokee territory.
What followed conformed to Native, not Anglo-American, legal norms. McKee
recounted that the Cherokees met the prisoner’s arrival with the firing of guns and shouts
of the “death whoop”; “joy,” McKee asserted, “seemed to be diffused in the countenance
of every description of the Cherokees.” Both McKee and King recorded how Middle
Striker, “a distinguished chief from Will’s Town,” grabbed the prisoner, lifted him up “as
high as he could, [then] dashed him with great violence on the ground, exclaiming, ‘That
is the way I shake hands with my enemy!’” When McKee managed to dissuade Hanging
Maw from scalping the prisoner alive, the Cherokees snatched Apongphonhigo’s warlock
instead, “with which they danced the scalp-dance all night, and used all the ceremony of
exultation commonly practiced among Indians on the death or capture of an enemy.” The
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next day, McKee, along with the Cherokees and local militia, escorted the prisoner to
Knoxville. Only then did the legal machinery of territorial law begin to operate.56
The Cherokees had their own reasons to assist the United States. William Blount
had adopted a preemptory tone in demanding Cherokee cooperation, giving Hanging
Maw ten days to apprehend the killers—an action that at once acknowledged the
Cherokees as an autonomous jurisdiction while also demeaning their independence. But
the Cherokees did not behave as though they were coerced; as Major King reported, they
“appeared to breath the keenest spirit of revenge for the death of Ish.” This eagerness
likely reflected Cherokee, rather than American, agendas. The upper Cherokees had little
love for the Creeks, with whom Hanging Maw was “highly exasperated on account of the
many injuries he has received.” The Cherokees also recognized that they could use the
affair to solidify their relationship with the United States. Afterwards, Hanging Maw
repeatedly cited the case to remind officials of Cherokee service, and, equally significant,
his own importance within the Cherokee nation. In his next meeting with Blount, Maw
stated, “I ordered the Creek seized . . . & I will kill my own People if they kill white
people.” When Blount began distribute goods to the Cherokees, Maw asked whether
they would go to the Cherokees who killed whites or to those “who had given proof of
their friendship to the United States by taking [a] Creek.” Blount got the message,
ensuring that loyal allies among the Cherokees received “the greatest share.”57
The elaborate display of federal legal supremacy in the Knoxville courtroom
sought to erase all this history, obscuring federal dependence on Native jurisdiction and
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law. But Aponphonhigo knew that the real legal work had been done on the Cherokee
path to Ocoee, not in Knoxville. Asked whether there was any reason the judgment of
the court should not be pronounced upon him, the Creek replied:
he had not any thing; that he come out with an intent of killing and stealing or
being killed; that he had killed the man for which he had been tried; and that it
had been his misfortune to fall into the hands of the whites; but that he should
escaped them if it had not been for the Cherokees; and that if he was now put to
death there was plenty of his nation remaining to revenge his death.
Apongphonhigo’s comments also suggest why his trial was the last instance an Indian
was prosecuted in the Southwest Territory. As Apongphonhigo threatened, the
cooperation Maw and the Cherokees offered the United States had costs as well as
benefits; it made the Cherokees liable under Native law for his death. Sure enough, mere
weeks after the killing, the Creeks appeared at Willstown, demanding that Middle Striker
and Willioe be “delivered up in satisfaction for the Creek, who they apprehended.” The
Cherokees had known that that their support would “draw the Creeks upon them,” and
had asked McKee for protection from the United States. Yet Blount and others did not
seem to take any special efforts in response. The evidence on this question is lacking, but
the Cherokees, perhaps, made their own calculation that the costs of aiding the United
States outweighed the benefits.58
It is tempting to read Apongphonhigo’s arrest, trial, and execution as evidence of
how the realities of the borderlands, particularly Native power, undermined federal
assertions of legal supremacy. The affair certainly underscored how dependent the often
inept and incompetent territorial government was on Native support. But fitting the trial
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into a narrative of federal weakness ignores the fact that, as arrogant as the United States
and its representatives could be, formal federal law disclaimed criminal jurisdiction over
Native lands. As King’s refusal to exercise authority within Cherokee territory suggests,
the Southwest Territory and the Cherokee Nation formally remained separate and distinct
jurisdictions.
The trial for United States v. Wapikinimomouk was held in Vincennes.
Wapikinomouk, a Delaware, was accused of murdering a white man named Harrison,
first name unknown. As in the case of Apongphohigo, the Delaware was prosecuted
before a specially called Court of Oyer and Terminer. Wapikinomouk’s proceeding,
however, was briefer and more cursory than Apongphohigo’s trial. He was indicted by a
grand jury on the testimony of a fellow Delaware, Johny, who had been “Sworn with an
uplifted hand after the Custom and manner of the Indians.” Although both
Wapikinomouk and Johny were presumably well acquainted with Euroamerican
society—the indictment described them as “late of Kaskaskia,” a French settlement in the
Illinois country on the American side of the Mississippi—they spoke through Joseph
Baron, the federal Indian interpreter. It is unclear whether Wapikinomouk had counsel.
His indictment charged with murder with malice aforethought in violation of territorial
law. Treaty law was not mentioned, although the Treaty of Greenville contained a
provision stipulating that Delawares who killed citizens of the United States would be
punished according to the laws of the United States. After the indictment was translated
to Wapikinomouk, he pleaded not guilty; a jury was empaneled and convicted him.
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Having nothing to say, Wapikinomouk was sentenced to be hanged on Monday,
November 23.59
Unlike in Apongphohigo’s prosecution, however, extensive testimony about the
crime survives, in the form of two recorded, likely pretrial interrogations of Johny and
Wapikinomouk, conducted by two judges of the court. These statements likely echoed
the testimony offered at trial, and offered a largely consistent account of the killing.60
In their telling, the crime, like much of the cross-cultural violence in the region,
reflected both the close ties that could arise between Natives and whites, and the
capriciousness and seeming irrationality of many killings. Wapikinomouk, Johny, and a
third Delaware named Matashikan had been traveling together from the Kentucky side of
the Ohio River when they encountered Harrison. Harrison asked to purchase some
venison which Wapikinomouk had recently caught; Wapikinomouk hospitably shared the
meat for free, at which point Harrison “gave them all a drink of Wiskey & then a Second
& third,” until they all “got drunk.” Around noon, the four men decided to take the ferry
to the north side of the Ohio River; Wapikinomouk stated that Harrison wanted to join
them on their way to “the Spanish Country,” on the other side of the Mississippi, “to see
what kind of country it was.” While they waited for the ferry, Harrison and
Wapikinomouk “jumped & wrestled,” just as had been done at the gathering at A.M.
Hoar’s house; Johny testified that it had been done “in good humour & [with] no
59
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Appearance of Disgust or Resentment.” On the other side of the river, the four mounted
men proceeded single file, with Johny in front, then Harrison, followed by the two other
Delawares. At some point someone shouted “Let’s kill him” in Delaware. Johny
whipped around to hear two rifle shots and see Harrison fall from his horse.61
The crime was remarkable for its seeming lack of motive. As a robbery, it offered
a poor yield: Wapikinomouk took four silver dollars from Harrison and divided them
among his party, though Johny refused to accept any. The Delawares took Harrison’s
horse, saddle, bridle, and rifle, but left his body on the ground; both Johny and
Wapikinomouk stressed that they had neither scalped nor stripped Harrison. Asked
whether there had been any cause for “Quarrel or misunderstanding,” both Johny and
Wapikinomouk insisted that there was not. Wapikinomouk, perhaps self-interestedly,
testified that Harrison “was killed when they were drunk and without any Cause of hatred
or ill will.” But Johny confirmed Wapikinomouk’s account. The murder, he told the
judges, was entirely unplanned. Right after the shooting, he had “upraided” the other
Delawares, noting that Harrison had “used them well and gave them to eat & drink with
him.”62
But it was what happened after the killing that was perhaps most relevant to how
the two Delawares ended up in the Vincennes courtroom. All three Delawares had
proceeded to Cape Giradeau, which was a town on the Spanish side of the Mississippi in
present-day Missouri. When they arrived, Johny went to his uncle Captain Allen, a
61

Examination of Johny,” October 29, 1801; “Examination of Wapihinomock,” October 29, 1801; “[Second] Examination of
Wapihinomock,” October 29, 1801. The only meaningful discrepancy between the testimony of Johny and Wapihinomock was that
Johny testified that Harrison asked to accompany them toward Kaskaskia, while Wapihinomock testified that Harrison planned to
accompany them toward the Spanish lands.
62
Examination of Johny,” October 29, 1801; “Examination of Wapihinomock,” October 29, 1801; “[Second] Examination of
Wapihinomock,” October 29, 1801.

287

Delaware chief, relaying the account and handing over Harrison’s rifle. Allen seems to
have informed Louis Lorimier, the town’s Spanish commandant, who demanded that
Wapikinomouk hand over the horse and bridle. It was the Spanish and the Delawares
who handed over Wapikinomouk for prosecution. But the third Delaware, Matyikan,
remained at Cape Girardeau, in Spanish territory, “not delivered up,” in Johny’s phrase.
The territory’s attorney general ordered that a writ be issued for his arrest, but, by its own
terms, the writ had no force in Spanish territory, and Matayhikan never seems to have
been captured.63
In short, Wapikinomouk’s prosecution, just like Apongphohigo’s, demonstrated
how much the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction over Natives depended on the
cooperation of other jurisdictions. Wapikinomouk faced federal law only because the
Delawares and the Spanish decided that he should; Matayhikan, on the strength of the
testimony equally culpable for the same crime, escaped punishment, similarly on based
solely on Delaware actions. Territorial officials’ scrupulous adherence to their vision of
the rule of law—more dubious in this instance, where the lack of intent might arguably
undermine a murder conviction—was entirely beside the point.
The problem with Knox’s vision of forcing Natives to submit to federal law was
not that informal law defeated the formal authorization of federal criminal jurisdiction.
The more substantial issue was that, on its own terms, federal law did not govern foreign
territory, including Indian country. As long as the territories were borderlands that
Natives and others could easily traverse, the formal as well as practical reach of federal
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jurisdiction would be limited. The consequence of this reality was that the federal
government could only get its hands on Natives to prosecute when Natives themselves
were willing to cooperate.

If prosecutions against Natives in territorial courts were rare, prosecutions of
territorial citizens for crimes committed against Natives were not. Dozens of such
prosecutions occurred, in both the Northwest and Southwest Territories. Given that
historians have correctly emphasized the early American state’s commitment to
imperialism and the inability of Anglo-American courts to deliver justice to Native
peoples, this discrepancy is unexpected. Much of the difference, of course, reflected the
fact that the territorial courts could get their hands on their own citizens to prosecute
much more easily. But many territorial officials proved just as dedicated as trying to use
the courts to punish cross-cultural crimes as Henry Knox was. In many ways, territorial
officials acted just as Knox had hoped they would, using federal jurisdiction to try to
bring what they regarded as justice to Native peoples.64
But few of these prosecutions ever produced a conviction. Crime against Natives
was rife in the territories: citizens of the Northwest Territory had “abused, cheated,
64
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robbed, plundered, and murdered [Indians] at pleasure,” Arthur St. Clair fulminated. But
these crimes also went unpunished: “I have never heard that any person was ever brought
to due justice and punishment,” St. Clair continued. South of the Ohio, federal Indian
agent Silas Dinsmore was equally frustrated. “[O]ur own people are the aggressors, &
we suffer the guilty to pass . . . unpunished,” Dinsmore complained.

He continued:

“Let us no longer boast of our civilization, of an equitable government and salutary laws,
if we cannot adduce one fact to authenticate the theory.”65
That federal officials could not enforce federal law within a region where the
federal government enjoyed “sole and exclusive” jurisdiction is, perhaps, surprising. But
federal officials had a ready explanation that historians have readily credited: bias. “It is
the prevailing opinion of the people in general upon the frontiers, that it is no harm to kill
an Indian,” a federal military officer informed Henry Knox. Knox himself complained
that the “frontier people generally” not only “lessen the criminality” of “killing of
peaceable Indians” but in fact “confer a degree of merit” on the crime. George
Washington, for his part, blamed “jealousies and prejudices” for forestalling “efficient
measures” in redressing harms to Indians.66
Federal officials were not wrong to place blame on territorial citizens. But their
pat explanation obscured how the complicated institutions and politics that characterized
the territories had also acted to undermine federal authority.
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There was only a single court system within the “ordinary jurisdiction” of the
territories: the federally created territorial courts. In structure, the territorial courts
resembled the two-tier systems that existed in most states: local county courts and an
appellate court created by the Northwest Ordinance known as the “General” or
“Supreme” Court. (In the Southwest Territory, rather than a single General Court, there
were three regional Superior Courts, a holdover from North Carolinian practice.) But in
other respects, the territorial courts were more like Article III federal courts, which did
not exist in the territories. The judges were all federal appointees: General Court judges
were selected by the President and confirmed by Congress, while county judges, as well
as local clerks, sheriffs, and other officials, were all chosen by federally appointed
governor. In that sense, federal authority reached deep into territorial governance. And,
except for the congressionally appointed appellate judges, who enjoyed lifetime tenure,
every other federal official in the territory, from the governor on down, served at the
pleasure of the President, and could be dismissed at will.67
For men like Henry Knox, the federal nature of these courts was important. As
national institutions, the federal courts were supposed to transcend local bias, a vision
expressed in the creation of diversity jurisdiction over suits by citizens of different states,
and the right to remove such suits from state to federal courts, in the Constitution and
67
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1789 Judiciary Act. The Washington Administration similarly looked to the federal
courts to secure justice to Natives free from local prejudice. George Washington referred
a group of Senecas from upstate New York to the federal courts for justice, just as Arthur
St. Clair argued that Pennsylvanians who attacked some Haudenausonee traveling under
federal protection “should be prosecuted in the Federal Court.”

From 1793 onward, the

Trade and Intercourse Acts codified this approach. Though the first version of the statute
had merely required that crimes against Natives be adjudicated in the “same manner” as
crimes against whites, the 1793 statute explicitly ceded jurisdiction over capital crimes
under the Act to the federal circuit courts, while jurisdiction over all other offenses would
be in federal district courts. In an acknowledgment of the parallels between the Article
III courts and the territorial courts, the statute provided that, in the territories, capital
jurisdiction would lie with the General Court, while lesser offenses would be tried in the
county courts.68
Many territorial judges, as well as territorial officials, did prove assiduous in their
efforts to punish crimes against Natives. Judges like Rufus Putnam and Joseph Anderson
in the Northwest and Southwest Territories respectively specifically called for the legal
protection of Natives in their charges to grand juries, while Governors St. Clair and
Blount and Secretaries Sargent and Smith constantly pressed for the prosecution of
crimes against Indians.69
In many ways, this result occurred precisely for the reasons Knox and others
thought the federal courts would be more reliable in executing federal policy. Unelected
68
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territorial judges and executives had little dependence on the local populace; they were
far more oriented toward their superiors in Philadelphia. Judge Campbell even sought to
ingratiate himself with Secretary of State Jefferson by sending the Secretary copies of his
grand jury charges urging prosecution of those who harmed Natives. But officials’
insulation from local pressures also allowed them, at least in their view, to assess the
situation impartially. Prosecuting and executing Indian killers was not only “humane,”
they stressed, but also “political,” in the eighteenth-century meaning of good policy: by
“convinc[ing] the Indians that we mean to do justice,” federal punishment would
“prevent retaliation upon some innocent persons.”70
Not unrelatedly, federal officials’ commitment to protect Native peoples had a
substantial class component. These men were hardly egalitarians; rather, they tended to
regard Natives through a haze of patronizing pity that the well-born felt for the weak and
helpless. “As we are now powerful and more enlightened than [the Indians] are,” Knox
wrote, “there is a responsibility of national character, that we should treat them with
kindness and even liberality.” This feeling of noblesse oblige translated into a sense of
official duty. As Natives “are less capable of Seeking Legal redress for wrongs don them
then other people,” Northwest territorial judge Rufus Putnam charged a Marietta grand
jury, “it is the more incumbent on all officers of Government and Courts of Justice, ex
oficio, to seek out and bring to punishment those who may have ben guilty of Trespasses
against them.”71
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This same class prejudice led federal officials to distance themselves from
virulent anti-Indian views, which they disdained as vulgar. In contradistinction to the
lawless white rabble they believed perpetrated crimes against Natives, these officials
believed themselves as members of the “dispassionate and enlightened part of mankind,”
which embraced “justice and moderation” towards the Indians; it was their peers, they
felt, whose approval they had to secure. This commitment made officials immune to the
torrents of anti-Indian rhetoric spilled in territorial newspapers and political broadcasts.
“[T]hough we hear much of the Injuries . . . committed by the Indians upon the Whites,”
St. Clair wrote, that “equal if not grate Injuries are done to the Indians by the frontier
settlers of which we hear very little.” George Washington similarly noted that the
Natives, “poor wretches, have no press through which their grievances are related.”72
If early American law had simply been the enactment of the will of officialdom,
then, many crimes against Natives would have received swift and decisiveness
punishment. But, even in a place where law ostensibly rested in the hands of a single
sovereign, these federal officials found that the checks on governmental authority, both
formal and practical, constantly thwarted their aims.
One challenge was that territorial law was geographically bounded. Like Natives,
U.S. citizens readily took advantage of their borderland location to hop between
jurisdictions. Many alleged criminals either came from or fled to places outside
territorial officials’ authority; Kentucky, sandwiched between the territories, was an
72
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especially common destination. In those instances, notwithstanding that the states were
ostensibly part of the same polity as the territories, federal officials became just as
dependent on the whim of another jurisdiction’s officials as when Natives fled to Indian
country or Spanish territory. All St. Clair, Winthrop Sargent, or Blount could do was
appeal to states’ governors to assist in apprehending criminals. The Constitution
ostensibly mandated extradition, but popularly elected officials in places where neither
Natives, nor the federal government, nor Arthur St. Clair were held in high esteem
crafted legal theories around this requirement. So, despite formal requests, it seems that
the sought-after criminals were rarely extradited.73
Federal and state jurisdictions could, in fact, prove quite hostile. In one instance
when federal soldiers entered a Kentucky town directly to try to apprehend a criminal for
an alleged murder of a Native, a near riot resulted, with the Kentuckians’ loud complaints
prompting a court-martial for expedition’s commanding officer. In another case, some
North Carolinians killed two Cherokees peaceably trading there. They then dispatched a
Cherokee woman they had captured back into Cherokee country with a letter that blamed
the killing on “the people of the territory south of Ohio,” in an avowed effort, William
Blount believed, to bring the Cherokees’ wrath on the Territory. But, because the
offenders were outside the Southwest Territory, Blount could not punish them directly.74
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Another challenge was the legal bar on Native testimony, which restricted most
Natives from testifying in court against non-Natives. Neither federal nor territorial law
mandated this prohibition; it stemmed rather from the long-standing common-law
proscription against non-Christian testimony, which itself was shifting during the period.
Territorial officials often complained about this restriction, particularly with respect to
illegal sales of liquor to Indians, and occasionally resorted to official fiat to avoid its
constraints. And officials did not apply its strictures to Natives who could plausibly
claim to be Christian, as in the case of the Cherokee Richard Finnelson, who was allowed
to swear a deposition “[a]fter having the nature of an oath explained, and declaring that
he believed in the doctrines contained in the New Testament, and its divine authority.”
But despite these frustrations and circumventions, neither Congress nor the territorial
legislatures abolished the restriction. In the territories, this may have stemmed from an
ongoing controversy over whether the Northwest Ordinance obligated the territorial
legislature to adopt preexisting statutes from the states or whether it empowered them to
craft wholly new laws—a position urged by the territorial judges, who pointed for the
need for regulations that would protect “the natives.” But it also stemmed from a deep
and widespread veneration for the common law, which was enshrined in the Northwest
Ordinance and described by the territorial judges as “the birth-right of the citizen.”75
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Territorial officials were also far more focused on the consequences of another
common-law right, one explicitly enshrined in the Northwest Ordinance: the requirement
that territorial inhabitants “shall always be entitled” to a trial by jury. In the territories,
juries seemed to foil all federal officials’ efforts to punish crimes against Natives. “A
Jury will hardly be found” in the Southwest Territory, William Blount reported, that
would convict for killing an Indian. “There had never been one instance of a white man
condemned and hanged by white men, on the frontier, for the murder of an Indian, since
the first landing in America,” Connecticut Representative Jeremiah Wadsworth
hyperbolically informed Congress in 1795. “No jury would bring the criminal in
guilty.”76
The failure of jurors to indict and convict criminals for crimes against Natives
was a particular bête noir for Governor Arthur St. Clair. In one especially glaring
instance in 1795, two Pottomattomies in federal custody were being transported to jail in
Cahokia, in the Illinois country, escorted by a militia guard and the county sheriff, when
they were killed “in open Day Light.” After St. Clair issued a proclamation against the
crime, two inhabitants of St. Clair County were arrested and brought before the grand
jury in the local court in Kaskaskia. But even though the “most positive testimony was
adduced,” the jury refused to indict. St. Clair specifically instructed the prosecutor to try
again when the court moved to Cahokia, also in the county, where the judge made a “very
pathetic charge” to the jury. Still, St. Clair bemoaned, the grand jury failed to cooperate.
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The prosecutor then tried to indict the men for manslaughter, but the jury similarly
refused to acquiesce. Secretary of War James McHenry sought to console St. Clair. It
was “deeply regretted” that such crimes were “connived at by a jury,” but, he lamented,
juries were “only medium thro’ which the Culprits can be punished.” St. Clair was not
convinced. Though he did not propose eliminating juries altogether—even for a man as
hierarchical as St. Clair, juries were too sacred to be abolished—he did suggest that they
be heavily controlled. The government, he urged, should “compel jurors to do their
duties” by prosecuting them for violating their oaths and by levying a “heavy” fine on
counties that allowed perpetrators to go free—a proposal the higher-ups never adopted.77
Federal officials did not deeply ponder why juries seemed to acquit these crimes
so freely. They found no mystery: jurors were irredeemably prejudiced against Natives
and so incapable of doing justice. But their insistence that juries never punished
offenders who harmed Indians, or that the local population always sanctioned such
violence, was overbroad. In Nashville, for instance, even before the advent of territorial
government, a local jury convicted David Wallace for beating the Chickasaw chief
William Glover. In 1793, when unknown assailants killed the “well known and
esteemed” Chickasaw chief John Morris only six hundred paces from William Blount’s
Knoxville home, local residents were outraged: thirty of them joined a (fruitless) posse to
hunt for the killers. The previous year, when Southwest Territory resident James
Hubbard shot at four Cherokee women and a Cherokee man, the Knoxville Gazette had
mocked Hubbard and stressed that his actions were “generally held in abhorrence.”
77
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Clearly targeting elite opinion, the newspaper had thought this statement “necessary,”
“[l]est it should be supposed by such as are unacquainted with the frontier settlers, that
such conduct meets their approbation.” And as discussed earlier, grand jurors in
Vincennes indicted multiple white defendants for violence against Natives even in cases
where the testimony seemed to support credible claims for self-defense; the final verdicts
in these cases are unknown.78
What seemed to distinguish these incidents from the acquittals that St. Clair and
others lamented was context. Glover and Morris were Chickasaws, a nation widely
known for its firm allegiance to the United States. By contrast, the acquittal of the
murderers of the Pottawatomies took place on a war-scarred frontier, where peace had not
yet been officially declared and where memories of Native attacks were quite fresh. The
Pottawatomies, in fact, had been jailed “on suspicion of their being a war party.” In these
circumstances, the jurors may have interpreted the killing less as an unjustified murder
and more as a legitimate act of war.79
St. Clair and Sargent did not view it that way; since the Natives were in federal
custody, they regarded the crime as an affront to government. In a sense, St. Clair and
Sargent were likely right. The early American judiciary, and especially juries, had long
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been conceived as a bulwark of resistance against governmental overreach. Judicial
politics were particularly intense in the territories, where the avenues to express popular
disapproval of governmental action that existed elsewhere—elections, legislatures, town
and county governance—were largely foreclosed.
Jury verdicts thus became one of the only vehicles for territorial citizens to
register their discontent with federal policy, particularly toward Indians. Territorial
citizens facing Native attacks felt themselves neglected and abandoned by the federal
government, a view only reinforced when arrogant men like St. Clair and Sargent seemed
more committed to protecting Indians than the nation’s own citizens. William Blount, far
more concerned about popular support than St. Clair or Sargent, interpreted jurors’
acquittals for crimes against Indians as a rebuke to governmental inaction. “The Indians
have killed in the most cruel and inhuman manner our nearest and dearest Friends,”
William Blount imagined jurors stating when asked to convict an Indian killer, “and
Government has made no demand of Blood in Satisfaction.” Given these facts, “why
should we by our Verdict give Blood either to satisfy the Government or the [Indian]
Nation[?]”80
This conflation between federal authority and justice for Natives played out
especially clearly in Cincinnati. Though the town was the capital of the Northwest
Territory, neither Arthur St. Clair nor Winthrop Sargent, with their seemingly imperious
demands for obedience, was held in high regard there. Sargent in particular, recollected
by territorial residents as a “proud, haughty man” who wanted “to make every Person
submit to his will,” had been at odds with territorial inhabitants since his arrival. After
80
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trying, and failing, to get a grand jury to indict several young men who had mocked him
in Marietta, Sargent moved to Cincinnati, where he found himself in near open warfare
with local residents. Twice he confronted near-riots as residents fired off guns in reckless
disregard, Sargent thought, of territorial law. But his efforts to compel justice were
ineffective. In Hamilton County, which encompassed Cincinnati, Sargent complained,
“the great invaluable blessing of Trial by Juries . . . is perverted to a Curse.” The
county’s veniremen were characterized by “uncountrouled Licentiousness,” and any
magistrate who attempted to enforce the law would “become the Object of their highest
Displeasure.” Sargent’s judgment was only confirmed when, several years later, a
Hamilton County grand jury indicted him on a trumped-up charge of usurpation.81
These preexisting tensions prompted and colored what amounted to an anti-Indian
riot that broke out in Cincinnati in September 1794, right at the end of the Northwest
Indian War. The riot began, once again, as a drinking affair. A number of Choctaws and
Chickasaws, serving at William Blount’s behest as Native allies in the federal campaign
against the Ohio nations, had passed through Cincinnati on their return to the Southwest
Territory. According to subsequent testimony, the Natives were at the store of Major
Zeigler, a former army officer, drinking whiskey “& Diverting themselves in their way,”
when a Mr. Findley came up and demanded that the Indians go away, claiming they were
disturbing a sick person. As the “intoxicated” Choctaws and Chickasaws dispersed, one
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who spoke English told Findley, “me Major Gen’l”—presumably alluding to his military
service. Findley did not take this assertion of rank by a Native well. He responded,
“you may go to hell,” and then said it again. A scuffle ensued—the testimony disagreed
about who began it—but knives were drawn, and Findley and his accomplices beat
several of the Choctaws.82
But in a town at war, the matter did not end there. A rumor spread that the
Choctaws had captured a white female child, “naked, bound, and suffering.” The story
was poppycock; in fact, it fit so well with the tropes of anti-Indian rhetoric, and was so
well calculated to appeal to Cincinnatians’ racial and gender anxieties, that Sargent
suspected it was invented solely to justify what followed—a “very general Muster of
armed men,” including some who arrived from neighboring towns. The men paraded
through the streets firing guns, and approached the camp multiple times, insisting that
they would take an Indian’s scalp. There, they faced off against the federal soldiers that
Sargent had hurriedly posted to protect the Choctaws, who safeguarded the Natives until
their departure several days later. But the Indians were not the only target of the riots’
wrath: unknown assailants fired two bullets into Winthrop Sargent’s house.83
Sargent was a whirlwind in response to the riots, marching out to demand that the
residents disperse, dashing off orders to the fort’s commandant and local magistrates,
issuing an official proclamation promising that “every legal exertion” would be used for
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punishment. But his hopes were disappointed: a grand jury indicted only two of the
perpetrators for assault and battery, one of whom was acquitted because the principal
witness was absent, another who, “by Delay of Process,” escaped. Sargent wrote a
scathing letter to the district attorney in response, accusing him of a litany of errors and
mistakes in bringing the perpetrators to justice. In the end, Sargent concluded in a letter
to the Secretary of State, “the civil authority in Hamilton County is inadequate to afford
protection to the Indians.” The reason he ascribed was revealing. The grand jury, Sargent
lamented, was neither “generally disposed (I believe) to do justice to the red people, or
sufficiently sensible of their Dependence upon, and Obligation to the general
Government.” Hostility toward Indians, in short, twinned with contempt for federal
authority, which were increasingly coming to be seen as the same thing.84
As Sargent implied, the problem of resistance to federal aims was not confined to
jurors, but pervaded the territorial judiciary. The power of appointment, it turned out,
provided only limited control, especially in thinly populated places where the territorial
governors were hard-pressed to find prominent local citizens with the requisite legal
knowledge: it was “impossible,” St. Clair proclaimed, to find judges who would act “in a
strictly legal manner.” So, particularly in the territorial county courts—many of which
had merely shifted from North Carolinian or Virginian control to federal jurisdiction with
a simple caption change in the minute book—the territorial governors had had little
choice but to continue the same local notables as judges and justices of the peace. As a
result, St. Clair, Sargent, and Blount found themselves relying on local judges who were
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often no more sympathetic to federal policies than local jurors. In fact, St. Clair and
Sargent got into a bitter struggle over federal authority with Cincinnati judges who
refused to accept appointments at pleasure, citing the Declaration of Independence for
support. District attorneys were no different. Governor Blount sent instructions to the
federal district attorney for the Mero District—a young and rising Andrew Jackson—to
make “Examples of the first Violators” of the Treaty of Holston by public prosecution, at
the same moment Jackson was fulminating in his own correspondence about the useless
of Indian treaties.85
High federal officials hoped for better things from the judges of the General
Court, selected directly by Congress and the President, but here, too, they were often
disappointed. In the Southwest Territory, federal officials had felt constrained to appoint
prominent locals who did not necessarily agree with Knox’s larger vision. Even as he
was lecturing juries on the need to prosecute criminals who harmed Indians, for instance,
Judge Campbell of the Southwest Territory was living in what he dubbed an “intrusion
castle” on unceded Cherokee lands in explicit violation of the Trade and Intercourse
Act.86
In the Northwest Territory, the problem was less territorial judges’ dislike of
federal policy than their distaste for its representatives, in the form of St. Clair and
Sargent. Judge Symmes had fought with the two executives upon first arriving in the
Territory, when they had differed over law and land matters. He quickly set himself up
as the champion of the people of Cincinnati against Sargent, refusing to help the
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Secretary reestablish order during the town’s repeated convulsions. “The strength of
government consists not in the will of the magistrate but in the support given him by the
people,” Symmes didactically informed Sargent. Sargent grumbled that Symmes was
taking “an active part to Sedition—popularity is his Aim,” and was convinced that the
judge would “attempt to stab me in the Back” with the President. But in the end, it was
St. Clair whom Symmes tried to dispatch: when St. Clair’s reappointment was on the
line, Symmes wrote to the President to inform him that St. Clair’s dismissal would elate
“thousands” in the Territory. In his litany of complaints, Symmes singled out St. Clair’s
Indian policy for attack. “Outrageous, if a citizen charged with the murder of an Indian,
be acquitted by a jury of the country,” Symmes stated in a sarcastic tone, “he [St. Clair]
can calmly look on and see citizens Murdered by Indians, without one effort of the
executive to bring the murderers to a trial.” As we have seen, Symmes was no Indianhater, but he was happy to adopt their rhetoric—especially the assertion that St. Clair’s
efforts were biased against territorial citizens—
to undermine his political enemy.87
A particularly outré case was Northwest Territorial Judge George Turner, who
was close friends with Symmes until they fell out over lands. Turner had had his own
disagreements with Sargent and St. Clair, and even with a “surprized, and mortified”
President Washington, who had had to peremptorily order Turner to his territorial post
when the judge lingered too long in Philadelphia. Despite his apparent dislike for the
territories, Turner nonetheless seemed sympathetic to frontier complaints against Indians.
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When two Pottawomaties were killed in the Illinois country while in federal custody,
rumor had it that the “the most Excellent Judge approved of the Deed, and took no
measures to apprehend the murders.”88
But Turner was willing to enforce the Trade and Intercourse Act, bringing one of
the few recorded prosecutions under the law in the Northwest Territory. Yet his motives
did not seem to include upholding federal policy, and the suit did little to convince
territorial citizens of federal goodwill. Turner traveled to Vincennes in summer 1794 to
hold a special session of the General Court, even though a single judge likely lacked the
authority to convene such a session. From the moment he arrived on the dock on the
Wabash—allegedly “so drunk he could not ascend without assistance”—Turner stirred
controversy. Based on slim testimony, he charged the operators of a barge with trading
with the Indians without a license in violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act. As
provided under the Act, the sheriff seized the men’s goods—which Turner then kept for
his own use, reportedly using an oil cloth for a tent cover, and transferring the silver, red
blankets, knives, and other items on his own boat in the Wabash. Turner’s actions caused
a tremendous uproar in Vincennes, and led to an indictment by the grand jury in St. Clair
County, as well as complaints to Congress of his “tyranny and oppressions,” including
the “forfeitures” of “property of citizens quietly travelling on the Ohio.” Because of the
distance, the Attorney General recommended that Turner be indicted before the General
Court of the Northwest Territory rather than be impeached. Ultimately, Turner resigned.
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A jury, meanwhile, acquitted the defendants of the charges under the Trade and
Intercourse Act.89
Like many of the struggles over justice in the territories, the controversy provoked
by Turner, with nary a Native involved, makes it easy to forget that actual Native peoples
were the original cause for these disputes. But this absence is revealing. Even for wouldbe humanitarians like Knox, the abstract insistence on justice for Natives was as much
about these officials’ own self-conceptions as about real Natives. And in the territories,
aligning justice for Natives with federal authority almost completely subsumed Native
issues within contentious struggles over federal power, even as the testimonial rules
literally silenced Native voices from court proceedings. Legal wranglings ensued:
despite its formal reliance on a single federal sovereign, the territorial legal system
allowed judges, governors, juries, and even other jurisdictions to all jockey for power.
But this was what early American courts did. In many ways, it was this proliferation of
institutional checks and independence from direct governmental control that conferred
legitimacy on the courts. But precisely because early Americans courts were envisioned
as institutions to limit executive power, tying justice for Natives to a model of law as the
command of the President, his cabinet, and power-hungry territorial officials ensured that
lengthy and protracted court battles would ensue.
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Knox’s vision that the federal government would intervene as impartial arbiter in
disputes between Natives and white settlers presaged later efforts both to subjugate
Natives to federal criminal jurisdiction and to use federal judicial power to protect the
rights of unpopular local minorities—processes that would reach their zenith nearly a
century later. In the late eighteenth century, however, efforts to hold Natives and
territorial citizens legally accountable for crimes against each other failed, and for similar
reasons. The law proved a poor implement to achieve Knox’s goals. In part, the
challenge was jurisdictional: territorially bounded legal spheres proved ineffectual at
policing a fluid borderland, where people could easily pass across boundaries that laws
could not. But it was also because formal law and territorial institutions severely limited
what territorial officials could accomplish. Knox’s vision of Olympian justice delivered
from on high simply did not acknowledge the realities of the early republic, in which
decentralized institutions--treaties, juries, and local judges—limited the reach of federal
authority even in places ostensibly under the federal government’s sole control.
***
Failure is in the eye of the beholder. Knox’s efforts did not stop violence between
Natives and white settlers. But in the long term, Knox’s three principles arguably
succeeded, albeit in tragic ways distant from Knox’s brand of imperialist benevolence.
Federal law did not restrain both Natives and white settlers, as Knox had envisioned.
Rather, the quest for separating Natives from whites helped produce the ethnic cleansings
of the nineteenth century, as the United States forcibly removed Natives behind what
seemed like the most unambiguous boundary of all, the Mississippi River. The desire to
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punish cross-cultural violence as crime resulted in increasingly aggressive assertions of
Anglo-American, and ultimately federal, jurisdiction over Natives, including within
Indian country, where federal and Native jurisdiction became ever more entangled.
But in the 1790s, all this lay in the future. At the time, the federal government
lacked the power to exercise the jurisdiction it ostensibly enjoyed, unable to compel
either Natives or its own citizens to obey federal laws. As we have seen, this resulted as
much from the tensions within federal law and governance—their failure to understand
the roots of cross-cultural violence, their institutional structures, and their own internal
ambiguities—as from the long-standing entrenchment of contrary laws and practices.
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Chapter 5: Laws of War or Peace
In 1794, territorial judge Joseph Anderson lectured the grand jury of the Hamilton
District, Southwest Territory on the civic duty. “Confidence in the general government—
an adherence to the principles of the constitution—a due observance of its laws, are the
true characteristics of a good citizen.” These, for Anderson, were not simply abstract
principles, but pointed remarks directed toward a crisis in the Territory. “Should any
citizen be so hardy, as to overleap the bounds of duty, and in defiance of the laws,
unwarrantably attack the friendly Cherokees,” Anderson instructed, “this Territory will
not only be involved in war with them, but the whole frontier will be again exposed to the
wanton depredations of the perfidious and barbarous Creeks.” Anderson summed up:
“Upon ourselves, it now depends, whether to choose peace or war."1
War and peace were ubiquitous terms in the early American borderlands. All
parties professed to desire peace, and yet war seemed to be the perpetual condition west
of the Appalachians: one commentator observed that frontiers had not “had six years of
peace since the first settlement of the country, or shall have for fifty years to come.”
Natives and Anglo-Americans seemed trapped in endless cycles of raids and counterraids. Henry Knox believed federal supremacy offered a solution here as well. As
enshrined in the Constitution’s provision granting Congress the power to declare war, the
federal government would now possess the sole authority to legitimate and authorize
organized violence against Natives.2
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The effect of this federal assertion in the territories was neither acquiescence nor
defiance, but a roiling debate over the scope and authority of federal law. Everyone in
the territories—federal officials, Natives, territorial citizens—had a view about the
meaning and legitimacy of the federal efforts. The discussion quickly became a legal
controversy—a fight over the meaning and application of the very categories of war and
peace. In one sense, the struggle seemed yet another conflict between custom and formal
law. On one side were the long-standing borderland practices of violence that blurred the
boundaries between conflict and its absence, and between state and non-state violence.
On the other side were the new, centralized, formal definitions that would be decided in
Philadelphia and imposed on the territories. But this sharp contrast is misleading. At the
core of the debate, as Anderson’s charge to the jury suggested, loomed the U.S.
Constitution; even Native peoples learned about, and discussed, the Constitution’s
implications for borderland violence. But the Constitution was ambiguous; it did not
define war and peace. The debates over violence in the territories took place in that gap,
which officials, citizens, and Natives all sought to fill; it also became a hotly contested
struggle over who, exactly, was empowered to make this judgment between war and
peace.
For all that borderland violence and, recently, the laws of war have fascinated
historians, this early debate over definitions has largely passed unnoticed, with such
arcana left to the pages of law reviews, which treat the subject as a question that never
left the confines of Congress or the President’s House. But if anything, the controversy
flowed the other way: the contentions in the borderlands came to infect Congress, which
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seemed equally unable to resolve who was authorized to exercise violence, and when.
But the resulting confusion was consequential. It helped ensure that, Knox’s hopes
notwithstanding, the lines between war and peace, between authorized violence on behalf
of the national state and what early Americans labeled “unauthorized expeditions,”
remained vague and unsettled on the borderlands well into the nineteenth century.3
***
As we have seen, the threat of war—of organized violence between the United
States and Natives as nations—lurked behind all violence in the borderlands, which was
one reason federal officials struggled so hard to prevent it. But beyond the secretive or
impromptu murders that fell under the purview of the criminal law, there was another,
more organized form of violence in territories explicitly cast as a form of warfare. This
consisted of what government officials termed “irregular and unauthorized
expeditions”—self-organized military campaigns of territorial citizens into Indian
country. For federal officials like Knox, such expeditions arrogated to citizens the right
to decide questions of war and peace that legally rested with the federal government, and
so had to be suppressed.4
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These expeditions institutionalized the doctrine of retaliation. In the wake of
Native attacks, frontier settlers would gather and march into Indian country, seeking
revenge against the tribes they believed responsible. Though rarely formally sanctioned
by the government, these expeditions often claimed quasi-official status--the participants
were frequently mustered as militiamen, and they were usually led by a prominent local
leader who assumed the title of “colonel” or “general.” Such self-organized operations
had a long pedigree on both the southwestern and northwestern frontiers. During the
Revolution, when many Natives allied with the British, North Carolinian and Kentuckian
militia had destroyed Cherokee and Shawnee villages with little outside aid or oversight.
In the context of brutal, disorganized violence of the borderlands, these expeditions
represented a potent way for decentralized and cash-strapped governments to wage war.5
But with the Treaty of Paris in 1783, such violence outside governmental control
became a threat to the tenuous peace that officials sought to create in the territories.
Despite their military trappings, the expeditions more closely resembled the era’s urban
mobs than a military campaign. Their participants were gangs of ill-disciplined and
refractory armed men, over whom their purported leaders enjoyed only nominal control.
And like rioters, they enforced their own norms of justice and legality, which held
Natives collectively responsible for frontier violence. As a result, their attacks were often
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indiscriminate in selecting their victims, falling on whichever Native village they found
heedless of culpability.6
Two attacks in the 1780s epitomize these expeditions’ weak structures of
authority and their brutal willingness to seek revenge against all Indians. In 1786, in
response to Native attacks, roughly two thousand Kentucky militia crossed into the
Northwest Territory in two columns under the commands of General George Rogers
Clark, a Revolutionary War hero, and Colonel Benjamin Logan. Clark’s men mutinied,
returning to Kentucky “in vile Disorder.” But while the Shawnee warriors were away
defending against Clark, Logan’s men marched into Shawnee territory largely
unopposed, where they proceeded to burn seven Shawnee towns. At one town, Logan
was met by Melonthy, a Shawnee chief who attended the Treaty of Fort Finney. Well
known as a “Friend to the United States,” Melonthy raised the American flag on the
column’s approach and came out bearing a copy of the treaty. Taken prisoner, Melonthy
was then shot down in defiance of orders by an officer named McGeery. Having killed a
half-dozen other Shawnees and taken several dozen women and children prisoner, Logan
and his men returned to Kentucky, where they displayed Melonthy’s flag as a trophy at
the Lexington court house.7
Logan’s campaign had its echo in an attack led by John Sevier, the erstwhile
governor of abortive secessionist state of Franklin in the Tennessee Country, against the
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Upper Cherokees in 1788. Receiving word that Cherokees from the town of Chilhowee
were responsible for the recent killing of the Kirk family, Sevier led his men deep into
Cherokee territory, destroying several Cherokee towns and killing nearly thirty
Cherokees. According to depositions from participants, when they arrived in Chilhowee,
the Cherokee leader Old Tassel, well known to the North Carolinians, raised a white flag.
Some of the militia pushed to kill Tassel anyway, leading Sevier to intervene: “Shurly
Not,” he reportedly exclaimed, “Would you be so Cruel as to Kill Any person that
Submitted to our Mercy?” Sevier then posted a guard and ordered the prisoners not to be
hurt “by any means.” But as Sevier walked away, a party of the militia swarmed the
guard. One of them pointed a cocked gun at him, demanding that either the guard move
“or he would make daylight shine through him.” When the guard gave way, John Kirk,
whose mother, brother, and sisters had all been killed in Indian attacks, rushed in and
killed the prisoners, including Tassel.8
On Sevier’s return several minutes later, he was outraged, declaring how
“disgracefull And inhuman it Was to put prisoners to death.” But Sevier then had to
intervene to prevent his men from killing a Cherokee woman as well as a “half breed
indian” named Charles Murphy, “beg[ging]” his men, “for god Sake they would not kill
him.” Murphy was spared, but only after much grumbling: Sevier’s plea for mercy gave
“great umbridge to the whole Army and some said it would be Well done to kill any Man
that would Save an Indian.” If leaders like Sevier were not willing to enforce these
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norms, other men would. Mere days after Sevier’s attack, another expedition led by a
man named Alexander Outlaw destroyed the Cherokee town of Citio, “where he found a
few helpless women and children, which he inhumanely murdered, exposing their private
parts in the most shameful manner, leaving a young child, with both its arms broke, alive,
at the breast of its dead mother.”9
Such expeditions horrified both state and federal governments, who sought to
hold the participants legally accountable. Successive governors of Virginia sent
instructions to Kentucky to institute “all proper legal inquiries” for punishing such
“unjust violences.” In response to Sevier’s “most cruel and unjustifiable” attack, North
Carolina’s governor issued a proclamation that “strictly enjoin[ed]” all state citizens from
entering Cherokee territory; the Continental Congress similarly issued a proclamation
condemning the attacks and contemplating using federal forces to expel intruders on
Cherokee lands. But these efforts were ineffectual: reports soon reached North
Carolina’s governor that two more attacks on Cherokees had occurred in defiance of his
proclamation. The norms sanctioning such expeditions were too powerful to be
counteracted by distant state and federal governments.10
Preventing expeditions unsanctioned by government was a principal goal for
Henry Knox as he recrafted Indian affairs. “If so direct and manifest contempt of the
authority of the United States be suffered with impunity, it will be vain to attempt to
extend the arm of Government to the frontiers,” Knox wrote President Washington in
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response to Sevier’s “disgraceful violation” of federal Indian treaties. “The Indian tribes
can have no faith in such imbecile promises, and the lawless whites will ridicule a
government which shall, on paper only, make Indian treaties, and regulate Indian
boundaries.”11
The Constitution was central to this project. Knox and the Washington
Administration interpreted the document, especially the provisions vesting the power to
declare war in Congress and explicitly barring states from levying war, as placing all
power over organized violence in federal hands. “[T]he paragraphs of the Constitution,
declaring that the general government shall have, and that the particular ones shall not
have, the rights of war,” Thomas Jefferson reported to Washington, “are so explicit that
no commentary can explain them further, nor can any explain them away.” Many others
shared this view. When a citizen appealed to Governor Pinckney of South Carolina for
the state’s support of an expedition against the southeastern nations, the Governor
declined. “[H]aving always determined to make the federal Constitution my guide,” he
wrote to President Washington, “I should not feel myself by any means justified in
sanctioning a measure of that kind, even from its necessity.” Pinckney feared that such
an action would ripen into “precedent.” 12
These restrictions mattered because, as Pinckney’s experience suggests, the
“unauthorized expeditions” often claimed the authority of state law by virtue of their
militia commissions. A band of Kentuckians seeking to attack Natives near Vincennes
tried this gambit in 1788, citing a state law that they claimed warranted their actions in
11

Knox to President of the United States, July 7, 1789; Secretary of War to Gov. Arthur St. Clair, December 19, 1789, in TP: Vol. II,
224-26.
12
Thomas Jefferson, “Opinion on Certain Georgia Land Grants,” May 3, 1790, in PTJ:MS, 16:406-07.

317

federal territory. A federal military officer informed them, “I did not know any authority
but that of Congress who could order a war with the Indians.” But federal law went even
further. Fearing that citizens claiming the right to levy war would “involve the United
States in an unjust war,” Henry Knox urged a law subjecting the expeditions’ participants
to a federal court martial. Instead, the anxiety over unauthorized expeditions provided a
major impetus for the extension of federal criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens in
Indian country in the Trade and Intercourse Act, which made it possible to prosecute the
perpetrators in federal court. Knox followed with explicit instructions to Governors St.
Clair and Blount to both prevent such attacks and, if that failed, to prosecute the
violators.13
Taken together, the Constitution and the Trade and Intercourse Act reflected a
vision in which the federal government alone held the power to legitimate violence by
deeming it war. The federal government would seek to deny that title to long-standing
practices of violence in the borderlands, the practices of military self-help with dubious
official sanction. Such unauthorized acts would now be considered crimes.
This restriction extended beyond territorial citizens to encompass Native nations,
as well, whose ambiguous status under federal law made it unclear whether they enjoyed
the power held by other sovereign nations to engage in war rather than simply to commit
“attacks.” This was because the brutal, isolated, and intensely personal nature of
borderlands violence diverged from elite expectations of the legal norms that supposedly
governed war. This was especially true with respect to non-combatants. Though the
13
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Declaration of Independence castigated the “undistinguished destruction of all ages,
sexes and conditions” as the “known rule of warfare” only of Indians, federal officials
recognized and acknowledged that borderlands violence involved both whites and
Natives in indiscriminate slaughter.14
But federal officials did not argue that borderland customs freed the United States
from the obligation to follow the laws of war that applied in conflicts among Europeans
in its struggles against Indians. On the contrary, even though they recognized that
Natives would not obey these legal norms, federal officials in the territories repeatedly
ordered their own military and militia to adhere to the “rules of war” and the “custom and
usage of civilized nations” in their fights against Indians. They embraced this one-sided
adherence to legal rules because they believed vigorous restraint of the wanton violence
of territorial citizens would serve to inculcate the same values of humanity in Natives.
Sparing women and children and treating prisoners “with humanity,” as the laws of war
required, “must teach even savages to follow them” and lead the Indians to “spare the
citizens of the United States, under similar circumstances.” At another point, William
Blount demanded that the Cherokees inform him and explain the causes before they
“went out for war”: he instructed them, “such is the custom among nations.” In short,
federal officials embraced a vision of tutelary warfare, in which their “examples” would
remake borderland violence, both white and Indian.15
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But until that point was reached, the violence of both territorial citizens and
Natives was too haphazard to deserve the formal status of “war.” “I presume we are not
to be deemed in a state of war whenever any Indian hostilities are committed on our
frontiers,” one Federalist author wrote during the debate over the ratification of the
Constitution, when the question of the legitimacy of a standing army in peace was
debated. “A distinction between peace and war would be idle indeed, if it can be frittered
away by such pretences as those.” After ratification, the casual dismissal of Indian
violence became the preserve of the opponents of the Washington Administration and its
seeming militarism. Bemoaning the army raised to serve in the Northwest Territory,
Thomas Jefferson complained that “[e]very rag of an Indian depredation” could be
exploited “as a ground to raise troops with those who think a standing army and a public
debt necessary for the happiness of the U.S.” What united these views was the insistence
that Indian attacks diverged too far from legitimated and accepted forms of violence to
constitute actual war, whatever that meant. In this view, only the federal government—
not Native nations and not territorial citizens—possessed the authority to sanction
violence by declaring it “war.”16
***
Native peoples, of course, had their own views on authority over war and peace,
which they, too, were debating alongside the Anglo-American neighbors. Just as
Congress ostensibly possessed sole authority over the war power, Natives had long
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resolved these issues through lengthy deliberations: one set of commissioners informed
Henry Knox of how the Creeks had an annual meeting to resolve such issues in “a great
council,” where they could “deliberate with freedom.” In theory, these lengthy sessions,
with much discussion, would slowly move toward consensus. If the decision were for
war, the council would then dispatch symbols—often black wampum or a hatchet—to
convey their decisions both to potential allies and to their adversaries.17
In their negotiations with the United States, Native leaders, like their federal
counterparts, portrayed themselves as possessing the power over war and peace. “I Love
peace, I Formerly Loved War,” proclaimed the Cherokee leader Tuskegetchee, who
stated that he “Command[ed] Seven Towns, thirteen others Listen to my talk.” For six
years, Tuskegetchee noted, he worked with the Indian agent Joseph Martin, “Assist[ing]
him in keeping peace,” turning back both hostile Creeks and the lower Cherokee towns
known as the Chickamauagas. “I stand up Like a Wall between Bad people and my
Brothers the Virginians.” At another diplomatic meeting, the Cherokee leader Hanging
Maw had made explicit the analogy between Anglo-American and Native authority in
emphasizing his power over war and peace. “I am the Head man of my Nation,” he
asserted, “as Governor Blount is of the white people.”18
Anglo-Americans negotiating with these Native representatives relied on these
claims of authority. They needed men like Hanging Maw and Tuskegetchee to enforce
the treaties and agreements reached with the Cherokees and other nations. But many
17
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Anglo-Americans also suspected that Natives leaders possessed far less power than they
asserted. The problem, many Anglo-Americans believed, was that the Natives existed
“[w]ithout government,” as Thomas Jefferson described it, where “public opinion is in
the place of law.” Jefferson romanticized this condition, believing that the people who
lived under it likely possessed “an infinitely greater degree of happiness” than “under
European governments.” But for those charged with governing Indian affairs, this
decentralized and seemingly anarchic method of rule made maintaining the peace with
Natives through negotiations with their leaders an endless chore. It was “vain,” Patrick
Henry wrote to his state’s congressional delegates, to hope that “great number of Nations
among whom the Restraints of Law & order are unknown” could keep the peace. Since
“[e]very Individual amongst them claims a right of gratifying his revenge, his avarice, or
ambition in the time & manner he pleases,” even the “most vigilant agency” could not
prevent violence.19
In part, what Anglo-Americans attributed to lawlessness reflected the complicated
organization of Native polities. The idea of Native nationhood had always masked a
more involved politics in which authority centered in villages, which then combined in
complicated and decentralized ways to exercise control on a regional and national basis.
Many observers also noted a general sense of Native leaders’ waning power: “the chiefs,
once absolute among them, did not have any more authority over their minds,” reported a
Catholic missionary among the Illinois Country tribes. When, in 1792, a group of
Cherokees, agitating for war, began dancing and shooting through a flag of the United
19

Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787, in PTJ:MS, 11:48; Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, January 30,
1787, in PTJ:MS, 11:92-97; Patrick Henry to Virginia Delegates, July 5, 1786, in The Papers of James Monroe, eds. Daniel Preston
and Marlena C. DeLong (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2003), 2:315-18.

322

States raised by the Cherokee leader Bloody Fellow, he tried to “order them to desist,”
even threatening to ”kill some of them.” But the Cherokees continued to war anyway.20
This seeming disruption in Native governance was a consequence of colonial
encounter: it resulted largely from the increasing intrusion of Euro-American authority
into Indian country, in the form of talks, goods, agents, and traders, which produced
complicated webs of influence and power within Native politics. The 1792 journey of
Anthony Forster into Chickasaw and Choctaw territory on behalf of William Blount is
illustrative. When Forster arrived at a Chickasaw “convention,” he discovered that the
Chickasaw leader the Hair-lipped King was “disgusted and chagrined” because Blount’s
letter had not mentioned his name and seemed to favored the King’s rival, Piamingo;
Blount, the King complained, did not know “his power and authority within the nation.”
When Forster continued to the Choctaws bearing a white wampum belt and an invitation
to a meeting in Nashville, a Choctaw council deliberated for over three hours. Just as
they were nearing “one uniform point of decision,” what Forster described as a “mob of
drunken Indians” stormed the council and “tore the peace belt in pieces.” It turned out, at
least according to Blount, that an Indian trader named Brassheart, purportedly in the
“Spanish interest,” had plied the dissenting Choctaws with rum to spur them on. As a
result, Blount argued, what seemed to be an “insult . . . to the United States” should not
“be attributed . . . to the Nation.” But the incident underscored how increasing
factionalism within Indian Country, and Euroamerican influence, worked to undermine
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traditional deliberations over war and peace, and made it hard to interpret what a nation’s
true intentions were.21
For federal and state officials, perhaps the direst consequence of this crisis of
authority was that, through the 1780s and into the 1790s, Native raids continued unabated
against Anglo-American settlements in the borderlands. Kentucky, Cumberland, the
Washington District in eastern Tennessee Country—all became the sites of constant
attacks. According to “respectable evidence,” between 1783 and 1790 Natives killed,
wounded, or took prisoner 1500 U.S. citizens along the Ohio, as well as stealing $50,000
worth of property. South of the Ohio was similar: William Blount asserted the nearly all
the land around Nashville “has been stained with the blood of the Inhabitants since my
arrival in this Country.” Few of these attacks were the sort of massed pitched battles
Anglo-Americans associated with warfare. They were, rather, incursions by “small
parties of Savages” on remote settlements that Henry Knox deemed as “difficult to be
guarded against, as a single wolf.” Brutal, swift, and isolated, these attacks, which
Anglo-Americans termed “depredations,” usually left behind only victims.22
Worst of all, from the perspective of federal officials, these attacks seemed to
continue unabated notwithstanding promises of peace and restraint on the part of Native
leaders, and even regardless of the formal treaties of friendship that Native nations had
entered with the United States. Territorial citizens began to mock these broken
agreements as a “paper Peace.” Federal Indian agent John McKee lectured the
21
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Cherokees: “Peace does not consist in writing or Beads, but in one and all your people
leaving off to kill the Citizens of the United States and steal their property.”23
In explaining these ongoing attacks, Anglo-Americans offered two interrelated
accounts, one generational, the other anthropological. The generational explanation
focused on the divide between Native leaders and their “young fellows,” whom Native
leaders complained were “always wanting war.” “It is well known how strong the
passion for war exists in the mind of a young savage, and how easily it may be inflamed,
so to disregard every precept of the older and wiser part of the tribes who may have a
more just opinion of the force of a treaty,” Henry Knox reported to President
Washington. Elsewhere Knox described young Native warriors as “headlong” and
“impetuous,” incapable of being “retrained by the feeble advice of their Chiefs.” Knox
sought to send a representative to the tribes responsible for the attacks to insist that they
“must devise some mode for the punishment of their guilty young men.” The United
States, he told William Blount, “cannot and will not suffer the depredations of any part of
the Indian tribes, with whom we have treaties.”24
The anthropological explanation, tinged with a good deal of racialist disdain, was
that Natives were simply too enamored of violence and bloodshed for them to cease.
Anglo-Americans who claimed expertise on Indian matters pointed out the role that the
“shedding of blood” played in propelling Natives to honor and authority within their
nations. As long as the “scalp of an innocent white man,” or “of a woman, or child,”
23
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would grant Natives “honor,” Indian agent John McKee wrote, “so long there would be
war.” The Knoxville Gazette put it more bluntly: “Rapacity, infidelity, and love of war,
are prominent features in the character of uncivilized nations.”25
What united both these explanations was their attribution of the causes of war to
something inherent in Native “character,” rather than viewing them as a response to
events on the ground. When Natives proffered explanations for their violence—most
frequently the Anglo-Americans’ rapacity for Native lands, as well as retaliation for
Anglo-American attacks against them—many Anglo-Americans dismissed these
complaints as mere pretext. “It is little matter with them, what the pretense for going to
war may be,” an Anglo-American emissary observed in an ethnographic report on the
Creeks. “They think that force constitutes right, and victory is an infallable proof of
justice on their side.” Anglo-Americans even sought to produce evidence, as in a
spurious letter reprinted in the Knoxville Gazette from the Creek Alexander McGillivray
disclaiming any right of revenge against Cumberland, that purported to undermine the
legitimacy of Native complaints.26
By contrast, Native leaders, though they sought to control the unruly young men,
acknowledged that the warriors were acting in response to legitimate grievances. For
Natives, negotiations with the federal government often represented the triumph of hope
over experience. At the Treaty of Holston, for instance, the Cherokee leaders pointed out
that at the earlier Treaty of Hopewell, federal representatives had come claiming “full
power and authority” to treat, only for the treaty to be freely “violated.” “[S]hould we
25
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now make another it may still be the case,” the leaders argued, “it may still be the case
until they take all our towns from us.” In their statements to federal representatives,
Native leaders pleaded with them to fulfill promises and affirm the faith the Natives had
placed in them, if only to avoid giving further support and encouragement to the warmongers who insisted that diplomacy was pointless. “We shall look to you to see it
done,” the Cherokee leader Bold Hunter wrote to Secretary Daniel Smith of the
Southwest Territory in response to a promise to punish an attack on the Cherokees, “and
not to our young warriors to say that you told them lies.” But for Natives, lies, it seemed
to them, was often all they got.27
The debates over war and peace in Indian Country thus paralleled in important
ways the controversies in the territories. As other scholars have suggested, both Natives
and the federal government confronted crises of authority that created similarly
“unauthorized expeditions.” But the challenge ran even deeper. To maintain the peace,
both sides relied on negotiations and the promises enshrined in treaties. But when neither
side could uphold the promises made there, it obviated their agreements and cast them
toward violence, as both Natives and Anglo-Americans interpreted these failures as
demonstrations of the other side’s fundamental untrustworthiness. Their respective
weakness cast them into mutual cycles of blame and recrimination: even as Kentuckian
Henry Innes told Henry Knox that the “Indians have always been the aggressors,” Bloody
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Fellow argued it was “more the White People’s fault than theirs that these disturbances
happen.”28
In their more candid moments, both Native and Anglo-American officials
acknowledged these parallel barriers to peace. “I was convinced it was not the wish of
them [the government officials] or my self to go to War,” the Cherokee leader John Watts
wrote, “but was afraid that the Lawless Men living on our lands & the frontiers, Would
be the occation of all Mischief.” Watts’s interlocutor, the Tennessean John Sevier,
voiced similar sentiments when he acknowledged that it “would be as difficult for the
chiefs to prevent those disorders in every instance, as it would be for the rulers in
Philadelphia to restrain murders and roberies often committed within that and
neighboring cities." George Washington, too, argued the United States could not achieve
frontier peace “[u]ntil we can restrain the turbulence and disorderly conduct of our own
borderers.” The United States, he concluded, could not expect from the Indians “that
they will govern their own people better than we do our’s.” 29
The parallel failures of governance and control also produced a similar challenge
of interpretation. Because of the question of authority, whenever an attack happened, or
a talk arrived, or rumors trickled in, it was never quite certain whether these actions were
the voice of the entire nation or merely spoke for isolated and discontented individuals.
In this circumstance, neither side could discern the true motives and intent of the other.
“From all quarters, we receive speeches from the Americans, and not one is alike,” the
28
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Shawnee leader Blue Jacket informed a federal emissary in 1790. “We suppose that they
intend to deceive us.” Several years later, when James Robertson of Nashville sent a
threatening talk to the Cherokees, they were understandably alarmed. William Blount
claimed they should disregard it as coming from an unauthorized source, and yet Natives
had good reason to wonder whether Blount could actually exercise the authority over
Robertson that he claimed.30
If anything, it was even harder for Anglo-Americans to discern the meanings
behind Native attacks, both because of the political divisions within Indian country and
because of the ignorance of most federal officials. “Truth in all enquiries is hard to
obtain, and in none in which I have been engaged, so much so as in what respects
Indians,” William Blount grumbled. The information that filtered to Blount from Indian
country, derived from a network of both Native and non-Native informants, was
“imperfect and contradictory.” Much of it was little more than rumor: vague reports that
the Cherokee leader Hanging Maw opposed war while the leader Double-Head supported
it; tales of the “bloody club”—a call to war—being offered the Creeks by the Cherokees,
or vice versa, and being accepted, or maybe refused; whispers of warriors from one town,
or perhaps another, setting out for an attack, or third-hand tales of traders spying white
scalps in the town’s square.31
Affixing responsibility for Indian attacks was equally difficult. Territorial
citizens had only a vague sense of Native identities, pleading inability to “distinguish
30
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between Cherokees & Creeks,” let alone among the nations’ myriad subdivisions. To
determine the identity of the perpetrators of some of the attacks, William Blount took to
scouring the scene of frontier killings for clues like a detective.

When pressed, Native

leaders usually disclaimed responsibility for the attacks, attributing them to other nations,
other towns within the same nation, or “what the chiefs are apt to call a few bad men.”32
A stock phrase began to be used to describe this confusing and ambiguous state of
affairs: “half peace & half war.” William Blount observed that such a war had raged in
the region since the Revolution and described it as the “worst of all wars.” The people
“would prefer an open war to such a situation,” a correspondent reported to Blount. “The
reason is obvious; a man would then know, when he saw an Indian he saw an enemy, and
be prepared and act accordingly.” Instead, with neither Native nations nor the United
States able to restrain their own citizens, the territories existed in a vague neverworld
between war and peace marked by ambiguous, secretive, and yet organized violence
outside of governmental control. 33
***
In both the Northwest and Southwest Territories, the federal government sought
to end such self-justified, extralegal violence by decisively asserting its constitutional
supremacy over war and peace. But the process played out very differently in the two
territories.
North of the Ohio, the federal government ultimately co-opted frontier violence to
serve its own ends. Though the United States had entered peace treaties with many of the
32
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nations of the Ohio and Illinois Countries, depredations continued. Knox attributed to
these attacks to “banditti” consisting of renegades from the what Knox termed the
“regular tribes,” as well as the Miamis and Wabash Confederacy, who, Knox complained,
had “refus[ed] to treat with the United States when invited thereto” because of their
“inveterate and incurable habits of enmity” toward the U.S. In the end, the Washington
Administration reluctantly turned toward force as the solution, securing congressional
authorization for a targeted expedition. “[T]he vengeance of the Union is to be pointed
only against the perpetrators of the mischief,” Knox stressed, “and not against the
friendly nor even neutral tribes.” The Administration cast the action as consistent with its
vision of the federal government as the impartial arbiter of justice on the frontier,
depicting the attack as a police action. “The aggressors should be made sensible that the
Government of the Union is not less capable of punishing their crimes,” President
Washington informed Congress, “than it is disposed to respect their rights and reward
their attachments.” As the conflict escalated, Knox and President Washington published
a widely reprinted and self-justifying statement of the war’s causes that emphasized how
the federal government had been “compelled to resort” to force and cited the treaties with
the Cherokees and Creeks as evidence of the “pacific and humane disposition of the
General Government toward the Indian tribes.”34
What was supposed to be simple exercise that would demonstrate to the Indians
“the absolute necessity of submitting to the justice and mercy of the United States,” in
Knox’s words, transformed into a bitter, costly, five-year-long war against the united
34

Henry Knox to Gov. Arthur St. Clair, September 14, 1790, in SCP, 2:181-83; Henry Knox to Gov. Arthur St. Clair, June 7, 1790, in
SCP, 2:147-48; “To the United States Senate and House of Representatives,” December 8, 1790, in PGW:PS, 7:45-49; “The Causes of
the Existing Hostilities Between the United States.”

331

force of thousands of Natives from throughout the Ohio and Illinois Countries and up into
the Great Lakes. Ultimately, there were three campaigns into Indian country: one
expedition led by Josiah Harmar in 1790, one by Arthur St. Clair in 1791, and one by
Anthony Wayne in 1794. Though commanded by federal officers and built around a core
of federal soldiers, the federal army was far too small to conduct the war on its own. All
three relied heavily on assistance from the militia of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
especially Kentucky to conduct their campaigns.35
In essence, this action granted unauthorized expeditions the sanction of law.
Many of the Kentucky militia who marched under Josiah Harmar and Arthur St. Clair in
1790 and 1791 were the same men who had earlier served Logan and Clarke. And, to the
dismay of federal officers, the militia proved just as fractious and disdainful of federal
authority as they had of their commanding officers on the unauthorized expeditions.
They were, one investigation subsequently found, “totally ungovernable, and regardless
of military duty or subordination.” When both the 1790 and 1791 expeditions
subsequently suffered catastrophic defeats at the hands of the Ohio country nations, many
federal military officers attributed the losses to the disorder caused by the militia.36
Anthony Wayne’s 1794 victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers—with a much
expanded and better trained regular force, though still extensively supplemented by
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militia—and the 1795 Treaty of Greenville ending the conflict largely put an end to the
problem of unauthorized expeditions in the Northwest Territory. Ironically, the
Washington Administration had accomplished this goal by aligning itself with many of
the expeditions’ aims. The Northwest Indian War, it turned out, was highly
controversial, for the same reason that the Washington Administration had sought to
quell the unauthorized expeditions. Some turned Knox’s favorite word on its head,
observing the war’s “justice . . . is at least doubtful in my mind.” These qualms were
strongest in the Northeast, especially in New England. When Washington’s secretary
Tobias Lear traveled there in 1792, he was “surprised to find that the Indian War is
extremely unpopular.” As Lear informed Washington, “I have not heard it mentioned by
a single person who did not consider it as arising rather from a wish on the part of the
United States to obtain lands to which they have no just claim, than as a war of necessity,
as it really is.” In the end, the New Englanders proved arguably more right about the
war’s aims than the self-deluding Washington Administration. Though the
Administration had disclaimed to all that would listen, both Native and non-Native, that it
had no interest in Native lands, it ended up purchasing most of present-day Ohio from the
defeated nations. With the Natives dispossessed and removed far from the scenes of their
depredations along the Ohio River, it is hard to imagine a result more pleasing to Logan
and his disorganized militia.37
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The legacy of the Northwest Indian War cast a long shadow over the Southwest
Territory. By 1792, it was apparent that the Treaties of New York and of Holston had not
brought peace to the southwestern borderlands. Reports of the “murder of some of our
fellow-citizens” at Cherokee and Creek hands filled a biweekly column in the Knoxville
Gazette, the Territory’s only newspaper. Yet the Washington Administration viewed
“the extension of the Northern Indian War to the Southern Tribes” with “extreme
reluctance.” Many of their hesitations were practical. Knox knew well that the Creeks
and Cherokees were even more numerous and powerful than the Ohio Country nations.
Moreover, with public support for the Northwest Indian War at a nadir in the wake of St.
Clair’s defeat, a call to broaden the conflict would be viewed “by the mass of the citizens
of the middle and eastern States as an insupportable evil.” The Northwest Indian War
had also taught the Administration that what was conceived as limited and targeted
expedition could expand into a much broader conflict. The President, Henry Knox
reported, was “exceedingly apprehensive that the flame of War once kindled in that
[southern] region upon the smallest scale, will extend itself, and become general.” And,
because the federal government had no soldiers in the region, it would be forced to rely
on the fractious and insubordinate local militia to achieve its ends.38
But the Washington Administration, especially Henry Knox, also had moral
qualms about the possibility of a southwestern war. In contrast with the situation north of
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the Ohio, the United States had entered solemn treaties with the southern nations, which
Henry Knox was loathe to abandon simply because these tribes, like the United States,
could not govern their own people. “[I]t is very questionable, while we are unable, in
many cases, to execute our own laws,” Knox argued, “whether we ought, in justice, to
levy a general war upon the Creeks, for the criminality of an individual.” Knox was also
extremely concerned about the nation’s “general reputation in the judgement of the
world,” and felt anxious to ensure that the justice of the war was so obvious as to
preclude any interpretation of the United States as the aggressor. “[I]f a war must
inevitably ensue,” he argued, it had to be under circumstances that would demonstrate “to
all the world that the government or citizens of the United States have not been the cause
of bringing it on.”39
The citizens and government of the Southwest Territory did not share the
Administration’s reservations. By the middle of 1792, public and elite opinion in the
territory had reached consensus in favor of war. “DELENDA EST CARTHAGO,” the
Knoxville Gazette started to taking to printing incessantly in its columns, repeating the
famous Roman cry to destroy Carthage. Unlike the Administration, the territorial citizens
placed no faith in further diplomacy. “Experience teach[es] us that Treaties answer no
other Purpose,” a young Andrew Jackson wrote, “than opening an Easy door for the
Indians to pass through to Butcher our Citizens.” Unlike Knox, Jackson was also
untroubled by the prospect of punishing an entire nation for the acts of a few. If the
nations failed to deliver up the murderers who attacked the Territory, he argued, “it is an
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infringement of the Treaty and a cause of war.” In fact, by condoning these acts, Jackson
argued, the nations were accomplices: they were giving “Tacit acknowledgement of their
Consent to the Commission of the Crime therefore all consenting are Equally guilty.”
Much of the first sitting of the territorial legislature in 1794 was devoted to drafting a
memorial conveying these views to Congress and urging it to punish the “faithless and
bloodthirsty nations, the Creeks and Cherokees, according to the usage and custom of
nations.” In their view, war was the only path to peace. “Fear, not love, is the only
means by which Indians can be governed.” Until Natives “are made to feel the horrors of
war,” it insisted, “they will not know the value of peace, nor observe the treaties they
may form with the United States.”40
The territorial leadership agreed with this call to war. “I know how earnestly the
United States wish for peace, no man can be more sincere in that wish than I am,”
Secretary Smith wrote to Henry Knox. But Smith had come to conclude “peace is not to
be had without a war to convince them of the strength and dignity of our government-that they are not to be violators of treaties with impunity.” Viewed in this light, Smith
argued, a targeted war would constitute a “mercy,” as “it would check the evil before it
becomes too general.” Blount, too, had become an ardent proponent for war. “The
Creeks must be scourged and well too and the Cherokees deserve it,” he wrote to a
congressman. Moreover, against Knox’s concerns, Blount argued that the war would not
be “such a bitter Pill as the War NorthWest of the Ohio.” With the widespread support of
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the Virginia, the two Carolinas, Georgia, and the territorial citizens, “the total Destruction
of the two Nations” would merely be a “a Party of Pleasure.”41
In August 1793, Blount traveled to Philadelphia to press the case for war to
Washington and Knox. He did so “with great earnestness,” apparently pushing war with
such “ardor” that observers believed that the governor was “interested for that
Purpose”—that is, biased in favor of war, perhaps to profit from it. But despite Blount’s
heartfelt pleadings, the Washington Administration ultimately punted on the question.
Blount was authorized to call out the militia to protect the territory, but they were to be
strictly limited to defensive operations, which did not encompass retaliatory attacks
against the Indians. The more aggressive campaign that Blount sought was, the
President, proclaimed out of his power: after lengthy discussion, Knox, Washington,
Hamilton, and Jefferson had “unanimous[ly]” concluded that “measures of an offensive
nature” could be sanctioned only by Congress, “who solely are vested with the powers of
War” under the Constitution. In part, this was a dodge for the Administration to avoid a
politically tricky issue. But the Administration also seemed highly conscious of the
precedent it was setting for the separation of powers. If, “by sad necessity,” so grave a
measure as war with the southern nations were to become inescapable, Knox thought it of
“the highest importance” that it be “a constitutional and legislative act.”42
This outcome hugely disappointed Blount, who now had to wait while a
contentious Congress slowly deliberated on the proposal. Congress, a frustrated Blount
argued at one point, should be “gullatined if they do not declare war.” But, perhaps
41
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because he was so dependent on the Administration, he largely accepted its verdict and
rationale. “It is Congress not the President have the power of declaring war,” he told
James Robertson, the Nashville militia commander. “Those who are bound must obey.
Patience is a virtue which must yet be exercised.”43
With their neighbors and friends dying around them, territorial citizens did not
feel patient. The defensive measures urged on them by the Administration were totally
inadequate, they insisted. It was impossible to carry on a “defensive war with Indians,”
who were “so wolfish in their manner.” The only way to end the attacks would be invade
Indian country directly and destroy the Cherokee and Creek towns. With no federal aid
forthcoming, they began to pursue self-help. Throughout 1792 and into 1793, small
claques would gather after Native raids. Incensed by the attacks, sometimes spurred on
by the relatives of the deceased, they proposed marching on the nearest Cherokee towns
to obtain “satisfaction.” One planned expedition of roughly fifty was thwarted after John
Sevier ordered them to disperse. William Blount managed to forestall another planned
campaign of nearly one hundred men by dispatching an officer to read a proclamation. In
a third instance, Blount had a warrant issued against John Tipton and his conspirators
when they plotted an attack. But despite these successes, Blount told Knox he was
“hourly in fear that [the people’s] thirst for revenge . . . will lead them to break through
the Bounds of good order and government, notwithstanding what can be said or done to
prevent it.” 44
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The “break” that Blount and others feared happened in the summer of 1793—at
the same moment, ironically, that Blount was in Philadelphia pleading the case for an
offensive campaign. Before he left, Blount had ordered Captain John Beard and fifty-six
militia to pursue the Cherokees reportedly responsible for the death of a man named
Gilham and his son outside Nashville. Blount had emphatically instructed Beard not to
cross the Tennessee River, the most unambiguous boundary between the Southwest
Territory and the Cherokee Nation. But, claiming to be following the track of the
murderers, Beard defied the orders and continued south of the river, to Hanging Maw’s
town.45
Hanging Maw was among the most prominent Cherokee leaders, and Blount had
assiduously cultivated a relationship with him. In fact, Blount had recently invited
Hanging Maw and a number of other Cherokee leaders to visit Philadelphia, and the
chiefs had gathered in Maw’s village with two of Blount’s representatives to consider the
invitation. None of this dissuaded Beard and his men. At dawn on June 12, 1793, the
militia attacked, reportedly targeting Blount’s white representatives and the Cherokees
indiscriminately. They killed eight or nine people, including Hanging Maw’s wife and a
white man named William Rosebury, and shot Hanging Maw in the arm. Running
through the hail of bullets, Blount’s representatives convinced the attackers, “by hard
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pleading,” to spare the rest of Hanging Maw’s family and abstain from burning his
house.46
Beard’s expedition was followed the subsequent summer by a much larger
expedition under the command of Major James Ore, a man with extensive trading ties to
Indian country. Ore’s expedition of somewhere between 550 and 600 militia was
authorized by militia commander James Robertson in Nashville, who had received word
from a Chickasaw whom he trusted that the Cherokees were attacking Cumberland in
three columns. Robertson ordered Ore and his men to intercept the invasion, and, if they
did not encounter the invaders, to cross the Tennessee and “destroy the Lower Cherokee
towns”—an order that exceeded his directives from Blount.47
On September 14, 1794, Ore and his men snuck up on the Cherokee town of
Nickajack and surprised its residents while they were eating breakfast. After briefly
resisting, the Cherokees made a “precipitate retreat” to the river. Ore and his men then
attacked the largely abandoned neighboring town of Running Water and returned to
Nashville. Ore suffered only a couple casualties, one when a militiaman fell out of a tree.
By contrast, fifty Cherokees were reported killed, many of them slaughtered in the
Tennessee River as they fled for safety; Ore also took nineteen prisoners. Robertson’s
explicit orders to the contrary notwithstanding, reports indicated that the “greatest portion
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of the victims were women and children”; an eyewitness reported that the first person
killed in the attack was a Cherokee woman.48
Beard’s and Ore’s indiscriminate attacks convulsed the Southwest Territory.
“[I]n no period of my life have I seen the public mind more agitated,” one observer
reported after Beard’s attack. There was a sharp divide between disapproval and support.
Those most outraged were, of course, the Cherokees themselves, whose letters to federal
officials in the attacks’ aftermath conveyed only a hint of their deep grief and despair. “I
am still among my people, living in gores of blood,” the Cherokee leader Doublehead
wrote after Beard’s attack. But, in Philadelphia, President Washington and Henry Knox
also responded to the attacks with alarm. Washington expressed “extreme concern” at
such “violent and lawless inroads.” Knox saw Beard’s attack as an assault on the most
basic foundation of his vision for the federal government as arbiter between Natives and
frontier settlers. “Unless such crimes shall be punished in an exemplary manner,” he told
William Blount, “it will be in vain for the government to make further attempts to
establish any plan or system for the administration of Indian Affairs founded on the
principles of moderation and justice.” He continued: “Treaties will be at an end and
violence and injustice will be the Arbiters of all future disputes between the whites and
the neighbouring tribes of indians; and of consequence much innocent blood will be shed,
and the frontiers depopulated.”49
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Unsurprisingly, territorial citizens did not share Knox’s views. Most strongly
supported such measures, especially in the face of seeming federal passivity. Ore’s
expedition “is spoken of by all ranks as the most brilliant thing that has happened or
could have happened for this Country,” one resident reported. Already, this observer
claimed, the Cherokees were pleading for peace, and attacks on the Territory had
abated.50
Mediating between these conflicting views of the Cherokees and high federal
officials on the one hand and territorial citizens on the other fell to territorial officials—
men like William Blount, Territorial Secretary Daniel Smith, and Nashville militia
commander and federal Indian agent James Robertson. Though they attempted to fulfill
Knox’s demands to bring the perpetrators to “immediate tryal,” their efforts to enforce
federal law in the Territory were fruitless. Smith, in charge of the Territory while Blount
was in Philadelphia, had ordered that Beard be court-martialed for his role and prosecuted
under the Treaty of Holston. But Smith discovered, “to my great pain,” that “to punish
Beard by law just now is out of the question.” Despite explicit orders, Smith could not
even prevent Beard from organizing another attack while the court martial was pending.51
In the eyes of many, the unauthorized expeditions demonstrated just how
powerless territorial officers were over the people they ostensibly governed. “[F]rom the
prejudice against Indians on the frontiers,” Henry Knox lamented, “it is but too probable
that the perpetrators of these violences will escape unpunished.” The strongest critiques
came from the Cherokees, who were understandably skeptical of federal promises that
50
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the President would secure them justice. “Why do you talk of sending to the President to
ask advice?” Doublehead asked Secretary Smith. “These people did not ask any advice
when they came and killed our people.” Hanging Maw mocked Secretary Smith for his
impotence. “Surely you are no head-man nor warrior,” he wrote, “I think you are afraid
of these bad men . . . I think they are making fun of you, and won't listen to your talks.”52
Much of the challenge facing territorial officials was that, unlike Knox or
Washington, they had to confront the political unpopularity of federal policy in the
Southwest Territory. “[W]hoever should attempt to preserve peace with Indians,” Blount
complained, “was instantly denounced as an Indian Friend and the Cry accordingly raised
against him.” Robertson, for one, received hostile anonymous letters when he attempted
to bar unauthorized expeditions; one letter writer wished Robertson “gone hence and a
better in your room.” Such opposition made capitulating to popular sentiment, as
Robertson later seemed to do in authorizing Ore’s attack, politically advantageous.
Though their political position temporarily rested solely with the federal government,
these officials knew that both their current influence and their political prospects after
statehood, which loomed not too far on the horizon, depended on popular support.
Secretary Smith observed that, for these reasons, many territorial officers had actively
supported the expeditions, and others remained silent, “countenancing disorder.” One
newspaper account observed that Captain Beard himself had previously been a staunch
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opponent of unauthorized expeditions but alleged that he had abandoned this position
once he “perceive[ed] that that was not the [path] to popularity.” 53
Governor Blount engaged in an especially complicated political calculus around
the expeditions. As we have seen, though Blount’s support for invading the Creek and
Cherokee Territory was unwavering, he felt obligated to follow and enforce federal law.
But he sought to fulfill his duties in ways that minimized the political cost to him. He
deliberately delayed his return trip from Philadelphia after Beard’s expedition and
allowed Smith to flounder, which served, Blount reported, to “highten my Character.” “I
left and returned . . . in good Time,” he observed. And, though Blount did not sanction
either Beard’s or Ore’s expeditions, he did secretly authorize to John Sevier to carry out a
more targeted expedition in his absence, but with orders to make it seem as if it happened
“on the Spur of the Occasion.” 54
Blount’s complicated triangulation between his official duties and his desire to
maintain popularity in the Territory led some to believe that, in his heart of hearts, Blount
supported the actions taken by Ore and Beard. “[T]he Governor is restricted to defensive
measures, & therefore as Governor is bound to disapprove it,” one observer wrote after
Ore’s expedition, “[but] as W.B. [William Blount] I dare believe that he is highly
gratified.” In fact, Blount seemed genuinely and sincerely outraged when he learned of
the expeditions. After receiving word of Ore’s attack, Blount dashed off a blunt and
harsh secret letter to Robertson expressing “surprise and mortification” that the general
53
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had “countenanced” such “lawless” actions, and forced Robertson to resign his federal
positions. “No good consequences can arise from such unauthorized expeditions,”
Blount informed Robertson.55
***
Why, given Blount’s explicit support for war, did he condemn Ore and Beard’s
expeditions, both publicly and privately? The answer lay in a roiling debate over federal
law and the unauthorized expeditions that sharply divided territorial citizens.
Unlike Knox or Washington, few in the Southwest Territory felt much
humanitarian concern for the expeditions’ victims; particularly with respect to Nickajack,
territorial citizens tended to believe that the Natives had gotten what was coming. Blount
himself proclaimed that the fate of the Cherokees killed in Ore’s attack was “a score so
far as it affects the hostile part that I am quite easy on.” But Blount was part of a small
coterie in the Territory, many of whom were also territorial officials, who loudly and
publicly denounced the unauthorized attacks even as they advocated war.56
These men’s principal objection to the attacks seemed to be that they violated the
“laws of God, of nature, and of man.” Displaying an ostentatious commitment to the rule
of law, these critics of the expeditions spent most of their time spinning out positivist
arguments for the third category of human law. Reverence for the Constitution loomed
especially large in these legal arguments. “[R]ead it by day, read it by night,” Judge
Campbell charged a grand jury in the Hamilton District shortly after Ore’s expedition, “it
is the supreme law of the land—it is the guardian of your liberties.” It was, Campbell
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reminded them, a “solemn compact” that they and their representatives had ratified, and
could not be retracted individually other than by leaving the country. Invocations of the
Constitution were especially pertinent in this context because, like the Washington
Administration, these men regarded the Constitution as clear and unambiguous on the
issue of authority over war. The Constitution “vests Congress, with a right of making
peace and war,” Judge Anderson instructed a grand jury shortly after Ore’s expedition.
“[W]e are bound as good citizens to act in conformity with their determination.” 57
This invocation of lawful obedience fused legal and pragmatic considerations. As
Blount and others understood, the Southwest Territory was precariously reliant on the
federal government. The act of cession, one newspaper columnist observed, granted
Congress, and Congress alone, “the right of governing this territory; also to protect. It
made them the judges of when, how, and where respecting protection.” One line of
argument framed this dependence in legal terms. The “grand machine, our laws,” was
the only method through which society could defend itself, the pseudonymous “P.Q.”
observed in the Knoxville Gazette, and, by violating the laws, the Territory’s citizens
were throwing themselves back “into a state of nature,” in which they forfeited any claim
to governmental protection. “The man who attempts to trample on your laws, is as great
an enemy to you as Indians,” P.Q. warned, “because he is endeavouring to deprive you of
the means of defence,” P.Q. urged territorial citizens to pursue “redress” through
“constitutional channels” instead.
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But there was also a practical edge to this argument, an issue of political strategy.
Blount and others knew well how Knox and other high-level federal officials viewed the
citizens of the Southwest Territory. When Blount had sought to persuade Washington
and others on the necessity of a campaign into Indian country, he had discovered how
“Beard and others foolish uninformed people have done the cause of the suffering
frontier people so much injury in the Eyes of the people of the Atlantic States.” And
when Blount expressed “pain” over Robertson’s orders to Ore, it was because of the
repercussions to “the Reputation of the People I have the honor to be appointed to
govern.” Picking up this strain, several newspaper writers argued that, had the people of
the Southwest Territory been more obedient, they would have already obtained
congressional support. Judge Anderson informed jurors that lawful conduct would secure
the “affection of the general government, and induce them to extend . . . her kind
protection.”58
Implicit in this argument was an acceptance of the legal categories urged by Knox
and others. At root there was a fused issue of both the laws of war and constitutional
law: when was the United States at war? Whether from principle or pragmatism,
Southwest Territory’s officials adopted the view urged on them by Washington’s cabinet:
the United States could not be at war with the Indians until Congress decided that it was.

Natives had a very different understanding of war and peace. For many
Natives—particularly those outside the class of Native leaders—the conduct of the
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United States in failing to respond to their attacks was baffling, since it diverged with the
legal frame they expected to govern frontier violence. In one story that reached Blount
from the Cherokee territory, eight young Creeks had stopped at the house of federal
Indian interpreter James Carey, where they “boasted” that “the Creeks did all they could
to provoke the United States to war with them.” A lengthy catalog of their alleged deeds
followed: “they killed and scalped men, women, and children; that they took them
prisoners, and made them slaves like negroes; that they debauched their women, they
took their property. But even though “they had done it for many years, yet they could not
make them mad.” The Creeks’ swaggering braggadocio finished with a particularly
pointed jibe: “Shall we take some man and bouger him, and send him back to tell his
people, and try if that will not rouse them to war?” 59
This highly gendered and likely embellished insult—Native instances of rape on
the early American frontier were very rare—fit within long-standing Native patterns.
Young Native men in particular were part of a boastful, masculine military culture
accustomed to “lying and exageration” about war exploits. Attacks denigrating the
manhood of enemies were particularly common: one visitor to Creek country observed
that those lacking prowess in war were “stiled old women, which is the greatest term of
reproach that can be used to them.” The Cherokees reportedly employed similarly
insulting metaphorical language to convey their disdain for how readily the United States
permitted them to kill its citizens. “[T]he Cherokees had eat a great quantity of the
white's flesh which they were very fond of at first, but they had had so much of it, had got
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tired and thought it too salt.” James Robertson, who relayed this tale, added, perhaps
unnecessarily: “this they spoke in way of derision.”60
Statements like those of the Cherokees and Creeks demonstrate how much the
restraint of the United States surprised and upended Native expectations, and subjected
the nation to mockery. Anglo-American failure to act equally befuddled the Chickasaw
leader Piamingo, a staunch ally who had close ties with Blount and James Robertson.
Piamingo—who was hardly disinterested, given his own desire to negate Creek and
Cherokee power in the region—thought himself as a Cassandra whose warnings the
United States had mysteriously disregarded. “[B]ecause you never went against them,”
Piamingo wrote in early 1793, “the Creeks Boast that your people are not men.” A
couple months later, he wrote again, expressing his mystification at the continued nonaction of the U.S.

“Did I not tell you how the Creeks and Cherokees would behave

when they treated?” Piamingo wrote to James Robertson. “I said they would pay no
regard to what they did; so you found it.” Yet, inexplicably, the federal government
seemed to continue to negotiate: “I hardly know what you mean by treating with tribes
that are always at war with you, and will be, until you whip them.” As a result, the
Natives now held the United States in contempt. “If you knew how lightly and
despisingly they speak of you and your friends, you could not bear it as you do[.] If we
did not know you to be warriors, we should not know what to think of you.”61
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Both the Native enemies and allies of the United States looked to find some
explanation for the nation’s unaccountable behavior. Unfortunately for the United States,
one credible answer came the country’s imperial rivals, Britain and Spain. In particular,
the Cherokees, Creeks, and Chickasaws maintained strong diplomatic and commercial
ties to Spanish Louisiana, frequently traveling to New Orleans and Pensacola to meet
with Spanish representatives. The Cherokees reported that the Spanish, happy to
undermine the influence of the United States, informed them “that United States had not
money to carry on a war, and that we not fear to them injuries.” In the eyes of the
Cherokees, the fact that “the United States so patiently and tamely bore the injuries they
[the Indians] had done them, without retaliation” served to “convince[] us of the truth of
what the Spaniards have told us.” Federal Indian interpreter James Carey, a man with
close ties to the Cherokees, told William Blount had “often” heard them discuss the
reasons for the passivity of the United States. “[T]hey suppose that the United States
must be so situated with foreign Powers, that they dare not enter into a war with them, or
they certainly would not be offering and begging peace, in return for murders, bloodshed,
and robbery, daily committed on their citizens.”62
The Spanish were not the only source for Native intelligence about the United
States; they also turned to the U.S. citizens they found in Indian country, who offered a
version of the Washington Administration’s constitutional argument that only Congress
could authorize a war. But, just as the intelligence that reached Blount was rarely an
accurate account of the intricate politics of Indian country, the translation of federal
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constitutional law that reached the Creeks and Cherokees was very different from how
Knox or Washington would have explained it it. In particular, the information arrived
via what Knox and Washington would have considered among the least reliable sources:
an Indian trader from Charleston named Mr. Grunter. As John McKee recounted the tale
to William Blount, Grunter “with apparent exultation informed the people present that the
Indians were safe; that no State could declare war against the Indians; that, let them do
what they would, your Excellency could not do them any injury in return; that the people
of the territory were very anxious to have a war, and that they were the cause of the past
disturbances.” Other traders were evidently bearing more extreme versions of the same
account to the Creeks: a Mr. Hull had informed “the Indians [that] the Congress have
thrown away the people of Cumberland, 'tis w[e]ll, to kill, plunder, and commit
devastations there, for Congress will not be angry at them for it.”63
Both the Creeks and Cherokees found these suggestions persuasive enough to
bring them up with federal representatives. In 1793, the Creeks asked to know “as quick
as possible” whether “Governor Blount, and these Cumberland people . . . are under the
Government of General Washington.” The following year, the Cherokee Hanging Maw
observed to William Blount that “[f]or many years” the Creeks “had been Killing the
People of this Country.” Maw enquired, “is it that this Country is not under the
Protection of the U.S., or is it that the President is uninformed of the many murders &
Thefts committed by the Creeks?” These suggestions horrified federal officials: Indian
agent John McKee thought that the traders’ statements would “tend to impress on the
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minds of the Indians a belief, (which l was of opinion they already began to conceive)
that the only business of Congress was to bind the hands of her citizens, whilst the
Indians butchered them.” And so those officials sought to emphasize to the Natives that,
not only were the Cumberland residents “citizens of the United States,” but that the
federal government was also highly solicitous of their welfare. The Cumberland people
were “as much under the care of the President as the people of Philadelphia are, and he is
equally desirous that your people should treat them well,” Blount told the Cherokee
Bloody Fellow; the Governor told Hanging Maw that the United States had been given
“full information of their [the Cumberland residents’] many sufferings.”64
From the perspective of the Cherokees or Creeks, who had watched AngloAmerican polities constantly break apart or recombine in the previous decade, the idea
that Cumberland was not part of the United States was hardly absurd. Arguably, it made
a good deal of sense. It helped explain why the United States seemed so indifferent to the
fate of its own citizens, when, as Piamingo explained, even the less powerful Chickasaws
“could not bear to throw away, and let the blood of one man pass without retaliation.”
But it also made understandable why the territorial citizens seemed to enjoy such
freedom to violate what federal representatives had constantly held out as the binding
laws of the United States. Natives, of course, could have readily understood the true
reason—the complicated politics and imperfect authority that existed in a partly
centralized polity—but federal officials admitted this reality only among themselves. On

64

“Talk from the Heads of the Upper and Lower Creeks, by Order of the Mad Dog . . . to Be Forwarded to His Excellency General
Washington,” July 21, 1793, ASP:IA, 408; “Conference at Tellico Blockhouse,” December 28, 1794; “Mr. McKee’s Report to
Governor Blount,” March 28, 1793.

352

the treaty ground and in their talks, they stuck to the unconvincing platitudes of federal
control.65

These platitudes did not fool territorial citizens any more than they persuaded
Natives. Those in the Southwest Territory knew very well how Natives were talking
about them: the Gazette printed both Piamingo’s judgments about the baffling tendency
of the federal government to embrace its enemies as well as the reports that the Indian
traders had proclaimed Cumberland outside federal protection, a move the newspaper
interpreted as a cynical ploy to get cheap stolen horses. They also insisted they
understood Natives far better than the distant politicians in Philadelphia, quoting with
approval Breckenridge’s gendered statement: "I consider men who are unacquainted with
the savages like young women who have read romances, and have as improper an idea of
the Indian character in the one case, as the female mind has of real life in the other.” The
point was that those who lived in the territories, unlike the distant politicians, understood
the practices and expectations of the Natives. They knew the legal norms governing
violence on the borderlands, and believed that passivity would produce neither respect
nor peace.66
The challenge was to translate this argument, couched in the customary law of the
borderlands, into a more legible legal form that would rebut the assertions of Knox,
Blount, and others and legitimate their right to make expeditions against the Cherokees
and Creeks. To do so, they sought to insert their legal practices into formal law, pressing
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particularly hard on the rigid dichotomy between war and peace that the Washington
Administration insisted on. This question was not decided in Philadelphia, they argued,
but dictated by the reality in the Southwest Territory. The Territory’s inhabitants were
“in an actual state of war, and daily feel the effects, whatever may be said of peace
elsewhere.”67
At the heart of this argument was an insistence that Native actions spoke more
loudly than any set of magic words, especially given the difficulty of determining who
represented and spoke for the Indian nations. One way to establish Native hostility was
to adduce proof that the Natives had been involved in attacks against whites, which
leaders of expeditions into Indian country took great pains to do. James Ore, for instance,
claimed to have discovered fresh scalps of Nashville inhabitants hanging from Cherokee
doorposts in Nickajack, as well as horses stolen from territorial citizens. Another way
was to cite evidence that the Native attacks were more than the actions of a few isolated
“banditti.” Here, the expeditions’ defenders pointed to attacks by large and wellorganized Cherokee and Creek armies, led by “the most distinguished of their warriors.”
These “act[s],” they insisted, could be viewed “in no other light than as positive a
declaration of war as ever was or can be denounced by one nation against another.”68
Once it was clear that the “actual, repeated, and continued hostilities” by the
Cherokees and Creeks constituted a state of war, important legal consequences followed.
Here, the authors looked particularly to the “law of nature and nations,” which governed
warfare among nations. For one, the United States would no longer be obligated by its
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treaties with Creeks and Cherokees, under the well-established principle of international
law, oft-cited in the Southwest Territory, that war dissolves all treaties. For another, it
would no longer be necessary to distinguish among friendly and hostile factions of
different tribes; the “whole nation,” Andrew Jackson wrote, could be “Scurged” for their
attacks against the whites. And, perhaps most importantly, it would legitimate attacks
carried out by the territorial militia. “The law of nations not only allows, but
commands,” one author observed, “when we are attacked, either by a public or private
enemy, to repel force by force.” James Robertson responded to William Blount’s pointed
rebuff of his authorization of Ore’s expedition by insisting on its lawfulness. “[T]o be a
good citizen, obedient to the Law is my greatest pride,” Robertson argued, but he could
not have imagined that pursuing the Cherokees who had attacked the people of Nashville
would be regarded as an “offensive measure unauthorized by the usage of Nations in such
cases.”69
The existence of a state of war also had important consequences under statutory
and constitutional law that undermined the suggestion that Congress alone held the power
to determine on war. In making this claim, the expeditions’ legal defenders were
promiscuous in the sources of law they relied on: in arguing that the Territory’s citizens
had the right to “seek satisfaction” against Natives, one author, “A Fellow Citizen,”
freely cited the right to assembly, the right to bear arms to defend the state, Blackstone’s
discussion of the right of personal security, and the preamble of the Constitution. But
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taken together, these authors constructed a pointed argument that flowed from the legal
existence of a war. At the base was a right to self-defense, which the expeditions’
defenders emphasized as “the first principle in natural or social law,” the primary object
of constituting government, and the “inherent right” of all peoples. “We . . . are afraid of
war in all shape,” the territorial legislature wrote Congress, “except that which the first
law of nature, self-preservation, may enforce upon us, unauthorized by your declaration.”
But the argument from self-defense was not grounded solely in natural law. It translated
into statutory terms in Congress’s acceptance of North Carolina’s cession of the
Southwest Territory, which had explicitly promised to provide an adequate defense.
“Have we experienced a fulfilment of that promise?” one writer asked rhetorically. The
right of self-defense against a state of war also had constitutional implications.
Proponents of expeditions closely examined Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution,
which, as described by William Cocke, “expressly declares, that no state shall engage in
war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as not to admit of delay.”
Unsurprisingly, those who argued for attack seized on this provision’s qualifying
language. Cocke interpreted this language to mean, “[W]hen an enemy invades any
particular state, such state may engage in war, and Congress is bound to support her.”70
The arguments advanced by Cocke and other defenders of the expeditions would
probably not have swayed Knox or Washington, had they deigned to read them. Rather
than abolishing the customary law that governed borderland violence, as Knox and others
sought, these men used the diverse intellectual tools of early American law to recraft in a
70
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compelling frame the legal principles seemingly acknowledged by both Natives and nonNatives. But in the process, the proponents of the campaigns into Indian country did not
present their arguments as a claim for the primacy of local and customary law against
federal supremacy. Rather, they did battle largely on the terrain defined by their
opponents, fixating by way of critique on what seemed to them an unrealistic and
unjustifiable formalism. In the process, they claimed to reverence and honor the
Constitution just as much as Judge Campbell and Blount did.
***
As territorial citizens well knew, the same issues that convulsed them were also
the subject of “long and warm” debates in Congress, transcripts of which were reprinted
in full in the Knoxville Gazette. There were two interrelated legislative proposals. The
first would authorize the President to call up ten thousand militia for “offensive
operations.” But when the Senate proposed substituting regular soldiers for the militia,
fierce disagreements arose when the bill returned to the House. With ongoing heavy
financial burdens and seeming injustice of the Northwest Indian War in mind,
representatives from the east, particularly New England, were skeptical of the entire
enterprise. “We have one Indian war already, which is enough at a time,” Fisher Ames of
Massachusetts stated. Ames was similarly dubious about employing the “exasperated
militia,” which, he asserted, would seize and shoot “the first man, with a red skin, whom
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they met.” Only then would they discover “that you have been shooting an Indian of the
wrong nation, while in the mean time, this whole nation rise and attacks you.”71
Joseph McDowell of North Carolina, by contrast, insisted that the “militia of the
frontiers” consisted “the only proper forces to oppose the Indians with success.” Unlike
the regulars, the militia “knew the country,” but more importantly, their “habits of life
made them perfectly acquainted with the character of the enemy.” The most extreme
comments came from Representative Carnes of Georgia, who veered off into a screed
against the Administration’s Indian policy more generally. He alleged that there were
“improper leanings in favor of the Indians” among the federal officials that made his
“heart boil,” and asserted that he would “not give the life of one white man for those of
fifty Indians.” As for protection, he threatened Congress that if they did not authorize a
campaign, “the Georgians would take measures for themselves.” In the end, voting
largely along these regional lines, the House rejected the Senate’s amendment, and the
measure died. The Knoxville Gazette lamented that both houses wished to protect the
Territory but “did not agree in the mode of doing it.”72
The other provision—long sought by Henry Knox, and specifically urged on
Congress by President Washington—would make U.S. citizens found in arms within
Indian country liable to court martial. Complaining that this “subject[ed] people to
martial law,” the House of Representatives modified the bill to permit the military to
arrest the offenders and bring them to trial pursuant to the Trade and Intercourse Act.
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But the strongest disagreements focused on a proposed amendment that would exempt
from these strictures citizens “in pursuit of Indians that had committed actual hostilities
on the frontier.”73
This proposal, too, split Congress along the same regional lines as before. The
New England representatives argued that the proposed change would blur the sharp line
between sanctioned and unsanctioned violence urged by Knox. The amendment would
“destroy” the statute’s purpose, which was to achieve “one of the great objects of frontier
policy”—namely, to “restrain the right of private war, by placing the power of vengeance
out of the reach of individuals, and in the hands of Government.” The amendment
“actually arms all the passions of revenge with the rights of law”; it made the victim of an
Indian attack “both judge and executioner in his own case”; it “legalize[d] all those acts
of violence and revenge, that, for a century past, have deluged the frontier with blood.”.
The amendment, in short, was the exception that would swallow the rule. “It went to
invert all the laws that had been made for the protection of the Indians,” James Hillhouse
of Connecticut insisted. “[I]nstead of being a bill to protect them from the whites, the
resolutions would produce a bill to protect the whites from them.”74
Representatives from the South and West, including James White, the Southwest
Territory’s recently seated non-voting representative, reiterated the arguments advanced
by the expeditions’ territorial defenders when they insisted that this approach was bad
law and bad policy. The amendment’s backers insisted that “a settler was, by the law of
nations, authorized to pursue the [Indians] across the line and to retaliate.” Restraining
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this right of retaliation, they insisted, would merely encourage “the savages to come over
the line and murder with impunity.” But mostly, these representatives offered emotive
appeals and outrage over what they interpreted as affronts to their constituents. If the law
passed unamended, they threatened, “houses will soon be smoking and blood running.”
Thomas Blount from North Carolina, brother of William, complained that instead of
Congress protecting territorial citizens, “their characters are abused on this floor.” The
most pointed attacks came from White, who proclaimed himself “much affected” and
used his remarks to lash out against the congressmen who he believed had impugned the
“frontier people.” Unsurprisingly, the Knoxville Gazette sided with White. In its only
editorial comment on the debates, it observed that the arguments of the New Englanders
“let the cat out of the bag” by confirming settlers’ suspicions that “many members of
Congress prefer the protection of the savages to that of their suffering frontier fellow
citizens.”75
This hard-fought debate was close; the committee of the whole initially endorsed
the amendment, only for it to be rejected by the House. In the end, rather than create a
separate bill governing the unauthorized expeditions, Congress simply amended the next
version of the Trade and Intercourse Act to include a provision that granted the army the
power to arrest offenders within Indian country. But there do not seem to have been any
prosecutions under the Act’s new provisions, either.
***
One congressman who stood largely aside from the debate was James Madison,
who seemed to regard the entire matter as an exercise in futility. “[N]o law of any kind,”
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he remarked, “would be able to hinder people from crossing the line.” The frustrated
Knox likely sympathized with this perspective, having seen his efforts to punish violators
of the peace repeatedly come to naught. He, like Madison, had come to see local
prejudices as too stubborn to be overcome by federal law.
But this narrative of legal impotence only captured part of the story. Equally
problematic was the insistence by high federal officials that Congress alone had the
authority to divide peace from war. This constraining legal straightjacket failed to fit the
territories, where both Natives and non-Natives regarded war not as a clearly delineated
status between nations but as part of a spectrum of violence between cultures. From the
perspective of territorial citizens, the results were arbitrary: Congress seemingly
acknowledged raids and counterraids as “war” in the Northwest Territory while refusing
to do so in the Southwest. Moreover, as the residents of the Southwest Territory insisted,
once their understanding of war was acknowledged, constitutional and statutory as well
as natural law required the federal government’s intervention and support. For the people
who crossed the line in defiance of government’s commands, federal law authorized,
rather than hindered, their actions.
Congress, it turned out, was also slow. By the time it finally half-addressed the
issue in 1795, the immediate crisis had passed. In October 1795, William Blount was
writing that the Creeks and Cherokees had demonstrated “pacific conduct” for nearly six
months. “Peace with the Indians exists now not only in name, or upon paper in form of
treaty, but in fact,” Blount exulted, observing that this was the first cessation in hostilities
in eighteen years. This sudden reversal had several causes: the defeat of the Ohio
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nations, which demoralized the southeastern tribes; the Jay and Pinckney Treaties with
Britain and Spain, which mitigated some of the intense factionalism produced by
European influences; the shifts within Native nations toward a more centralized form of
governance. But it also owed something to a change in federal policy, a move away from
law toward finance.
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Chapter 6: The Expenses of Sovereignty
As part of his reports to George Washington on Indian affairs and the western
territories, Henry Knox spent considerable attention on finance—a frequent topic for him,
since, under the Articles of Confederation, he had long had to operate the War
Department on a pittance. Knox particularly bemoaned that many of the troubles that
confronted the United States in both Indian affairs and the territories seemed to stem from
an unwillingness to spend money. “The United States having come into the possession of
sovereignty, and an extensive territory,” he wrote, “[it] must unavoidably be subject to
the expenses of such a condition.”1
As recent scholarship has demonstrated, the new federal government came into
existence fixated on its finances. The Constitution and the new financial system granted
the federal government financial resources that far exceeded what the states could muster.
Over the following decade, as Knox had foreseen, a great deal of federal money flowed
westward into the territories, as the “expenses” of sovereignty that Knox anticipated
mounted. Yet national finance, long seen as the paradigmatic example of state capacity,
played a paradoxical role in the territories. Rather than an unqualified source of strength,
the national treasury served federal officials as a crutch to create policy when, as we have
seen, law and authority proved inadequate. Often, federal officials barely seemed able to
control or resist the claims made on federal funds. 2
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One role for money was to patch over federal failures. Unable to restrain or
punish either Natives or Anglo-American settlers for crimes, the national government
sought to forestall violence by compensating both groups for the harms the other had
committed. The effect was that the federal government became financially responsible
for the actions of people it could not control and, in the case of Natives, who were
ostensibly not part of the American polity at all.
Federal officials also used federal funds to try shore up the tenuous and flexible
loyalties of borderland inhabitants, both Native and non-Native. Throughout the 1790s,
the federal government engaged in an extensive, and expensive, program to supply
Native nations with so-called “Indian presents.” Intended to placate Native demands, not
purchase Native lands, these gifts were justified through rhetorical invocations of
Natives’ (often real) poverty. But in their more candid moments, federal officials
acknowledged that they were trying to buy Native allegiance, in competition with British
and French patrons. In this sense, the presents reflected federal limitations in the face of
Native power.
Federal officials proved even more constrained in the face of constant demands
by territorial citizens for “protection.” Federal money poured into the territories for
defense. Some this came through spending on the army, but much of it involved paying
territorial citizens directly for their service in the militia. In the process, federal money
underwrote the territories’ economic development and enriched (some of) the inhabitants.
Though territorial citizens, like Natives, often regarded this largesse as nothing more than
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their due, federal officials, and some citizens themselves, understood this money as an
effort to secure the questionable allegiances of ostensible U.S. citizens.
These expenditures reflected a national state that fit poorly into present-day
scholarly dichotomies between “weak” and “strong.” On the one hand, there were only a
handful of federal officials in the territories, and they rarely wrote or spoke as if they
acted from positions of authority. On the contrary, tasked with governing vast spaces,
these officials felt battered by a constant stream of events over which they had little
control, confronted by Native and local leaders who seemed to have much more ability to
dictate events. Federal officials could not even always control how federal funds were
spent: over officials’ vociferous objections, the national treasury paid the perpetrators of
violence that federal law deemed illegal and unwarranted. But on the other hand,
national finance did a remarkable job of extending the influence and reach of this
seemingly ineffectual government. The federal government in the territories was
ubiquitous, not out of sight. In the form of medals and blankets, federal authority
insinuated itself into Cherokee councils, even without the presence of a single federal
officer. Muster rolls and payment vouchers—other forms of federal finance—implicated
the lives of nearly all male territorial citizens. The prospect of federal payment caused
Natives and non-Natives alike to take their complaints to territorial officials, and even to
Philadelphia, for redress. In short, federal finance allowed a handful of constrained
officials to orient the territories around federal policy.
***
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As recounted in the previous chapters, the failure of federal law left Natives and
white settlers free to continue long-standing practices of retaliating against each other.
Treaty law even seemed condone such actions by barring retaliation until “satisfaction
shall have been demanded of the party of which the aggressor is,” as stipulated in the
Treaty of Holston. Though these provisions were intended to forestall retaliation, the
federal failure to fulfill the promises it made gave Native acts of revenge legal sanction.3
In an effort to forestall such violence, federal officials quickly hit on an ersatz
substitute for justice through the criminal law: compensation. Unable to punish its own
citizens for the crimes they committed against Natives, the federal government began to
repay Native victims for both lives and property lost. As historians have traced, such
payments corresponded with Natives’ own customary legal practice of “covering the
grave”—that is, rectifying wrongs, including murder, through payment. “It has been
understood, that, among the Indian nations, when one Indian kills another, the offence is
not considered so much a public as a private evil, for which the family of the deceased is
bound to obtain satisfaction . . . .sometimes by blood, and at others, by pecuniary
considerations.” Henry Knox wrote to the Creek leader Alexander McGillivray. Knox
proposed, “[i]f this idea is just,” that McGillivray compensate the family of a Creek
Indian murdered by whites, “to prevent the personal and national evils arising from
indiscriminate retaliation.” Knox would make “immediate” repayment to McGillivray
from the national treasury.4
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For all that these payments corresponded with Native expectations, though, they
rarely arose directly from Native demands. Rather, as in the case of Knox, they began
with federal officials grasping for any available tool to assuage Native grievances. Most
often, given the failure of the courts, the readiest method available was money, over
which federal officials had much more discretion. Federal officials began to respond to
every crime by doling out goods. In early 1791, for instance, unknown whites killed a
number of Senecas and plundered their goods on the border between the Northwest
Territory and Pennsylvania. Since “legal process will be both slow and uncertain,” Knox
instructed St. Clair that the governor should write to the friends and relatives of the
deceased to demonstrate the federal government’s “abhorrence” of the act: “you will
convince them of your sincerity by making liberal compensation to the relations for the
loss of property.” Knox later asked St. Clair to compile lists of stolen goods, to ensure
“complete indemnification for every article lost.” A similar process unfolded near
Knoxville in 1793, when unknown whites fired on a Cherokee and two Chickasaws,
including a Chickasaw named John Morris, who later died from his wounds. Blount
published a reward for the recovery of the murderers, but the men he suspected of the
crime, he learned, all had alibis. In the interim, Blount arranged for Morris to be buried
with full military honors “at the usual burial-ground of the white people,” and marched
alongside the Chickasaw’s brother in the funeral cortege. After the funeral, Blount gave
goods to Morris’s Chickasaw family, as well as to the Cherokees and Morris’s
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grandfather, who was white. “I considered it political nay essential that pretty liberal
presents should be given,” Blount reported, “the more effectually to bury their sorrows.”5
Federal officials did not believe that compensation bought a permanent peace:
Blount himself acknowledged that the relatives of the victims “are not to be permanently
satisfied by Presents,” and would likely retaliate eventually. They recognized that these
payments did not fully represent the justice they had promised. But as long as “justice”
proved elusive, compensation would have to do. When a number of American settlers
murdered a group of peaceful Cherokees, Henry Knox wrote to the Cherokee leader
Hanging Maw and assured him that the President, “deeply afflicted,” would ensure that
the Natives received the “same humanity and justice as his white children.” But, Henry
Knox continued, “sometimes, the bad escape unpunished.” In that instance, Henry Knox
enquired, “if the laws should not condemn the murderers of your friends, is there no other
mode by which you could be satisfied?” He directed the Cherokees to William Blount,
whom he had already directed to provide goods to “pacify the relations of the murdered
Indians and thereby prevent future hostilities.”6
As a way of papering over law’s failure, compensation was not limited to
murders, nor to payments to Natives. Rather, federal officials came to rely on payments
whenever authority and coercion were inadequate to preempt the long-standing practices
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that prompted frontier violence. Nowhere was this clearer than federal efforts to stanch
the endemic practice of horse theft in the territories.7
After land, horses were among the most valuable property in the borderlands.
Residents of the Southwest Territory were particularly horse-mad; prominent
advertisements for studs appeared regularly in the territory’s only newspaper. Unlike
land, horses were mobile, which made them a tempting target for thieves. Nearly every
traveler in the territories recounted losing a horse at some point in the journey.8
Both Natives and non-Natives were horse thieves. The territorial citizens stole
horses from each other, and many stole from Natives as well: there were frequent reports
of whites sneaking into Indian camps and coming away with three or four horses. But
territorial citizens fixated on Natives as horse thieves. In the Southwest Territory, the
inhabitants complained, that Natives had stolen 2,000 horses in the early 1790s, valued at
a total of $100,000. Natives would then resell the stolen horses to white traders happy to
look the other way. Horses stolen in the Southwest Territory soon made their way to
outposts in Georgia and North and South Carolina, where, after resale, they were spirited
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to Savannah or Charleston. Horses taken in the Illinois Country usually ended up in
Kentucky.9
Horse theft and cross-cultural violence were closely intertwined. Many murders,
including that of the Chickasaw John Morris, began as horse thefts. Natives who
plundered horses from Tennessee settlers often found themselves pursued and so “kill[ed]
in their own defence.” For their part, white victims of Native horse thefts could barely
refrain “from taking what they call Satisfaction that is from killing Some of the Indians.”
Both Indians and whites resorted to self-help to recover their losses, which, when coupled
with mutual senses of collective responsibility, prompted further violence. One incident
in the Northwest Territory in 1799 was especially telling. While traveling along a road,
two Wyandots encountered a party of Americans, who grabbed the horse, saddle, and
bridle of one of the Natives. The Americans justified such bald-faced theft by insisting
that they were only seeking compensation from the Wyanodots: “the Indians had stole
horses enough,” they told them, “and that they would take that one in place.” After the
theft, the Wynadots soon encountered two other American travelers on horseback. The
Wyandots employed the same logic of collective guilt as the Americans: they insisted on
taking one of the Americans’ horses, “thinking it also proper having lost one of their
horses.” When the man refused to yield the horse, a fight ensued that ended in the death
of the two white travelers.10
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As such incidents underscored, horse theft presented a major threat to whatever
tenuous peace prevailed in the territories. “Horse Stealing is the grand Source of
Hostility between the white and red people in this district,” William Blount opined, the
cause for “almost continual” complaints to him; if unchecked, he feared, it would end in
open warfare. North of the Ohio, Arthur St. Clair similarly believed that Native horse
theft was a prelude to full-fledged hostilities.11
Territorial officials tried different approaches to stanch the practice. Law was one
route. The 1793 version of the Trade and Intercourse Act established a complicated
licensing scheme for purchasing horses from Natives. In a couple rare instances,
purchasers who knowingly bought stolen horses, or who stole horses from Indians, were
prosecuted. In one exceptional case, a Vincennes resident brought suit against a
Pottawattamie known as “Grand Blue” for holding a black mare the white settler claimed
as his own; the two men reported “amicably settled the dispute.” Federal agents would
sometimes intervene to recover horses that Natives asserted were theirs, as James
Robertson did in Nashville in the early 1790s, thereby incurring the wrath, and a lawsuit,
from the disgruntled white owner.12
The most frequent approach, however, was to send complainants or federal
representatives into Indian country equipped with letters to Native leaders. Federal
treaties with Native nations required that tribes restore stolen horses upon application for
11
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recovery. Native leaders were often cooperative, especially as they rarely profited from
the stolen horses personally. One Cherokee leader even promised to appoint men to go
through the nation, and “procure by force or otherwise” all stolen horses. But William
Blount was skeptical that the Cherokees would be successful: “I am very sure that the[y]
[the chiefs] have not power nor influence sufficient to have [the horses] restored.” In one
instance, after a territorial inhabitant reported horses stolen by the Cherokees, William
Blount dispatched John Chisholm into the nation to recover them. Chisholm got the
horses, but they were stolen as he headed out of Cherokee territory. Applying to the
chiefs again, Chisholm recovered the horses a second time, only to have them stolen yet
again, for a third and final time. “[T]herefore [I] think it is scarcely worth while to make
application to the Indians for the recovery of our horses,” the victim of the original theft
concluded. Another problem was that horses were easily and quickly traded among
Indians. One horse owner in the Northwest Territory learned where his horses had gone
third-hand: a local Delaware Indian told the owner that he had learned from a Shawnee
that another Shawnee had taken the horse to the little Miami. The owner diligently
traveled to the Shawnee village along the river and learned that that his horse had been
there, but it was already gone; the owner abandoned his efforts.13
To avoid such complicated trips, some owners had success in hiring other Indians
to recover the horses, which became a frequent source of Indian employment. This posed
its own problems, however. “I had heard the savages frequently stole horses with a view
to be hired to search for them,” one traveller in the Illinois Country reported. This
13
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traveler had recovered his own horse after he offering a local Delaware a two-dollar
reward.14
With both law and applications to tribes largely fruitless in recovering stolen
horses, the federal government adopted a different tack: compensation. At first, this was
an ad hoc solution. For those tasked with implementing federal policy, the benefits far
outweighed the costs. Military commanders, threatened with the prospect of violence,
informed their subordinates to have white victims “record their losses upon good
testimony, and I am certain the Government will indemnify them sooner than have a drop
of bloodshed.” When Chickasaws came to Indian agent James Robertson complaining
that Kentuckians had stolen several horses, Governor Blount ordered Robertson to
compensate the Chickasaws from the public treasury at a price of no more than fifty
dollars per horse. “The dilemma at present is either for the United States to pay for these
horses, or for the Indians to take pay (as they express it) by stealing as many other horses
from some frontier people.” As Blount observed, “One way or the other they [the
Indians] will have pay.”15
In 1796, Congress codified this approach when it renewed the Trade and
Intercourse Act. Under the law, Natives who had goods stolen by whites would be
compensated from the federal treasury. The law also provided that whites who had been
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the victims of Indian theft would be repaid for their losses by the federal government,
which would then deduct the amount from the tribe’s annuity payments.16
Formally, compensation for Natives required the conviction of the U.S. citizens
who had committed the crime. In practice, federal officials continued their earlier custom
of paying the claims of Natives who demanded payment for stolen horses, even when
they felt that those claims were dubious. William Blount strongly suspected that the
Cherokee chief White Man-killer’s horses simply wandered off during the Cherokee’s
1792 visit to Knoxville, but the governor paid the Cherokee anyway. Several years later,
Arthur St. Clair compensated a Delaware who demanded payment for a stolen horse,
even absent any criminal proceeding; the Secretary of War subsequently endorsed this
approach and promised to repay St. Clair. U.S. citizens even demanded repayment from
the federal government when they helped pay for Natives to recover their horses.17
For the most part, though, compensation under the Trade and Intercourse Act
went to U.S. citizens, not Indians. The number of Native claims presented to federal
officers was dwarfed by the complaints of the territories’ white inhabitants, who penned
lengthy lists of stolen horses, expecting compensation under the statute. In 1799,
inhabitants of the Northwest Territory gave Arthur St. Clair a list of horses that totaled
$1700—as much as many of the nations’ yearly annuity. It is unclear how many of these
claims ever received payment, especially in the 1790s. St. Clair and others forwarded
16
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claims to the President; the resulting bureaucratic delays—along with the dilatory
behavior of many of the claimants themselves—meant that many claims were not
adjudicated until well into the nineteenth century. Sometimes the payments were in fact
deducted from the tribes’ annuities, though the evidence seems to suggest that the federal
government more frequently just paid the claims from the treasury. Deducting from the
annuities, one federal official concluded, would be “inexpedient.”18
One reason for delays in payment was that the creation of this system of ad-hoc
administrative adjudication offered little guidance on how to evaluate claims, particularly
with regard to supporting evidence. The statute provided only that claimants provide the
“necessary proofs,” a term that flummoxed federal officials. Winthrop Sargent regarded
compensation as the only barrier that stood between territorial inhabitants and “Lex
Talonis”—the law of retaliation. He accordingly made the “most liberal Construction” of
the statute, offering “lavish
. . . promises and assurances” of compensation. Sargent hoped that the evidence required
to support the claims would not be “legal”—evidence, in other words, that would hold up
in a court of law. What Sargent saw as an advantage—the looseness of proof—Arthur St.
Clair saw as a liability. Given the hazy information surrounding most purported thefts,
the evidence for these claims could rarely be “satisfactory, or such as would entitle the
claimants recover in a Court of Justice had the thefts been committed by fellow Citizens.”
But such a generous standard would only encourage the territory’s inhabitants to abuse
the system. “[N]ot a horse will be either lost or stolen, by whomsoever it may be done,”
18
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St. Clair bemoaned, “but the Indians . . . will be charged with it, and some person or other
will be found to swear that they believe the Indians were guilty of it, and the United
States will be called upon for all of them.” St. Clair accordingly advocated abolishing the
provision altogether.19
The uncertainty around this question long outlasted St. Clair and Sargent’s terms
in office, as the War Department struggled to create clearer standards. But even by end
of the eighteenth century, it was clear that the system would be neither wholly generous
nor restrictive; it would be capricious. As St. Clair predicted, claimants—many of whom
who petitioned Congress directly —sought to push the federal promise of compensation
as far as possible. Many, including Daniel Smith, the Southwest Territory’s secretary,
and James Ore, leader of the 1794 unauthorized expedition against Nickajack, submitted
claims for harms that occurred within Indian country, which the statute did not authorize,
or that predated the statute and federal treaties, sometimes tracing back to the Revolution.
In some cases, Congress drew a sharp line, fearful of opening the floodgates to endless
claims; yet in other instances, it granted requests that seemed to have no legal basis.20
Alongside the vigorous and largely illegal trade in horses was a parallel trade in
people, particularly enslaved African-Americans. “Negroes and Horses,” Anglo-
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Americans repeatedly complained, were the “property” that Natives constantly stole from
their settlements.21
There were many African slaves in the borderlands, where they often toiled
alongside enslaved Natives. In both Tennessee and Kentucky, slavery was both legal and
increasingly common: by 1797, William Blount was writing from Nashville that
“Negroes are the most valuable Property in this Country.” Enslaved Africans obtained
under French and British rule also lived in the Illinois Country, where their legal status
was nebulous because of the unclear retroactive scope of the Northwest Ordinance’s
prohibition on slavery.22
Just as proximity entangled whites and Natives together, Natives and Africans
also forged relationships, though the sources only hint at these links. Like Native-white
ties, these connections were often violent. In Vincennes in 1794, local Delawares
allegedly helped a white man abduct a slave claiming his freedom into Kentucky. In
1797, a “free Negro” was arrested in Detroit for the murder of an Indian; he broke his
shackles and escaped. And in an intriguing incident northwest of Nashville in 1799, an
African-American slave that James Robertson had hired from Abraham Martin to work at
Robertson’s iron works refused to accompany his master to the Mississippi Territory,
instead “lay[ing] out Around and About the Iron Works.” John Jones, a white man who
lived in the area, later reported that a group of Cherokee hunters who had been in
21
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neighborhood for “some Considerable Time” came by Jones’s house one afternoon “all
very much frightened.” The Cherokees, Jones stated, “intemated they had had a dispute
with a negro fellow belonging to Genl. Robertsons Iron Works and that they had killed
him.” The absence of any discussion or testimony about the nature of the “dispute”
suggests the hidden nature of many of these relationships, which took place out of sight
of most Anglo-Americans.23
But the predominant way that the surrounding Native nations came to understand
enslaved Africans was as akin to horses: as valuable and mobile property that could
easily be taken. Because Indian country was a foreign jurisdiction so close to territorial
settlements, some slaves fled there to escape bondage. But Natives also seized dozens of
slaves against their will—in ambushes on boats traveling down the Ohio or Tennessee,
for instance, or in raids on Anglo-American settlements; the Cherokees reported taking
twenty-seven slaves in a single summer. In Native attacks, one army officer observed,
“the Negroes are the only ones who have a Chance of their lifes (I suppose because they
sell well).” The Native nations of the Southeast and the Ohio and Illinois Countries had
long traditions of taking captives and incorporating them into their societies, which
sometimes happened with Africans. But slaves’ value as property distinguished them
from other captives. Joseph Brown, a white child captured by the Cherokees in 1788,
reported that the Cherokees were on the point of executing him when they realized that
his captor would then insist on taking revenge on a “Negro woman” they had also
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captured. In Brown’s telling, the prospect of losing the “service of the negro” was too
painful; the Cherokees’ “avarice,” he reported, spared him.24
In one ironic moment, Tennesseean John Sevier even reprimanded the Cherokees
for being too quick to disregard slaves’ humanity. “You know it is wrong to swop people
for horses,” Sevier stated, “for negroes is not horses tho they are black.” Sevier’s highly
hypocritical remarks—he lived, after all, in a society in which horses, slaves, and land all
served as routine and interchangeable mediums of exchange—also ignored the source of
Native knowledge of Africans’ values as commodities: their white neighbors. Arthur St.
Clair reported that the Natives discovered that white Indian traders offered “a ready sale
for every Thing plundered from the Inhabitants of the United States, but particularly
Horses and Negroes.” William Blount supplemented his negotiations with Chickasaw
leaders by selling them slaves on the side.25
Moreover, in taking slaves that legally did not belong to them, Natives were also
just aping their white neighbors. If territorial court proceedings are any indication,
territorial citizens frequently filched each others’ slaves. William Blount himself, along
with his Indian agent John Chisholm, brought a criminal suit alleging that a man named
George Mitchell had unlawfully taken “a certain Woman Slave named Amey the property
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of William Blount.” In one instance, white thieves reportedly abducted two slaves
belonging to a Cherokee woman and carried them into Kentucky.26
As with the traffic in horses, the trade in slaves thrust on federal officials the
obligation to try to recover Anglo-American property from Indian country. White
victims badgered federal representatives like Rufus Putnam, William Blount, and Indian
agent James Seagrove to retrieve their enslaved property, even providing detailed
descriptions of the stolen or runaway Africans. The treaties that the United States drafted
specifically included provisions explicitly promising that “the practice of Stealing
Negroes and Horses” from Anglo-Americans “shall forever hereafter cease” and
requiring the restoration of stolen property. But Native leaders found it as difficult to
return stolen slaves as stolen horses. When William Blount met with the Cherokees in
1794 and “repeatedly mentioned about the delivery of Negroes,” Bloody Fellow was able
to recall the location and owner of nearly every slave taken from the Southwest Territory.
Some, he knew, had been sold to the Creeks or to the Spanish. Many, though, remained
within the Cherokee Nation, but Bloody Fellow lamented that he was powerless to
recover them: “We are but a poor People and have no goods to purchase the Negroes
from the Persons who have Possession of them, if we attempt to take them by force
perhaps they might put them to death or injure them.”27
Once again, federal finance provided the solution. Bloody Fellow noted that they
would be likely be able to deliver the slaves “when we receive our annual allowance from
26
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the U.S. then we can with those goods pay the Possessor for them & deliver them to
you.” Even before the enactment of the Trade and Intercourse Act, William Blount had
sought to obtain federal compensation for slaves that Natives had taken, advising that one
disgruntled resident should drawn up a petition “respecting their Negroes” in “good hand
writing” and with the facts plainly stated, so that Blount could forward the claim to the
President. After the Act, many of the petitions seeking reimbursement pleaded for
compensation for stolen slaves as well as horses.28
In one case, the federal government became entangled in a dispute over slave
property that did not even involve the citizens of the United States. By some unknown
method, the Cherokees obtained “a negro man, a negro woman and child” that belonged
to the Chickasaw leader George Colbert. Colbert came to Knoxville with a retinue of
twenty Chickasaws to ask William Blount’s assistance in recovering the slaves. Blount
pledged his help but was apparently unsuccessful, as a year later John Sevier sent a letter
to the Cherokees. Sevier, indicating that he was “requested to write to you” by the
Chickasaws, lectured the Cherokees that they could not expect to be “brothers and good
neighbours” with the Chickasaws “if you keep their people from them.” A year later,
with still no relief, Colbert evidently applied to Benjamin Hawkins, the new federal
Indian agent. Colbert sought relief from the only ready source of property the Cherokee
Nation had—the federal government’s “annual present made the nation.” Hawkins
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agreed to this arrangement as long as the Cherokees consented; after that, the issue
vanished from the record.29
Even absent clear resolution, the dispute over Colbert’s slaves reveals how much
federal finance and authority had insinuated themselves into Indian country. Colbert
expected federal officials to resolve his dispute with the Cherokees, and Blount, Sevier,
and Hawkins all agreed to intervene. Moreover, federal annuities and other funds had
become Indian Country’s readiest and most fungible source of compensation, even in
disagreements among Natives.

In short, throughout the 1790s, federal officials paid out compensation to both
Natives and non-Natives, for crimes committed by the other. Though this had the ironic
effect of conforming to Native customary practice, the underlying motivation for those
who crafted the policy was the precise opposite: to replace what officials regarded as the
customary legal order of retaliation with a new legal order of peace and security. Federal
officials had tried, and failed, to accomplish this goal through law; they turned instead to
money. They were trying to buy their way to peace.
The strange and perverse consequence of this seeming federal weakness was to
reorient both Natives and non-Natives toward the national government. Instead of
raiding Knoxville, Nashville, or Vincennes, Native leaders arrived in these towns as
supplicants seeking payment. Instead of traveling into Indian country—either to “take
satisfaction” or to pursue their horses—white claimants now traveled to Philadelphia, or
29
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forwarded their petitions there, to obtain relief. Through compensation, the federal
government became financially responsible for the acts of people it could not control.
The result was that relations between Natives and non-Natives in the territories were now
triangulated through a distant national government.30
***
Compensation for the harms committed by U.S. citizens was only a small portion
of the federal funds that flowed into Indian country. A much larger proportion were socalled “Indian presents” that the federal government gave to Native nations throughout
the territories. Some of these presents were symbolic: silver medals especially designed
to be doled out to Native leaders and elaborate military uniforms bedecked with frills.
But most were practical: food, alcohol, gunpowder, guns, bullets, clothing, blankets,
cloth, tobacco, mirrors, pots, and other household items. Native demands for these
goods, and the federal willingness to satisfy them, reflected a complicated mixture of
strength and weakness on both sides.
Federal officials arriving in the territories quickly discovered that, whenever they
encountered Natives, they also confronted outstretched hands. Indians demanded goods
as concrete proof of federal professions of goodwill. When Antoine Gamelin traveled up
the Wabash River into the lands of the Miami confederacy on a diplomatic mission, the
Native leaders asked for a “draught of milk” (alcohol), “some good broth,” and powder
and ball. “[A] bearer of speeches should never be with empty hands,” the Miamis
informed Gamelin. An Anishinaabe emissary who met with federal representatives in the
early 1790s spent most of his speech bemoaning how his nation was “very poor,”
30
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appealing for guns, clothes, liquor, and provisions “to cover me and my peoples.” Such
demands seemed to mark all interactions between Natives and the federal government.
“It is a fact that whomsoever has to see the Indians is obliged to give them [goods],” one
federal officer complained. “[I]t is unavoidable.”31
Because of these interactions, “beggar” became the standard epithet federal
officials applied to any Native they encountered. “They are the greatest beggars and the
most indolent creatures we ever saw,” the commissioners to the Treaty of Hopewell
reported of the Choctaws they met in 1786. Governor Arthur St. Clair described Baptiste
DuCoigne, the leader of the Kaskaskias around Vincennes, as “the greatest beggar I have
met with among nations who are all beggars.” His second-in-command, Winthrop
Sargent, recounted how “very glad” he was whenever Indians left. When Indians came
on what they called “friendly Visits,” Sargent complained, “they generally eke out [these
visits] while you have any thing to give them, & this may be applied to their whole
Colour, who are beggarly past Description.” A federal military officer stationed at Fort
Finney along the Ohio reported that Natives visited “almost every day to eat and drink
with us, by way of brightning the chain of friendship curse them.”32
As historians have demonstrated, federal officials’ contempt for Natives and their
demands fundamentally misunderstood Native culture. For both the varied Native
peoples of the Ohio Country and the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws of
the Southeast, gift-giving served a critical diplomatic role in cementing relationships in
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cultures oriented around exchange. Natives showed up to diplomatic meetings with
federal officials with gifts of their own, frequently maple sugar and wampum. But
federal officials had little use for sugar or “beads,” as they dubbed wampum. By
contrast, Natives needed, often quite urgently, the presents the federal government
bestowed. Centuries of trade had profoundly reoriented Native societies around
European trade goods. The blankets, pots, and especially guns and gunpowder that
Natives demanded were essentials that Native nations could not readily produce for
themselves. The result was a situation of deep economic inequality. When U.S. army
general James Wilkinson sought to intimidate the warring nations of the Northwest
Indian Confederacy, he reminded them that the “warriors of the United States” could
raise their own meat and bread “& they make arms & ammunition for their own use.”
Implicit in Wilkinson’s bluster was the implication that Natives lacked the same knowhow. As the Cherokee leader Little Turkey said of arms and ammunition, “we could not
make it ourselves.”33
Natives understood very well how federal officials viewed them, and attempted to
counter their claims. “We did not come here with an expectation of getting presents from
you,” an Ottawa delegation informed federal army officials in 1786. “I am no beggar,”
the Chickasaw leader Piamingo similarly insisted as he asked that the President provide
powder and bullets for his people; he would pay for them with furs, skins, or horses. But
exchange was often not enough, in part because Natives were shut out of aspects of the
33
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Anglo-American market economy—“We Red People have no money,” Piamingo
lamented—but also because Native claims of poverty were not mere rhetoric. By the
1790s, much Indian country was a war-ravaged land. For thirty years, Anglo-Americans
had destroyed Native villages, leveled cornfields, and pillaged Native goods. Bloodshed
and destruction continued after the end of the Revolution: a quasi-war raged south of the
Ohio, while the federal government’s expeditions against the Northwest Indian
Confederacy dislocated entire populations, turning whole nations into refugees. AngloAmericans understood this relationship between warfare and Native poverty, and they
sought to use it as a form of power against Native peoples. “[W]hen your Houses [and]
Cornfields are destroyed you have no provisions made to replace them, but are thrown
into the greatest distress and Missary,” U.S. army commander Henry Burbeck told the
Anishinaabe assembled at Fort Mackinac in the Northwest Territory in 1799: “[I]n short
it’s the W[hite] people that you have to depend on and to apply too [sic] for all your
wants.”34
These accounts of Native poverty and suffering were often structured by gender
and age. “The white People cloath their women and children,” a leader of the Wabash
Confederacy told a federal representative at a treaty session in Vincennes in 1792.
“[O]urs are running naked. Take pity on them & send something every spring to make
them glad.” Elsewhere, the Wabash and Illinois told Anglo-Americans that they
“commend our women & children to your care.” Federal officials attempted to satisfy
these demands by routinely including goods intended for Indian “queens” and “squaws”
34
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at diplomatic gatherings, and promising to supply Natives with goods for “your women
and children.” Many military officers found themselves feeding “old men, Women, and
Children, who seem to have no relations to afford them support.” Since both Native and
American cultures associated masculinity with autonomy and independence, couching
Native reliance on federal goods in such explicitly gendered terms served similar, yet
antithetical, goals. For (male) Native leaders, pleading for goods on behalf of women
and children diminished their own sense of dependence on the Americans. For federal
officials, by contrast, associating Natives with women and children heightened the
association between Natives and the era’s well-worn gendered tropes of dependency.35
Metaphors based on familial relationships also governed the meaning of federal
“presents.” By providing for Indian nations, the United States was stepping into a wellestablished role as the metaphorical “father” of Native peoples. “All white People who
have hitherto spoken to Us, have always called Us Children,” a Wabash leader informed
Rufus Putnam during treaty negotiations. “I shall therefore call You Father.” In one
dramatic moment at the negotiations of the Treaty of Greenville, the assembled Ohio
country nations ceased calling the federal representatives brothers and instead
“acknowledged” the United States “to be our father.” Federal representatives embraced
this language, and role, when speaking to Natives. When William Blount doled out gifts
35
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to the Cherokees, for instance, he spoke of “the good things which our father, the
President, ha[s] done for you, and what be yet intended to do.” 36
As with gender dynamics, scholars have traced how this language of kinship and
paternalism was susceptible to differing interpretations by Natives, who saw fathers as
benevolent figures who protected and doted on their children, and federal officials, who
viewed fathers as authority figures. But by the late eighteenth century, Natives
understood pretty well the meanings that the Anglo-Americans assigned to these familial
metaphors. In one striking moment at the Treaty of Holston, the assembled Cherokees
observed that calling the United States eldest brother and father was “only a Title of
Friendship we being the oldest people on this ground.” The Cherokees then proceeded to
invert the metaphor. “Look [on] me as a mother more than any thing else,” Hanging
Maw told William Blount and the assembled federal representatives, employing the
maternalism more comfortable for the matriarchal Cherokees. “[M]y land raised &
produced you.” Other Cherokees stressed how much “it hurts our hearts” to hear the
Anglo-Americans demand land: “[Y]ou have grown up on our land now taking it away
from us it is just like an ungrateful child robbing his father." Other Native groups
stubbornly insisted on calling the United States “brothers,” or rejected familial
relationships altogether in favor of the less hierarchical “friend.”37
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In short, though they contained elements of truth, narratives of Native weakness
and reliance on American goods could often reflected expediency, for both sides. For
Americans, these narratives bolstered aspirations of national power, while Natives played
up their poverty to extract trade goods. But, as the Cherokees’ reversal of federal
paternalism suggests, the rhetoric of a benevolent federal government dispensing its
largesse to an impoverished people was often just that: empty words that glossed over
how federal officials and Native peoples actually behaved when they met on the frontier.

In particular, federal self-representation as liberal and generous obscured an
important reality: the early federal government had little desire to be a conduit for food,
weapons, and goods to Indians. Burdened by an enormous war debt, the new nation
sought to spend as little public money as possible on Indian affairs. Behind the scenes,
Henry Knox and other federal officials were urging “the most rigid oeconomy” on Indian
agents and others at every juncture, particularly with respect to Indian “presents.”38
Yet despite these admonitions, presents flowed out anyway, accompanied by a
stream of excuses from federal officers to justify their seeming disregard of official
instructions. In this correspondence among themselves and their superiors, government
officials painted a very different picture than the one they offered for Native
consumption. In their own accounts, these officials described themselves as the
constrained supplicants, confronting Natives confident of their own strength. Officers
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spoke of “the impossibility of resisting the applications of Indians for rations, and
presents.” Such language suggests that federal compliance with Native demands for
material support reflected, not federal authority and Native weakness, but the reverse: a
recognition that Native power in the borderlands obliged the federal government to send
goods westward.39
Native power and federal acquiescence had several sources. From a financial
standpoint alone, the federal government desperately wanted to maintain friendly
relations with Native peoples. Henry Knox frequently wrote of how the United States
could ill-afford a war with the Natives. Events proved Knox’s predictions right. When,
despite what Knox regarded as the nation’s best efforts, the United States engaged in the
four-year Northwest Inidan War, the conflict drained federal coffers, consuming over five
million dollars—over eighty percent of federal revenues during this period. Knox’s backof-the-envelope calculations made clear that, whatever the price of purchasing Native
loyalty was, it would be far less than the expense of a “system of coercion and
oppression.”40
Providing goods promised to be a much cheaper way to ensure peace: “[O]ne
grate mean of securing the allegience of the natives,” Rufus Putnam wrote, “I take to be
the furnishing them with such necessaries as they want.” Thomas Jefferson similarly
concluded, “The most economical as well as the most humane conduct towards them [the
Indians] is to bribe them into peace, and to retain them in peace by eternal bribes.” The
39
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cost of a single expedition, Jefferson argued, would supply Natives with “presents on the
most liberal scale” for a century.41
Moreover, in providing Natives with goods, the federal government was not
crafting policy on a blank slate, but conforming to decades of diplomatic tradition in the
formerly British and French regions that now comprised the Northwest and Southwest
Territories. These precedents conditioned expectations for how a Euro-American power
seeking Native support should behave.42
Vincennes, long a hub for French and then British diplomacy with the Native
nations of the Illinois country, provides an excellent illustration of how earlier practice
constrained federal officials. Granting presents to “friendly” Indians was the “Practice of
all European People,” Winthrop Sargent wrote to Major John Hamtramck, the
commanding officer of Fort Knox, the town’s army outpost. Sargent lamented his lack of
funds to support such gifts, but Hamtramck was undeterred. Sargent’s letter crossed one
from Hamtramck to him that contained virtually identical language. Hamtramck noted
that, financial limitations notwithstanding, he had been forced to make assurances of
presents to the Natives who came in. “It was necessary in order to secure their [the
Indians] friendship to promise them some trifling recompense,” he reported. “[I]t is an
old Custom and they all expect it, which obliged me to promise it to them and if they get
nothing I shall appear in a very ridiculous point of view.” Several years later,
Hamtramck justified supplying Natives alcohol to a different superior by insisting that
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during diplomatic meetings the Indians “expect a keg from their father, they have been
accustomed to it, by both French and British Governments.”43
Hamtramck felt particularly obliged to satisfy Native expectations because, as he
and every other federal official in the territories was well aware, the British and Spanish,
with whom the United States fiercely competed for Native loyalties, continued to dole out
goods from Detroit and New Orleans. “[I]f our Government does not make [the Natives]
presents,” Hamtramck wrote Henry Knox, “they will go to the British, who will be glad
to see them and who will, supply them amply.” The Wabash chiefs told Hamtramck that
the British presented them with “Goods . . . in large heaps like stacks of Hay”; Arthur St.
Clair similarly pressed for more federal goods by noting that the British had given
Natives six thousand pounds in cash and an equal amount in goods. In the Southwest
Territory, Leonard Shaw, federal agent to the Cherokees, attempted to obtain the loyalty
of an influential Cherokee chief, White Owl’s Son, by presenting him a laced scarlet coat,
a ruffled shirt, a handkerchief, and some feathers. But rather than expressing gratitude,
White Owl’s Son merely told Shaw “what valuable presents had been given to him . . . by
the British in Detroit,” including four coats and two shirts, boats, arm bands, gorgets, and
as much gunpowder and lead as he wanted. Other reports indicated that the Spanish in
New Orleans had entire warehouses full of items intended for the Cherokees,
Chickasaws, and Choctaws. British and Spanish officials heightened the sense of
competition by telling the Indians that the “Americans were poor,” since the United
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States was distributing goods to the Natives that the Americans had purchased from
Europe.44
The result was an escalating and expensive arms—or rather presents—race, as
federal officials sought to outgift the British and Spanish. Governor Blount doled out
goods liberally to try to wean the Chickasaws and Choctaws from foreign influence—
“ten beaves [cattle] a day and what Rum thay wanted and tobaco to smoak after thay get
home and every other thay could say,” the Natives bragged. Their agent told Blount the
strategy was working: “[T]hay have bosted they never met with so good treatment from
the british as from your Exelncy.” The Chickasaw leader Ugulayacabe complained that
the “delusory presents of the Americans [] unhappily blinds too many of my color.”
Bloody Fellow similarly praised American liberality, asking his fellow Cherokees when
they had ever gone to the British and “brought home the like of this?”45
Federal officials justified the mounting costs by repeatedly insisting that it would
“impolitic”—in the eighteenth-century sense of poor policy—to “break thro’ the Custom”
and disappoint Native expectations. Implicitly, this acknowledged that tenuous federal
authority in the territories, which Sargent euphemistically referred to as “our present
Situation,” required such liberality. Others admitted this relationship more explicitly: the
magistrates of Vincennes strongly approved of Hamtramck’s “constant Practice” of
44
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feeding and clothing local Natives who came to the settlement precisely “on Account of
the weak Situation of the Country.”46
Of course, federal officials sought to conceal these facts from Natives, offering
their presents as a testimony to the strength and wealth of the United States. Yet many
Anglo-Americans feared that the Natives were not fooled. The Indians, they knew, were
just as capable as assessing the situation as Anglo-Americans, and could recognize that
the federal government’s “large presents and annuities” demonstrated weakness rather
than strength. “[I]nstead of viewing such conduct on the part of the United States, as an
evidence of friendship towards them [the Indians],” the legislature of the Southwest
Territory reported to Congress, “they have considered it as an evidence of fear, or as a
tribute paid to their superior prowess in war.”47
Though these legislators had their own agenda in urging the abandonment of
diplomacy, they were right: judged by their behavior, many Native leaders understood all
too well the bargaining power they held. Federal officials frequently complained that
Native leaders, rather than behaving like supplicants, expected federal goods as a “Matter
of Right.” This was particularly true for those leaders who had long been courted by
federal officials. The influential =Cherokee leader John Watts and his entourage, for
instance, reportedly burned the government-supplied beds they slept on during a
diplomatic visit after officials refused to permit them to take the beds with them.
Similarly, during a 1795 Chickasaw visit to Philadelphia, Secretary of War Timothy
Pickering worked hard to secure the loyalties of their leader Major Colbert and his
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entourage. Pickering not only promised Colbert and his companions clothing for them
and their entire families, but even gave Colbert four hundred dollars to purchase “an
elegant Stallion.” But Colbert “seemed to consider this sum hardly sufficient”; the
Chickasaw leader, Pickering complained, “was singularly difficult to please.”48
Such demands were not limited solely to Native leaders, however. Time spent
among the Creeks and Cherokees led Benjamin Hawkins, southeastern superintendent of
Indian affairs, to denounce all Indians as a “proud lying spoiled untoward race.” Years of
presents from Britain and Spain, he lamented, had accustomed them to receive goods
“sufficient to clothe all the Idlers in the Nation.” Now the Natives he encountered
“demand any thing they want, from a whiteman, and feel themselves insulted, when
refused, they think they confer a favour on the donor if they accept of clothes from him
when naked or provisions when hungry.”49
Alongside complaints about Natives’ lack of humility, federal officials attacked
their seeming lack of gratitude. The one thing that the federal government’s
extravagance was supposed to purchase—Native allegiance—proved fickle. “The very
Indians, who no longer ago that the last autumn were prevented from suffering the
extremes of hunger by the bounties of the United States,” Daniel Smith reported to Henry
Knox, “have recently been either stealing horses, or murdering defenceless women and
children.” Reports from a council held within the Cherokee nation in 1792 indicated that
many of the chiefs who had been fed and clothed by William Blount had quickly turned
face and advocated for war. Bloody Fellow did point to the expensive goods he received
48
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from Blount—the silver medal, and coat with silver epaulettes, and scarlet coat with
silver lace—in advocating for peace. But in the end, he, too, felt constrained to support
the war. By contrast, one of the foremost leaders of the push for war, John Watts, had
also always received “the attention [of] Governor Blount and the White People . . .
whenever he came among them.” Reportedly, even Watts’s own brother, Unacata,
mocked his changeable loyalties. “[T]he Whites had given him (Watts) a great many fine
Clothes and he grown saucy,” Unacata stated, even as he refused to join Watts in his call
to take up arms.50
It is important to interpret federal complaints of Natives’ sense of entitlement
critically. Federal officials’ anger about Native behavior reflected their own racialized
biases. Accounts of proud and spoiled Natives represented the converse of the tropes of
Native poverty and dependency that surrounded federal largesse; by refusing to mouth
the words of supplication and distress that federal officials expected from such “beggars,”
Native leaders seemed to be violating the diplomatic script around Indian “presents.” In
condemning Natives for insufficient gratitude for governmental liberality, federal
officials’ disdainful reaction mirrored wider denunciations of the era about the unworthy
poor.51
But, just as Native poverty was more than a mere rhetorical artifact, so too the
entitled behavior of Native leaders likely reflected more than simply the projections of
federal officials. It represented, rather, a hard-headed recognition by Natives of the
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power that they held in the particular historical moment, when the federal government
was arguably far more dependent on Natives than vice versa. Natives, it turned out, were
just as adept at using what leverage they could under constrained circumstances as were
the federal officials they encountered.
In looking to the new federal government to pursue the “sweets of Emolument,
which now offer,” as one observer described it, Natives were hardly alone. As the venal
machinations of legislators, land speculators, and financiers suggest, early Americans’
deep anxieties over corruption and abuse were often well-warranted, and the national
treasury undergird many great fortunes. If Natives were distinctive in this general
“Scramble . . . for the Loaves & Fishes,” as one officer-seeker described this grab for
federal patronage, it was perhaps only in the size and scope of their success in using their
bargaining power to secure federal largesse. 52
***
Whether the federal government was spending a lot or a little on Natives is a
matter of perspective. Viewed in hindsight, the federal government got off cheap. As
existing literature emphasizes, the federal government bought Native land for much less
than it was worth on the open market. Between 1790, when it entered the Treaty of New
York with the Creeks, and 1800, the federal government spent $122,000 on treatystipulated annuities for Native nations. During the same period, the federal government
obtained a minimum of nearly 12 million acres of land through federal Indian treaties, a
price that works out to around one cent per acre. Since, over this period, the federal
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government sought to resell the land for prices ranging from 30 cents to two dollars per
acre, it was substantially undercompensating Natives for their lands. Even Henry Knox
acknowledged that the federal government was “taking away [Indian] lands” for “pitiful
considerations.”53
But if Knox acknowledged that the federal government was obtaining Native land
cheaply, he nonetheless did not feel that the federal government was spending too little
on Indians. On the contrary, he was the most vocal of a bevy of federal officials
bemoaning what they regarded as the inordinate expenses of the Indian Department.
These protestations reflected the standard carping of public officials about spending
funds, especially during the cash-strapped early republic. But, particularly from the
standpoint of the 1790s, the assertion that Indian affairs cost the federal government a
great deal of money rang true.
For one, despite rosy-eyed expectations about sales of western lands, there was
tremendous uncertainty over the future of how the public domain would be distributed, as
earlier chapters recount. In the 1790s, income from the land purchased from Natives was

53

“Report of the Secretary of War to the President,” December 10, 1790, in TP, Vol. II, 313-14. Calculating the number of acres
purchased by the United States is difficult. The figure of nearly 12 million comes from Susan B. Carter et al., “Table Ag542-543:
Lands Purchased by the United States from American Indian Tribes: 1795-1838,” in Historical Statistics of the United States
Millennial Edition Online (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), which relies on a 1839 report. But this calculation is
almost certainly too low, since it seems to only include land obtained at the Treaty of Greenville. Another estimate puts the amount at
over eighteen million, based on map measurements, but this estimate, too, seems to include only the Treaty of Greenville, ignoring the
other land cession treaties the federal government entered during the decade. Stanley Lebergott, “The Demand for Land: The United
States, 1820-1860,” The Journal of Economic History 45, no. 2 (1985): 181, 211, app’x B. On work that suggests that Natives were
substantially undercompensated for their lands, see Eric Kades, “Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation
of American Indian Lands,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 148 (2000): 1065; Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their
Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 74–82. For another
discussion on the expenses of the Indian department during this period, see Stephen J. Rockwell, Indian Affairs and the Administrative
State in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 49-50.

398

largely hypothetical, and many feared it would it never materialize. In fact, federal land
sales over the decade did not even equal federal expenditures on treaty annuities.54
More broadly, fixating on federal annuities has the ironic effect of construing the
treaties as nothing more than a land sale, in which all the terms appeared within the four
corners of the document. Federal officials may have aspired to transform treaties into
such simple exchanges, but in practice, neither Natives nor federal representatives viewed
treaties this way. Though they concluded with formal written documents, treaty sessions
were also grand diplomatic affairs where Natives reaffirmed their relationship with the
United States. They resembled nothing so much as an elaborate weeks- or months-long
conventions in the woods, usually held in the borderlands distant from Anglo-American
settlements, attended by scores of federal officials, soldiers, interpreters, and clerks, as
well as hundreds or even thousands of Natives.55
For federal officials, all these aspects of treaty sessions required one thing:
money. It was the treaty sessions, not the annuities, that led one federal superintendent to
bemoan “the great expence attending Indian Treatyes.” Federal officials had to feed,
clothe, and house all the Natives who showed up, as well as supply them with gifts, at
federal expense, in addition to providing provisions and salaries for the scores of staff
treaties required. Natives also had an annoying habit of failing to stick to federal
timelines: Blount complained that the Chickasaws and Choctaws showed up “many days”
early to 1792 treaty session, “which made expenses much higher.” Federal
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representatives futilely tried to keep down costs by limiting the attendees to only
“headmen,” but “common Indians,” as they called them, came anyway, often in
enormous numbers, expecting to be housed and fed.56
Despite officials’ best efforts, then, treaty sessions were elaborate affairs that ate
up, quite literally, public resources. At the small treaty that Rufus Putnam held at
Vincennes in 1792, which only seven hundred Natives attended, Putnam estimated that
40,000 rations would be required as a “moderate calculation.” For a proposed meeting
with the Cherokees, federal officials purchased 8,000 pounds of flour, one ton of lead,
and 900 gallons of whiskey. In addition to food, federal officials carried all manner of
goods. To his treaty session, Putnam carried coats, hats, suits, kettles, blankets, shirts,
hatchets, knives, and ribbons. Most of these items had to be transported from
Philadelphia—prices in the territories were, federal officials complained, usurious—
which required salaries for wagoneers, boatmen, and storekeepers.57
The result of all these expenses was that a single treaty session ended up costing
many multiples of the annuities enshrined in the written treaties as the formal
consideration for ceded lands. A conference with the Chickasaw and Choctaw Indians—
a peace conference, where no lands were to be purchased—ran an estimated $6,754.50.
The goods alone for a proposed treaty with the Cherokees cost $4,743.25. In 1789,
Arthur St. Clair estimated that a treaty along the Mississippi would cost an estimated
$10,250 in goods, transportation, and salaries, and another $5,000 for 30,000 rations. St.
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Clair would know: the Treaty of Fort Harmar that he had just concluded had cost over
$18,000. One congressman’s extreme estimate put the cost of the Treaty of New York
with the Creeks at $61,000 in presents, and a subsequent meeting at $150,000. Little
wonder that the inhabitants of Cumberland feared that the expense of holding an Indian
treaty from their own funds would “reduce them to the Greatest Poverty and Distress.”58
Treaties were merely the most concentrated instances when federal moneys went
to house, cloth, and feed Natives. Precisely because treaty sessions represented a
relationship rather than a single transaction, the underlying logic—that the federal
government had to continually supply Native peoples to secure their allegiances—meant
that much of the federal government’s Indian Department expenditure was entirely
unconnected with land sales but intended merely to maintain Native goodwill. This was
particularly true for the Chickasaws and Choctaws in the Southwest Territory. Since
neither nation had sold land to the federal government, neither received an annuity, but
their strategic location in the southeast borderlands, and the constant fear of Spanish
influence, quickly directed federal largesse their way. In 1793, William Blount, who
hoped to use the Chickasaws to counter what he saw as the threat from the Creeks,
proposed that a staggering $97,500 in goods be supplied to the Chickasaws and Choctaws
annually—including 16,000 blankets, 70,000 yards of cloth, and 15,000 pounds of
ammunition. The actual amount they received was less dramatic, but still significant: the
federal government provided them with $16,000 worth of goods, including gunsmithing
and blacksmithing tools, as well as paying the salary of a blacksmith from Knoxville for
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their use. Another $3,000 worth in goods followed based on the President’s promise a
few years later. Federal officials also supplied the Chickasaws with 1500 bushels of corn
after a poor harvest.59
Natives, though, did not simply wait for the federal government to provide goods.
Instead, throughout the 1790s, they constantly showed up at federal forts in both the
Northwest and Southwest Territories, expecting to be fed. Commanding officers, in vain,
tried to refer Natives to the governor, which only “excite[d] their indignation.” The
Natives insisted that “in all their intercourse with white people, [they had] been
accustomed to do business with military Chiefs.” Hesitant to allow Natives to return
their nations empty-handed—where the officers feared they would report, “We have
nothing to expect from the United States”—the officers issued the rations the Indians
demanded: 3,154 pounds of flour, 2,196 pounds of beef, 220 gills (5 ounces) of salt, and
294 gills of whiskey at Fort Defiance in 1798; 2556 pounds of beef in a single month in
1796 to support ninety Indians “who have altogether been victualled by the Garrison” at
Fort Wayne; 688 rations of liquor in a single month in 1801 at Fort Washington. The
costs mounted. In Vincennes, Captain Prior spent $1600 in a single year on the Indian
Department; other officers referenced the “incredible expence to government” of feeding
Natives. Complaining that the “provisions to Indians distributed at military posts far
exceed in value the amount of their annual Stipends [and] encourage the Indians in
idleness,” the Secretary of War attempted to have the practice “absolutely terminated”
except in instances of “indispensable charity.” But the “incidental expenses” of the
59
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Indian Department—including the “rations issued to Indians”—only continued to rise,
going from thousands to tens of thousands of dollars every year.60
Federal officials did not have to travel to remote borderlands outposts to
encounter importuning Natives, however. Throughout the 1790s, groups of Cherokees,
Choctaws, and Chickasaws, bedecked in federally provided attire, could be found
strolling the streets of Philadelphia. Their presence was the result of what were termed
“Indian visits,” where groups of Native leaders journeyed thousands of miles to meet
directly with the President and Secretary of War in the capital. Throughout the decade,
Cherokee leaders John Watts and Bloody Fellow and the Chickasaw leaders Piamingo
and Colbert traveled to Philadelphia nearly yearly. One congressman joked that Henry
Knox would soon learn Cherokee “by keeping continually whole tribes of indians at this
place.”61
Both high-level federal officials and Native leaders saw advantages in such visits.
Successive Secretaries of War encouraged trips to Philadelphia as an opportunity to
impress Native leaders with the size and power of the United States as well as to provide
evidence of nation’s goodwill toward Natives; the officials believed that Natives who saw
“the population of the country, and the improvements of all sorts” would quickly realize
the “futility” of war against the United States. For their part, Natives embraced the visits
60
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as an opportunity to conduct diplomacy unmediated by Indian agents, who were
predictably wary of these trips. “Indian visits to this place [Philadelphia] ought to be
prevented,” one close associate of William Blount complained. “[A]fter the agreement
made in Treaty the Indians had only to say we are dissatisfied with the Superintendant we
will go to Congress, this they do and get what they want.” This observation helps explain
why so many Natives eagerly made the long and occasionally dangerous journey and
why they often organized their trips unbidden by federal officials in the territories, who
gave them their support only reluctantly and often only after receiving direct orders.62
Indian visits were expensive. Natives who traveled on these trips were housed,
fed, transported, and clothed at federal expense, and escorted by translators and agents
paid from the federal treasury. Upon arrival in Philadelphia, Native leaders were
“abundantly supplied with goods,” with the obvious intent that their allegiance would be
secured and they would be able to report back to their nations on the nation’s generosity.
William Blount, who accompanied the Chickasaws on a 1793 visit to Philadelphia, hoped
that the chief Piamingo would “give occular demonstration of the liberality of the United
States” on his return. Such “liberality” meant that the costs of these Indian visits often
equaled those of treaty sessions: Blount estimated a single Cherokee visit in 1792 ran
about ten thousand dollars. 63
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In sum, satisfying Native demands through elaborate treaty sessions, provisions,
“presents,” and Indian visits was a costly undertaking. Tallying up the precise figures is
difficult given the poor state of early federal recordkeeping, but one calculation—pieced
together from various records in 1820 and likely an underestimate—stated that the federal
government spent $722,393 in the Indian Department throughout the 1790s, nearly 2% of
the federal government’s non-debt expenditures during the period. The expenditures
continued to rise, precipitously, in the following decades.64
Though these numbers vindicated those who saw placating Native wants as
cheaper than warfare, they nonetheless dramatically exceeded the $15,0000-20,000
annually that most of these prognosticators believed even the most generous presents
would cost. By the early 1800s, Indian Department expenditures routinely exceeded
$100,000 a year. These were especially large sums of money in the territories, where
hard currency was scarce; Ohio, for instance, brought in a little less than $40,000 in taxes
in 1798-99, while Tennessee supplied just over $13,000 in the same period. The Indian
Department expenditures look quite large, too, when set against the $972,000 the federal
government spent on compensation and pensions for Revolutionary War veterans during
the same period.65
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These expenditures certainly seemed enormous to those outside of the federal
government. In the Knoxville Gazette, William Cocke complained of “half the wealth of
the union presented to the enemy”; an ordinary citizen from Georgia, writing to President
Washington, bemoaned the “enormous sums of money” expended “yearly” on Indian
“presents.” Some drew explicit comparisons to federal spending on veterans. If
Congress “has any bounty to spare,” Tennessee’s first governor John Sevier argued, it
should grant its “charity” to “the lame, the halt, and the blind soldier” who sacrificed for
their nation, rather than “giving thousands to those who dispise it.”66
The response in the Northwest Territory was even more extreme. Some of the
inhabitants of Vincennes argued that, instead of “receiv[ing] any Indians into the Village,
[] we ought to kill them.” Perhaps the clearest evidence of the frenzied response of many
frontier settlers to federal support for Natives comes from the 1794 riot in Cincinnati,
discussed in the previous chapter. As the inhabitants whipped themselves into a
genocidal fury against a group of Choctaws aiding the U.S. army, they “Observed that
those Indians were a Considerable Expence to the US--that it would be Serviceable totaly
to destroy them (and that Instantly) than that they should receive any further Support.”67
Underlying this rage was a deep-seated sense that the federal government was
coddling Natives at the same moment that the nation’s own citizens were left to suffer the
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fury of Native attacks unaided. “While [the Cherokee chief] Double Head . . . and his
sanguinary Brothers are received and caressed at Philadelphia,” the inhabitants of the
Southwest Territory reportedly complained, “we are daily Suffering at the Hands of their
Associates in Iniquity.” Biased in favor of Natives, the federal government seemed to be
forgetting its obligation to its own citizens. The “present measures of the Federal
Government,” one observer reported, led many people to believe “they are neglected, and
the interest of the indians only consulted.” Returning to the paternalist metaphors that
frequently framed Indian affairs, one inhabitant of the Southwest Territory complained
that Congress “are more favourable to their savage, adopted, and illegitimate, than to us
their legitimate children.”68
***
Territorial citizens’ narrative of federal neglect was misleading. Their attacks on
Natives as the undeserving beneficiaries of federal largesse ignored the extent to which
much of this westward flow of funds ended up in their, rather than Native, hands. Towns
like Vincennes, Detroit, Knoxville, and Nashville were full of inhabitants dependent on
the Indian Department for their livelihood. Some, like Indian interpreters and agents,
were directly on the federal payroll. But federal spending enriched a larger circle than
simply federal employees. Territorial merchants provided the rations, horses, and
wagons the department needed, often at high markups; wagoneers and boatmen
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transported goods up the rivers from Philadelphia into Indian country; craftsmen built the
boats, trading posts, and warehouses the Department called for.69
Beyond these legitimate opportunities, minimal oversight meant that it was easy
enough to divert some of the stream of federal monies flowing through the territories
away from their intended recipients. In Vincennes, the local commander, Captain Prior,
reportedly dubbed himself “agent for Indian affairs on the Wabash,” and operated the
department as a “system of job-making” for the “sole benefit” of him and his
confederates--at “very Enormous” expense. In Nashville, local Indian agent James
Robertson allegedly organized a cartel of local merchants, to whom he directed business
supplying Indians in return for kickbacks—discounts on items for personal use, a wink
and a nod when Robertson took items for himself and billed them to the Indian
Department. In order to make the prices billed the government seem reasonable, an
informant asserted, Robertson and the merchants then delivered the Indians only half the
goods contracted for. Such venality allegedly included the territorial governors
themselves: rumors circulated that William Blount employed moneys sent for treaties to
buy slaves, which he later traded for the required provisions at a tidy profit, pocketing the
difference. Little wonder that Secretary of War Timothy Pickering bemoaned the “great
abuses existing in the conduct of affairs in the Southwestern Territory.”70
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But there was also a deeper and more significant irony to territorial protests over
Natives’ dependence on the federal government. In a formal constitutional sense, it was
the territories, not Native nations, that were “dependent.” At the time, the term conveyed
a political meaning that indicated a lack of autonomy, the opposite of independence. It
was this meaning that Arthur St. Clair invoked when he described territories as the
“dependent colon[ies]” of the United States, in contrast to sovereign participants in the
nation. But St. Clair did not use dependence purely as a technical term; he also argued
that this position mandated citizens’ subordination to the dictates of the national
government. When the territorial inhabitants grew too demanding, St. Clair insisted that
they be “put in Mind that they are not yet a part of the Union, but dependent upon it.”71
This category of dependence led some to view the territories through the same
lens of paternalism that federal officials had tried to thrust on Native peoples. This
metaphor cast the territories as the growing children of a benevolent and caring nationfather. Unsurprisingly, St. Clair particularly embraced this rhetoric: he described the
territories as “in a State of Infancy,” and related his feelings on viewing the development
of the Northwest Territory to “those of a father” who had watched his son grow up and
was about to venture out into a dangerous world. But some of the territorial inhabitants
adopted this rhetoric, too, expressing “gratitude to the Federal Government for the
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paternal care which they have exercised over the colony” and describing the territory as a
“Child . . . nursed with such tenderness by the United States.”72
But if the citizens of the territories were children, they were willful and
disobedient children who seemed to have little love for their parents, or so federal
officials felt. In fact, many territorial inhabitants would have rejected the infantilizing
metaphor; their view of their relationship with the United States was less sentimental and
more transactional. Like Natives, their loyalties and allegiances seemed fickle and
changeable. “They are too far removed form the seat of government to be much
impressed with the power of the United States,” St. Clair reported to a congressman in
Philadelphia of the residents of the Northwest Territory. “Fixed political principles they
have none, and though at present they seem attached to the General Government, it is in
fact but a passing sentiment, easily changed or even removed.” Earlier, St. Clair told
President Washington that the “Ligature that binds together” the territories and the United
States “is a weak one.”73
Also like Natives, frontier settlers used their strategic position in the borderlands
to their advantage, flirting with Spanish and British patronage to possibly secure some
sort of autonomous status. Throughout the 1780s and 1790s, much of the western United
States was aflame with secessionist sentiments: Rufus Putnam described this vision of a
“separate, independent Govrnment” as a “maggot . . . in the heads of some people.”
Though the most active advocates for secession were in Kentucky, the idea infected the
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territories, too. In the Northwest Territory, federal officials were highly uncertain of the
loyalties of the French in the Illinois Country and in Detroit, who had only recently
become U.S. citizens. In the Mero district around Nashville—itself named in honor of
the Spanish governor of New Orleans—inhabitants could not quite decide whether they
wanted to join Spanish Louisiana or invade and take it over; plans for both seemed to
emerge every few years. Federal officials believed that the Spanish and British
encouraged these secessionist sentiments, hoping to check American power. “Spain on
the one hand is certainly at Work for that purpose,” St. Clair reported, “and on the other
hand I have reason to believe that Great Britain is not Idle.” Throughout the period,
territorial officials occasionally received panicked letters from Philadelphia over alleged
Spanish, British, and French agents working their way through the territories, reportedly
sowing secessionist allegiances in their wake. In fact, many of the locals who engaged in
the most elaborate intrigues were also the ones that the federal government had to rely on
to implement its policies—James Wilkinson, later federal commander of the U.S. army in
the Northwest Territories; Harry Innes, later a federal judge, in Kentucky; James
Robertson, later a federal Indian agent.74
The alarmism over secessionism, especially in Philadelphia, ignores the extent to
which many in the territories were posturing, at least in part. Like Native nations, they
were engaged in a playoff system of their own, using the prospect of disloyalty to secure
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ever-greater concessions from the government. The threat of secession was in line with
inhabitants’ preferred interpretation of their relationship to the federal government, which
was contractual, not familial; they viewed their loyalty to the national government as
contingent on the federal government fulfilling its obligations to its citizens, just as the
Declaration of Independence suggested.
Above all, they expected one thing from the federal government: “protection,” a
keyword that, as Patrick Griffin has demonstrated, reverberated throughout the
borderlands during this period. “[P]rotection,” in the words of Virginia governor Patrick
Henry, “is the best & grand object of social compact.” Henry interpreted the federal
government’s failure to adequately defend Kentucky against Native attacks in this frame.
“[I]f it is found that no reliance can be placed in Congress for protection, are not all the
Western people driven into a separation from us?” Western settlers took such thinking to
heart, insisting that the federal government had failed to fulfill its duties. “America ought
not to exist as a nation,” one Kentuckian observed, “unless she chastises . . . her hostile
enemies.” One writer in the Knoxville Gazette put it baldly. “Allegiance and protection
are reciprocal in their nature,” the pseudonymous “Fellow Citizen” wrote, “and the one
may of right be refused when the other is withdrawn.”75
As this statement suggests, the attack on the federal government for inadequate
protection was a particular hobbyhorse of the inhabitants of the Southwest Territory,
who, as we have seen, believed they were the “most easy prey & the most out of
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protection” of any part of the United States. They especially resented that their pleas
were neglected, they believed, because of their political powerlessness and remote
location. “We are part of the united government, and from them we have a right to
expect protection,” a grand jury in the Hamilton District pronounced in 1793. Pointing
out the defense afforded the victims of the Algerine pirates, the Territory’s legislature
reminded Congress “that the citizens who live in poverty on the extreme frontier are as
much entitled to [be] procted [sic] in their lives, their families, and their little property, as
those who roll in luxury, ease, and affluence, in the great and opulent Atlantic cities.” An
author in the Knoxville Gazette expressed this sense of neglected grievance, writing of
recent attacks: “Had THESE DEPREDATIONS been committed in PHILADELPHIA
the reader can fill in the blank.” An anonymous reader actually did so, writing in: “there
would have been provisions made to punish those savages.”76
The extravagant rhetoric of the territorial citizens should not obscure the
genuineness of their sufferings. Cherokees and Creeks killed over two hundred territorial
citizens in a population of several thousand; representatives in the territorial assembly
asserted that nearly all of them had lost a “dear wife or child, or aged parent, or near
relation” to Native attacks. (Of course, they made no acknowledgment that the
Cherokees and Creeks shared this experience of loss because of whites’ attacks.) But the
territorial citizens’ claim on protection was also an attempt to wring federal resources
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from a reluctant government. “Does not Congress consider the lives of their people of
more value than money?” wrote one western settler pleading for military action.77
Many in the federal government well understood this linkage between federal
military expenditures and territorial loyalties. Expending money on the military, Henry
Knox reported, was the means most likely “to attach the people of the frontiers to the
government of the United States.” Massachusetts congressman Fisher Ames echoed
Knox’s link between federal money and territorial loyalties. “Congress has little
occasion to make itself known to [the frontier settlers] except by acts of protection,” he
told Rufus Putnam. “The most successful way to banish the ruinous idea of the future
independency of the western country is, doing good to the settlers, to gain their hearts.”78
In the Northwest Territory, such rhetoric by ordinary citizens and federal officials
alike was successful, helping drag the reluctant national government into the lengthy and
costly war against the Northwest Indian Confederacy. “To obtain protection against
lawless violence, was a main object for which the present government was instituted,”
Henry Knox wrote in his public declaration of the war’s causes. Echoing the constant
refrain from the territories, he continued: “A frontier citizen possesses as strong claims to
protection as any other citizen.” Privately, he wrote to Arthur St. Clair to use the
federally supported expeditions into Indian country as an opportunity to “impress the
frontier Citizens, of the entire good dispositions of the General government towards
77

“To the Congress of the United States”; Thompson to Madison, June 1, 1790. William Blount put the number killed or taken
prisoner by Creeks and Cherokees at “upwards of two hundred,” while the residents of the Mero District alone presented President
Washington with a list of 117 killed and wounded in the region since the Treaty of Holston. William Blount to James Seagrove,
January 9, 1794, in TP: Vol. IV, 320-23; Citizens of the Mero District to George Washington, August 13, 1793, in PGW:PS, 13:44042. In 1791, there were a little over 7,000 residents around Nashville, and 35,000 in the Territory as a whole. Walter T. Durham,
Before Tennessee: The Southwest Territory, 1790-1796 : A Narrative History of the Territory of the United States South of the River
Ohio (Rocky Mount Historical Association, 1990), 53.
78
Henry Knox, “A View of the Present State of the Military Force of the United States” March 19, 1791, NWTC; Fisher Ames to
Rufus Putnam, February 22, 1791, in MRP, 250.

414

them.” He gave St. Clair what amounted to talking points to quiet the frontier
complaints: “The United States embrace with equal care all parts of the Union, and in the
present case are taking expensive arrangements for the protection of the frontiers.”79
These “expensive” arrangements proved highly important to the Northwest
Territory’s economic development—not only in encouraging settlement by removing
perceptions of Native threats, but because the U.S. army soon became one of the most
important drivers of the territorial economy. The money that cascaded westward as a
result of the war against the Northwest Indian Confederacy proved a particular boon for
Cincinnati, where the army was stationed. “Inhabitants have doubled here within nine
months past,” John Cleves Symmes reported from the city in 1790, “owing to two
reasons principally—the residence of the army here, and great demand for labour on
buildings is such to give employment to every class.” An inhabitant of Marietta later
recalled how all “the Yong & interpriseing men follow[ed] the Armey to catch the
Government’s money & Make to themselves Fourtains [fortunes].” Embittered, he
complained, “"The Indian War Built up Cincinaty & the adjacent Countrey at the
expence of the Ohio Companeys Settlement.”80
The army proved financially essential to other places in the Northwest Territory
as well. When the United States took possession of Detroit in 1796, many of the firms
that had long made a living from the fur trade began providing the military with the
enormous quantities of alcohol, beef, and especially flour needed to support the soldiers.
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The town was so dependent on military money that its judges protested when the army
attempted to limit soldiers’ leave, as it would deprive the “the Citizens [of] the benefit of
the free circulation of Cash.” There was a similar effect wherever soldiers were
stationed: citizens in the Illinois country began building flour mills to supply the army
when soldiers were posted downriver. Federal officer John Hamtramck estimated his
soldiers in Vincennes had consumed one-third of all the flour produced in the village.
William Blount observed that the lands to the north were “more full of Money arising
from . . . the army North of Ohio than any other Part of America.”81
The Southwest Territory ostensibly fared differently, as Blount’s jealousy
indicates. As we have seen, despite Blount’s zealous advocacy and citizens’ impassioned
pleas, Congress refused to authorize punitive expeditions there akin to the campaign
north of the Ohio. Andrew Cayton has argued that this failure helped sour territorial
inhabitants against the federal government, creating long-standing regional divergences
in attitudes toward national authority.82
The claim that the federal government neglected the Southwest Territory, though,
gives too much credit to the bitter complaints of the most vocal territorial citizens. In
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fact, the authority and legitimacy of the federal government was the subject of fierce
contention within the Territory. Even as many argued that the national government had
failed to fulfill its most fundamental obligation of protection, others sharply disagreed.
“If ever a people lived under a desireable Government,” Territorial Judge Campbell
observed in a grand jury charge, “it may truly be said to be the people of the [Southwest]
Territory . . . We experience all the Advantages of Government without feeling any of its
burdens.” Another argued that the Territory had flourished under federal rule, which had
“establish[ed] things greatly beneficial to the people collectively.”83
This view was credible because, notwithstanding the protests, the federal
government heavily subsidized the territories. Though local taxes and fees underwrote
some infrastructure and parts of the judicial system, the heaviest expenses were paid from
the federal treasury. The largest expense of all, protecting the territories, was born
entirely by the federal government, which paid the substantial costs of the territorial
militia.
The militia was a deeply local institution that required all male citizens to serve to
protect the community. Military men like St. Clair and especially Henry Knox had little
respect or confidence in the militia, whom they viewed as disobedient, ill-trained, and
unreliable. But territorial citizens insisted that local militia, being accustomed to Native
methods of warfare, were far more effective against Native attacks. And so, in both the
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Northwest and Southwest Territories, Congress used its constitutional power to authorize
the President to call out the militia to supplement the minuscule national military.84
As an institution, this federalized militia was an odd amalgam of local and
national authority. Though the militia ostensibly fell under the formal control of federally
appointed military commanders like Arthur St. Clair, in practice the militia had little
respect for the regular army. The army did not select militia officers; localities did. Even
in the territories, where the federal governors appointed militia leaders, they felt
constrained to pick local notables based on their stature in the community. Whenever the
militia and regular army fought alongside each other, as they did during the Northwest
Indian War, there were incessant disagreements over rank and command.85
Federal officials held the formal authority to decide when and how to call out the
militia. Yet distance required placing much of this authority in influential locals or in the
so-called county lieutenants, the militia’s local commanders. Federal officials’ discretion
was also heavily constrained by demands from local inhabitants: they were “teazed to
death by rumours of persons killed, strong assertions & persuasions of the necessity of
establishing posts at this that and the other place.” Westerners had strong views, based
on experience, about what “adequate” protection required—not just large numbers of
general militia, but also specialized scouts, rangers, and mounted militia. Federal
84
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officials fulminated that localities were always calling up more militia than needed, and
to little effect. The counties, Arthur St. Clair observed, did “not ma[k]e a very discreet
use of the powers they were invested with, as to numbers.”86
In practice, then, federal officers exercised little control over either the personnel
or the service of the “federal” militia. What the federal government did provide was
financing. While in federal service, the militia received the same pay as regular soldiers
in the federal army, from the same source—the national treasury. They also received pay
for subsistence and supplies, which made the mounted rangers and scouts, with their
horses, especially expensive. Henry Knox fruitlessly appealed to the militia commanders
to observe the “highest oeconomy.” Instead, he lamented, the militia made “unlimited
expences” and were “exceedingly inattentive to public Stores of every kind.” The pay
afforded to the scouts and rangers the frontier settlers so favored was especially
outrageous. “Were it carried to a considerable extent,” Knox complained, “no
Government on earth could support it.”87
The numbers supported Knox’s complaints. As Native attacks escalated in the
early 1790s, the federal government expended tens of thousands of dollars monthly on
militia defense. In early 1791, Henry Knox predicted that militia protection for all of
Virginia and Kentucky would cost $50,000 for the year. By 1792, the Southwest
Territory had an estimated 1500 militia under arms—at a time when the Territory’s
population was only 35,000—at a cost for an estimated $20,000 for three months
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protection. By 1793, the Territory spent $37,517.69 on militia for protection against
Cherokees and Creeks during October and November alone; Henry Knox feared that
costs would top $100,000 by February. Expenses in the isolated Mero District, around
Nashville, were especially heavy: Blount calculated that they were four times greater than
those elsewhere in the Territory.88
To pay these claims, literal chests filled with tens of thousands of dollars made
their way to the office of David Henley, the army’s paymaster in Knoxville. Henley later
recounted being completely overwhelmed, as he had to process hundreds of thousands of
dollars in claims and payments almost single-handedly (his ineffectual assistant, an
untrained army officer, later vanished, leaving his accounts $50,000 in arrears).89
Though many territorial inhabitants regarded these measures as inadequate, others
recognized that the Southwest Territory received a double benefit from these federal
expenditures, as the writer LM. observed in the Knoxville Gazette. For one, “the citizens
have been protected . . . the force of the Territory has been called out.” For another, “for
these services they are and will be paid, in money, a medium of trade, general and
efficacious.” L.M. noted that under North Carolina’s rule, the only currency in
circulation was near-worthless state paper, which was nonetheless in short supply. Now,
thanks to the federal government, “a medium of commerce, viz. gold and silver, has been
introduced,” leading, in L.M.’s view, to the “rise and growth of every little town.”90
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Inhabitants soon came to see militia claims as nearly as central to the local
economy as land rights—like title, “the [militia] Certificates became as it were a
circulating Medium thro’ out the Territory.” Militia claims also presented the same
hazards as land ownership in the Territory. Just as North Carolina had attempted to halt
fraud through bookkeeping, the War Department outlined an elaborate payment
procedure involving extensive paperwork, stipulating that militia commanders provide
triplicate receipts, to regulate the massive flow of funds. But this failed to stop abuse. In
one instance, a muster master allegedly skimmed four dollars from the pay of every
officer. In another, commander reportedly mustered more men than really served; he
then distributed the pay for these phantom soldiers among the actual militia.91
More common than outright fraud, however, was a complicated system of
speculation in militia claims. Because of the delay in federal payment, and because of
the shortage of specie in the Southwest Territory, soldiers entitled to militia payments
routinely assigned them at a discount to other parties, who then passed them along as
currency; storekeepers frequently accepted militia vouchers as payment. Many of these
assignments were done informally, often lacking the name of the attorney, witness, or
even party involved in the transfer, but nonetheless securing the required endorsement of
a justice of the peace. Territorial citizens were, in essence, trading and gambling on
federal credit, a practice that Secretary of War Timothy Pickering complained was
“unauthorized” and pernicious. His fear was that those who had actually served would be
“injured” while “persons who have speculated on their claims” would receive “unjust
91
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emolument.” Once again, Pickering fretted, local practices wrested ostensibly federal
authority out of the hands of federal officials, even as territorial citizens would blame the
federal government for its inattentiveness to their needs.92
But if territorial citizens proved remarkably effective at repurposing federal funds
to their own ends, the federal government also received an ostensible benefit from the
seemingly ceaseless flow of federal funds to pay the militia. If nothing else, federal
finance was a source of federal power that gave federal officials authority over a militia
otherwise largely outside meaningful federal control. Federal officials could, and did,
refuse to pay expenses that they regarded as unauthorized.
A particularly fierce controversy raged around the Beard and Ore expeditions of
1793 and 1794. As discussed in the previous chapter, these expeditions flagrantly
violated federal law, but efforts to hold the perpetrators legally accountable failed.
Territorial citizens brazenly argued that not only were the expeditions legally justifiable,
but that Congress was obligated on “equitable” grounds to repay their expenses from the
public treasury. For Ore’s expedition, James Robertson even signed off on the muster
rolls required for federal reimbursement. William Blount was shocked at the audacity.
There was not “the most distant hope that the Perpetrators of such lawless unauthorized
acts could expect the least Pecuniary Reward for their trouble, for services I cannot call
them.” Blount told Robertson. “I know not the price I would take to report such an order
to the War office.”93
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In the short term, Blount’s predictions were right: successive Secretaries of War,
in authorizing the Territory’s militia payments, refused to pay the costs of the offensive
military operations, even going so far as to instruct the paymaster to parse out which
militia companies had remained within territorial boundaries. Blount noted that this
refusal was a “great Disappointment” to many speculators, who were “deeply interested .
. . holding many of the claims.” One territorial resident complained that his “whole time”
was taken up trying to obtain reimbursement. Another stated that, as a consequence of
this refusal, the inhabitants’ “Confidence in the General Government [was] lost.” When
a grand jury in Hamilton District presented its grievances against the government in
1795, two of its four complaints stemmed from frustration that the national executive
refused to pay these expenses under the “pretence” that they were offensive operations.94
The jury offered an implicit theory for this apparent failure: states that had
representatives, they noted, had received both payment and protection from the federal
government. This explanation for the Territory’s seeming mistreatment by Congress held
widespread currency. Increasingly, citizens concluded that the Territory’s political
problems stemmed from its constitutional status: as one writer observed in the Knoxville
Gazette, “All dependent governments are deficient as to form.” Were the Territory
represented in Congress, another Gazette writer opined, the relation of their sufferings
would wring tears from the walls themselves, if not from the unfeeling congressmen.
William Blount himself hinted that Ore’s expedition would have been warranted in
“states who have Senators and Representatives in the Public Councils.” But there was
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also a remedy: the Territory held the power to cast off their territorial status and assume
statehood. Anxiety over Indian affairs led multiple voices to argue that the Territory
should seek admission as a “member state of the federal union” as “speedily as
possible.”95
In some ways, these calls proved prescient. After Tennessee’s admission to
statehood, disgruntled militia members submitted petitions to Congress requesting
payment, first for Beard’s 1793 expedition and later for Ore’s 1794 attack. Congress
referred the petitions to Secretary of War James McHenry, who urged that Congress not
pay the costs of either expedition, which had flouted federal law. He provided especially
lengthy documentation on the illegality of Ore’s attack. But Tennessee’s newly elected
congressman, Andrew Jackson, who himself had served as a private in Ore’s brutal
expedition, agitated strongly for payment of the 1793 expedition by employing the
overwrought anti-Indian rhetoric of the era—“the knife and the tomahawk,” he recounted
for Congress, “were held over the heads of women and children.” When the petition was
referred back to committee, Jackson secured a position as chairman, producing a report
that once again stressed Indian perfidy, suggested that the President’s militia
authorization had legitimated the attacks, argued that the Territory enjoyed a separate
right under the Constitution to repel attacks, and insisted that the militiamen were simply
following orders. Without much discussion, Congress authorized payment as part of the
yearly military appropriation, an action that a correspondent told Jackson “has hightened
the esteem of the people, for the General Government, and secured to yourself a
95
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permanent interest.” Jackson’s successor in office, William Clairborne, soon
accomplished the same feat with Ore’s even more dubious expedition. Like Jackson,
Clairborne focused on the individual militiamen; how were they to know that their
commander lacked legitimate authority? Congress agreed to the payment without
opposition. Perhaps the earlier heated debates on unauthorized expeditions had
exhausted them, or they were apathetic about a retroactive issue. But Jackson and
Clairborne cared deeply, and their passion prevailed.96
There was, of course, an irony about the newly “independent” state proving its
autonomy by lapping at the federal trough. But it in many respects, it was entirely
consistent with the territories’ creation and development. Territorial citizens may have
viewed themselves as dependent in name only, but in many respects they were wards of
the national government in practice as well as in theory. Federal officials recognized this
reliance: “[T]he expence of protecting such distant settlements greatly exceeds the value
of them,” Henry Knox wrote. Nonetheless, the funds kept flowing despite this
assessment, demonstrating how frontier citizens proved even more effective than Natives
at using some of the same sources of leverage—their dubious allegiances in a competitive
and unsettled borderland—to wring cash from the federal government. In the process,
federal expenditures buoyed and expanded an often marginal economy. “All the Stirrings
of Industry” had been “set in Motion by the circulation of [federal] Money,” Arthur St.
Clair reported from the Northwest Territory, in urging that yet more funds be expended
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there. Such money “like a gentle stream fertilize[d] and beautif[ied] the whole Country
through which it flowed.”97
Some territorial citizens recognized that they benefitted from these expenses, but
they viewed such payments as nothing more than their due—merely the fulfillment by the
federal government of its obligation, under the “social compact,” to protect all parts of
the federal union. It did little to alter the tendency of territorial residents, especially in
the Southwest Territory, to view themselves as abandoned by distant politicians
untroubled by their destruction, and to view their survival as largely thanks to their own
self-reliance rather than government aid. Thus it was that those in the territories could
describe themselves, without any apparent awareness of irony, as of that “class of men,
that earn their scanty living by hard labour, and who do not seek in the sweets of the
general Government, to their aid.”98
***
In 1807, Joseph Buell wrote to an unknown correspondent on “business of trifling
consequence.” Buell, from Marietta in the new state of Ohio, wanted to know what he
should do with a small cannon given the town by the federal government during the
Indian war, “in our former stage of government.” Now, he reported, the gun’s “principal
use” was the “discharging of it on the 4th of July, Reechoing the toasts drank in contempt
to the Genl Government.”99
The “small field piece” Buell described was part of the stream of federal largesse
that had flowed into the territories throughout the 1790s. The national treasury had paid
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the extravagant costs of the national military campaign against the Northwest Indian
Confederacy, but it had also paid for corn for the Chickasaws, ruffled shirts for Cherokee
leaders, goods to compensate relatives of murdered Haudonesaunees as well as white
owners of horses stolen in the Southwest Territory, and the costs of the territorial militia.
For all their insistence on economy, federal officials were quick to turn to federal funds to
try to placate the repeated and competing demands placed on them by both Native and
non-Native inhabitants of the territories.
Such largesse reflected an amalgam of federal constraint and power. Federal
officials turned to money when law failed: compensation made up for the federal
government’s inability to control and punish Natives and white settlers. They also used
money to try to secure the fickle allegiances of both groups. But even these generous
expenditures proved a blunt, and often ineffective, method of making policy. Muchcourted Native leaders like John Watts commanded attacks on the Southwest Territory,
while the territorial militia secured federal funds for expeditions in flat contravention of
federal orders and at odds with federal goals. In part, this seeming failure stemmed from
democracy: federal officials could not always rely on Congress to support them,
especially after statehood gave former territories much more voice in national councils.
But it also reflected the broader challenge of governing the borderlands, where there were
multiple centers of power, and authority, allegiance, and identity all proved fluid.
Yet in the long run, federal largesse proved a potent tool in securing at least some
of the fickle allegiances of territorial inhabitants, both Native and non-Native, to the
national government. Many early Americans had a hard-headed understanding of the
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role of self-interest in governance. “[M]ankind are every where governed by their
Interest however variously modified,” the venal James Wilkinson argued. “To select,
seize, & turn to advantage the predominant passion is the depth of political science.”
Others extended this interest-based theory of politics to Indian affairs. “The great object
in managing Indians, or indeed any other men, however enlightened, is to obtain their
confidence,” Henry Knox instructed William Blount (who presumably well understood
the role of self-interest in creating attachments). “This cannot be done but by convincing
them of an attention to their interests.” Many Tennesseans and Natives, of course,
remained deeply skeptical of the federal government. But secessionist sentiments in the
West waned, and federal patronage produced powerful pro-American factions within
many Native nations; future Native struggles against the United States quickly became
civil wars.100
For both Natives and territorial citizens, the concept of dependence played a
central role. As scholars have noted, concepts of dependency were first applied to people
of color, including Natives, before being transferred to certain recipients of state aid more
generally. Anglo-Americans increasingly employed dependence as a term of art to
describe both the purported reality and the legal status of Native nations within the
United States. Over time, Native “dependence” became a free-floating justification for
federal authority over all Indians.101
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The history traced here suggests that the linkage of dependency between Natives
and the people who would later be termed “welfare recipients” was more direct than
historians have recognized: the federal “bounty” bestowed on Natives made them among
the first creators and beneficiaries of what would later become scholars have dubbed “the
national welfare state.” Though most work on the welfare state’s early antecedents has
focused on pensions and payments to veterans, Natives presented a different case, as their
claim of national resources stemmed not from service or merit, but, at least ostensibly,
from poverty and humanitarian impulses. The federal government’s authority over Indian
affairs also meant that supplying Natives was a national project, unlike the deeply local
schemes of poor relief that operated within Anglo-American society. Already, by the late
eighteenth century, neighboring Anglo-Americans had come to view Natives as the wards
of a paternalist federal government.102
The deep irony was that it was precisely because the Shawnees, Delawares,
Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws were “independent tribes of Indians,” in Henry
Knox’s words, that they were able to extract such concessions. Even if Natives’ white
neighbors attempted to thrust the two together, Indian affairs and “welfare” were
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different, and neither Native peoples nor federal officials, at least in their more candid
moments, regarded Native nations as dependents. Strategically positioned in the
borderland between the United States, Spanish Louisiana, and British Canada, these
nations were outside the control of any Euro-American power, which made them all
compete to secure Native allegiances. Both Natives and federal representatives, then,
interpreted federal gifts through the lens of allegiance and diplomacy, as the price of
Native friendship. But this history of empowered Natives and conciliatory, even
obsequious, federal officials was forgotten, leaving behind a narrative in which the
continued flow of hundreds of thousands of federal dollars into Indian country was a
symbol of Native weakness rather than strength.103
Another irony was that the territorial inhabitants, for all their disdain for Natives’
reliance on federal goods, were also “dependent” on the United States. This was true not
just in the term’s formal political meaning but also in an economic sense, as federal
money was a primary driver of the territorial economy. But, just as recipients of national
funds would later be distinguished based on the contrast between “needs” and “rights,”
territorial inhabitants did not see themselves as equivalent to Natives; they regarded
themselves as entitled to the largesse they received. They saw the federal government’s
enormous expenditures on defense and particularly the militia as merely their due, part of
their “right” to receive protection from the national government.104
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In the long run, this rhetoric of entitlement proved remarkably effective. Native
“dependents” of the federal government ultimately received its benevolence through their
forcible eviction from their homelands. This process destroyed the wealth Native nations
had assembled—farms, plantations, livestock, and slaves, much accumulated as a result
of conscious federal efforts to use gifts to encourage the adoption of American modes of
agriculture—and forced Natives to places where they truly did rely on meager federal
rations for survival. Meanwhile, the citizens of the former territories, now risen to the
“independent” status of statehood, prided themselves on their autonomy and self-reliance,
firing off federal cannons to condemn the national government.105
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PART III: STATEHOOD
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Chapter 7: Statehood, Precedent, and Federal Power
In 1796, the Southwest Territory became the first U.S. territory to seek admission
as a state. The Northwest Ordinance provided some guidance on admission: it stipulated
that the territories would be admitted once they had 60,000 free (non-Native) inhabitants,
though they could be admitted earlier at Congress’s discretion. But the Ordinance left
many other questions unresolved. As a result, Congress debated the Territory’s statehood
at length, focused less on the new state of “Tennessee” than on the future. “Other States
would be rising up in the Western wilderness, and claiming their right to admission,”
Representative Smith of South Carolina observed at the outset of the debate, “and
therefore the precedent now to be established, was of very considerable importance."1
In admitting Tennessee and, six years later, the eastern portion of the Northwest
Territory, “Ohio,” Congress began to clarify these undetermined issues. Some questions
concerned process: could Tennessee claim admission as of right, or did it require a
special act of Congress? But other issues centered on the long-term division of authority
between the United States and the newly admitted states. People in the territories-cumstates, as well as in Congress, had to work through the tangle of property, jurisdiction,
and sovereignty that lay latent, and unresolved, in much territorial practice. In particular,
with the end of direct federal sovereignty, early Americans had to determine how much
of the deep federal involvement in governance throughout the territories would be
similarly unspooled.
Unsurprisingly, these controversies came to turn on land and Indian affairs. In
part, this was because federal power over both the public domain and Indian affairs rested
1
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on constitutional sources other than federal authority over the territories. But even more
meaningfully, as we have seen, administering land and Indian affairs was the bulk of
what federal territorial governments did. The result was a robust federal administrative
structure of Indian agents and land offices independent of the territorial executive,
judicial, and legislative branches that passed from federal to state control. At the time,
precisely because these issues mattered so much for daily governance, newly admitted
states, especially Tennessee, were anxious to claim authority in these areas. Defying the
federal government, they sought to assert jurisdiction over both the public domain and
Native diplomacy.
The confrontations that followed were framed in era’s high rhetoric of
federalism—as a clash over the meaning of sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction, and the
Northwest Ordinance’s promise that the new states would be admitted “on an equal
footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.” But underlying these broad
struggles over constitutional meanings lay more immediate controversies in which
interests loomed just as large as ideology. In these conflicts, the states and the federal
government served as the proxies for rival claimants. This was particularly true in
Tennessee, where issues of the public domain and Indian affairs swirled together in a
struggle over Cherokee land rights. As quasi-legal settlers turned to state jurisdiction
while the Cherokees sought federal vindication, the dispute demonstrated the stakes at
issue in determining which sovereign would arbitrate property and jurisdictional
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conflicts. In this sense, the constitutional struggles over federalism on state admission
represented a fight over adjudicatory authority.2
In Tennessee, the federal government ultimately gained what seemed a Pyrrhic
victory: it maintained its authority in principle even as it ceded Tennessee the power the
state sought, leaving the Cherokees to bear the costs of this capitulation. But, because of
precedential stakes, even this limited success had important consequences. In particular,
when Ohio subsequently sought admission, the federal government asserted its authority
by forcing the state to disclaim its rights to the public domain. Because of the unique
political circumstances of Ohio’s statehood, the state acquiesced. The result was that the
practice became entrenched part of constitutional practice. In this sense, the federal
government’s brief moment of sovereignty in the territories resulted in a durable
expansion of federal power.
This process also offers a corrective to the predominant scholarly narrative, which
interprets the structure of dual sovereignty created by early American federalism as an
embrace of localism and diversity. Yet, as we have seen, these values flourished in the
territories even when sovereignty, jurisdiction, and ownership were formally all united
under the federal government. This was because foreign jurisdictions, secessionist
movements, and wild-eyed plans for self-sovereignty all contended with the United States
for authority. Statehood collapsed these contentions into the overarching divide between
federal and state sovereignty, thereby channeling preexisting conflicts such as the
struggles between the Cherokees and their neighbors into a structural contest between
state and federal authority. The vision of state territorial sovereignty that Tennessee and
2
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other states came to champion offered more homogeneity, not less; it sought to transform
the borderlands into the “ordinary jurisdiction” of state control.3
***
That federal land ownership of public lands became a question at all was
surprising given the text of the Northwest Ordinance, which provided that the
“legislatures of . . . [the] new States shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the
soil by the United States in Congress assembled.” But Ordinance’s continued status after
statehood was an open question. Although most regarded the Ordinance as a
constitutional document, its status as a compact meant that, upon statehood, the former
territorial residents were arguably entering a new and different agreement with the federal
government.4
The first test of this provision came in the Southwest Territory, where frustration
with federal rule made the desire for statehood nearly unanimous. “People here almost
without Exception are for a State,” territorial governor William Blount wrote. In late
1795, Blount commissioned a census that reported that the Territory had 77, 262 free
inhabitants, well over the 60,000 inhabitants required for statehood under the Ordinance.
Blount, concluding that this now made the Territory “a State of Right,” accordingly
issued a proclamation calling for a constitutional convention.5

3

For work on federalism in this period, most of which focuses on high politics and constitutional history, see Alison L LaCroix, The
Ideological Origins of American Federalism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010); Gordon S. Wood, “Federalism from
the Bottom Up,” The University of Chicago Law Review, 2011, 705–32, Saul Cornell and Gerald Leonard, “The Consolidation of the
Early Federal System, 1791-1812,” 518-54.
4
Journals of the Continental Congress, 32:334-43. On the uncertain status of the Northwest Ordinance after statehood, see Peter S.
Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).
5
William Blount to James Robertson, February 2, 1795, in “The Correspondence of Gen. James Robertson,” The American Historical
Magazine 4, no. 2 (April 1, 1899): 171-72; “Enumeration of Inhabitants of the Southwest Territory,” November 28, 1795, Reel 2:
Territory Southwest of the River Ohio, Senate Territorial Papers (microfilm), M200, U.S. National Archives; William Blount to John
Gray Blount, March 28, 1795, in JGBP, 2:520-23; “Proclamation by Governor Blount,” November 28, 1795, in TP: Vol. IV, 407-08.
Although Tennessee was the first state created from the U.S. territories, the process of its statehood has received little scholarly

436

The convention met in January 1796, in the office of War Department paymaster
David Henley, the War Department’s paymaster, one of the few public buildings in
Knoxville. Over next two and a half weeks, the convention drafted a proposed
constitution similar to other state constitutions of the time. What made the draft
constitution exceptional was the attention it devoted to land. One article of the
declaration of rights specifically guaranteed the right of preemption to the settlers south
of the French Broad River. The initial draft of the proposed constitution also outlined the
boundaries of the new state and enshrined the state’s “Sovereignty and right of Soil”
within the borders. But a somewhat confusing qualifier was subsequently added that the
state claimed the right of soil only “so far” as consistent with the U.S. Constitution, the
North Carolina Bill of Rights and Constitution, the Northwest Ordinance, and North
Carolina’s act of cession; this provision also stipulated that nothing in the State
Constitution would affect individual claims guaranteed under the Cession Act. It was this
ambiguous version that secured approval from the Territory’s inhabitants.6
As adopted, then, Tennessee’s Constitution merely acknowledged the confusing
muddle of federal, state, and individual claims that had characterized the Tennessee
country from the beginning. Noticeably absent were Native land rights, even though
federal treaties guaranteed Cherokee and Chickasaw ownership of most of the land within
state’s new boundaries. One commentator, writing to President Washington, found “the
Instrument called a Constitution” defective, reflecting its hasty drafting. At the very
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least, he urged, an article should be added “recognizing the right of the United States to
dispose of the lands occupied by the Indians, and also the vacant lands within the limits
prescribed by the Treaty of Holstein [Holston].”7
When Congress received a copy of Tennessee’s Constitution, its response was
mostly astonishment at the seeming effrontery of the would-be state: Tennessee had
conducted the census and drafted its constitution on the strength of its own authority
alone, without any congressional authorization. An intense debate followed over the
quasi-metaphysical question of when, exactly, Tennessee had become a state, and
whether Congress had a role in deciding statehood. Representative Albert Gallatin, from
western Pennsylvania and a supporter of the nascent Republican Party, argued that the
Southwest Territory “became ipso facto a State the moment they amounted to 60,000 free
inhabitants,” and that Congress was obliged to recognize this fact under the terms of the
Northwest Ordinance. Others insisted that residents could not “at their own mere will
and pleasure” simply declare themselves a separate state, which required congressional
approval. Some saw politics at work in this opposition: William Blount, for instance,
suspected that the delay was due largely to fears that Tennessee would join other southern
states in opposing John Adams’s presidential campaign. But letters from territorial
citizens indicated that they, too, held divergent views on this question.8
Another line of debate focused on the seeming deficiencies of Tennessee’s
Constitution. Several congressmen wished that the conditions and restrictions of the
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Northwest Ordinance had been explicitly written into the document. In particular, the
issues of lands, both Native and federal, loomed large, just as they had for the
Tennesseans. James Hillhouse of Connecticut, long the House’s leading defender of
Native title, expressed concern over the breadth of the state’s territorial claims and
advocated redrawing the state’s borders to exclude Indian lands, a proposal echoed by
other northern congressmen. Proponents of Tennessee’s statehood responded by insisting
all the laws of Congress would still apply, obviating the need for further guarantees of
title. The ordinance would remain “paramount” to the state’s constitution, the Trade and
Intercourse Act barring settlement on Indian lands would provide security for Native title,
and North Carolina’s still-valid cession ensured that all unappropriated lands would
belong to the United States. In the end, statehood ultimately prevailed, though Congress,
seeking to affirm its authority over the process of admission, lamely enacted a statute
retroactively authorizing Tennessee’s actions.9
Yet what seemed like settled law when viewed from Congress turned out to be
much more open in the minds of Tennesseans, producing what one congressman had
accurately predicted might be “disagreeable discussions.” In particular, weeks into its
first sitting and only two months after official statehood, the Tennessee Assembly raised
the question of ownership of the public lands in a remonstrance to Congress. Though the
Assembly limited its claim to an insistence that Congress honor its obligations under the
North Carolina cession by satisfying North Carolinian land grants, the remonstrance’s
language swept more broadly, insisting on the state’s “equal footing” and emphasizing
the guarantee of each state’s “right of soil and sovereignty” implied by the Treaty of Paris
9

5 Annals of Cong. 1300-30 (1796); Act of June 1, 1796, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 491.
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and congressional actions during the American Revolution. In forwarding the petition to
Andrew Jackson—Tennessee’s new congressional representative—John Sevier, the
newly elected governor, made the implied link between property and sovereignty explicit.
In his view, “the state of Tennessee is reinvested with all the right of domain [i.e.,
ownership]” that North Carolina had held prior to cession. Otherwise, the promise in the
federal statute admitting Tennessee “on an equal footing with the original States, in all
respects whatever” would be violated, since Tennessee would “not equally stand
possessed of those free and independant rights the original States enjoy.” 10
Jackson strongly agreed with Sevier’s position. Tennessee’s sovereignty, he
stressed, was enshrined in both the federal constitution and in the act of admission, and
ownership was an integral aspect of sovereignty. “[T]he right to the Soil,” he told Sevier,
“is so firmly invested in the sovereignty of the State, both by Constitutional principles
and by the law of nations added to that . . . that nothing but the act of the Strong hand of
power itself, can divest us of that right.” The United States, he emphasized, had “no solid
Legal ground” for its claim to land within the state; he seconded Sevier’s reliance on the
equal footing doctrine, since otherwise “the right of Domain is not a right which must be
preposterous and perversion of the English Language.” A year later, Jackson reported
rumors that Alexander Hamilton concurred with their position: the former Secretary of
the Treasury supposedly opined that “the vacant soil belongs indubitably to the
sovereignity of the State.”11
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“Address and Remonstrance of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee,” [August 9, 1796], in ASP:IA, 1:625-26. The date
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In crafting their arguments from sovereignty, Jackson and Sevier passed over in
silence the question of the Northwest Ordinance and its guarantee of federal title. But
their claims represented less a repudiation of the Ordinance than an emphasis on its
contradictions. The equal footing doctrine and the codification of federal land ownership
were only reconcilable based on a highly formalist divide between state jurisdiction on
the one hand and property on the other hand. But as Jackson and Sevier convincingly
argued, this dichotomy was untenable in either early American law or, even more
meaningfully, practice. As Jackson and Sevier knew from first-hand experience,
governing the public domain and its distribution was perhaps the most significant form of
sovereignty in the Tennessee country.

Related to their anxieties over land were Sevier and Jackson’s concerns about
federal overreach in Indian affairs. “In you alone is Constitutionally invested the
authority and power of protecting the State,” Jackson informed Sevier after the governor
told him of state plans to try to prosecute Natives for crimes against the white citizens.
Authority over such matters, Jackson emphasized, “are powers, that Consistant, With the
Sovereignty retaind. by the States, properly belong to Each Individual State, which never
ought on any account to be Surrender to the General Government.” This led Jackson to
an extended attack on the President for “Grasping after power” he did not constitutionally
enjoy and threatening to “overwhelm[]” the “Sovereignty of the Individual States.”
Jackson singled out for attack the federal officer David Henley, who remained in
Clause prohibited Georgia’s repeal of its land sales to the Yazoo Companies. Robert Goodloe Harper, The Case of the Georgia Sales
on the Mississippi Considered . . . . (Philadelphia: Printed by Richard Folwell, 1799), 88-89. However, Hamilton specifically
disclaimed any determination as to whether Georgia had legitimate title to the land that it had sold. Ibid.
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Tennessee as army paymaster and was now invested with authority to “superintend[] the
Indian affairs.” This position, Jackson complained, was unsanctioned by “any law that I
can find.”12
Consistent with this theory, Sevier conducted his own diplomacy with the
Cherokees and Creeks. As authorized under federal law, he issued passports permitting
U.S. citizens to travel into Indian country. But he went further, routinely corresponding
with Native leaders and dispatching his own representatives into Indian country, and
seemingly arrogating to Tennessee the right to determine whether the state would honor
federal Indian treaties. To justify this seeming usurpation of federal law and prerogative,
he contrasted his own “extensive acquitance with several Indian tribes upwards of thirty
years” with the callow and ignorant young men the federal government employed as its
agents. Moreover, he told Secretary of War McHenry that, “notwithstanding the [federal]
Agents resident among them,” much of the Cherokee nation lay “within our territorial
limits,” which required that the state government be “constantly engaged, and much time
taken up, in the transaction of indian business.”13
The boldest challenge to federal authority over Indian affairs, however, came
from William Blount. The former territorial governor had a new position as one of
Tennessee’s new U.S. senators. But this recognition did not seem to satisfy Blount, who
12

Andrew Jackson to John Sevier, February 24, 1797, in PAJ, 1:126-27;
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felt neglected and betrayed by his former superiors, especially in the War Department: in
the waning days of the territorial government, he and Secretary of War Timothy
Pickering had had an acrimonious correspondence in which Pickering suggested that
Blount’s handling of Indian affairs was suspicious and self-serving. This mortified
Blount. “[H]e had taken great pains to settle that state, and to render it important,” one
conversant reported of a discussion with Blount soon after Tennessee’s statehood. Yet
“he been treated very ill by the President . . . [and] the executive officers of the United
States. The conversation indeed became so affecting to him, that he wept.”14
The lachrymose Blount soon became involved with a dubious scheme put forward
by his close associate, John Chisholm, who had served as Blount’s errand man into
Indian country. Chisholm, apparently an arrant boaster— a “windy blasty fellow,” as
Blount himself once described him—concocted a plan to attack and capture Spanish
Pensacola. Blount fixed on the proposal and expanded it into an ambitious project to
seize all of Spanish Louisiana and transfer it to the British. Blount’s motivation seemed
to be to preserve his stature and reputation in the wake of statehood. “[P]eople about
here thought it was all over with Governor Blount,” one of Blount’s co-conspirators
reported back in Tennessee, “but he would rise yet.” Blount himself indicated that he had
“high expectations of emolument and command” upon a successful outcome.15
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Letters, Ayers 926, Newberry Library; Timothy Pickering to David Henley, July 22, 1795, Folder 12, Timothy Pickering Letters,
Ayers 926, Newberry Library. Blount’s biographer suggests that it was Blount’s dislike for Pickering that prompted his rupture with
the Federalists. William H. Masterson, William Blount (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954), 271-75.
15
“Deposition of James Carey” September 29, 1797, in Report of the Committee of the House of Representatives, cxiv-cxxi;
“Examination of James Carey” July 8, 1797, in Report of the Committee of the House of Representatives, cvi-cxii; “Deposition of
Doctor Nicholas Romayne,” July 15-20, 1797. The principal interpretation of the actions that produced Blount’s conspiracy appears
in Andrew R. L Cayton, “‘When Shall We Cease to Have Judases?’ The Blount Conspiracy and the Limits of the ‘Extended

443

Blount believed success hinged on his influence among the Natives; his nebulous
plans seemed to envision leading an Indian army into Spanish territory. He thus obsessed
about his reputation among the Indian nations, which he feared was diminishing now that
he no longer held official status; he needed, he insisted, to “hold[] his importance among
them.” To that end, Blount wrote to the federal Indian interpreter James Carey, with
whom he had worked closely, to secure him and the Indians to the conspiracy. “If I
attempt this plan,” Blount told Carey, “I shall expect to have you and all my Indian
country and Indian friends with me."16
As he conveyed to Carey, Blount believed he was in competition to preserve his
influence against the men who had replaced him in administering southeastern Indian
affairs. Receiving flattering accounts that the Cherokees, “much dissatisfied” with the
new regime, “were calling out for their old friend Gov. Blount,” Blount worked hard to
undermine Indian Department officials at every turn. When, for instance, the Cherokee
John Watts complained that the Secretary of War had refused provide alcohol, Blount
mocked the Secretary and promised the Cherokee leader two kegs of whiskey in
Knoxville instead. Blount had an especial dislike for his replacement as superintendent
of Indian affairs, his one-time friend and political ally Benjamin Hawkins, who had
previously served as a senator from North Carolina. Blount instructed Carey to damage
Hawkins’s authority among the Creeks and Cherokees. “[A]ny power or consequence he
Republic,’” in Launching the “Extended Republic”: The Federalist Era, eds. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1996), 157-89. Consistent with his broader interpretation of the contrast between the Northwest and
Southwest Territories, Cayton argues that Blount’s Conspiracy stemmed from an effort to fill the “vacuum” that purported federal
inaction had produced in the Southwest. I discuss this interpretation, and possible corrections to it, in Chapter 6. Older discussions
and materials appear in Frederick J. Turner, “Documents on the Blount Conspiracy, 1795-1797,” The American Historical Review 10,
no. 3 (April 1, 1905): 574–606; Alfred Byron Sears, The Blount Conspiracy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1928). A
contemporaneous account of the conspiracy, possibly written by Blount himself, “A Short Account of the Origin and Progress of a
Speculation That Terminated in a Project That Was Called Blounts Conspiracy,” N.D., Undated Material, WBP:LC.
16
“Deposition of Doctor Nicholas Romayne,” July 15-20, 1797; William Blount to James Carey, April 21, 1797, in Report of the
Committee of the House of Representatives, xlvi-xlviii.

444

gets,” Blount warned, “will be against our plan.” Blount also counseled Carey to prevent
word of the plan from reaching Silas Dinsmore, the federal Indian agent among the
Cherokees, or anyone else in Spanish or U.S. employ; he further told the interpreter that,
if the Cherokees were upset about the line of the Treaty of Holston, then being run, Carey
should cast all responsibility for any dissatisfaction away from Blount onto former
President Washington.17
Blount’s letter to Carey proved his undoing. Rather than following Blount’s
instructions to burn the letter, Carey determined that his oath to the federal government
required that he report it. The letter quickly traveled through the ranks of the federal
bureaucracy in Tennessee’s Indian country, ending up in the hands of David Henley,
Silas Dinsmore, and Benjamin Hawkins, who soon dispatched word to Congress. A
political scandal followed, much of which focused on the fraught relationship between
the United States and Britain, which, because British officials had briefly entertained
Chisholm’s proposal, was seen to be involved in a conspiracy that affronted U.S.
sovereignty and autonomy. Blount was expelled from the Senate, but the House of
Representatives impeached him nonetheless, for violating, among other laws, the Trade
and Intercourse Act and the Treaty of Holston, as well as for attempting to “seduce”
James Carey from his official duties. Ultimately, in the first impeachment trial under the
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Constitution, the Senate determined it lacked jurisdiction over Blount. Blount returned to
Tennessee and suffered no further punishment.18
Blount’s Conspiracy, as it came to be called, fit oddly within a federalist frame.
Though some Tennesseans argued that Blount’s plan “would have promoted the interest
of the State,” his actions were less a defense of Tennessee’s sovereignty than a quixotic
effort at self-aggrandizement. In this regard, Blount’s cockamamie scheme bore a
striking resemblance to the grandiose dreams of Zachariah Cox, with whom, in a striking
and ironic reversal, Blount was now “upon the best of Terms.” Governor Sevier in fact
disapproved of Blount’s actions, calling them “imprudent[].” But Sevier’s defense of
state autonomy and independence provided a flag of convenience for all those who, like
Blount, had soured on federal authority. After his scheme collapsed, Blount began to
identify as an ever-more ardent Republican and adopt the party rhetoric. “The State of
Tenessee is affected to the federal Government as it ought to be,” he later wrote, “alive to
their Duties & their Rights, ready to perform one and defend the other.” Notwithstanding
his national disgrace, Blount secured election to the Tennessee Senate, where he became
speaker. There, he and Governor Sevier soon made common cause in their struggle
against federal authority within Tennessee. Whether motivated by principle or personal
animosity, the two politically prominent men sought to rid the state of what they regarded
as the pernicious remnants of federal rule. Blount’s conspiracy thus serves as an
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excellent example of how federalism channeled the intensely personal, occasionally
bizarre, and often-venal politics of the borderlands into the frame of dual sovereignty.19

Though the Tennesseans sometimes spoke about federal land ownership and
federal supremacy over Indian affairs as separate questions, they were in fact closely
interrelated. Underneath the abstract rhetoric about state sovereignty was the state’s most
pressing political issue, one that united issues of title and federal diplomacy: the property
rights of Anglo-American settlers living within disputed Cherokee territory under the
Treaty of Holston. These settlers had legal title to their lands, derived from the North
Carolinian grants protected under North Carolina’s act of cession. But, by living within
lands guaranteed the Cherokees under the Treaty of Holston, the settlers were also
violating the federal Trade and Intercourse Act. These settlers’ legally tenuous position
dominated politics in early Tennessee. Their petitions preoccupied the early sessions of
the state legislature; their plight appeared in Governor Sevier’s Inaugural Addresses;
securing their relief was the “chief[]” and “grand object” of the new state’s congressional
delegation.20
At stake, then, in the ownership of Tennessee’s lands was which sovereign would
weigh the equities of the settlers’ and the Cherokees’ respective claims. The Assembly’s
early congressional petition made this linkage clear by moving quickly from the abstract
19
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language of sovereignty to a discussion of Cherokee lands under the Treaty of Holston.
The Assembly’s positions on the merits of the respective claims was equally clear. If the
Indians held any land claim at all, the Assembly insisted, it was as “tenants at will,” while
the claimants under North Carolina’s grants deserved “every right, privilege, and
advantage, which they are entitled to by constitutional laws.”21
As Tennesseans knew and feared, Congress was much less sympathetic to the
legality of the settlers’ claims. In early 1796, mere months after Tennessee drafted its
constitution, Congress revisited the Trade and Intercourse Act, which criminalized
settlement on Indian lands; the statute had a sunset provision that required frequent
reauthorization. The Washington Administration, frustrated by flagrant violations of
treaty boundaries, urged Congress to enhance the Act’s penalties. In the freewheeling
debate over Indian property rights that followed, the House of Representatives focused
exclusively on the Southwest Territory and the problem of settlers claiming under North
Carolina’s grants, the Act’s national reach notwithstanding. North Carolina’s
representatives echoed Tennessee’s arguments that the Indians lacked ownership rights,
but most in Congress, especially New England Federalists, adopted the view that North
Carolina’s grants provided a right to enter and take possession only once the federal
government had purchased the land—a preemptive right entirely consistent with Indian
ownership. Confirming this view, the final version of the Act significantly bolstered the
penalties for illegal settlement on Indian lands. It authorized the President to expel illegal
settlers using military force, and, in one of the law’s most controversial aspects, provided
that any claimants who sought to settle or survey beyond the boundary would forfeit any
21
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property rights in these lands. This provision targeted the Tennessee settlers in particular;
it was hoped that stripping them of rights under North Carolina’s grants if they violated
the Treaty of Holston would remove the incentive to seize Native lands.22
The renewal of the Trade and Intercourse Act also made the position of
Tennessean claimants precarious because the statute called for the President to survey
and clearly mark treaty boundaries with Native nations. Many Tennessee settlers could
only guess at their status, because, even though the Treaty of Holston had been concluded
six years earlier, its boundary had never been officially surveyed and marked, for reasons
common for Indian treaties of the time. After signing the treaty, William Blount and the
Cherokees had agreed to each send commissioners to run the line, to meet in late 1792.
According to commissioners selected by Blount, the Cherokees never arrived, and so they
proceeded to run what they called a “line of experiment,” although they did not formally
mark the boundary. But there was another version of the process, supposedly conceded
by one of the commissioners in a moment of weakness. In this account, the
commissioners ran the line “secretly” before the Cherokees arrived, and, when they met
the Native representatives in the woods, the commissioners sought to hide their surveying
equipment. Whatever the reason, the result was that no formal boundary separated
Cherokee and U.S. lands.23
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In 1797, President Adams dispatched Indian superintendent Benjamin Hawkins to
survey officially the boundary established under the Treaty of Holston. Determined to
avoid any appearance of bias, Hawkins ran the line anew, insisting that it be based on the
text in the “instrument itself,” not on “interested reports” by either Cherokees or AngloAmerican settlers. He and his assistants concluded their survey in late summer 1797 and
dispatched a report to the Secretary of War. Neither Cherokees nor settlers were
contented with the result. As one Cherokee leader reported, “[T]here was much talk in
the nation about the line.” Hawkins’s actions reopened long-standing Cherokee
complaints about the boundaries drawn at Holston, which Cherokee leaders reiterated in a
dispatch to President Adams. Nonetheless, while insisting that they never assented to the
treaty, the Cherokees acquiesced in Hawkins’s efforts, likely hoping for the removal of
illegal settlers across the boundary.24
The Cherokees’ mild resistance paled compared to the overheated and
vituperative rhetoric of the Tennesseans. Hawkins, who had expected “much
opposition,” still found the resistance “more powerful than I expected.” Though thronged
by anxious settlers, Hawkins discovered that the loudest complaints came not from those
affected by the line but from Tennessee state officials. The state legislature dispatched its
own commissioners to retrace and find fault with Hawkins’s route, informing Congress
that the Tennesseans had “less confidence” in Hawkins “than in the Indians themselves.”
Much of this opposition stemmed from the continued influence of William Blount, whose
earlier dislike for Hawkins had hardened to hatred for his role in unmasking Blount’s
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Indian country plottings. It was Blount, though at this point still out of office, who had
drafted Tennessee’s complaint to Congress. Blount scrawled even harsher views on his
personal copy. “Never was Man more execrated in any Country than Hawkins in this,”
Blount stated, accusing Hawkins of weeping “Crocodile tears” over the settlers’
situation.25
Undaunted, the Adams Administration moved to enforce the newly surveyed
boundary line. On August 19, 1797, Col. Thomas Butler, the commander of the federal
soldiers in Tennessee, issued a proclamation ordering all white settlers within the
Cherokee lands—an estimated 2,500-3,000 people—to remove by October 25 or face
military expulsion. He attempted to reassure the settlers that their land titles would be
unimpaired and would have full force whenever the Indian title had been purchased.26
Butler’s proclamation transformed the simmering controversy over Indian title
into a full-blown constitutional crisis. The struggle was not between customary frontier
legal practices and formal law. As Hawkins acknowledged, the purported violators of the
Trade and Intercourse Act had legal justification for their actions: “Heretofore,” he
observed, “intrusions [onto Indian lands] were always countenanced by the government
in the provision made to give [the settlers] a preference in all the land laws.” The
settlers’ champions in fact urged them, in their resistance, to “depend principally on the
legality of your claims: they are founded on . . . laws which cannot be controverted.” Nor
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was the dispute at root a controversy over the nature of Indian ownership. Even as they
suggested that the Cherokees were not the lands’ true owners, Tennessee officials
implicitly acknowledged Cherokee sovereignty by alleging (albeit on thin evidence) that
the Cherokees had subsequently given authorization for the illegal settlers to remain. By
enshrining Native title in federal law, Congress transformed a legal struggle over Native
land tenure into a federalist controversy over legal supremacy. As a result, even though
the seemingly inescapable issue of Native rights once again served as the impetus for the
confrontation over sovereignty, federal and state actors fixated on the struggle as a
conflict between federal and state law to govern Tennessee’s territory, relegating Natives
to mere backdrop.27
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution ostensibly resolved this question,
mandating that the Trade and Intercourse Act prevail over North Carolina’s land grants.
Many Tennesseans, however, rejected this conclusion. In the pages of Tennessee’s only
newspaper, The Knoxville Gazette, a series of pseudonymous writers spun out a legal
theory that insisted the federal statute was unconstitutional. The Tennesseans’ arguments
reflected the promiscuousness of early American constitutional culture, drawing on the
“law of nature, of nations, the statutes of North Carolina . . . [and t]he Constitution of the
State of Tennessee” for vindication. But their fundamental attack on the constitutionality
of the federal actions rested on two interrelated claims, both of which relied less on
specific legal provisions than on structural principles. First, they insisted that the federal
27
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law was “unconstitutional, because they deprive us of property, for which we had a legal
right before the Treaty of Holston.” Despite a brief reference to “just compensation,” this
argument did not seem to rest primarily on the Fifth Amendment but rather on an
“unalienable right[]” to property that the Trade and Intercourse Act violated. In this
reading, the Treaty of Holston had the nature of a ex post facto law: “The treaty of
Holston was made subsequent to our claims,” one commentator wrote, “and the rights of
our property no power on earth can justly violate.”28
Second, the Tennesseans questioned the legitimacy of the exercise of federal
power over lands within the state of Tennessee. “We ask from whence does the Federal
Government derive the power to exercise legal jurisdiction over the land on which we are
settled, in any other than the general mode in which other states of the union are
governed[?]” wrote an author writing on behalf of the “Frontier People of Tennessee.”
“It is a distinction new and incomprehensible to us, that a grant from a sovereign and
independent State, can convey a right without the power to enjoy it.”29
David Campbell, a judge on Tennessee’s highest court writing as the barely
disguised “Campbell,” offered the most legally sophisticated argument on this aspect of
the “dispute . . . betwitxt the general and state governments.” Campbell had a
paradoxical role in the controversy: as a federal territorial judge, he had urged upholding
the Treaty of Holston, but privately he defended the “right of intrusion,” and had long
28
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lived illegally on Cherokee lands. In the Gazette, he framed his argument in federalist
terms. In his view, because the Treaty of Holston “dismember[ed] the state of
Tennessee,” it represented an effort by the federal government to “arrogate . . . the
barbarous right of alienating . . . any part of an individual state.” Citing diverse
constitutional provisions—among others, Article III’s provision extending the judicial
power of the U.S. over cases and controversies, the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, the
Enclave Clause of Article I—Campbell argued that “the constitution of the United States,
does not authorize military force, or diplomatic authority to decide the right of property,”
and insisted that the controversy could only be resolved by trial, in state court. “The
Frontier People of Tennessee” likewise insisted that only a “jury of our country” could
resolve the respective rights as the sole “tribunal which in our governmental compact we
have made the arbiter of right and wrong.”30
These heated legal claims did not deter the Administration from enforcing the
Trade and Intercourse Act. Secretary of War McHenry mocked these “repeated
publications” and disdained their legal theory as the claim that the “United States alone
were wrong in every proceeding that respected [the settlers].” In early 1798, his officers
began forcibly removing settlers on the Cherokee side of Hawkins’s line. Violence
ensued, as settlers killed several army horses and wounded a federal soldier. Predictably,
federal actions also outraged Tennessee state officials. The state’s assembly denounced
the removals as “an act of violent oppression”; Governor Sevier excitedly exclaimed,
30
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“[S]urely there never was an instance of such mistaken policy, in any other government,
since governments had an existence.”31
The conflict reached its climax when, on 10 p.m. on the evening of February 3,
1798, two army officers arrested Judge Campbell, detaining him in a military camp
overnight. For state officials, this arrest of a state officer was an explicit affront to the
state’s dignity, provoking angry missives to President Adams. “Representing as we do,
the Sovereignty of the State of Tennesee,” the state’s congressional delegation wrote,
“[we] Consider that Soveriegnty as haveing been Outra'd, by the Conduct of Colonel
Butler, on the person of one of the Supreme Judges of the State, as also the rights of Civil
liberty, most unwarrantably Violated.” The congressmen demanded an investigation into
this “Military Tyranny,” which they received: the Secretary of War promised to explore
Butler’s conduct.32
Campbell’s arrest underscored that rigorous enforcement of the Treaty of Holston
boundary was becoming too politically costly for the Adams Administration. With the
state’s entire congressional delegation constantly agitating on the subject, abandoning the
Treaty of Holston, and its protection of Cherokee land rights, proved easier. President
Adams authorized another treaty with the Cherokees to purchase the illegally settled
lands; the Secretary of War deemed the right for settlers to return to be the treaty’s “first
stipulation,” to be obtained even before negotiations began in earnest. Not content to rely
on federal officers, Governor Sevier sent state representatives to the treaty negotiations,
31

Remonstrance and Petition of the Legislature of the State of Tennessee. 4th December, 1797, Referred to Mr. Pinckney, Mr.
Venable, Mr. Nathaniel Smith, Mr. Wm. C.C. Claiborne, and Mr. Bayard (Philadelphia: William Ross, 1797), 192; John Sevier to
Andrew Jackson, William Claiborne, and Joseph Anderson, April 5, 1798, in PAJ, 1:191; John Sevier to Andrew Jackson, William
Claiborne, and Joseph Anderson, February 5, 1798, in PAJ, 1:176.
32
Andrew Jackson to John Adams, March 5, 1798, in PAJ, 1:185-86; John Sevier to President John Adams, February 6, 1798, in
“Executive Journal of Gov. John Sevier,” 170; Sevier to Jackson, April 5, 1798.

455

with instructions to challenge the “constitutionality” of the Treaty of Holston as a
measure “that prostrated the guaranteed rights of the whole state.” Sevier also dispatched
a state agent into Cherokee territory. The agent pretended to be another Indian trader, but
the true object of his mission was to convince the Cherokee leaders to sell their lands.33
But even with the federal and state governments united in their aim to secure
rights to the settlers’ lands from the Cherokees, they nearly failed. At the first meeting in
July, the Cherokees “would not relinquish or sell one inch of land.” The commissioners
convened another meeting in September, where they succeeded in inveigling the
Cherokees to cede the contested territory for an immediate payment of $5,000 in goods
and a $1,000 annual annuity. Why the Cherokees changed their mind is unknown (the
record of the treaty negotiations was later destroyed). There are hints in the letters from
Sevier’s agent of internal power struggles between the Cherokee chiefs and warriors,
which he believed the state could exploit. What is clear is that the Cherokees secured a
considerably larger compensation, for a much smaller tract of land, than they had at the
Holston negotiations.34
Despite this limited Cherokee success, the Treaty of Tellico represented a greater
victory for Tennessee, as it secured federal support for its aims and legitimated the
settlers’ property rights. Yet even this triumph failed to quell controversy over the
settlers, which continued to convulse Tennessee politics even as the debate shifted from
the treaty ground to the courts. The very first cases in the Nashville district of
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Tennessee’s new federal court were two prosecutions against Archibald Lackey and
Robert Trimble for crossing into Cherokee territory without a passport, thereby violating,
as the indictment recounted at length, Treaty of Hopewell and the Trade and Intercourse
Act. William Blount observed that two men’s “cause” had received “serious attention”
from the “people in general,” who felt that their “civil rights” were at stake in the case.
Defense counsel was Lachlan McIntosh, a recent Georgia transplant who had served on
Sevier’s commission to redraw Holston boundary and who was also heavily involved
with Zachariah Cox and Tennessee Company. Based on his “thorough knowledge” of the
law, Blount predicted the two men would go free. Defying this prediction, the jury
convicted and fined both men, though the federal judge’s refusal to admit evidence of the
supposed “line of experiment” produced predictable howls of outrage from the Tennessee
bar.35
In the meantime, William Blount sued Elisha Hall, the secretary of the federal
treaty commissioners, in state court for slander for alleged statements that western leaders
wished the treaty to fail. Judge David Campbell—the same man who had attacked
federal authority over Indian affairs in the Gazette and been arrested by federal officers—
dismissed Blount’s complaint on the ground that Hall was a federal ambassador, immune
from state suit under the law of nations and the federal Judiciary Act. Blount, now
serving as Speaker of the Tennessee Senate, initiated impeachment proceedings against
Campbell, arguing that Campbell’s action violated the provisions of the state constitution
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concerning writs. Yet even as he was suffering political retribution for defending federal
authority, Campbell was formally accused of being too zealous in his advocacy for the
frontier settlers. The charges against him included failing to hold a court session because
he had been away supposedly inveigling with the federal commissioners to secure
Cherokee lands at the Treaty, and maligning Governor Sevier by asserting in a grand jury
charge that, had Sevier done his duty, “the people would not have been removed from
their lands” by federal soldiers. With Blount both prosecuting and presiding over the
trial, Campbell nonetheless escaped removal from office by a single vote.36

The swirling political controversies provoked by the question of the Holston
boundary—accusations of federal military tyranny, Campbell’s impeachment, the
constitutionality of the Trade and Intercourse Act—may all seem remote from the
abstract question of sovereignty and ownership of Tennessee lands through which Sevier
and Jackson framed the original dispute. But even as these issues of federalism refracted
oddly and unpredictably through the complicated personal politics of early Tennessee,
many officials retained their focus on freeing Tennessee’s lands from federal control. In
this view, the Treaty of Tellico vindicated Tennessee’s claim that the state’s sovereignty
granted it ownership of all the land within the boundaries. “It is time for this government
to assert her just rights & claim of domain of country included in her chartered limits,”
Governor Sevier told the Tennessee legislature shortly after the Treaty. The legislature
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responded to Sevier’s call, within a month enacting a statute to open state land offices on
the North Carolinian model.37
Congress, however, did not back down. Learning of Tennessee’s law, the House
and Senate appointed a committee to investigate the state’s claims. The committee,
which consisted of two Federalist senators from Kentucky and Vermont as well as the
Republican Senator Anderson of Tennessee, issued a report thoroughly rebuffed the
arguments advanced by Sevier and Jackson. It began with the act of cession, which it
insisted unambiguously granted title to the unappropriated lands to the United States. To
challenge North Carolina’s right to transfer title, the committee observed, “is to question
the title of every man in Tennessee who holds the soil by deed from North Carolina.”
But the report’s main target was Tennessee’s equal footing argument. “The right of
jurisdiction, and the right of soil, are distinct rights, and may be severed,” the committee
insisted against Tennessee’s effort to conjoin them. Indeed, prior to cession, North
Carolina had retained jurisdiction over the land even as it alienated large portions of the
territory. Because of this distinction, when the Southwest Territory attained statehood on
equal footing, “in the opinion of the committee, the State of Tennessee acquired
jurisdiction over, but not the right of soil, within the said territory.” By virtue of North
Carolina’s original cession, “the right of soil remained in the United States.”38
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In addition to this sharp distinction between jurisdiction and ownership, the
committee also adopted a subtler argument against Tennessee’s position. Tennessee had
claimed the right of ownership “on the principle that a grant of jurisdiction over territory
possesses the right of soil therein.” As we have seen, this reasoning had a strong basis in
earlier practice and law: the colonial charters had conjoined jurisdiction and ownership,
as had the state cessions to the federal government. But the committee rejected this claim
on the ground that the “State of Tennessee does not derive even her jurisdiction from the
Government of the United States, but has it by operation of the act of cession from the
State of North Carolina.” In other words, according to the committee, the federal
government had acted purely as a trustee, exercising “only a limited and temporary
jurisdiction over the said territory” that had transferred “of right” to Tennessee once it
had satisfied the population requirement. This argument elegantly employed Tennessee’s
own insistence that its admission was a legal entitlement beyond congressional control to
undermine the state’s claim to land ownership. Downplaying formal federal authority, in
this instance, served to expand the federal government’s effective power.39
The report’s recommendations, however, did not match the firmness of its legal
conclusions, which perhaps explains why Senator Anderson seems to have endorsed it. It
did urge opening a land office for the only unappropriated lands in the state that were
outside Indian country, the contested French Broad lands, but it also recommended
codifying the existing settlers’ right to preemption. And it requested that the attorney
general gather all laws related to the land claims, and it urged that a report be sent to
Tennessee’s governor, inviting a response. Congress did none of these things; it dithered,
39
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perhaps because of the Republican ascendency but more likely because congressional and
executive attention were fully occupied resolving Georgia’s western land rights,
especially the extremely complicated aftermath of the Yazoo debacle. Over the next few
years, a near-unanimous Congress, with the sole exception of Tennessee’s delegation,
agreed to create new committees that gathered voluminous evidence of Tennessee’s and
North Carolina’s land laws, even as Congress continued to receive, and defer, alarmist
petitions on ongoing conflicts between Cherokee lands and North Carolina grants in
Tennessee.40
The dispute dragged on in large because there was no neutral arbiter to resolve it.
Despite his confidence in Tennessee’s claim, Sevier believed that a resolution by the
“supreme judiciary of the united States” would likely prove “very problematical.” That
left only Congress, where the “United States were, in this case, made a judge in their own
cause,” as one congressman had put in an earlier dispute over Tennessee lands.41
Yet Tennessee did not accept that conclusion, refusing to passively accept
Congress’s verdict. Writing to Governor Sevier, citizens around Nashville who had
evidently followed the debate “with some concern” pressed the governor to make some
response to Congress, anxious that silence would be interpreted as a “virtual
acknowledgement of the right of the General government and a final relinquishment.”
This, they feared, would be disastrous, echoing earlier anxieties that the federal
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government was insufficiently solicitous of their property rights. A federal land office
would, they anticipated, fail to make “necessary provision for individual claims,”
presumably preexisting preemption and land grant rights, “thereby involv[ing] us in
lasting difficulties.”42
Though it probably did not require urging, the Tennessee legislature acted to
protect its constituents’ interest. Its preferred method to resolve the dispute was
negotiation: it appointed its senators and representative as “agents” with “full power and
authority” to assert the state’s “absolute right of disposing of [its] vacant and
unappropriated soil.” These agents were given discretion to have the respective claims
“examined and determined,” and allowed to determine terms and manner of an agreement
that would secure some sort of federal “relinquishment of [the U.S.] claim.” In proposing
a negotiated settlement with the federal government, Tennessee’s legislature was
following earlier precedent, since such bilateral contracts between states and the national
government were how state cessions had been worked out. But it was also a presumption
of equality—an assertion of Tennessee’s independence in which disputes between state
and national government were to be resolved through agreement on both sides rather than
by fiat.43
As legal theory, Tennessee’s view was increasingly seen as dubious: as one
congressman observed during the debate over Tennessee’s admission, “all compacts
between a nation and a part of its citizens” were not legally binding, since the two parties
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were not equal: there was “no other security for the other contracting but the obligations
of good faith and the ingregity of the Government.” But perhaps equally significantly,
Tennessee was reliant on congressional power even as it denied it. This dependence
stemmed from the reality that Tennessee and the federal government were not the only
claimants to sovereign ownership of Tennessee’s land: North Carolina cited the act of
cession to claim the authority to continue to issue grants to military bounty lands located
in Tennessee, an action that angered Tennessee officials nearly as much as the federal
claims. Governor Sevier now turned his equal footing argument against North Carolina:
its purported authority over the “most important business in the state of Tennessee”
violated the principle that Tennessee enjoyed “every power, privilege, sovereignty and
jurisdiction that any of the original states in the union enjoy.” This dispute manifested in
a bizarre tussle over control over the state land grant records, which a group of
Tennesseans attempted to steal away from an armed North Carolinian escort. In 1804,
the two states concluded an agreement, under which North Carolina could continue to
issue military land warrants but Tennessee would fulfill them, without showing any
preference to its own citizens. Yet under the U.S. Constitution, this agreement could only
be valid with congressional consent.44
In 1806, Congress at last brokered an agreement between the three claimants to
the land—the federal government, Tennessee, and North Carolina. The statute ratified
the 1804 agreement between North Carolina and Tennessee. The law also split the
44
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difference between the federal government and Tennessee, drawing a line in west-central
Tennessee. Lands west of the line became part of what was known as the “congressional
reserve,” to which Tennessee relinquished all “right, title, or claim” and agreed that these
lands would be “at the sole and entire disposition of the United States.” In return,
Congress ceded and conveyed Tennessee “all right, title, and claim” to lands east of the
line, granting the state the same power to issue “perfect titles” within this district “as
Congress now have.” The cessions contained a number of provisos that secured both
federal and state aims. Even as the statute guaranteed the preemptive rights of settlers
south of the French Broad, it promised that nothing in the statute “shall be construed to
affect the Indian title, or to subject the United States to the expense of extinguishing the
same”; it also stipulated that Tennessee use portions of the public lands to support
education.45
The 1806 statute largely settled the contested question of the formal ownership of
land within Tennessee. As a capstone to the saga of “federal” lands in Tennessee, it
reflects, in one sense, federal weakness when confronted with state intransigence. In
principle, both the Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance enshrined the supremacy of
federal land ownership. In practice, federal officials found their power of ownership
significantly limited: by the intricacies and breadth of North Carolina’s cession; by their
political inability to use raw force to enforce federal law; and by the rhetorical potency of
appeals to state sovereignty, especially alongside the equal footing doctrine.
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Yet reading the 1806 statute as a hollow victory for the federal government
ignores the significance of formal law in constructing early American federalism, which
was still deeply unsettled. In fact, proponents of state sovereignty had little to be
satisfied about the resolution. The 1806 law was, after all, a statute, not a contract,
though nearly a year after its enactment Tennessee’s representatives filed a vestigial and
meaningless “consent” with Congress. Moreover, Tennessee had proved dependent on
the federal government to determine the scope and nature of its land rights; in the end,
Congress was the sole judge in its own cause. Subsequent events only further entrenched
the statute’s supremacy. When disputes over the ownership of Tennessee lands recurred
in later years, as when North Carolina in 1818 sought to seize on an ambiguity to once
again assert the right to grant state lands, the U.S. Supreme Court rebuffed these efforts
by citing the 1806 compact. Tennessee, in other words, now needed the federal authority
it had earlier spurned to safeguard the integrity of its land ownership. Like other land
claimants, it, too, had come to rely on the federal government as the legitimate and final
arbiter of claims of land ownership.46
***
As Congress and Tennessee tussled over the state’s public lands, the eastern
portion of the Northwest Territory itself sought admission as a state, in a process that
culminated in 1802. But the path to statehood for what became known as “Ohio” differed
sharply from Tennessee’s. In Tennessee, statehood had been a shared political project
and the aim of nearly all territorial citizens; disagreements emerged only at the national
46
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level. By contrast, Ohio’s admission was, from start to finish, a partisan affair that
divided both territorial citizens and Congress into antagonistic camps based on affiliation
with clearly defined political parties.47
Ideology and interest were complicatedly entangled in the rise of partisanship in
the Northwest Territory. As we have seen, many citizens had chafed under what they
perceived as the heavy-handed practices of St. Clair and Sargent. But these
disagreements did not harden into clear political factions until the rise of a number of
transplanted Virginians within the Virginia Military District. These men grew rich from
the property chaos that existed within the District; St. Clair despised them as having
“suddenly raised fortunes by speculations in lands, and many of those not the most
honorably.” Led by Thomas Worthington, these men were ideologically “democrats,” in
St. Clair’s view, but they also resented St. Clair’s stranglehold on territorial patronage, as
well as his refusal to move the territorial capital to their new county town of
Chillicothe.48
Although not the cause of hostility, the federal land system quickly became the
focus for much of this contention. In 1800, Congress had amended the abortive 1796
land sale statute and adopted the Harrison Land Act, named for William Henry Harrison,
the Northwest Territory’s non-voting delegate who had largely crafted the statute’s
provisions. The Act occasioned very little of the lengthy debate that marked the
enactment of its predecessor. The only substantive discussion occurred when

47

Accounts of Ohio’s statehood that focus on its partisan context appear in Andrew R. L Cayton, The Frontier Republic: Ideology and
Politics in the Ohio Country, 1780-1825 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1986), 68-80; Onuf, Statehood and Union, 67-87.
48
Arthur St. Clair to Paul Fearing, December 25, 1801, in SCP, 549-51; Arthur St. Clair to James Ross, December 1799, in ibid, 2:4884. Thomas Worthington, for instance, complained that St. Clair had “near 700” offices and officers “under his controul.” Thomas
Worthington to Secretary of the Treasury, May 17, 1802, in TP: Vol. III, 224-27.

466

Tennessee’s representative William Claiborne proposed an amendment that would have
granted preemption rights to the “intruders”; his fellow Republicans, led by Albert
Gallatin, quickly rebuffed him. Otherwise, the lengthy contentions that had marked all
previous discussions of federal land sales had seemingly settled into a rough and tenuous
consensus on the basic structure of governing the public domain.49
The Act’s most important provision was to open, at long last, federal land offices.
The earlier plan to sell large plots of land in Philadelphia, never realized, was abandoned.
Instead, offices located in four towns in the Northwest Territory—Cincinnati, Chillicothe,
Marietta, and Steubenville—would sell to the public the lands that Rufus Putnam and his
assistants had furiously surveyed into rectangular plots. In a concession to small
purchasers, lands were to be sold in sections and half-sections of 640 and 320 acres,
respectively. Available sections would be sold first in three-week-long “public
vendue”—land auctions—with all unsold lands thereafter available at the land office for
“private sale.” The minimum price for all sales, public and private, was $2.00 per acre,
with yearlong credit terms available; after a year, unpaid lots would be resold. The land
offices were to be staffed by registrars, who were supplied with careful and elaborate
instructions on how to record land sales in the public ledgers, and required to send
detailed quarterly reports to the Secretary of the Treasury.50
Soon after it opened, the Chillicothe land office became the center of a power
struggle between Thomas Worthington and his cronies on the one hand and Governor St.
Clair and his allies on the other. Thanks to the election of 1800, a Republican
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administration headed by Thomas Jefferson now controlled the land office, with Albert
Gallatin now serving as Secretary of Treasury. Due to his impeccable Republican
credentials, Worthington secured a position as the superintendent of public land sales and
registrar of the land office. Since the law creating the offices had only just been enacted,
much remained uncertain, including when and how the fees should be levied. St. Clair
alleged that Worthington had been unlawfully charging fees for public land auctions that
properly applied only to private sales. Worthington, angered by this attack on his
character by a man he thought had “no concern Whatever in the regulation of My
Office,” sought absolution from the Secretary of Treasury. Unfortunately for
Worthington, the Attorney General sided with St. Clair, and a lawsuit proceeded against
Worthington in the local courts. In the end, though, both the county and General Court
disagreed with the Attorney General and vindicated Worthington. Yet St. Clair remained
unsatisfied. He later alleged that Worthington was colluding with private purchasers at
the land auctions, tamping down bidding on choice lands in return for kickbacks.51
The bitter antagonism between St. Clair and the Chillicothe Junto led
Worthington and his allies first to attempt to secure the governor’s removal and, when
that failed, to press for the Territory’s admission as a separate state. For their part, St.
Clair and his Federalist supporters managed to forestall statehood, at least temporarily, by
obtaining the division of the territory in the waning days of the Adams Administration.
The western portion containing the Illinois and Wabash Countries became the newly
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created Indiana Territory, leaving only the eastern portion as the Northwest Territory,
with fewer than the 60,000 inhabitants stipulated by the Northwest Ordinance for
admission.52
Worthington and his allies pressed for the Territory’s admission anyway,
confident of the support of President and Congress, who they believed would welcome
the additional Republican senators and representative. But the legal situation was more
tangled. Regardless of whether a territory could, as Tennessee had attempted, claim
admission of right with sixty thousand inhabitants, it was clear that the Northwest
Territory, still shy of the required population, could be admitted only through act of
Congress. A Republican-dominated committee duly met and drafted a bill that would
authorize the Northwest Territory to draft a constitution and seek admission.53
In the course of drafting the enabling act, the committee consulted with Secretary
of Treasury Albert Gallatin. As congressman, Gallatin had been the foremost advocate
for permitting the Southwest Territory to achieve statehood of right, without any
involvement from Congress other than acknowledgment. But now that he was charged
with administering the public lands, Gallatin, writing at the exact same moment when a
congressional committee was addressing the issue of land title in Tennessee, emphasized
“fervently” the need to enact “effectual provisions” to “secure to the United States the
proceeds of the sales of the Western lands.” One provision in the draft Enabling Act
explicitly provided that Ohio could not enact laws repugnant to the provisions of the
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Northwest Ordinance. But Gallatin urged, and the committee adopted, additional
conditions to the Territory’s admission, intended to ensure that the newly admitted state
could in no way “interfere with the regulations adopted by Congress for the 'primary
disposal of the soil.’” The draft Enabling Act thus further required that all lands sold by
the federal government would be immune from state taxes for five years, on the grounds,
Gallatin claimed, that state foreclosure proceedings for non-payment would interfere with
federal authority over the land system. The bill attempted to sweeten this sweeping
restriction on state authority by promising the new state ten percent of the proceeds of
federal land sales towards internal improvements—which was later reduced to five
percent, instead of accepting the proposal of the Territory’s delegate that half the
proceeds go toward road-building.54
The parties argued over whether Congress held the right to thus condition
admission. To avoid colliding with his earlier position against congressional authority,
Gallatin argued, and the other Republicans agreed, that the conditions were mere
proposals to the Territory’s constitutional convention for their “free acceptance or
rejection.” But Federalist opponents of statehood argued that the Enabling Act
represented an unconstitutional interference with the Northwest Territory’s right of selfgovernment through their own legislature. The most sustained attack came from Arthur
St. Clair, reluctantly permitted to speak before Ohio’s Constitutional Convention held in
late 1802. In a striking reversal, St. Clair, long the Territory’s leading advocate of
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submission to federal authority, offered a defense of local autonomy against
congressional interference that could just as easily have come from Sevier or Jackson.
Congress’s enabling act, he argued, was a “nullity,” since the Territory could no more be
regulated in its internal affairs by Congress “than we would be bound by an edict of the
first consul of France.” He continued to attack the attachment of conditions to a “right
which is ours by nature and by compact.” Conditions, he observed, were unprecedented,
an “odious distinction” reserved for the Territory alone: “Were conditions imposed upon
Vermont, or upon Tennessee, before they could be admitted into the Union? There was
none attempted.” The whole reason that Congress had hurried along the Territory’s
statehood, he argued, was that it was the “only time to saddle us with conditions,” since,
once they had the requisite numbers, “it would be no longer in their power.”55
The Convention ignored St. Clair and approved a constitution for the new state of
Ohio that accepted Congress’s stipulations. “The poor old man has made his last speech
and will very soon die politically,” Worthington gleefully reported to his allies in
Congress. Yet St. Clair’s speech touched a nerve in the Jefferson Administration;
Gallatin reported on its details to Jefferson, accusing St. Clair of misusing the precedent
of Tennessee. Even though St. Clair’s post would expire in mere weeks when Ohio
assumed statehood, the President, through Secretary of State James Madison,
peremptorily dismissed St. Clair anyway, citing his “intemperance and indecorum of
language towards the Legislature of the United States.” St. Clair thanked the President
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for “discharge[ing] me from an office I was heartily tired of” six weeks sooner than
planned.56
The Jefferson Administration’s touchy response to St. Clair’s speech likely
reflected some unease over their political position. In insisting on conditions to
admission, the Republicans had seemingly proved no more principled than St. Clair,
readily jettisoning their ideological commitment to state sovereignty and autonomy for
expediency’s sake. The argument that Gallatin advanced—that a constitutional
convention that still required congressional approval would “freely” determine whether to
accept Congress’s proposal—was, perhaps, too much of a legal fiction to be entirely
comfortable. So many Republicans adopted another, less tortured defense of the
attachment of conditions: they were, they argued, merely “explanatory” of Northwest
Ordinance’s preexisting protection of federal property rights. Or, as the enabling act’s
drafter argued on the floor of Congress against suggestions that “mystery and disguise”
surrounded the bill, the conditions were simply “additional securities for the national
property.” They would obviate the fears expressed by some representatives—who were
considering Tennessee’s land claims nearly simultaneously—that “the Territory, when
formed into a State, actuated by the inordinate possession of power, will be likely to
grasp at our lands.”57
Irony abounded in the political posture of Ohio’s admission: the Jeffersonians
became the unlikely champions of federal authority over the states, while men like St.
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Clair converted into improbable acolytes of local sovereignty against Congress. But the
consequence of these uncomfortable contortions was to prevent a rehashing of
Tennessee’s arguments over whether the federal public domain could be reconciled with
the equal footing doctrine. It helped, of course, that the Territory’s foremost advocate of
statehood, Worthington, was also a bureaucrat in the public land office. But it was even
more significant that, because of the partisan alignments of Ohio’s admission,
Republicans both in Congress and in Ohio became staunch defenders of the federal
government’s land rights within state boundaries. In the process, the congressional right
to regulate and condition state entry into the union—uncertain and contested when
Tennessee had sought statehood as of right—was now codified into precedent.
Ohio’s statehood differed sharply from Tennessee’s in another way, as well: there
was no discussion of Natives and their lands. In part, this reflected the consequences of
the Northwest Indian War and the Treaty of Greenville. Unlike in Tennessee, where
most of the state’s territory legally remained Indian country, only Ohio’s northwestern
corner was still owned under federal law by the Wyandots and Miamis. Moreover, the
comparative success of the federal land system avoided the problem of two overlapping,
legally valid sources of title, as happened in Tennessee’s Indian country. A federal
infrastructure of forts, Indian agents, and annuity payments still dominated Native
territory within Ohio, but Ohioans seemed relatively content with this division of labor.
As a federal circuit court observed when the question of jurisdiction over Indian country
in Ohio finally came to court thirty years later, “Within this state no collisions on this
important subject [of state and federal jurisdiction over Indian country] have occurred.”
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Through subsequent treaties and cessions, the federal government slowly whittled away
at Natives’ land base, until only a single portion of Wyandot territory twelve miles square
remained as Indian country. In 1842, the federal government extinguished Native title to
these lands and removed the Wyandots to Kansas.58
***
The Southwest and Northwest Territories had been created, in large part, to
resolve the seemingly interminable struggles over sovereignty, jurisdiction, and property
in the early American West. These questions did not vanish under territorial governance,
but they were flattened and submerged into administrative politics, as territorial citizens
argued with territorial officials, who in turn debated with cabinet officials and with
Congress. Tennessee and Ohio’s admissions as states reopened these long-standing
issues, albeit it with an altered inflection. The earlier contentions had been polyvocal, as
secessionist movements, Native nations, land companies, and multiple states all
competed among and with each other for jurisdiction and ownership over the same lands.
An echo of these struggles recurred in Tennessee’s land struggles with North Carolina.
But as even that dispute demonstrated, these confrontations were now framed and
resolved not through the horizontal fights among sovereigns, but in the vertical clash
between national and state sovereignty. As a result, the burning issue upon the states’
admission was how much of the federal government’s expansive authority would survive
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now that Tennessee and Ohio were no longer federal dependencies but independent and
co-equal states.
In one sense, statehood settled nothing, despite the hope that it would provide
definitive precedent. In Indian affairs, although there was no dramatic rupture as had
occurred in 1797 and 1798, Tennessee and the federal government continued to tussle
over authority well into the nineteenth century. Given the tangled history, many
Tennesseans conflated federal and Native sovereignty, viewing both as an intrusion of a
foreign jurisdiction within the state’s sovereign borders. In the 1820s and 1830s,
Tennessee Supreme Court, echoing courts elsewhere in the South, affirmed state
jurisdiction over Indian country. At the same time, federal courts in Tennessee and Ohio
nearly simultaneously issued the two most important decisions on the meaning and scope
of the Trade and Intercourse Acts. Both courts sharply limited federal criminal law’s
reach and endorsed state jurisdiction, even as the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed federal
supremacy in the Cherokee cases. Yet few in Tennessee objected to federal power over
Indian affairs when their former congressman Andrew Jackson employed it to secure the
long-sought-after removal of the Cherokees and Chickasaws from within the state’s
borders.59
In land, too, federal supremacy proved uneven, particularly in Tennessee. Even
the 1806 statute’s solemn guarantee of federal title in southwest Tennessee proved moot.
After a fierce thirty-year battle in Congress, in which Representatives James Polk and
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David Crockett played leading if contending roles, the Tennesseans finally overcame
eastern Whig opposition. In 1841, Congress made the state the agent for the sale of the
“Congressional Reserve”; in 1846, it simply ceded the lands to Tennessee outright. As a
result, formal federal ownership notwithstanding, Congress never created a federally
administered land system in the state, and was forced to accede to Tennessee’s policy
goals. In the half-century long struggle for the “right of soil,” Tennessee gained the
authority and control over the lands within its borders it had long sought.60
Tennessee’s success emboldened other states. In the 1820s and 1830s, as
proponents of state sovereignty grew more aggressive, Ohioan, and later representatives
from Illinois, Indiana, and other public land states carved from the Northwest Territory,
began demanding retrocession of the public domain to the states. Their rhetoric echoed
nearly verbatim the arguments first advanced by Sevier thirty years earlier: the provisions
of the Northwest Ordinance were no longer binding on the states once they were admitted
to the Union, and denying states authority over their own lands violated the promise of
equal sovereignty and independence pledged under the equal footing doctrine.61
In 1796, these arguments might have prevailed—as they did, in a sense. But the
federal government’s stubborn refusal to concede the principle, in what seemed a merely
symbolic victory, worked toward establishing federal ownership as precedent. Yet, given
the continued uncertainty produced by Tennessee’s confrontation with the federal
government, the argument from state sovereignty might even have produced results in
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1802. Instead, Congress, seemingly anxious to avoid the controversies that had occurred
with Tennessee, attached conditions to Ohio’s entry, which the proponents of Ohio
statehood, eager to avoid any hint of challenge to congressional authority, blithely
accepted. This created an even more durable precedent. After Ohio, every state admitted
to the union had “voluntary” conditions attached to their entry, even when they had the
requisite population of 60,000. No state ever rejected Congress’s terms. Nearly all of the
conditions related to the public lands; some explicitly required that the states renounce all
title to unappropriated lands and acknowledge that they remained at the “sole and entire
disposition of the United States.” Much later, the federal government would require that
western states disclaim all jurisdiction over Indian country as well.62
The result was, by the 1820s, it was much harder to challenge the constitutional
settlement that Tennessee and Ohio’s admission represented, and the arguments for state
title failed. Abstractly, these arguments had a compelling logic that reflected how
entwined property and sovereignty had been in the territories from the beginning. States
had ceded the federal government jurisdiction with the express provision that it would
exercise that authority only temporarily; it was anomalous that title was not similarly
ceded to the new states. But thirty years on, this argument was largely foreclosed. As
their interlocutors frequently reminded them, the opponents of federal title now
confronted decades of entrenched precedent, codified under the fiction of state consent in
the enabling acts.
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The irony was that the critics were right: the new states were not on an equal
footing. The territorial system was built on the myth that the federal government would
temporarily control all aspects of governance within the territories, but that, upon
statehood, this authority would recede, leaving behind a fully independent and coequal
sovereign state. But the newly admitted states were not equal to the preexisting states
with respect to federal authority and presence within their borders. Instead, the federal
authority that had accreted under territorial governance remained, especially over land
and Indian matters, forcing the newly admitted states to routinely grapple with federal
officials. The result was that the territories—more particularly, the transition from
territory to state—became arguably the most important site for the controversies over
federalism that consumed the early republic and the antebellum United States. And the
federal government retained an outsized presence in the West even after former territories
ascended to statehood.63
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Conclusion
In 1804, David Campbell—former territorial judge of the Southwest Territory,
advocate for the intruders on Cherokee lands, and arrestee at the hands of the U.S.
army—wrote to President Thomas Jefferson. The primary subject of his letter was the
lands of the Cherokee Nation. “I will yet call them a Nation,” Campbell observed,
“though they are not all together independent in reality, but so in form.” Campbell
described the prospects that the Cherokees might exchange their lands within Tennessee
for new “hunting grounds” beyond the Mississippi River; currently, he noted, they were
resistant, but he believed that this goal could be accomplished “with time.” Such a
cession was warranted, he argued, as it would “secure the immediate occupancy of all the
lands granted to individuals by the State of No. Carolina before she ceded this part of the
Country to the General Government.” This would “silence discontented Citizens,” who
were complaining that they were “unjustly deprived from the enjoyment of property.”1
Campbell’s remarks, looking forward to a time when Native jurisdiction would no
longer interfere with Tennessee’s exercise of its territorial rights, were one of the first
discussions of a project of removal that would take thirty years to reach fruition. But
they also demonstrated the long-lasting legacy of the debates over sovereignty and
ownership that had occasioned the creation of Southwest and Northwest Territories and,
later, the states of Tennessee and Ohio. In 1783, citizens of the newly created United
States had often spoken of the newly acquired trans-Appalachian West as a vacant land of
latent states-in-waiting to be shaped by national policy. What the new nation discovered

1

David Campbell to Thomas Jefferson, January 1, 1804, Series 1: General Correspondence. 1651-1827, Thomas Jefferson Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib013071/.

479

instead was land thickly settled with both people—Natives, long-standing French
habitants, itinerants from Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia—and their varied
claims to ownership, governance, and protection. Resolving these conflicting rights had
consumed federal territorial governance, as the diverse claimants had pressed federal
officials to honor and codify their rights.
As Campbell’s remarks indicated, uncertainty—over federal authority, property
rights, and Indian affairs—persisted through, and well past, statehood. With respect to
land, the significance and durability of property claims meant that it took the better part
of a century to unspool the tangle of title created in the 1780s and 1790s. Preemption
rights to lands south of the French Broad River; Symmes’s loose land practices; the
vague boundaries of lands in the Virginia Military District; the confusing titles granted by
St. Clair and Sargent in the Wabash Country; rights to U.S. military bounty lands; the
Ohio Company’s finances—they all produced endlessly complicated histories of lengthy
reports and interminable litigation that lasted well into the nineteenth century. The postrevolutionary schemes spawned lawsuits that filled the dockets of state supreme courts.
In the U.S. Supreme Court, real property cases, many of them disputes arising under the
systems of indiscriminate location from Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky, constituted
nearly a quarter of the nonconstitutional cases decided between 1815 and 1835.2
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But the legacy of the late eighteenth-century land experiments in the territories
extended beyond the confusion they left in their wake in Ohio and Tennessee. In leaping
straight from the Ordinance of 1785 to the Harrison Land Act of 1800, historians
naturalize these statutes’ neat framing of the issues—parcels’ size, price, credit terms—
that would dominate the public lands’ contentions of the following centuries. But the two
land laws were built on a fundamental fiction of vacant lands. This vision of empty,
saleable parcels, divided by neat gridlines into tidy sections, that could be sustained only
once preexisting land rights had been clarified, defined, and, if necessary, extinguished.
Through the 1790s, federal officials, along with thirteen of the fifteen land statutes
enacted by Congress during the decade, had created this “empty” land by arbitrating the
claims of Natives, earlier European settlers, and intruders. Only after fifteen years of this
administrative toil could a federal land office come into existence.
But the work did not stop in 1800. The land laws’ underlying fiction remained a
fiction: as the United States expanded westward across the continent, incorporating new
regions obtained through purchase and through force, Anglo-Americans never found the
vacant land of their imagination. Everywhere they went, federal officials discovered that
the lands they now claimed were part of the United States already had owners—Natives
asserting complicated rights under Native law, but also landholders and purchasers whose
title traced to a snarl of law and custom established under the continent’s earlier Spanish,
On the numbers of real property cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, see. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change:
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French, British, and Mexican sovereigns. The tangle of these rights in places like
Mississippi, Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, let alone California and New Mexico, far
eclipsed the challenges that had baffled St. Clair and Sargent in Vincennes. But these
land rights were ultimately resolved the same way: through the precedent of federal
administrative adjudications first adopted, almost thoughtlessly, in the Illinois Country.3
There was also another, more abstract legacy of the struggles over the territories.
The state cessions had started, but did not finish, the process of creating the federal public
domain. As the history of the 1780s and 1790s shows, there was nothing inevitable or
natural about federal control over western lands. In taking the vague promises of the
Northwest Ordinance as clear consensus, historians have ignored how deeply rooted state
ownership of the public domain remained for many in the early republic. “The lands
within the United States are holden of the individual states, and not of the United States,”
Representative Giles of Virginia, later a key architect of Ohio’s admission, stated in
Congress in 1791. And in fact, whether formally, as in the Virginia Military District, or
de facto, as with all of Tennessee, state ownership of ostensibly federal lands was
common. This precedent could, and nearly did, become the model that governed
westward expansion. Instead, the federal government met at least partial success in
beating back arguments for state ownership when Tennessee and Ohio gained statehood.
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Nothing was definitively settled: there was a good deal left to fight about, as the later, and
ongoing, contentions over sovereignty and title attest. But the precedents and law created
by Tennessee and Ohio’s admissions helped doom efforts to undo the constitutional
settlement that had evolved in the 1790s.4
Struggles continued in Indian affairs as well, as Campbell’s letter indicated.
Knox and others had hoped that the federal government would serve as a neutral arbiter
in the seemingly intractable disputes between Natives and their non-Native neighbors in
the territories. The attempt to fulfill that promise spawned an infrastructure of
superintendents, Indian agents, interpreters, and military and trading posts to stand
between the two groups. The considerable flow of federal funds and Indian “presents”
westward also had some effect. Ironically prompted by Native power, this largesse,
though a blunt and often ineffective implement of federal policy, worked to make
formerly “independent” Native nations like the Cherokees seem dependent on the federal
government, at least to the eyes of outsiders like David Campbell. As Natives found
themselves an increasingly administered, they became arguably the first people within the
United States to confront the thicket of federal bureaucrats that would later develop into
the administrative state. In the process, Native and federal authority became inextricably
entangled; though Natives understood the divide all too well, it was increasingly hard for
people like Campbell to separate Native and federal sovereignty.5
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5
On the subsequent administration of Indian affairs, see Stephen J Rockwell, Indian Affairs and the Administrative State in the
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States
Government and the American Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); Ronald N. Satz, American Indian Policy in the
Jacksonian Era (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974); Deborah A Rosen, American Indians and State Law: Sovereignty,
Race, and Citizenship, 1790-1880 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007).
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The federal government’s attempt to use law and finance to control its own
citizens proved less effective. Even while the national government controlled the
territories, it could not fully restrain the inhabitants. Notwithstanding their self-serving
denunciations of federal officials’ “improper leanings” in favor of Natives, territorial
citizens proved quite adept at twisting federal power, and securing federal patronage, to
serve their own ends. And, in the Southwest Territory, the prospect of increased power
for local citizens over Indian affairs was a major impetus toward statehood: territorial
citizens had rightly predicted the political influence that an autonomous government and
representation in Congress would grant them.
It was arguably the growing clout of the rising western states, as much as the shift
to the Jeffersonians, that eroded the Washington Administration’s paternalist
humanitarianism in Indian policy over the first half of the nineteenth century. Just as
federal power and Native autonomy became intertwined, states’ rights and Indian
dispossession similarly fused, constituting the core principles of an ascendant Democratic
Party centered in the Old Southwest. By the 1830s, as Daniel Walker Howe observes,
votes on Indian affairs were the strongest predictor of partisan affiliation. As a result,
though the rhetoric and ideas exemplified by Knox never vanished—finding substantial
echoes, for instance, in Marshall’s Cherokee cases—Knox’s successors found themselves
stymied when they sought to follow his precedents. There were simply too many barriers
to enforcing Knox’s legal legacy: hostile and uncooperative state governments, a partisan
and divided Congress, and ultimately a Presidency held by a former federal official from
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the Southwest Territory—Andrew Jackson—who had fought Knox’s program from the
beginning.6
There was a lot more at work here than simply the long shadow of the fights of
the territorial period. Controversies of federal power over land and Indian affairs, though
fierce in former territories like Tennessee, Alabama, Indiana, and Michigan, also raged
hotly in Georgia, which had never been a territory at all. But these struggles also
reflected legacies of the territorial period, particularly in the lingering footprint of a
federal state that had come early and, despite the promises of equal footing with the
original states, never quite left. “[H]appy it would have been for the people of this
Country,” John Sevier told the Tennessee legislature in 1804, in the thick of the fight
over Tennessee’s lands, that “after conquering the savages and supporting our
independence without the aid of the parent,” Tennesseans might have been allowed to
realize “the fruits of our labour.” Instead, the federal government sought to deny the
state “our justly acquired rights,” even as “other States in similar circumstances” received
“without molestation the benifits and rewards of their struggles.”7
Sevier’s rhetoric of self-reliance was a fantasy version of Tennessee’s history, but
one with considerable power: it helped secure Tennessee both ownership and eventually
sovereignty over its lands, once the Cherokees and other Native groups that the
Tennesseans no longer considered nations were removed from the state’s territory. That
both these processes occurred through federal law was irrelevant: a state arguably
6

Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007), 357. On the Marshall cases, see ibid., 413-21; Jill Norgren, The Cherokee Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1996).
7
John Sevier, “Legislative Message,” July 23, 1804, in Messages of the Governors of Tennessee, ed. Robert H. White (Nashville:
Tennessee Historical Commission, 1952), 182-84. Interestingly, in using the term “parent,” Sevier seemed to be referring to North
Carolina as well as to the federal government.
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spawned by the federal government proved a willful and disobedient child, eager to cast
out “the parent” that had nurtured it.

***
In 1940, Tennessee marked the sesquicentennial of the Southwest Territory. It
was a respectable affair, a gathering at Rocky Mount in eastern Tennessee with an
address to two thousand attendees. But it was far outshone by the Northwest Territory’s
sesquicentennial three years earlier. For those celebrations, a “pioneer caravan” of reenactors retraced Rufus Putnam 1787-88 route to found the Ohio Company’s settlement.
Beginning with services at Manasseh Cutler’s church in Ipswich, Massachusetts, they
journeyed in a wagon train to western Pennsylvania, where they chopped down trees to
construct a raft, and, in the spring, they began to float down to the Ohio. En route, the
caravan stopped at towns to perform a pageant entitled “Freedom on the March,” which
depicted eight scenes including the Treaty of Fort McIntosh and the enactment of the
Northwest Ordinance. On April 7, 1938, the convoy reached Marietta, 150 years after
Putnam and his men, where they were reportedly met by Delaware Indians. Everywhere
it went, the caravan caused a tremendous sensation. National radio broadcast updates on
their progress, and hundreds of thousands of people turned out to see the caravan: in the
end, an estimated two million people had come to see the caravan as it passed from
Massachusetts to eastern Ohio.8

8

For the sesquicentennial celebration of the Southwest Territory, see Russell Cherrington Driver, Leslie Rowles Driver: The Fruitful
Prince (Maryville, Tenn. Script Press, 2002), 300 n.839. Letters from the college students serving as re-enactors in the pioneer
caravan appear in Northwest Territory Celebration Letters, 1937-1938, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan. For
accounts of the pageant and caravan by the organizers, see Northwest Territory Celebration Commission, Final Report of the
Northwest Territory Celebration Commission . . . (Marietta, Ohio: Federal Writers’ Project, WPA in Ohio, 1938). An overview of the

486

The contrast between the two celebrations reflected how central the Northwest
Ordinance and the Northwest Territory had become to national and regional identity,
even as Tennessee turned its attention from its territorial interlude to the later illustrious
career of native son Andrew Jackson. But the focus of Northwest Territory Celebration
was not the men in Congress who had crafted the Ordinance, nor the leaders of the Ohio
Company. It was a celebration of the pioneers—the “plain American citizens . . . who
pushed [democratic] government westward across a continent and to eminence among the
nations of the earth.” Amid the speechifying at Marietta was an embrace of the local
pioneer values against the encroaching reach of the New Deal.9
In its celebration of the common man, the “pioneer caravan” reflected the times,
although it differed sharply from the original Ohio Company, whose leaders like
Winthrop Sargent had lacked the common touch. But there was nonetheless an important
parallel between the two. The sesquicentennial celebration of autonomous, democratic
expansion was organized by the Northwest Territory Celebration Commission,
established by congressional resolution. Congress also foot the bill, appropriating
$100,000.10

celebration appears in John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century,
Reprint edition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 126-34.
9
Bodnar, Remaking America, 126-34.
10
Joint Resolution of August 2, 1935, ch. 429, 49 Stat. 511.
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